Hylozoism, panpsychism, and organizationalism

[Kuznetzova]

The reader of this thread is invited to do a lot of outside research in regards these topics. A careful watching of the documentary film titled What the Bleep Do We Know!? staring the deaf actress Marlee Matlin. A googling of hylozoism, and the wikipedia portal on panpsychism.

Bleep contains a grab-bag of topics covering physics, neuroscience, new age spirituality, and a theme of overcoming addiction. But it also contains a presentation on philosophical topics. The philosophical subject of the documentary is that Free Will is embodied in quantum mechanics of particles, and therefore, we being made of those particles, inherit this Free Will, and so we create our own reality through exercising choice. The dramatized parts of Bleep show flashy computer graphics of expanding energy bubbles whenever the main character makes a life-altering choice ,to indicate that reality is snapping into the new direction. The presentation is not intended to be academic, since they never resort to naming the philosophical position, even when it has one. That would require that the experts being interviewed would mention the word "panpsychism". The word appears nowhere in the documentary.

Other philosophies follow suit in this regard. Panpsychism claims that all matter is mind, thus more complex living organisms inherit this pre-existing mind-property from matter itself, and come to express it more fully. Historical debates in the history of philosophy, such as the Mind/Body problem, are superficially laid to rest. Hylozoism is analogous, in claiming that all matter is in some sense alive, proto-alive , or containing a potential for alive-ness. Living complex organisms then inherit the proto-life substance/potentiality and come to express it more fully. Age-old questions, "Why is there life in the universe?", "Why did life emerge in the universe?" are laid to rest (superficially anyway).

Panexperientialism and so-called "quantum consciousness" are another example. By claiming that all matter everywhere is in some sense already containing internal phenomenal experience, then all living organisms, being made of that matter, in turn inherit this pre-existing property. This again appears to (superficially) solve the Hard Problem of Consciousness.

To see that all of the above philosophies share a common seed, one need only consider the contrary stance to them, which I will call Organizationalism. The author admits to coining a neologism here: Organizationalism. This epistemological commitment says that being alive is a property most directly caused by the organization of matter, not of its intrinsic physical properties. The rest of the afore-claimed properties also fall against this epistemology, one by one. If some entity in the world has a mind, it is due only to the organization of its constituent molecules. If a living entity is conscious, it is because of the organization and connectivity of the cells in its brain. If a living being engages in mental choices and acts on those choices, its free will is due mostly to the organization of its brain.



In addition to "they way things are put together" there is also the way a thing uses energy, and whether it takes in energy or not. That is to say, whether it is located in a spot in the universe in which energy goes into it perpetually. So both organizational and dynamical properties combine to support the epistemology of Organizationalism. This topic was raised (surprisingly on TV), when Charlie Rose interviewed roboticist Rodney Brooks. At the end of the interview, he asked if his research also had an aim to uncover whether all aspects of the human mind could be explained by "parts turning on parts". That is to say, the parts are not alive, the parts do not have minds, the parts are not conscious, and the parts do not make choices. Only by virtue of them turning on each other, dynamically, organizationally .... do all these higher, more noble, properties emerge.

Organizationalism was relied on by myself in other threads on this very forum. In one instance, I referred living cells in the body of humans as "blind, dumb, mechanical machines". This appears to be the case when immune cells react to the ebola virus. Further, all viral infection appears in support of this.

At the end of the day, there are two contrasting tracts of thought here; two philosophical ideologies at odds with one another. On one side is the hylozoism/panpsychism/conscious-matter Camp. And standing opposite them, is the Organizationalist Camp. I would say that both camps are completely valid and defend-able as philosophical positions. Both are valid ways of understanding the world around us.

This author can find bothersome, philosophical holes in both camps. A tireless, objective commitment to Organizationalism appears to raise more questions than it answers, and a person ends up having to rely on a multi-verse, that is, a collection of an infinite number of universes. That bothers me psychologically, because it smells very much like an explanation that goes: "The world is supported on the back of a turtle and it's turtles all the way down." A singular, self-contained universe like the one we occupy, seems more fitting if it is hylozoist in its nature.

