I had classified Henry's view as Moral Intuitionism, i.e. his views are intuitive, i.e. without verified and justified proofs.
However, upon deeper reflection that is not the case, rather Henry's view is more to Moral Sentimentalism or Moral Sense which is promoted by Hume, Adam Smith, Hutcheson and the like.
Here's ChatGpt [with reservation] relieving me of a lot of effort in researching and explaining:
ChatGpt: [with reservation]Question:
Re: Moral Intuitionism.
My understanding is the above relates to the typical dictionary definition of "intuition".
However I read from Robert Cowan article:
https://eprints.gla.ac.uk/100674/8/100674.pdf
"Despite the moniker, intuitionism does not require the view that intuition (whatever that may be) is the source of all justified ethical belief and knowledge1.
Here is the core claim:
Ethical Intuitionism (EI): normal ethical agents can and do have noninferentially justified first-order ethical beliefs2.
Although this is the standard formulation (an analogous formulation can be given for
knowledge), there are two senses in which EI is importantly incomplete as a statement of
ethical intuitionism. Firstly, EI claims that there are non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs, but there is a worrying lack of consensus in the ethical literature as to what non-inferentially justified belief amounts to, e.g., differing accounts from Sinnott-Armstrong (2006), Audi (2008). Secondly, it has been overlooked that there are plausibly different types of noninferential justification, and that accounting for the existence of a specific sort of noninferential justification is crucial for any adequate ethical intuitionist epistemology. "
It seem Cowan is not relating Moral Intuitionism to the dictionary definition of "intuition".
Please explain the above difference between Cowan's sense of 'intuition" and the dictionary definition of "intuition" [ re Cowan's "whatever it is"].
What is morality that is based on Gut Feelings or Instinct?ChatGpt wrote:Robert Cowan, in the passage you've quoted, is discussing Ethical Intuitionism (EI) and makes it clear that when philosophers talk about "intuition" in the context of ethical intuitionism, they aren't necessarily referring to the everyday understanding of the term. Let's break down the key points.
Ethical Intuitionism (EI): Cowan defines Ethical Intuitionism as the claim that normal ethical agents can and do have noninferentially justified first-order ethical beliefs. "Noninferentially justified" means that these ethical beliefs are not derived from or based on other beliefs through logical inference.
Non-inferential Justification: The term "intuition" in the context of EI does not necessarily align with the colloquial understanding of intuition as a gut feeling or instinct. Instead, it refers to a form of non-inferential justification. Non-inferential justification means that the belief is justified independently of any other beliefs—it doesn't rely on reasoning or inference from other beliefs.
Variability in Understanding: Cowan points out a lack of consensus in the ethical literature regarding what exactly counts as non-inferentially justified belief. Different philosophers may have different accounts or definitions of this concept.
Types of Non-inferential Justification: Cowan suggests that there are plausibly different types of non-inferential justification. In other words, not all non-inferential justifications are the same. He argues that understanding and accounting for these different types is crucial for developing a comprehensive ethical intuitionist epistemology (the study of how knowledge is acquired).
So, the difference between Cowan's sense of "intuition" and the dictionary definition of "intuition" lies in the specialized and technical use of the term within the context of ethical philosophy. In this context, "intuition" refers to a specific kind of non-inferential justification for ethical beliefs, and philosophers may have different views on what this entails. It's a more nuanced and technical concept than the everyday notion of intuition.
If "EI" is not based on the colloquial understanding of intuition as a gut feeling or instinct, then, how and what sort of morality can we refer to where morality agents rely on gut feeling or instinct that there are moral truths or facts? Please give references if any.
What about, if the moral agent is not a typical-philosopher [e.g. academic]?ChatGPT
The idea that individuals might rely on gut feelings or instincts to discern moral truths or facts aligns more closely with moral sentimentalism or moral sense theory rather than ethical intuitionism as described by Cowan. These theories propose that our moral judgments are rooted in emotions, sentiments, or an innate moral sense rather than a rational, non-inferential process.
Moral Sentimentalism: This approach suggests that moral judgments are expressions of our emotions or sentiments toward certain actions or situations. Philosophers like David Hume and Adam Smith are often associated with moral sentimentalism. According to Hume, our moral judgments arise from sentiments of approval or disapproval that we feel in response to actions.
Moral Sense Theory: This theory posits that humans have an inherent moral sense that allows them to perceive moral truths directly. Francis Hutcheson and some aspects of the moral philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment are associated with moral sense theory. It suggests that just as we have senses like sight or hearing that allow us to perceive physical facts, we have a moral sense that allows us to perceive moral facts.
References:
Hume, D. (1739). "A Treatise of Human Nature."
Smith, A. (1759). "The Theory of Moral Sentiments."
Hutcheson, F. (1725). "An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue."
It's important to note that these theories, while related, have nuances and differences. Moral sentimentalism and moral sense theory often involve a more direct connection between emotions or innate senses and moral judgments, which might be described as a kind of "gut feeling" about what is morally right or wrong.
In contrast, ethical intuitionism, as described by Cowan, emphasizes non-inferential justification but may not necessarily be tied to emotional responses or an innate moral sense. Instead, it focuses on the idea that some moral beliefs can be justified independently of reasoning from other beliefs.
What about the typical layperson [non-philosopher] who just believe based on his intuition and instinct there are moral truths? Does that fit into Sentimentalism or Moral Sense Theory?
Discuss?? Views.ChatGPT
The typical layperson who believes in moral truths based on intuition and instinct might find their perspective aligning more closely with moral sentimentalism or moral sense theory. Here's why:
Moral Sentimentalism: If someone believes in moral truths because they feel a strong emotional response or sentiment toward certain actions or situations, their perspective is consistent with moral sentimentalism. For example, if a person condemns an act because it "feels wrong" or approves of another act because it "feels right," they are relying on their emotional responses as the basis for their moral judgments.
Moral Sense Theory: Similarly, if a layperson believes in moral truths because they sense them directly, without relying on elaborate reasoning, this aligns with moral sense theory. The idea is that individuals possess an innate moral sense that allows them to perceive moral facts directly, much like our senses allow us to perceive the physical world.
In both cases, the emphasis is on a direct and immediate connection between personal feelings, instincts, or senses and moral judgments. These perspectives suggest that moral beliefs can be grounded in these more immediate and less reflective processes.
It's worth noting that these theories are not mutually exclusive, and an individual might draw on elements from both. Additionally, these theories are frameworks used by philosophers to understand and explain different aspects of moral reasoning; laypeople may not explicitly adhere to any particular philosophical framework when forming their moral beliefs.
