Philosophy Now Forum

Hume’s view on external objects is that the mind is programmed to form some concept of the external world, although this concept or idea is really just a fabrication. (1)

Hume’s skeptical claim here is that we have no valid conception of the existence of external things (Treatise, 1.2.6.9). (2)
Nevertheless, he argues that we have an unavoidable “vulgar” or common belief in the continued existence of objects, and this idea he accounts for.

His explanation is lengthy, but involves the following features.
Perceptions of objects are disjointed and have no unity in and of themselves (Treatise, 1.4.2.29).
In an effort to organize our perceptions, we first naturally assume that there is no distinction between our perceptions and the objects that are perceived (this is the so-called “vulgar” view of perception).
We then conflate all ideas (of perceptions), which put our minds in similar dispositions (Treatise, 1.4.2.33); that is, we associate resembling ideas and attribute identity to their causes.
Consequently, we naturally invent the continued and external existence of the objects (or perceptions) that produced these ideas (Treatise, 1.4.2.35).
Lastly, we go on to believe in the existence of these objects because of the force of the resemblance between ideas (Treatise, 1.4.2.36).

Although this belief is philosophically unjustified, Hume feels he has given an accurate account of how we inevitably arrive at the idea of external existence. (3)
In contrast to the previous explanation of this idea, he recommends that we doubt a more sophisticated but erroneous notion of existence—the so-called philosophical view—which distinguishes between perceptions and the external objects that cause perceptions.

The psychological motivation for accepting this view is this: our imagination tells us that resembling perceptions have a continued existence, yet our reflection tells us that they are interrupted.
Appealing to both forces, we ascribe interruption to perceptions and continuance to objects (Treatise, 1.4.2.52).

https://iep.utm.edu/hume/#SH3d

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Thu Sep 14, 2023 8:37 am What's the difference between 'absolutely mind indenpendent reality' and
'mind independent reality.'?
If something is mind indenpendent, then it doesn't depend on minds. It's not partially indepdentdent.
So what gets added when you write 'absolutely.?

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Sep 14, 2023 7:53 am As I had claimed the philosophical realists' dogmatic and ideological claim of an absolutely mind-independent reality and things to the extent the moon pre-existed humans and will continue to exist even after humans are extinct, is grounded on an illusion.

Why philosophical realists cling to the idea of an absolutely mind independent reality is driven by an evolutionary default, thus based on a psychological impulse.

Here is Hume's view on the same issue;

Hume’s view on external objects is that the mind is programmed to form some concept of the external world, although this concept or idea is really just a fabrication. (1)

Hume’s skeptical claim here is that we have no valid conception of the existence of external things (Treatise, 1.2.6.9). (2)
Nevertheless, he argues that we have an unavoidable “vulgar” or common belief in the continued existence of objects, and this idea he accounts for.

His explanation is lengthy, but involves the following features.
Perceptions of objects are disjointed and have no unity in and of themselves (Treatise, 1.4.2.29).
In an effort to organize our perceptions, we first naturally assume that there is no distinction between our perceptions and the objects that are perceived (this is the so-called “vulgar” view of perception).
We then conflate all ideas (of perceptions), which put our minds in similar dispositions (Treatise, 1.4.2.33); that is, we associate resembling ideas and attribute identity to their causes.
Consequently, we naturally invent the continued and external existence of the objects (or perceptions) that produced these ideas (Treatise, 1.4.2.35).
Lastly, we go on to believe in the existence of these objects because of the force of the resemblance between ideas (Treatise, 1.4.2.36).

Although this belief is philosophically unjustified, Hume feels he has given an accurate account of how we inevitably arrive at the idea of external existence. (3)
In contrast to the previous explanation of this idea, he recommends that we doubt a more sophisticated but erroneous notion of existence—the so-called philosophical view—which distinguishes between perceptions and the external objects that cause perceptions.

The psychological motivation for accepting this view is this: our imagination tells us that resembling perceptions have a continued existence, yet our reflection tells us that they are interrupted.
Appealing to both forces, we ascribe interruption to perceptions and continuance to objects (Treatise, 1.4.2.52).

https://iep.utm.edu/hume/#SH3d

Views?

Sculptor wrote: ↑Thu Sep 14, 2023 10:56 am

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Sep 14, 2023 7:53 am As I had claimed the philosophical realists' dogmatic and ideological claim of an absolutely mind-independent reality and things to the extent the moon pre-existed humans and will continue to exist even after humans are extinct, is grounded on an illusion.

Why philosophical realists cling to the idea of an absolutely mind independent reality is driven by an evolutionary default, thus based on a psychological impulse.