[Kuznetzova]

I have already admitted that both camps are solid philosophical positions. Both are of equal validity.

A nagging question remains regarding which one of these opposing camps will prevail under hammerhead of objective, mathematical scrutiny. Can we possibly imagine a scenario where the question could be tested under controlled conditions of science? Could we construct an experiment that would, in some say, suggest one is true and not the other?

I think in the realm of science fiction, we could try a certain experiment. Consider a desktop computer and its RAM. Let's use a higher estimate here, and say a desktop computer has 12 Gigabytes of RAM. That is to say, the whole operating system, the desktop, its settings, the icons, the software itself and finally the data of the software; all of these things must fit within 96 billion bits. No more.

Imagine a simulation of little particles in an artificial chemistry. Tentatively, we will say this soup of classical particles should contain 10 trillion particles. Here is the number written out,

10,000,000,000,000

Of course each particle would take up nearly 50 bytes of information about its velocity and its position stored as real numbers. This simulation is orders of magnitude beyond the technology of a desktop computer. We are deep into the supercomputer realm. These particles will bump around in 3 dimensions and connect to each other in pseudo chemical bonds to form "molecules". These particles are classical balls who bounce off each other; which shouldn't be confused with genuine quantum chemistry simulations.

{(Mild Digression: Quantum chemistry simulations, which view atoms as electron systems with orbitals do exist. Sometimes called ab initio quantum chemistry, or Density Functional Theory simulations. They consider atoms as described by the Schroedinger equation. These are not considered here. Because a supercomputer is already needed literally when these simulations have even 200 atoms. We are considering 10s of trillions of particles here.)}

Okay back to our simulation. The particles are modeled classically as spheres that collide and bounce. Due to a short list of rules, they form and break bonds with each other, which we will simulate as hard springs. The rules for bond formation will be set down by us such that long chains of molecules will form. In particular we want these long molecular strings to make copies of themselves in a process called Template Replication. This works by a molecular chain floating around and collecting a corresponding partner particle at each location along the chain. When this is complete the copy breaks off from the parent molecule. Where there was once one molecule, there is now two identical copies. The rules for other bond formation will involve the formation of protective barriers or "membranes" around the replicators.

We will run this simulation for thousands of years of "simulation time". Since the supercomputer is sped up, it only takes a couple months to run the simulation in our time. At the complete of the two-month run, we come back and see what has happened. It is very plausible that the simulation has undergone natural selection, and has since formed things that look and act a lot like bacteria. Those entities which were more successful at replicating their "genes"/"molecules" were the ones who inherited the latter parts of the simulation.

If bacteria-like entities exist, we could point at this simulation and its underlying mechanics as being necessary and sufficient conditions for "alive-ness". This is commensurate with Richard Dawkin's definition of life -- that is, survival machines whose only motivation and meaning in the world is to replicate strands of genes. Since we wrote the simulation ourselves, we know its underlying mechanics are classical. We added no special alive-ness to the particles, we added no proto-panpsychist mind substance to them, and no "inner consciousness" properties. In essence, we may have demonstrated that "parts turning on parts" is sufficient for the formation of complex biological organization.

This experiment has never been carried out. Only a tiny handful of people have suggested it be tried. The number I gave above, 10 trillion particles, may fall short of what is really needed in practice. I assume this is in the realm of science fiction.

http://www.evogrid.org/index.php/Main_Page

http://berlinbrowndev.blogspot.com/2011 ... cules.html

[MGL]

We added no special alive-ness to the particles, we added no proto-panpsychist mind substance to them, and no "inner consciousness" properties. In essence, we may have demonstrated that "parts turning on parts" is sufficient for the formation of complex biological organization.

