Harbal wrote: ↑Sun May 19, 2024 10:55 pm
I should just point out that while the practice, or exercising, of morality collectively seems to be your main point of interest, it isn't really mine,
I have not the slightest idea why you would think that. I've been speaking about the definition and meaning of morality, not the exercising thereof. But morality is nothing if not "practical." What would an "unpracticed morality" even look like?
Morality has to be capable of coming with some 'compulsive' property, at least in the way of a legitimate feeling of obligation, if not something more definite than that.
Well there are a number of things that could act as incentives to abide by a moral code, such as conscience, social pressure, and legal enforcement. How important do you think it is that those being compelled are willing subjects?
I don't think it's an either-or. One can be quite "willing" while assenting to a morality first suggested to one by somebody else.
But "compulsion" was your word, and I think it has an even worse susceptibility than the word "duty": namely, that while "duty" may be imposed, a "sense of duty" is not; but one of its meanings of "compulsion" is the idea of force being used -- which is not, I think, the nuance you intended it to have at all. I think you were aiming to point to a kind of
inner compulsion, a sense of duty-arising-from-within, one in which the moral person participates by consent and agreement with the relevant moral principle. And I have no problem with that.
I'm thinking now of behaviour that might be considered immoral by some people, but isn't prohibited by law.
Human law isn't the source of morality, of course. Human laws are highly variable and changing, and we have many cases of laws that have been highly immoral. What the law is, at its best, is an attempt to reflect the truth about morality. To do justice. To show mercy. To deliver what is deserved and appropriate. But the ideal to which such law, the law as it should be, aspires is not given vision by the mere fact of law, but by an ideal...such as the ideal of justice.
IC wrote:Harbal wrote:That obligation could be placed on us by some legal system, or other authority, but if we experience it as a duty, I think that has to be self imposed.
Okay. Can I first summarize that, just to see if I've got your point? I think what you're saying is that you don't regard a...let's use your word..."compulsion" derived from outside of yourself to be genuinely "moral." Is that the substance of it?
There are a number of things that are more or less universally accepted as moral among "civilised" people and societies,
That's problematic. Who gets to say which societies count as "civilized"?
You can force someone to comply with a moral rule, but you can't make him believe in its morality, in which case he would see that thing as a requirement, or obligation, but not as a duty. To feel a sense of duty, it seems to me, you have to believe in the thing you are required to do.
Yes, I think that's right. But I trust you understand I'm not proposing we use any force. And I recognize the value of consent.
There are two different issues here: morality and law. They're not the same. Morality is the ideals with which people should agree. But it must be quite obvious that these are not always, and are never perfectly, reflected in laws. Laws are very fallible. And some are downright unjust.
But then we have a further problem. If self-imposition is all that's required, can one "self-impose" something that is not moral? Can one be misguided by one's desires, or misinterpret one's obligation to one's "self-compulsion"? Or does everything one "self-imposes" automatically become "right" just because one "self-imposed" it?
Yes, we do have a problem if our mission is to get everyone singing from the same moral hymn sheet.
No, that's not the problem, really.
Even if we have different people doing different things, there are things which arise inside every person that are not moral. And one may have a compulsion for revenge, lust, gluttony, covetousness, cruelty, hatred, cowardice and so on. The real problem is what to do with the fact that our inner "compulsions," including those of every individual, are actually often quite dark. How then can we use our "inner compulsions" to deliver to us reliable information about what we
should morally do?
The problem with trying to impose objectively moral standards on everyone is that we are depending on the choir master knowing what is objectively moral, and how can we be sure that he's got it right, and not misguided by his desires?
Well, we'd better pick a reliable choir-master. And I know of no human being whose fit for that task, do you?
And one more problem: how are we to judge morally among opposite "compulsions"? If you find that beating women is immoral (which I assume you do), what do you do when your neighbour believes in Sharia and feels a "moral compulsion" or "moral obligation" to beat his wife (with the Koranic limits, of course; no using a stick thicker than a man's finger) when she displeases him or fails in some perceived responsibility?
