Rational Desires vs Empirical Desires

Should you think about your duty, or about the consequences of your actions? Or should you concentrate on becoming a good person?

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Veritas Aequitas
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Rational Desires vs Empirical Desires

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Peter Holmes wrote: Fri Oct 09, 2020 12:02 pm So, according to Hurthouse, '
  • The conclusions of ethical naturalism can be arrived at only from within an acquired ethical outlook, not from a scientific account of human nature.

    If so, your claim that there are moral facts inherent in human nature is false.

    And if this supposed 'acquired ethical outlook' depends 'on our interests and desires', then it is subjective. It's a fact that we have interests and desires, from which our moral values and judgements emerge. But that doesn't mean those values and judgements are objective - matters of fact, independent from opinion.

    Same mistake, over and over again.
In the above Peter Holmes hastily jumped to conclusion that
"if this supposed 'acquired ethical outlook' depends 'on our interests and desires', then it is subjective."

The above is due to the ignorance of the concept of Rational Desires/Interest versus Empirical Desires.

Within the Philosophy of Morality, there is a distinction between
empirical desire, which results from a sensation of pleasure accompanying an object, and
rational desire, which arises from volitional choice, and produces pleasure in the representation of the object.

Where moral judgments are strongly and solely motivated and driven by Empirical Desires and inclinations, that is where they are considered subjective to one's personal beliefs and opinions.

As Kant had stated and implied, empirical desires and inclinations has a strong propensity to trigger one to radical evil when one's moral competence and strength of virtue is weak.

However, in morality proper what is proper is to invoke Rational Desires and interests in realizing moral facts [with justifications] and aligning one's self and moral judgment to these moral facts.
Peter Holmes
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Re: Rational Desires vs Empirical Desires

Post by Peter Holmes »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun Oct 11, 2020 7:40 am
... in morality proper what is proper is to invoke Rational Desires and interests in realizing moral facts [with justifications] and aligning one's self and moral judgment to these moral facts.
1 What you call 'morality proper' is your own invention.
2 The claim that there's such a thing as rational as opposed to irrational desire begs questions. And anyway, is it a fact that we ought to invoke rational desire - or is that a matter of opinion? (This is rehashed Aristotle.)
3 The expression 'realizing a moral fact' is gobbledygook.
4 Initially capitalising words doesn't turn them into proper nouns with actually existing referents.
Veritas Aequitas
Posts: 15722
Joined: Wed Jul 11, 2012 4:41 am

Re: Rational Desires vs Empirical Desires

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Peter Holmes wrote: Sun Oct 11, 2020 8:55 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun Oct 11, 2020 7:40 am
... in morality proper what is proper is to invoke Rational Desires and interests in realizing moral facts [with justifications] and aligning one's self and moral judgment to these moral facts.
1 What you call 'morality proper' is your own invention.
There is nothing wrong with giving the emphasis 'proper' to 'morality' because the term 'morality' is a very loose term.
'Morality-proper' meant what is morality in truth and in the realistic perspective.

As a require of intellectual integrity I have to define what I meant by 'morality-proper' i.e.
here is my definition;
viewtopic.php?p=469799#p469799

A definition even "proper" is not sufficient, it must be accompanied by its Framework and System of Knowledge which I won't into here other than the Moral FSK is similar to the Scientific FSK.
2 The claim that there's such a thing as rational as opposed to irrational desire begs questions. And anyway, is it a fact that we ought to invoke rational desire - or is that a matter of opinion? (This is rehashed Aristotle.)
There you go with your rhetoric and deception.
Where did I ever state or imply 'irrational desire' in any way.
The difference here is not between 'rational' and 'irrational' but didn't you read I the OP, i.e. "Rational Desires vs Empirical Desires."

There is no question of 'ought' in this case - which I had asserted and supported - is a trivial issue within morality & ethics.

The topic of 'rational desires' is more than Aristotle's views.

If you are relying on Hume's downplay of "reasoning" in terms of morality/ethics within human nature, note Hume was very ignorant of the full perspective of human reason within the brain and mind.