The complex structure and behaviour of living organisms (including mental behaviour) is perhaps explainable in terms of "organisationism", but how could this possibly account for the conscious sensation of redness that accompanies the mental event of perceiving or imagining a red flower?

[Kuznetzova]

As far as the conscious percept of red, matter itself may contain an internal state. The brain being made of that matter would necessarily cause such internal experience. That may be called a Dual Aspect theory.

[MGL]

..... we added no proto-panpsychist mind substance to them, and no "inner consciousness" properties. In essence, we may have demonstrated that "parts turning on parts" is sufficient for the formation of complex biological organization.

The complex structure and behaviour of living organisms (including mental behaviour) is perhaps explainable in terms of "organisationism", but how could this possibly account for the conscious sensation of redness that accompanies the mental event of perceiving or imagining a red flower?

As far as the conscious percept of red, matter itself may contain an internal state. The brain being made of that matter would necessarily cause such internal experience. That may be called a Dual Aspect theory.

Is it not the case that proto-panpsychist mind substance is an internal state of matter and therefore one of the aspects of Dual Aspect theory? Does not Dual Aspect Theory add "inner consciousness" properties to matter?

[Kuznetzova]

No. Dual Aspect is specifically about theories of consciousness. It was coined by David Chalmers in his Ph.d thesis.

[MGL]

Galen Strawson's panpsychism is also specifically a theory about consciousness and it seems like a kind of dual apect theory, at least in the way you describe percepts of red as being an internal state of matter. But this seems to be at odds with your earlier claim that "organisationism" adds no "inner consciousness" properties to matter. By saying that the percept of red is an internal state of matter you seem to be making a very pan-psychist point. Or are you defining pan-psychism as entailing everthing has a fuly-developed mind and insisting consciousness necessarily entails a fully developed mind, something only a sufficiently organised entity such as a brain could host?

[Kuznetzova]

But this seems to be at odds with your earlier claim that "organisationism" adds no "inner consciousness" properties to matter. By saying that the percept of red is an internal state of matter you seem to be making a very pan-psychist point.

As it turns out, atoms themselves do have internal structure. Their atomic number tells them how to interact chemically with each other, in terms of breaking bonds and forming bonds. The differences are wild. Glass only melts at ridiculously high temperatures. Platinum and gold interact chemically with nothing. Florine reacts (violently) with almost anything. So the brain itself does have layers of internal states. There are "states" occupied by the neuronal groups. There are states occupied by single neurons, and then there are chemical states occupied by the neurotransmitter molecules.

I was not trying to make a "point" about Dual Aspect Theories and conscious percepts of red -- I was merely describing them in an overview. You can consult Chalmer's actual writings if you want to see how he argues for his position.

Or are you defining pan-psychism as entailing everthing has a fuly-developed mind and insisting consciousness necessarily entails a fully developed mind, something only a sufficiently organised entity such as a brain could host?

I was unable to parse this spaghetti sentence. Break this up into a few sentences and ask the question again in a different way.

[MGL]

Apologies if my perplexity with your position is unclear.

I was trying to understand how organisationism accounts for the phenomenal properties of consciousness if it did not need to rely on any "inner consciousness properties". Your reference to dual aspect theory and the suggestion that the percept of red could be an "internal state" of matter seemed to be making the point that organisationism did rely on "inner consciousness properties".

My "spaghetti sentence" was my attempt to see if I could reconcile this apparent inconsistency by asking you what you understood by pan-psychism and consciousness in this context. I could parse it into two sentences by dropping the "AND", but I am sure you are capable of doing this yourself, and cannot think of any way of making the clauses either side of it any clearer without the risk of engendering further confusion.

Thank you for your suggestion to read Chalmers on Dual Aspect theory.I am curious to see how it differs from Galen Strawson's pan-psychism.

[SpheresOfBalance]

The reader of this thread is invited to do a lot of outside research in regards these topics. A careful watching of the documentary film titled What the Bleep Do We Know!? staring the deaf actress Marlee Matlin. A googling of hylozoism, and the wikipedia portal on panpsychism.

