Charles Pigden: Is-Ought - No Impact on Moral Objectivity

[Veritas Aequitas]

Here is an article from Philosophy Now;

https://philosophynow.org/issues/83/Hum ... _and_Ought

Pidgen reviewed NOFI and concluded;

For in so far as it is true and provable, NOFI [no Ought from Is] provides no support for non-cognitivism and no argument against naturalism.
Therefore the objectivity of ethics has not been disproved.

Pigden argued, those who rely on Hume's NOFI to counter moral objectivity is mistaken, i.e. they slide in a premise of the 'analytic bridge principles' which Hume never intended.

Pigden asked;

Is Hume
1. claiming that you can’t get moral conclusions from non-moral premises by logic alone, that is, that there are no logically valid arguments from the non-moral to the moral?
Or is he
2. claiming that you can’t get moral conclusions from non-moral premises by logic plus analytic bridge principles, that is, that there are no analytically valid arguments from the non-moral to the moral?
The first could be true and the second false.

Hume recognized moral truths can be inferred from natural facts;

Hume himself was a naturalist, since he supposed that there are moral truths which are made true by natural facts, namely facts about what human beings are inclined to approve of.

To confirm the above, read the article from Philosophy Now.
https://philosophynow.org/issues/83/Hum ... _and_Ought

Your views?