Here is Hume's view on the same issue;

Hume’s view on external objects is that the mind is programmed to form some concept of the external world, although this concept or idea is really just a fabrication. (1)

Hume’s skeptical claim here is that we have no valid conception of the existence of external things (Treatise, 1.2.6.9). (2)
Nevertheless, he argues that we have an unavoidable “vulgar” or common belief in the continued existence of objects, and this idea he accounts for.

His explanation is lengthy, but involves the following features.
Perceptions of objects are disjointed and have no unity in and of themselves (Treatise, 1.4.2.29).
In an effort to organize our perceptions, we first naturally assume that there is no distinction between our perceptions and the objects that are perceived (this is the so-called “vulgar” view of perception).
We then conflate all ideas (of perceptions), which put our minds in similar dispositions (Treatise, 1.4.2.33); that is, we associate resembling ideas and attribute identity to their causes.
Consequently, we naturally invent the continued and external existence of the objects (or perceptions) that produced these ideas (Treatise, 1.4.2.35).
Lastly, we go on to believe in the existence of these objects because of the force of the resemblance between ideas (Treatise, 1.4.2.36).

Although this belief is philosophically unjustified, Hume feels he has given an accurate account of how we inevitably arrive at the idea of external existence. (3)
In contrast to the previous explanation of this idea, he recommends that we doubt a more sophisticated but erroneous notion of existence—the so-called philosophical view—which distinguishes between perceptions and the external objects that cause perceptions.

The psychological motivation for accepting this view is this: our imagination tells us that resembling perceptions have a continued existence, yet our reflection tells us that they are interrupted.
Appealing to both forces, we ascribe interruption to perceptions and continuance to objects (Treatise, 1.4.2.52).

https://iep.utm.edu/hume/#SH3d

Views?

As usual you fail to grasp the depth required to understand something like Hume project.

He is never wishing to imply that external reality is "JUST" a fabrication.
It's a cognitive interreptation or fabrication of something we have sensations of.

In this way your in cautious words attempt to denigrate one of the world's greatest thinkers though your superficial and negligent understanding.
You pepper your text with references, but you do not quote.
DO better!

ChatGpt wrote:Hume's philosophy, especially as outlined in his "Treatise of Human Nature," involves complex and nuanced discussions about the nature of our concepts and beliefs, particularly concerning external objects.
The term "fabrication" used in the passage you provided is a reasonable characterization of Hume's perspective when considered within the context of his philosophy.

In Hume's philosophy, he argues that our ideas and beliefs about external objects are not grounded in any direct, indubitable perception of these objects themselves. Instead, he contends that our ideas are based on our sensory perceptions and that we have no immediate or certain knowledge of the external world. In this sense, Hume suggests that our ideas about external objects are constructed or "fabricated" based on our mental processes and the associations we make between perceptions.

Hume's philosophy is often associated with empiricism, which emphasizes the role of sensory experience in shaping our beliefs and ideas. According to Hume, our beliefs about external objects are formed through a series of mental operations, such as association, resemblance, and causation, which lead us to construct the idea of the external world. These mental operations are not direct perceptions of external objects but rather the result of our mental faculties.

So, when the passage you provided states that Hume's view is that the concept or idea of external objects is "really just a fabrication," it is expressing a viewpoint consistent with Hume's philosophy. Hume's goal was to explore the foundations of human knowledge and demonstrate that many of our beliefs, including those about external objects, are based on mental constructs rather than direct, certain perceptions.

However, it's important to note that Hume's views have been a subject of debate and interpretation among philosophers for centuries. Some may interpret his ideas differently or emphasize different aspects of his philosophy.
Nonetheless, characterizing Hume's view as involving the "fabrication" of ideas about external objects is a reasonable and widely accepted interpretation within the context of Humean philosophy.

• For as to the notion of external existence, when taken for something specially different from our perceptions [Part. II. Sect. 6.], we have already shewn its absurdity.
  
  If our senses, therefore, suggest any idea of distinct existences, they must convey the impressions as those very existences, by a kind of fallacy and illusion.
  Treatise 1:4:2

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Fri Sep 15, 2023 4:08 am

Sculptor wrote: ↑Thu Sep 14, 2023 10:56 am

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Sep 14, 2023 7:53 am As I had claimed the philosophical realists' dogmatic and ideological claim of an absolutely mind-independent reality and things to the extent the moon pre-existed humans and will continue to exist even after humans are extinct, is grounded on an illusion.

Why philosophical realists cling to the idea of an absolutely mind independent reality is driven by an evolutionary default, thus based on a psychological impulse.