Here is one clue;
The Evolution of Reason: Logic as a Branch of Biology
The formal systems of logic have ordinarily been regarded as independent of biology, but recent developments in evolutionary theory suggest that biology and logic may be intimately interrelated. In this book, William S. Cooper outlines a theory of rationality in which logical law emerges as an intrinsic aspect of evolutionary biology. He examines the connections between logic and evolutionary biology and illustrates how logical rules are derived directly from evolutionary principles, and therefore, have no independent status of their own. This biological perspective on logic, though at present unorthodox, could change traditional ideas about the reasoning process.
Link:

Hume thought the passions and emotions precede and are independent from all reason-based thoughts and actions within morality and ethics.
The above [as modern neurosciences, etc.] proved Hume was wrong.
As proven, the fundamentals of 'reason' is primal which is parallel to that of the passions, thus they worked complementarily and none of [reason nor passion] dominate the other.

This point opened a pandora-box of knowledge you will need to research into.
So DONT bank too much on the ignorance of an 18th-century-Hume in terms of such knowledge related to neurosciences, neuropsychology, evolutionary psychology, the likes.
3 The expression 'realizing a moral fact' is gobbledygook.
What is the problem of realizing the existence of a fact, e.g. realizing the Sun exists or whatever of reality exists. Obviously "realizing" is more effective than "knowing" in this case in relation to facts of reality.
Thus moral facts exist and they are realized by those who are able to confirm their real existence with its respective referent.
4 Initially capitalising words doesn't turn them into proper nouns with actually existing referents.
Surprised you are jumping on this.
Capitalizing those words in the OP is characteristic of how they are done in a Title and that I did the same later is merely to emphasize them just in case you deliberately ignore the terms.
Despite my emphasis on 'Rational' you tried to cheat by bringing in 'irrational' when that is not intended at all.

Surely you are not disputing that empirical-based-desires and rational-based-desires are supported by their specific referent of a neural alogrithm [set of neural mechanisms] in the brain.
Peter Holmes
Posts: 4134
Joined: Tue Jul 18, 2017 3:53 pm

Re: Rational Desires vs Empirical Desires

Post by Peter Holmes »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Mon Oct 12, 2020 6:26 am
Peter Holmes wrote: Sun Oct 11, 2020 8:55 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun Oct 11, 2020 7:40 am
... in morality proper what is proper is to invoke Rational Desires and interests in realizing moral facts [with justifications] and aligning one's self and moral judgment to these moral facts.
1 What you call 'morality proper' is your own invention.
There is nothing wrong with giving the emphasis 'proper' to 'morality' because the term 'morality' is a very loose term.
'Morality-proper' meant what is morality in truth and in the realistic perspective.

As a require of intellectual integrity I have to define what I meant by 'morality-proper' i.e.
here is my definition;
viewtopic.php?p=469799#p469799

A definition even "proper" is not sufficient, it must be accompanied by its Framework and System of Knowledge which I won't into here other than the Moral FSK is similar to the Scientific FSK.
2 The claim that there's such a thing as rational as opposed to irrational desire begs questions. And anyway, is it a fact that we ought to invoke rational desire - or is that a matter of opinion? (This is rehashed Aristotle.)
There you go with your rhetoric and deception.
Where did I ever state or imply 'irrational desire' in any way.
The difference here is not between 'rational' and 'irrational' but didn't you read I the OP, i.e. "Rational Desires vs Empirical Desires."

There is no question of 'ought' in this case - which I had asserted and supported - is a trivial issue within morality & ethics.

The topic of 'rational desires' is more than Aristotle's views.

If you are relying on Hume's downplay of "reasoning" in terms of morality/ethics within human nature, note Hume was very ignorant of the full perspective of human reason within the brain and mind.

Here is one clue;
The Evolution of Reason: Logic as a Branch of Biology
The formal systems of logic have ordinarily been regarded as independent of biology, but recent developments in evolutionary theory suggest that biology and logic may be intimately interrelated. In this book, William S. Cooper outlines a theory of rationality in which logical law emerges as an intrinsic aspect of evolutionary biology. He examines the connections between logic and evolutionary biology and illustrates how logical rules are derived directly from evolutionary principles, and therefore, have no independent status of their own. This biological perspective on logic, though at present unorthodox, could change traditional ideas about the reasoning process.
Link:

Hume thought the passions and emotions precede and are independent from all reason-based thoughts and actions within morality and ethics.
The above [as modern neurosciences, etc.] proved Hume was wrong.
As proven, the fundamentals of 'reason' is primal which is parallel to that of the passions, thus they worked complementarily and none of [reason nor passion] dominate the other.

