Sculptor wrote: ↑Fri Sep 15, 2023 8:11 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Fri Sep 15, 2023 4:08 am
You pepper your text with references, but you do not quote.
You have given someone elses' POV, and references. You have not read the Treatise or Enquiry. Nor have you "checked" them
Here is the whole section from Hume's Treatise;
( I have parsed it for easy reading)
The other section re Skepticism of external reality is too long to post here.
"Quote
BOOK I OF THE UNDERSTANDING
PART II. OF THE IDEAS OF SPACE AND TIME,
SECT. VI. OF THE IDEA OF EXISTENCE, AND OF EXTERNAL EXISTENCE.
It may not be amiss, before we leave this subject, to explain the ideas of existence and of
external existence; which have their difficulties, as well as the ideas of space and time.
By this means we shall be the better prepared for the examination of knowledge and probability, when we understand perfectly all those particular ideas, which may enter into our reasoning.
There is no impression nor idea of any kind, of which we have any consciousness or memory, that is not conceived as existent; and it is evident, that from this consciousness the most perfect idea and assurance of being is derived.
From hence we may form a dilemma, the most clear and conclusive that can be imagined, viz. that since we never remember any idea or impression without attributing existence to it, the idea of existence must either be derived from a distinct impression, conjoined with every perception or object of our thought, or must be the very same with the idea of the perception or object.
As this dilemma is an evident consequence of the principle, that every idea arises from a similar impression, so our decision betwixt the propositions of the dilemma is no more doubtful.
go far from there being any distinct impression, attending every impression and every idea, that I do not think there are any two distinct impressions, which are inseparably conjoined.
Though certain sensations may at one time be united, we quickly find they admit of a separation, and may be presented apart.
And thus, though every impression and idea we remember be considered as existent, the idea of existence is not derived from any particular impression.
The idea of existence, then, is the very same with the idea of what we conceive to be existent.
To reflect on any thing simply, and to reflect on it as existent, are nothing different from each other.
That idea, when conjoined with the idea of any object, makes no addition to it.
Whatever we conceive, we conceive to be existent.
Any idea we please to form is the idea of a being; and the idea of a being is any idea we please to form.
Whoever opposes this, must necessarily point out that distinct impression, from which the idea of entity is derived, and must prove, that this impression is inseparable from every perception we believe to be existent.
This we may without hesitation conclude to be impossible.
Our foregoing reasoning [Part I. Sect. 7.] concerning the distinction of ideas without any real difference will not here serve us in any stead.
That kind of distinction is founded on the different resemblances, which the same simple idea may have to several different ideas.
But no object can be presented resembling some object with respect to its existence, and different from others in the same particular; since every object, that is presented, must necessarily be existent.
A like reasoning will account for the idea of external existence.
We may observe, that it is universally allowed by philosophers, and is besides pretty obvious of itself, that nothing is ever really present with the mind but its perceptions or impressions and ideas, and that external objects become known to us only by those perceptions they occasion.
To hate, to love, to think, to feel, to see; all this is nothing but to perceive.
Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and
since all ideas are derived from something antecedently present to the mind;
it follows, that it is impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically different from ideas and impressions.
Let us fix our attention out of ourselves as much as possible: Let us chase our imagination to the heavens, or to the utmost limits of the universe; we never really advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can conceive any kind of existence, but those perceptions, which have appeared in that narrow compass.
This is the universe of the imagination, nor have we any idea but what is there produced.
The farthest we can go towards a conception of external objects, when supposed SPECIFICALLY different from our perceptions, is to form a relative idea of them, without pretending to comprehend the related objects.
Generally speaking we do not suppose them specifically different; but only attribute to them different relations, connections and durations.
But of this more fully hereafter.[Part IV, Sect. 2.]
" Unqote