Here is Hume's view on the same issue;



Views?

As usual you fail to grasp the depth required to understand something like Hume project.

He is never wishing to imply that external reality is "JUST" a fabrication.
It's a cognitive interreptation or fabrication of something we have sensations of.

In this way your in cautious words attempt to denigrate one of the world's greatest thinkers though your superficial and negligent understanding.
You pepper your text with references, but you do not quote.
DO better!

What are you complaining when you have not read Hume's Treatise thoroughly.

The references are given and I have checked with the Treatise.

Here is ChatGpt's [with reservations] view on the issue, which I agree.

ChatGpt wrote:Hume's philosophy, especially as outlined in his "Treatise of Human Nature," involves complex and nuanced discussions about the nature of our concepts and beliefs, particularly concerning external objects.
The term "fabrication" used in the passage you provided is a reasonable characterization of Hume's perspective when considered within the context of his philosophy.

In Hume's philosophy, he argues that our ideas and beliefs about external objects are not grounded in any direct, indubitable perception of these objects themselves. Instead, he contends that our ideas are based on our sensory perceptions and that we have no immediate or certain knowledge of the external world. In this sense, Hume suggests that our ideas about external objects are constructed or "fabricated" based on our mental processes and the associations we make between perceptions.

Hume's philosophy is often associated with empiricism, which emphasizes the role of sensory experience in shaping our beliefs and ideas. According to Hume, our beliefs about external objects are formed through a series of mental operations, such as association, resemblance, and causation, which lead us to construct the idea of the external world. These mental operations are not direct perceptions of external objects but rather the result of our mental faculties.

So, when the passage you provided states that Hume's view is that the concept or idea of external objects is "really just a fabrication," it is expressing a viewpoint consistent with Hume's philosophy. Hume's goal was to explore the foundations of human knowledge and demonstrate that many of our beliefs, including those about external objects, are based on mental constructs rather than direct, certain perceptions.

However, it's important to note that Hume's views have been a subject of debate and interpretation among philosophers for centuries. Some may interpret his ideas differently or emphasize different aspects of his philosophy.
Nonetheless, characterizing Hume's view as involving the "fabrication" of ideas about external objects is a reasonable and widely accepted interpretation within the context of Humean philosophy.

Note 'widely accepted' based on ChatGpt's surveyed of the whole internet.

As usual, you're the ignorant and incompetent one and Ultracrepidarian re Hume.

Nonetheless, characterizing Hume's view as involving the "fabrication" of ideas about external objects is a reasonable and widely accepted interpretation within the context of Humean philosophy.

Sculptor wrote: ↑Fri Sep 15, 2023 8:11 am

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Fri Sep 15, 2023 4:08 am

Sculptor wrote: ↑Thu Sep 14, 2023 10:56 am

As usual you fail to grasp the depth required to understand something like Hume project.

He is never wishing to imply that external reality is "JUST" a fabrication.
It's a cognitive interreptation or fabrication of something we have sensations of.

In this way your in cautious words attempt to denigrate one of the world's greatest thinkers though your superficial and negligent understanding.
You pepper your text with references, but you do not quote.
DO better!

What are you complaining when you have not read Hume's Treatise thoroughly.

The references are given and I have checked with the Treatise.

Here is ChatGpt's [with reservations] view on the issue, which I agree.

ChatGpt wrote:Hume's philosophy, especially as outlined in his "Treatise of Human Nature," involves complex and nuanced discussions about the nature of our concepts and beliefs, particularly concerning external objects.
The term "fabrication" used in the passage you provided is a reasonable characterization of Hume's perspective when considered within the context of his philosophy.

In Hume's philosophy, he argues that our ideas and beliefs about external objects are not grounded in any direct, indubitable perception of these objects themselves. Instead, he contends that our ideas are based on our sensory perceptions and that we have no immediate or certain knowledge of the external world. In this sense, Hume suggests that our ideas about external objects are constructed or "fabricated" based on our mental processes and the associations we make between perceptions.

Hume's philosophy is often associated with empiricism, which emphasizes the role of sensory experience in shaping our beliefs and ideas. According to Hume, our beliefs about external objects are formed through a series of mental operations, such as association, resemblance, and causation, which lead us to construct the idea of the external world. These mental operations are not direct perceptions of external objects but rather the result of our mental faculties.

So, when the passage you provided states that Hume's view is that the concept or idea of external objects is "really just a fabrication," it is expressing a viewpoint consistent with Hume's philosophy. Hume's goal was to explore the foundations of human knowledge and demonstrate that many of our beliefs, including those about external objects, are based on mental constructs rather than direct, certain perceptions.

