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LOL just make shit up.Skepdick wrote: ↑Mon Feb 22, 2021 6:33 pmYou were talking about epistemology. But you wanted to pretend that you were talking about ontology.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Mon Feb 22, 2021 6:33 pm Great. The problem is that that has fuck all to do with what I was talking about.
I am not making shit up. I am REJECTING YOUR SEMANTICS.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Mon Feb 22, 2021 6:34 pm Make shit up.
Man would your head be in the toilet if we were talking in person.
I'm not talking about anything like that. I was asking whether in Gewirth's argument, he was saying that P and X could refer to the same thing or not. If it cannot, then that's fine. That gives us our answer.Skepdick wrote: ↑Mon Feb 22, 2021 6:36 pmI am not making shit up. I am REJECTING YOUR SEMANTICS.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Mon Feb 22, 2021 6:34 pm Make shit up.
Man would your head be in the toilet if we were talking in person.
Does the referent "electron" refer to "only one thing"?
Does the referent "universe" refer to "only one thing"?
If you answer "yes" you are equivocating "thing".
It could mean anything and everything. Whether you are referring to 1 existent or ALL existents.
Wow. You really really really don't get the implication of Quine, eh?Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Mon Feb 22, 2021 6:38 pm I'm not talking about anything like that. I was asking whether in Gewirth's argument, he was saying that P and X could refer to the same thing or not. If it cannot, then that's fine. That gives us our answer.
What does this have to do with my question about Gewirth's argument?Skepdick wrote: ↑Mon Feb 22, 2021 6:41 pmWow. You really really really don't get the implication of Quine, eh?Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Mon Feb 22, 2021 6:38 pm I'm not talking about anything like that. I was asking whether in Gewirth's argument, he was saying that P and X could refer to the same thing or not. If it cannot, then that's fine. That gives us our answer.
You are equivocating the meaning of "thing" !!!!! It means anything and everything.
Is "electron" a thing?
Is the universe (made up of fuckton of electrons and them some stuff) a thing?
The entire idea of "reference" is horseshit without a semantic.
Everything?Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Mon Feb 22, 2021 6:42 pm What does this have to do with my question about Gewirth's argument?
Explain in detail what it has to do with what I'm asking.Skepdick wrote: ↑Mon Feb 22, 2021 6:48 pmEverything?Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Mon Feb 22, 2021 6:42 pm What does this have to do with my question about Gewirth's argument?
OK... watch closely....Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Mon Feb 22, 2021 6:53 pm What you're saying impacts whether Gewirth is saying that P and X can be the same thing via ______?
Fill in the blank
Rejecting my equivocation of "thing" impacts whether Gewirth is saying that P and X can be the same thing how?Skepdick wrote: ↑Mon Feb 22, 2021 6:56 pmOK... watch closely....Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Mon Feb 22, 2021 6:53 pm What you're saying impacts whether Gewirth is saying that P and X can be the same thing via ______?
Fill in the blank
I reject your equivocation of "thing".
And I am asking can P and X both be "things"?
If P is "The Universe" and X is "an electron"
Are P and X the same via "thingness"?
Dude. It's a pain in the butt to try to Aspie-proof everything one writes!Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Mon Feb 22, 2021 8:14 pm Rejecting my equivocation of "thing" impacts whether Gewirth is saying that P and X can be the same thing how?
And this has what to do with my question about what Gewirth is saying?Skepdick wrote: ↑Mon Feb 22, 2021 8:28 pmDude. It's a pain in the butt to try to Aspie-proof everything one writes!Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Mon Feb 22, 2021 8:14 pm Rejecting my equivocation of "thing" impacts whether Gewirth is saying that P and X can be the same thing how?
Does "thingness" imply "sameness" by transitivity?
X is a thing.
Y is a thing.
Does that imply X is "the same" as Y?
IF there is no such implication, then you need to tell us what you mean by "sameness"!
Because the notion of "sameness" is ambiguous even in Mathematics. And Mathematics is way more precise than English!
different kinds of equality.
In yet-another language that I HOPE you will understand. To say that X is the same as Y is to CLAIM that X is "the same" as Y.
Sameness-claims require justification.
Again, I'm a nominalist. But nominalism doesn't imply that there are no things that are the same: namely, something is the same as itself (at a particular "point" in time, at least). That's what I'm talking about here--what's known as "numerical identity" in philosophy. In other words, just one whatever, at a particular spatiotemporal location. I've explained this many times in the thread already (Not that I expect anyone to read all of the nonsense above.)
I do not agree with your interpretation and views of the above.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Mon Feb 22, 2021 2:48 pmRight, so you don't understand what I'm asking, because you're just now trying to clarify what I'm even referring to via "identity."Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Mon Feb 22, 2021 10:36 amThe OP is about Gewirth's argument.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Sun Feb 21, 2021 4:57 pm
No, you did not. I don't know if you don't understand what I'm saying here?
I'm insisting on an identity relation because it's a logical possibility, and as far as I can see, there are only two logical possibilities here. Do you understand the idea or not? You're not at all addressing the actual idea.
Gewirth never mentioned 'identity'.
If you insist that is a strawman.
I have already explained Gewirth's position on the issue.
Are you referring to the Law of Identity?
If that is the case, note Rorty's critic of Mirroring as in his
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.
Instead of arguing about something and continually responding in a situation like this, clarify what the person is referring to, so you can be talking about the same thing, addressing the same thing.
What I'm referring to isn't a "law" of identity per se, but it's the idea that the "law" of identity is addressing: simply, whether x and y are exactly one and the same thing.
Again, I'm not saying that Gewirth used the term identity. I'm saying that per his argument, there are only two logical possibilities re the relationship between P and X. Either he's saying they can be one and the same thing, or he's talking about situations where they are never one and the same thing.
Do you agree with this?
Which part of the relation between the above and what Gewirth is saying do you not understand?Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Mon Feb 22, 2021 11:10 pm And this has what to do with my question about what Gewirth is saying?