This point opened a pandora-box of knowledge you will need to research into.
So DONT bank too much on the ignorance of an 18th-century-Hume in terms of such knowledge related to neurosciences, neuropsychology, evolutionary psychology, the likes.
3 The expression 'realizing a moral fact' is gobbledygook.
What is the problem of realizing the existence of a fact, e.g. realizing the Sun exists or whatever of reality exists. Obviously "realizing" is more effective than "knowing" in this case in relation to facts of reality.
Thus moral facts exist and they are realized by those who are able to confirm their real existence with its respective referent.
4 Initially capitalising words doesn't turn them into proper nouns with actually existing referents.
Surprised you are jumping on this.
Capitalizing those words in the OP is characteristic of how they are done in a Title and that I did the same later is merely to emphasize them just in case you deliberately ignore the terms.
Despite my emphasis on 'Rational' you tried to cheat by bringing in 'irrational' when that is not intended at all.

Surely you are not disputing that empirical-based-desires and rational-based-desires are supported by their specific referent of a neural alogrithm [set of neural mechanisms] in the brain.
1 The claim that the abstract noun 'morality' is the name of a thing of some kind that can be described is a metaphysical delusion in the first place. So your claim that you know what 'morality proper' is - is a delusion within a delusion.

2 I find Hume almost unreadable. And, as a man of his time, he was wrong about many philosophical and psychological issues. IMHO.

3 If by 'realize a fact' you just mean 'know or be aware that something is or was the case' - that's fine. But you have still to show that there are any moral facts to be known. So far - nothing.
Veritas Aequitas
Posts: 15722
Joined: Wed Jul 11, 2012 4:41 am

Re: Rational Desires vs Empirical Desires

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Peter Holmes wrote: Mon Oct 12, 2020 9:11 am 1 The claim that the abstract noun 'morality' is the name of a thing of some kind that can be described is a metaphysical delusion in the first place. So your claim that you know what 'morality proper' is - is a delusion within a delusion.
Rhetoric again.
I did not claim 'morality' like 'Science' is a thing of some kind.
What I claimed is there are moral facts like there are scientific facts/truths/knowledge.
Moral facts are justified to be true like scientific facts.
If scientific facts are not metaphysical delusion, then moral facts are not metaphysical delusions.
2 I find Hume almost unreadable. And, as a man of his time, he was wrong about many philosophical and psychological issues. IMHO.
I find Hume very readable except I do not agree with some of his views.

He was wrong with being too dogmatic on the 'is-ought' distinction which YOU are relying upon to support your views that there are no moral facts and Morality is not Objective.
3 If by 'realize a fact' you just mean 'know or be aware that something is or was the case' - that's fine. But you have still to show that there are any moral facts to be known. So far - nothing.
I have already demonstrated many times where I have justified [empirically and philosophically] the existence of moral facts conditioned upon the moral framework and system.


Btw, your refutation that there are no moral facts and Morality is not Objective is only effective against;
  • 1. the theist moralists who claimed morality is objective as there are moral facts from a real objective God.
    2. the platonist moralists who claimed there are moral facts as universals and forms.I will agree with your refutation of the the above.
However from the perspective of moral empirical realism and its moral framework and system, there are moral facts and as such morality is objective.

Here is a clue [not a confirmation] that project moral realism is tenable;
A survey from 2009 involving 3,226 respondents[6] found that 56% of philosophers accept or lean towards moral realism (28%: anti-realism; 16%: other).[7]

Some notable examples of robust moral realists include David Brink,[8] John McDowell, Peter Railton,[9] Geoffrey Sayre-McCord,[10] Michael Smith, Terence Cuneo,[11] Russ Shafer-Landau,[12] G. E. Moore,[13] John Finnis, Richard Boyd, Nicholas Sturgeon,[14] Thomas Nagel and Derek Parfit. Norman Geras has argued that Karl Marx was a moral realist.[15]

Moral realism has been studied in the various philosophical and practical applications.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_realism
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