However, it's important to note that Hume's views have been a subject of debate and interpretation among philosophers for centuries. Some may interpret his ideas differently or emphasize different aspects of his philosophy.
Nonetheless, characterizing Hume's view as involving the "fabrication" of ideas about external objects is a reasonable and widely accepted interpretation within the context of Humean philosophy.

Note 'widely accepted' based on ChatGpt's surveyed of the whole internet.

As usual, you're the ignorant and incompetent one and Ultracrepidarian re Hume.

You have given someone elses' POV, and references. You have not read the Tresise or Enquiry. Nor have you "checked" them

• Treatise
  BOOK I OF THE UNDERSTANDING
  PART II. OF THE IDEAS OF SPACE AND TIME,
  SECT. VI. OF THE IDEA OF EXISTENCE, AND OF EXTERNAL EXISTENCE.
  PART IV. OF THE SCEPTICAL AND OTHER SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY.
  SECT. II. OF SCEPTICISM WITH REGARD TO THE SENSES.

• Here are a few quotes from the Treatise to support the OP;
  For as to the notion of external existence, when taken for something specially different from our perceptions [Part. II. Sect. 6.], we have already shewn its absurdity.
  
  If our senses, therefore, suggest any idea of distinct existences, they must convey the impressions as those very existences, by a kind of fallacy and illusion.
  Treatise 1:4:2

Sculptor wrote: ↑Fri Sep 15, 2023 8:11 am

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Fri Sep 15, 2023 4:08 am You pepper your text with references, but you do not quote.

You have given someone elses' POV, and references. You have not read the Treatise or Enquiry. Nor have you "checked" them

Here is the whole section from Hume's Treatise;
( I have parsed it for easy reading)
The other section re Skepticism of external reality is too long to post here.

"Quote
BOOK I OF THE UNDERSTANDING
PART II. OF THE IDEAS OF SPACE AND TIME,
SECT. VI. OF THE IDEA OF EXISTENCE, AND OF EXTERNAL EXISTENCE.

It may not be amiss, before we leave this subject, to explain the ideas of existence and of external existence; which have their difficulties, as well as the ideas of space and time.
By this means we shall be the better prepared for the examination of knowledge and probability, when we understand perfectly all those particular ideas, which may enter into our reasoning.

There is no impression nor idea of any kind, of which we have any consciousness or memory, that is not conceived as existent; and it is evident, that from this consciousness the most perfect idea and assurance of being is derived.
From hence we may form a dilemma, the most clear and conclusive that can be imagined, viz. that since we never remember any idea or impression without attributing existence to it, the idea of existence must either be derived from a distinct impression, conjoined with every perception or object of our thought, or must be the very same with the idea of the perception or object.

As this dilemma is an evident consequence of the principle, that every idea arises from a similar impression, so our decision betwixt the propositions of the dilemma is no more doubtful.
go far from there being any distinct impression, attending every impression and every idea, that I do not think there are any two distinct impressions, which are inseparably conjoined.
Though certain sensations may at one time be united, we quickly find they admit of a separation, and may be presented apart.
And thus, though every impression and idea we remember be considered as existent, the idea of existence is not derived from any particular impression.

The idea of existence, then, is the very same with the idea of what we conceive to be existent.
To reflect on any thing simply, and to reflect on it as existent, are nothing different from each other.
That idea, when conjoined with the idea of any object, makes no addition to it.
Whatever we conceive, we conceive to be existent.
Any idea we please to form is the idea of a being; and the idea of a being is any idea we please to form.

Whoever opposes this, must necessarily point out that distinct impression, from which the idea of entity is derived, and must prove, that this impression is inseparable from every perception we believe to be existent.
This we may without hesitation conclude to be impossible.

Our foregoing reasoning [Part I. Sect. 7.] concerning the distinction of ideas without any real difference will not here serve us in any stead.
That kind of distinction is founded on the different resemblances, which the same simple idea may have to several different ideas.
But no object can be presented resembling some object with respect to its existence, and different from others in the same particular; since every object, that is presented, must necessarily be existent.

A like reasoning will account for the idea of external existence.
We may observe, that it is universally allowed by philosophers, and is besides pretty obvious of itself, that nothing is ever really present with the mind but its perceptions or impressions and ideas, and that external objects become known to us only by those perceptions they occasion.
To hate, to love, to think, to feel, to see; all this is nothing but to perceive.

Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and
since all ideas are derived from something antecedently present to the mind;
it follows, that it is impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically different from ideas and impressions.
Let us fix our attention out of ourselves as much as possible: Let us chase our imagination to the heavens, or to the utmost limits of the universe; we never really advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can conceive any kind of existence, but those perceptions, which have appeared in that narrow compass.
This is the universe of the imagination, nor have we any idea but what is there produced.

The farthest we can go towards a conception of external objects, when supposed SPECIFICALLY different from our perceptions, is to form a relative idea of them, without pretending to comprehend the related objects.
Generally speaking we do not suppose them specifically different; but only attribute to them different relations, connections and durations.
But of this more fully hereafter.[Part IV, Sect. 2.]
" Unqote

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Fri Sep 15, 2023 9:52 am

Nonetheless, characterizing Hume's view as involving the "fabrication" of ideas about external objects is a reasonable and widely accepted interpretation within the context of Humean philosophy.

So, chatgpt is saying that we fabricate the ideas about external reality. The ideas about something are fabricated. That is, created/made. The ideas. That's not saying the external world is a fabrication. In fact, if anything, that sentence implies there is an external world. Further, it would mean that your idea that there is no external world, is also fabricated.

I fabricated a text about VA.
Here it is. VA is tall.
I made/created/fabricated that text about VA.
Saying I fabricated a text about/an idea about VA, does not mean that he doesn't exist.
In fact I am pretty sure you do exist.

And let's remember: if Hume is talking about everybody's thoughts and ideas about reality, his generalization is a fabrication. IOW everyone else's thoughts/ideas are external to him.

YET, despite this, he is saying those ideas and conceptions are like this and not that.

That is a problem if he is claiming we must be wrong. Because then he must be wrong. Further, he is talking about things - our thoughts and fabrications - that are part of his external world.

And he seems to think they exist AND his fabrications are correct about these things that are external to him.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sat Sep 16, 2023 4:43 am Note the above and section I posted from Hume
SECT. VI. OF THE IDEA OF EXISTENCE, AND OF EXTERNAL EXISTENCE.

If you have read Hume's Treatise and Enquiry thoroughly, you would have understood Hume's intention related to 'idea'.

What Hume asserted is that the realist's belief that there is a reality and things existing as absolutely mind-independent or perception independent is an illusion and a fabrication.

Hume is a hardcore empiricist, thus what is real to him is 100% conditioned upon the empirical, i.e. experience and not on relation-of-ideas.
Since Hume's reality is grounded on the empirical, it has to be human-conditioned thus cannot be absolutely mind independent or perception independent.

To Hume there is no thoughts, ideas or real things that are external to humans as mind-independent or perception independent.

Philosophically, Hume is an ANTI-Philosophical_Realist.

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Sat Sep 16, 2023 7:01 am

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sat Sep 16, 2023 4:43 am Note the above and section I posted from Hume
SECT. VI. OF THE IDEA OF EXISTENCE, AND OF EXTERNAL EXISTENCE.

If you have read Hume's Treatise and Enquiry thoroughly, you would have understood Hume's intention related to 'idea'.

So far, you are just posturing. We disagree. Fine. But you focus, ad hom, on me and what you think I have or have not done.

What Hume asserted is that the realist's belief that there is a reality and things existing as absolutely mind-independent or perception independent is an illusion and a fabrication.

I responded to what was in the post. You are just reasserting your position, so far without interacting with anything I said.

Hume is a hardcore empiricist, thus what is real to him is 100% conditioned upon the empirical, i.e. experience and not on relation-of-ideas.
Since Hume's reality is grounded on the empirical, it has to be human-conditioned thus cannot be absolutely mind independent or perception independent.

Irrelevant.

To Hume there is no thoughts, ideas or real things that are external to humans as mind-independent or perception independent.

Perhaps that's true, but you are still not responding to either of the main points I made. YOu have not interacted at all with what I wrote. Perhaps you didn't understand it. Perhaps I could have been more clear. If you actually interact with what I wrote, instead of reasserting your position, we might find that out.

Philosophically, Hume is an ANTI-Philosophical_Realist.

Again, that doesn't matter. You did not respond to single point or issue I raise.
You reasserted your positions.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sat Sep 16, 2023 7:20 am That is not an ad hom.
You have misrepresented Hume's view of what is idea with your own 'what is idea'.
I believe you have not read Hume's work thoroughly else you would have quoted what Hume meant by idea and his view of external reality.

What Hume asserted is that the realist's belief that there is a reality and things existing as absolutely mind-independent or perception independent is an illusion and a fabrication.

Since I believe your views are off tangent, I don't want to waste time on that.

This is the reason why I presented what is Hume's view to get back to topic.