A new normative theory and the demandingness objection
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Daniel McKay
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A new normative theory and the demandingness objection
For my PhD thesis I am defending an entirely new normative theory, called freedom consequentialism, that holds that what is of moral value is the freedom of persons over what belongs to them; their minds, their bodies and their property. As part of this thesis I have written a chapter on the demandingness objection and how freedom consequentialism can solve it and align with our moral intuitions in a way that utilitarianism can't. I am also presenting an abridged version of this chapter at a conference later this year.
What I need is the criticism and counterargument of other philosophers. Because a lot of this stuff is brand new, I can't just research established arguments. So I am hoping some of you would help me by reading the chapter in question and, if you disagree with any of it, telling me why. Anything I use in my thesis will be properly referenced to you of course.
So if you'd like to help or just read an interesting piece of philosophy, comment here or send me a message.
What I need is the criticism and counterargument of other philosophers. Because a lot of this stuff is brand new, I can't just research established arguments. So I am hoping some of you would help me by reading the chapter in question and, if you disagree with any of it, telling me why. Anything I use in my thesis will be properly referenced to you of course.
So if you'd like to help or just read an interesting piece of philosophy, comment here or send me a message.
- Hobbes' Choice
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Re: A new normative theory and the demandingness objection
Freedom consequentialism is clearly stated. But what is the 'demandingness objection" and how does freedom consequentialism 'solve it'?Daniel McKay wrote:For my PhD thesis I am defending an entirely new normative theory, called freedom consequentialism, that holds that what is of moral value is the freedom of persons over what belongs to them; their minds, their bodies and their property. As part of this thesis I have written a chapter on the demandingness objection and how freedom consequentialism can solve it and align with our moral intuitions in a way that utilitarianism can't. I am also presenting an abridged version of this chapter at a conference later this year.
What I need is the criticism and counterargument of other philosophers. Because a lot of this stuff is brand new, I can't just research established arguments. So I am hoping some of you would help me by reading the chapter in question and, if you disagree with any of it, telling me why. Anything I use in my thesis will be properly referenced to you of course.
So if you'd like to help or just read an interesting piece of philosophy, comment here or send me a message.
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Daniel McKay
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Re: A new normative theory and the demandingness objection
Good point. I was being unclear.
By the demandingness objection I mean the objection commonly leveled at utilitarianism, and potentially any other agent-neutral form of consequentialism, that the theory demands too much of people in order to act rightly. Specifically, that in order to act rightly, one must devote almost all their time to producing the most good possible, and anything else is considered wrong action.
Thanks for pointing that out.
By the demandingness objection I mean the objection commonly leveled at utilitarianism, and potentially any other agent-neutral form of consequentialism, that the theory demands too much of people in order to act rightly. Specifically, that in order to act rightly, one must devote almost all their time to producing the most good possible, and anything else is considered wrong action.
Thanks for pointing that out.
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Re: A new normative theory and the demandingness objection
Sounds like you are trying to make a case for libertarianism on the grounds that to consider the needs of anyone else other than yourself is just too difficult. So instead of considering the needs of the many you think Selfishness is a cure for human ills?Daniel McKay wrote:Good point. I was being unclear.
By the demandingness objection I mean the objection commonly leveled at utilitarianism, and potentially any other agent-neutral form of consequentialism, that the theory demands too much of people in order to act rightly. Specifically, that in order to act rightly, one must devote almost all their time to producing the most good possible, and anything else is considered wrong action.
Thanks for pointing that out.
Re: A new normative theory and the demandingness objection
May I exercise my freedom over my body by having an abortion at 9 months minus five minutes?Daniel McKay wrote: the freedom of persons over what belongs to them; their minds, their bodies and their property.
May I exercise my freedom over my body by shooting heroin? With my kids in the house? With your kids in my house?
May I exercise my freedom over my property by displaying a Confederate flag, a Nazi flag, and a bloody fetus photo on my house, visible from the public street?
Just want to try to clarify what you mean by freedom.
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Daniel McKay
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Re: A new normative theory and the demandingness objection
I mean freedom over those things that belong to you; your mind, your body and your property. So, in order.
No, as by nine months a baby is enough of a person that you may not kill it. Killing it is not your choice to make. So your freedom over your own body must be violated somewhat to prevent the greater violation to the child. So if you want to have an abortion, you need to do it earlier on in the pregnancy.
