Landau: Moral Realism: A Defence

[Veritas Aequitas]

Moral Realism: A Defence
Russ Shafer-Landau

Moral Realism is a systematic defence of the idea that there are objective moral standards. Russ Shafer-Landau argues that there are moral principles that are true independently of what anyone, anywhere, happens to think of them. His central thesis, as well as the many novel supporting arguments used to defend it, will spark much controversy among those concerned with the foundations of ethics. - Amazon

CONTENTS
# Introduction 1
PART I: REALISM AND ITS CRITICS
1. The Non-cognitivist Challenge 13
I. What Moral realism Is 13
II. The Non-cognitivist Challenge 18
III. A Critique of Non-cognitivism 22
IV. Conclusion 37

2. The Constructivist Challenge 39
I. Subjectivism and Objectivism 39
II. Moral and Non-Moral Constraints 41
III. Four Constructivist Critiques 44
IV. Conclusion 51

PART II: MORAL METAPHYSICS
3. Ethical Non-naturalism 55
I. Moore's Argument 56
II. Naturalism and Non-naturalism 58
III. Against Classical Naturalism 65
IV. Non-naturalistic Metaphysics 72
V. Conclusion 79

4. Supervenience and Causation 80
I. Metaphysical Worries 80
II. The First Supervenience Argument 84
III. The Second Supervenience Argument 89
IV. The Causal Argument 98
V. Conclusion 114

PART III: MORAL MOTIVATION
5. Motivational Humeanism 119
I. The Non-cognitivist Argument 119
II. The Attractions of Anti-Humeanism 122
III. Five Humean Arguments 127
IV. Conclusion 140

6. Motivational Judgement Internalism 142
I. A Taxonomy of Internalisms 142
II. The AMoralist 145
III. An Objection 147
IV. The Examples 148
V. Internalist Worries 155
VI. Conclusion 161

PART IV: MORAL REASONS
7. Reasons internalism 165
I. The Scope of Practical reason 165
II. Varieties of Reasons internalism 171
III. Arguments for Reasons internalism 176
IV. Two Arguments against Internalism 185
V. Conclusion 188

8. Moral rationalism 190
I. Realism and Rationalism 190
II. A Presumptive Argument for Moral rationalism 192
III. Four Anti-rationalist Arguments 193
IV. Partners in Crime 209
V. Conclusion 211

9. Rationality and Disagreement 215
I. The Argument from Disagreement 215
II. Explaining Actual Disagreement 218
III. Explaining Hypothesized Disagreement 221
IV. Conclusion 227
CONTENTS ix

PART V: MORAL KNOWLEDGE
10. Moral Scepticism 231
I. The Master Argument 231
II. Realism and Epistemic Inaccessibility 232
III. Four Sceptical Arguments 235
IV. Believing Where We Cannot Prove 241
V. Conclusion 245

11. The Justification of Moral principles 247
I. The Appeal to Self-evidence 247
II. Objections to Self-evidence 250
III. Conclusion 265

12. The Justification of Verdictive beliefs 267
I. Three Models of Ethical Theory 267
II. Moral reliabilism 272
III. Objections to Moral reliabilism 275
IV. Identifying Reliable Processes: Some Preliminaries 293
V. Identifying Reliable Processes: The Role of Exemplars 296
VI. Conclusion 300

# References 303
# Index

How could the Moral law be something not of our own making, something whose truth did not depend on the commitments of those who are bound by its dictates?
Answering this question is the project I have set myself in this book.
If success is possible on this front, it will take the form of an adequate defence of Moral realism.
Moral realism is the theory that Moral judgements enjoy a special sort of objectivity:
such judgements, when true, are so independently of what any human being, anywhere, in any circumstance whatever, thinks of them.

I defend the rationalist thesis in Chapter 8. 143
I reject Humeanism, and am proposing to reject Internalism as well. 147

I believe that a reliabilist theory can help us in this matter.
In what follows, I lay out the rudiments of a reliabilist theory of epistemic warrant and apply it to verdictive Moral beliefs.
I develop the view largely in response to foreseeable criticisms, and try to show how reliabilism offers a promising strategy for solving a very difficult epistemological problem

I agree with Landau's theme:
"Russ Shafer-Landau argues that there are moral principles that are true independently of what anyone, anywhere, happens to think of them" i.e. there is moral realism and morality is objective.
but I do NOT agree with all the approaches he relied upon in his book.

Discuss??
Views??

eta: I do NOT agree ..

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes:

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes:

Previously the counters against Moral Realism were against the arrogant authority from the dominant religion who insist moral commands are objective and cannot be compromised because they are from an independent omnipotent God.

However, in our modern era there are new non-religious related views on Moral Realism, I have introduced some including this one as below; there are more..

Boyd: How to be a Moral Realist
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29683

Sayre-McCord: Essays on Moral Realism
viewtopic.php?t=42479

Landau: Moral Realism: A Defence
viewtopic.php?t=42498

Moral Naturalism - re Moral Realism and Moral Objectivity
viewtopic.php?t=42444&sid=261b37d3d2b53 ... e1a3f81a98

I believe the concept of Moral-Realism-proper is critical for the moral progress of humanity which in the past has been stifled and hindered by moral relativism, moral skepticism [nihilism] and theism.

[Iwannaplato]

I agree with Landau's theme:
"Russ Shafer-Landau argues that there are moral principles that are true independently of what anyone, anywhere, happens to think of them" i.e. there is moral realism and morality is objective.
but I do agree with all the approaches he relied upon in his book.

Discuss??
Views??

1) I would guess you left out a 'don't' .
Otherwise the 'but' is strange and also you would be agreeing with a kind of p-realism.
2) This thread doesn't really go beyond 'Hey, I found another person who believes in objective morals.'

If you want the debate to move somewhere, give us one of his arguments in your own words. Best integrating with some other points you've made which were not previously accepted.

What you've done so far is just an implicit appeal to authority.