Gerwith: IS/OUGHT Resolved Rationally

[Terrapin Station]

Great. The problem is that that has fuck all to do with what I was talking about.

You were talking about epistemology. But you wanted to pretend that you were talking about ontology.

LOL just make shit up.

Man would your head be in the toilet if we were talking in person.

[Skepdick]

Make shit up.

Man would your head be in the toilet if we were talking in person.

I am not making shit up. I am REJECTING YOUR SEMANTICS.

Does the referer/term "electron" refer to "only one thing"?
Does the referer/term "universe" refer to "only one thing"?

If you answer "yes" you are equivocating "thing".

It could mean anything and everything. Whether you are referring to 1 existent or ALL existents.

[Terrapin Station]

Make shit up.

Man would your head be in the toilet if we were talking in person.

I am not making shit up. I am REJECTING YOUR SEMANTICS.

Does the referent "electron" refer to "only one thing"?
Does the referent "universe" refer to "only one thing"?

If you answer "yes" you are equivocating "thing".

It could mean anything and everything. Whether you are referring to 1 existent or ALL existents.

I'm not talking about anything like that. I was asking whether in Gewirth's argument, he was saying that P and X could refer to the same thing or not. If it cannot, then that's fine. That gives us our answer.

[Skepdick]

I'm not talking about anything like that. I was asking whether in Gewirth's argument, he was saying that P and X could refer to the same thing or not. If it cannot, then that's fine. That gives us our answer.

Wow. You really really really don't get the implication of Quine, eh?

You are equivocating the meaning of "thing" !!!!! It means anything and everything.

Is "electron" a thing?
Is the universe (made up of fuckton of electrons and them some stuff) a thing?

The entire idea of "reference" is horseshit without a semantic.

[Terrapin Station]

I'm not talking about anything like that. I was asking whether in Gewirth's argument, he was saying that P and X could refer to the same thing or not. If it cannot, then that's fine. That gives us our answer.

Wow. You really really really don't get the implication of Quine, eh?

You are equivocating the meaning of "thing" !!!!! It means anything and everything.

Is "electron" a thing?
Is the universe (made up of fuckton of electrons and them some stuff) a thing?

The entire idea of "reference" is horseshit without a semantic.

What does this have to do with my question about Gewirth's argument?

[Skepdick]

What does this have to do with my question about Gewirth's argument?

Everything?

I am literally asking you the exact same question you are asking about Gewirth's argument.

Do "electron" and "universe" both point to "thing" ?

[Terrapin Station]

What does this have to do with my question about Gewirth's argument?

Everything?

Explain in detail what it has to do with what I'm asking.

What you're saying impacts whether Gewirth is saying that P and X can be the same thing via ______?
Fill in the blank

[Skepdick]

What you're saying impacts whether Gewirth is saying that P and X can be the same thing via ______?
Fill in the blank

OK... watch closely....

I reject your equivocation of "thing".

And I am asking can P and X both be "things"?

If P is "The Universe" and X is "an electron"

Are P and X the same via "thingness"?

[Terrapin Station]

What you're saying impacts whether Gewirth is saying that P and X can be the same thing via ______?
Fill in the blank

OK... watch closely....

I reject your equivocation of "thing".

And I am asking can P and X both be "things"?

If P is "The Universe" and X is "an electron"

Are P and X the same via "thingness"?

Rejecting my equivocation of "thing" impacts whether Gewirth is saying that P and X can be the same thing how?

[Skepdick]

Rejecting my equivocation of "thing" impacts whether Gewirth is saying that P and X can be the same thing how?

Dude. It's a pain in the butt to try to Aspie-proof everything one writes!

Does "thingness" imply "sameness" by transitivity?

X is a thing.
Y is a thing.

Does that imply X is "the same" as Y?

IF there is no such implication, then you need to tell us what you mean by "sameness"!

Because the notion of "sameness" is ambiguous even in Mathematics. And Mathematics is way more precise than English!

different kinds of equality.

In yet-another language that I HOPE you will understand. To say that X is the same as Y is to CLAIM that X is "the same" as Y.

Sameness-claims require justification.

[Terrapin Station]

Rejecting my equivocation of "thing" impacts whether Gewirth is saying that P and X can be the same thing how?

Dude. It's a pain in the butt to try to Aspie-proof everything one writes!

Does "thingness" imply "sameness" by transitivity?

X is a thing.
Y is a thing.

Does that imply X is "the same" as Y?

IF there is no such implication, then you need to tell us what you mean by "sameness"!

Because the notion of "sameness" is ambiguous even in Mathematics. And Mathematics is way more precise than English!

different kinds of equality.

In yet-another language that I HOPE you will understand. To say that X is the same as Y is to CLAIM that X is "the same" as Y.

Sameness-claims require justification.

And this has what to do with my question about what Gewirth is saying?

[Advocate]

All things are a set of attributes and boundary conditions. Every thing includes the attributes of a unique place in space and time. By this standard, the only meaningful one, there are no two same things, only approximately similar ones.

[Terrapin Station]

All things are a set of attributes and boundary conditions. Every thing includes the attributes of a unique place in space and time. By this standard, the only meaningful one, there are no two same things, only approximately similar ones.

Again, I'm a nominalist. But nominalism doesn't imply that there are no things that are the same: namely, something is the same as itself (at a particular "point" in time, at least). That's what I'm talking about here--what's known as "numerical identity" in philosophy. In other words, just one whatever, at a particular spatiotemporal location. I've explained this many times in the thread already (Not that I expect anyone to read all of the nonsense above.)

And addressing a question like whether in Gewirth's argument X and P can be the same shouldn't require a diversion like this. We can just go with what Gewirth would say, where we need not fret over what his answer would be, at least at first, unless there's something peculiar about it.

[Veritas Aequitas]

No, you did not. I don't know if you don't understand what I'm saying here?

I'm insisting on an identity relation because it's a logical possibility, and as far as I can see, there are only two logical possibilities here. Do you understand the idea or not? You're not at all addressing the actual idea.

The OP is about Gewirth's argument.
Gewirth never mentioned 'identity'.
If you insist that is a strawman.
I have already explained Gewirth's position on the issue.

Are you referring to the Law of Identity?
If that is the case, note Rorty's critic of Mirroring as in his
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.

Right, so you don't understand what I'm asking, because you're just now trying to clarify what I'm even referring to via "identity."

Instead of arguing about something and continually responding in a situation like this, clarify what the person is referring to, so you can be talking about the same thing, addressing the same thing.

What I'm referring to isn't a "law" of identity per se, but it's the idea that the "law" of identity is addressing: simply, whether x and y are exactly one and the same thing.

Again, I'm not saying that Gewirth used the term identity. I'm saying that per his argument, there are only two logical possibilities re the relationship between P and X. Either he's saying they can be one and the same thing, or he's talking about situations where they are never one and the same thing.

Do you agree with this?

I do not agree with your interpretation and views of the above.

What Gewirth implied between X and P is there is an inherent moral purpose in P with reference to S.
Gewirth focus is not on 'helping the elderly getting across the street'.
In any case your example is not that clear.

Let take a more clearer example.
Suppose S is a soldier and faces an unarmed enemy E.
S decides not to shoot E for what he thinks is for Purpose P [so that E can live].
In this case, Gewirth would imply the inherent Purpose, the moral ought within S i.e. the 'ought-not-to-kill humans.

[Skepdick]

And this has what to do with my question about what Gewirth is saying?

Which part of the relation between the above and what Gewirth is saying do you not understand?