Bleep contains a grab-bag of topics covering physics, neuroscience, new age spirituality, and a theme of overcoming addiction. But it also contains a presentation on philosophical topics. The philosophical subject of the documentary is that Free Will is embodied in quantum mechanics of particles, and therefore, we being made of those particles, inherit this Free Will, and so we create our own reality through exercising choice. The dramatized parts of Bleep show flashy computer graphics of expanding energy bubbles whenever the main character makes a life-altering choice ,to indicate that reality is snapping into the new direction. The presentation is not intended to be academic, since they never resort to naming the philosophical position, even when it has one. That would require that the experts being interviewed would mention the word "panpsychism". The word appears nowhere in the documentary.

Other philosophies follow suit in this regard. Panpsychism claims that all matter is mind, thus more complex living organisms inherit this pre-existing mind-property from matter itself, and come to express it more fully. Historical debates in the history of philosophy, such as the Mind/Body problem, are superficially laid to rest. Hylozoism is analogous, in claiming that all matter is in some sense alive, proto-alive , or containing a potential for alive-ness. Living complex organisms then inherit the proto-life substance/potentiality and come to express it more fully. Age-old questions, "Why is there life in the universe?", "Why did life emerge in the universe?" are laid to rest (superficially anyway).

Panexperientialism and so-called "quantum consciousness" are another example. By claiming that all matter everywhere is in some sense already containing internal phenomenal experience, then all living organisms, being made of that matter, in turn inherit this pre-existing property. This again appears to (superficially) solve the Hard Problem of Consciousness.

To see that all of the above philosophies share a common seed, one need only consider the contrary stance to them, which I will call Organizationalism. The author admits to coining a neologism here: Organizationalism. This epistemological commitment says that being alive is a property most directly caused by the organization of matter, not of its intrinsic physical properties. The rest of the afore-claimed properties also fall against this epistemology, one by one. If some entity in the world has a mind, it is due only to the organization of its constituent molecules. If a living entity is conscious, it is because of the organization and connectivity of the cells in its brain. If a living being engages in mental choices and acts on those choices, its free will is due mostly to the organization of its brain.



In addition to "they way things are put together" there is also the way a thing uses energy, and whether it takes in energy or not. That is to say, whether it is located in a spot in the universe in which energy goes into it perpetually. So both organizational and dynamical properties combine to support the epistemology of Organizationalism. This topic was raised (surprisingly on TV), when Charlie Rose interviewed roboticist Rodney Brooks. At the end of the interview, he asked if his research also had an aim to uncover whether all aspects of the human mind could be explained by "parts turning on parts". That is to say, the parts are not alive, the parts do not have minds, the parts are not conscious, and the parts do not make choices. Only by virtue of them turning on each other, dynamically, organizationally .... do all these higher, more noble, properties emerge.

Organizationalism was relied on by myself in other threads on this very forum. In one instance, I referred living cells in the body of humans as "blind, dumb, mechanical machines". This appears to be the case when immune cells react to the ebola virus. Further, all viral infection appears in support of this.

At the end of the day, there are two contrasting tracts of thought here; two philosophical ideologies at odds with one another. On one side is the hylozoism/panpsychism/conscious-matter Camp. And standing opposite them, is the Organizationalist Camp. I would say that both camps are completely valid and defend-able as philosophical positions. Both are valid ways of understanding the world around us.

This author can find bothersome, philosophical holes in both camps. A tireless, objective commitment to Organizationalism appears to raise more questions than it answers, and a person ends up having to rely on a multi-verse, that is, a collection of an infinite number of universes. That bothers me psychologically, because it smells very much like an explanation that goes: "The world is supported on the back of a turtle and it's turtles all the way down." A singular, self-contained universe like the one we occupy, seems more fitting if it is hylozoist in its nature.

I see that what you see in the film, Carl Sagan's words, etc, is a mere reflection of what you are capable of seeing within their words, as I can see it differently.