It depends on how old the kids are and whether you are looking after them. If these hypothetical kids are old enough to take care of themselves or there is someone else in the house taking care of them, and you are taking your heroin in a locked room away from them, then feel free. However you may not shirk your responsibilities to take care of children that you are looking after or put others at risk by taking substances that may lead you to behave unpredictably around them.
Yes, yes and maybe. There is possibly a case to be made that a bloody fetus photo, if seen by children, could have detrimental effects on their development, but I am not wholly convinced by that.
Would you like to read the chapter in question?
No, as by nine months a baby is enough of a person that you may not kill it. Killing it is not your choice to make. So your freedom over your own body must be violated somewhat to prevent the greater violation to the child. So if you want to have an abortion, you need to do it earlier on in the pregnancy.
It depends on how old the kids are and whether you are looking after them. If these hypothetical kids are old enough to take care of themselves or there is someone else in the house taking care of them, and you are taking your heroin in a locked room away from them, then feel free. However you may not shirk your responsibilities to take care of children that you are looking after or put others at risk by taking substances that may lead you to behave unpredictably around them.
Yes, yes and maybe. There is possibly a case to be made that a bloody fetus photo, if seen by children, could have detrimental effects on their development, but I am not wholly convinced by that.
Would you like to read the chapter in question?
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Daniel McKay
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Re: A new normative theory and the demandingness objection
Hobbes. No, I am not doing anything like that. My theory is not very much like libertarianism at all and still makes significant demands on the agent. However, it seems that saying we must constantly do the best possible thing or we are acting wrongly is too demanding.
Would you like to read the chapter? I can send you a copy and you can just comment if you feel like it.
Would you like to read the chapter? I can send you a copy and you can just comment if you feel like it.
- Hobbes' Choice
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Re: A new normative theory and the demandingness objection
Sure you can post it here?Daniel McKay wrote:Hobbes. No, I am not doing anything like that. My theory is not very much like libertarianism at all and still makes significant demands on the agent. However, it seems that saying we must constantly do the best possible thing or we are acting wrongly is too demanding.
Would you like to read the chapter? I can send you a copy and you can just comment if you feel like it.
You seem to be implying that utilitarianism is something like "always doing the right thing", but I don't see it that way at all. It's more like a rough estimate of an estimate of the greatest good. This tends to leave the individual with rather too much freedom for wide open interpretations.
And I also don't see any problem with doing the right thing being difficult - no one does that - they just do what they can.
When you try to be good, you can always follow the categorical imperative. One simple rule to follow - how difficult is that?
Your "alternative" seem to be the right to do what the hell you want with - " their minds, their bodies and their property."
I agree with minds and bodies (though I think there is no distinction here), but "property"?? I'm sure the capitalists, multinationals and aristocrats all over the world will be queuing up to support this clause. This sounds like pure libertarianism.
Would this triple freedom giver a person the right to attack any person stepping on their land?
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Daniel McKay
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Re: A new normative theory and the demandingness objection
Sure. Forum won't let me attach file but here is a link to it on google drive: https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B00h0N ... sp=sharing
I am implying that utilitarianism considers the right action to be the action which maximizes utility, which it does (or at least the most common versions of it do).
Don't you think that if, as you put it, no one does the right thing, then we have a poor definition of right? What I am proposing is that it is not as binary as either doing the best possible thing or acting wrongly, rather that there is a minimum amount of good required of people but beyond that our actions become supererogatory, praiseworthy certainly, but not obligatory.
Also, yes you "can always follow the categorical imperative" but that is only a good idea if you think it is a good way of determining right from wrong. Which, presumably, utilitarians do not. I tend to agree with them as the categorical imperative primarily because following the (at least the first formulation of the) categorical imperative either leads us to ignore the consequences of our actions entirely or, through refining our maxims to make them better, quickly collapses into a form of utilitarianism anyway.
I can see how it might sound that way, but I can assure you it isn't like libertarianism at all. And no it wouldn't give them that right. "Attacking" people generally involves a significant violation of their freedom, one which certainly does not offset the potential small amount of freedom that might be protected by expediting their exit from your land.
Most of this is better explained in the chapter in question. I'd love to hear your thoughts/criticisms
.
I am implying that utilitarianism considers the right action to be the action which maximizes utility, which it does (or at least the most common versions of it do).
Don't you think that if, as you put it, no one does the right thing, then we have a poor definition of right? What I am proposing is that it is not as binary as either doing the best possible thing or acting wrongly, rather that there is a minimum amount of good required of people but beyond that our actions become supererogatory, praiseworthy certainly, but not obligatory.
Also, yes you "can always follow the categorical imperative" but that is only a good idea if you think it is a good way of determining right from wrong. Which, presumably, utilitarians do not. I tend to agree with them as the categorical imperative primarily because following the (at least the first formulation of the) categorical imperative either leads us to ignore the consequences of our actions entirely or, through refining our maxims to make them better, quickly collapses into a form of utilitarianism anyway.
I can see how it might sound that way, but I can assure you it isn't like libertarianism at all. And no it wouldn't give them that right. "Attacking" people generally involves a significant violation of their freedom, one which certainly does not offset the potential small amount of freedom that might be protected by expediting their exit from your land.
Most of this is better explained in the chapter in question. I'd love to hear your thoughts/criticisms
Re: A new normative theory and the demandingness objection
Very fancy wording and following explenation 2 posts down later, but it's essentially nonsense and babble based on weird assumptions.Daniel McKay wrote:For my PhD thesis I am defending an entirely new normative theory, called freedom consequentialism, that holds that what is of moral value is the freedom of persons over what belongs to them; their minds, their bodies and their property. As part of this thesis I have written a chapter on the demandingness objection and how freedom consequentialism can solve it and align with our moral intuitions in a way that utilitarianism can't. I am also presenting an abridged version of this chapter at a conference later this year.
What I need is the criticism and counterargument of other philosophers. Because a lot of this stuff is brand new, I can't just research established arguments. So I am hoping some of you would help me by reading the chapter in question and, if you disagree with any of it, telling me why. Anything I use in my thesis will be properly referenced to you of course.
So if you'd like to help or just read an interesting piece of philosophy, comment here or send me a message.
..don't quit your dayjob!
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Daniel McKay
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Re: A new normative theory and the demandingness objection
HexHammer, I am not sure what you mean by nonsense and babble.
If you mean that the terms I am using don't refer, then you're just wrong. And I would ask what you think we have been arguing about up till this point.
If you mean it's obviously wrong or silly, you might want to explain why as I have obviously been oblivious up till this point and it would be very useful to not waste any more of my time on it.
If you mean that the terms I am using don't refer, then you're just wrong. And I would ask what you think we have been arguing about up till this point.
If you mean it's obviously wrong or silly, you might want to explain why as I have obviously been oblivious up till this point and it would be very useful to not waste any more of my time on it.
- Hobbes' Choice
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Re: A new normative theory and the demandingness objection
I'd not worry too much about Hex. He does not like philosophy.Daniel McKay wrote:HexHammer, I am not sure what you mean by nonsense and babble..
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Daniel McKay
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Re: A new normative theory and the demandingness objection
Well he told me not to quit my day of as a philosopher, so he can't be completely against it.
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surreptitious57
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Re: A new normative theory and the demandingness objection
You cannot legally have an abortion after twenty four weeks unless your life is actually in dangerwtf wrote:
May I exercise my freedom over my body by having an abortion at nine months minus five minutes ?
May I exercise my freedom over my body by shooting heroin ? With my kids in the house ? With your kids in my house ?
May I exercise my freedom over my property by displaying a Confederate flag a Nazi flag and a bloody fetus photo on
my house visible from the public street ?
No gynaecologist would perform one on you otherwise as they would be charged with murder
You are free to inject heroin although it is not recommended you do it in front of minors
However it is a controlled substance and you could lose your liberty if you are arrested
You can display anything visible from the street as long as that is not legally obscene
None of your examples qualify as such though passers by may object to the last two
Ultimately you can do whatever you want to regardless of its legality if you so wish
But if the the thing in question is illegal you may have to accept the consequences
- Hobbes' Choice
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Re: A new normative theory and the demandingness objection
Daniel McKay wrote:Well he told me not to quit my day of as a philosopher, so he can't be completely against it.
What's good for the goose in not good for the gander in this case