I suppose I report him to the police.
But on what basis do you know that your "compulsion" to call the law on him is better than his "compulsion" to beat his wife? Absent an external standard that governs you both, you simply don't. So both your calling of the law and their use of force in imprisoning him are no longer known reliably to be "moral," because we can't explain to ourselves what makes you and your law right, and him and Sharia wrong.
IC wrote:Harbal wrote:I suspect that doesn't answer your question, but your use of the word, duty, is giving me a problem.
Well, let's not make that a sticking point. After all, I gave you alternate words, such as "should" and "ought." You can pick the one you want, if the word "duty" offends you.
The word doesn't offend me, I think it is your expectations of it that are the problem. You can make somebody do something,
I'm glad I've cleared up your misunderstanding of me, then. By "duty" I mean the same thing you mean by "inner compulsion." I'm not talking about external force.
...as long as we have a sense of morality, we probably have at least some feeling of obligation to abide by it. I really haven't given any thought to how we get society as a whole to behave morally.
It's maybe time for that, then.
IC wrote:Harbal wrote:It seems to me that a duty is something one has to agree to, or accept, otherwise it is just an authoritative demand.
Okay. Let me repeat back, just so I get what you're saying right.
Your first criterion of morality would be that it has to be "self-imposed," and not "imposed" by an "authority"? Is that right?
If I am to believe it is morally right, yes.
Okay, I see. Thanks.
IC wrote:Harbal wrote:But to adopt a system, or impose duties, without knowing what you want to achieve by it makes no sense.
This would be a serious problem with the "self-imposed" criterion. It would give you no way of assessing, among all the desires it's possible for you (or others) to have, which of those desires is genuinely moral. And I'm pretty sure you're going to see the reasonableness of somebody doubting that, say, bloodlust or vengeance, or the desire to humiliate or rape, among other desires, are not likely to be appropriately moral. So if there are desire that one might "self-impose," but are not moral, we're going to need an additional criterion to divide between the things self-imposed on the basis of moral desires, and the things self-imposed by base, vile, violent or unworthy desires.
What can you supplement your first criterion with, so we eliminate the bad stuff?
I can't help you with that, I'm afraid. I just know that if I impose some moral "duty" on myself, I know what I want to achieve by it beforehand, otherwise I would have no reason to impose it.
Well, here we need to make another distinction. It's between the pragmatic and the moral. To be pragmatic is to do something that gets you some goal. To be moral, though, is to make sacrifices...to set aside one's pragmatic goals in order to respond to a higher good.
So, for example, we don't tend to think of a man as behaving "morally" for strategizing to fill his bank account or to buy himself a boat. We don't accuse him of being immoral, but we don't see any reason to regard him as virtuous or special in any way. He's just looking out for himself, and doing what makes sense. What's so "moral" about that?
But we start to admire the man's morals when he gives up his bank account to feed the hungry, or when he risks his boat to save soldiers from Dunkirk. Moral behaviour, in such cases, is the opposite of pragmatic. And that's why we admire it.
IC wrote:Harbal wrote:Well, basically, I think morality is what the dictionary says it is: Principles concerning the distinction between right and wrong or good and bad behaviour. I think I've said this a few times, in various ways.
It doesn't say where those "principles" come from, so it's really not very useful as a definition, I have to say.
I don't expect the dictionary to tell me what my moral values should be, so I don't share your disappointment at their absence from its pages. I prefer to sort those out for myself.
I don't expect a dictionary to tell me anything about morality but the most superficial. Its job is to define words, not to provide exhaustive information. Which is why it wasn't really useful in giving us the information we need.
It also doesn't tell us how to discern between "wrong" and "right" or "good" and "bad," so it really just says, "Somebody got something he/she calls 'a principle' from somewhere, and that's what morality is." If we can't do better than that, I'm afraid we'll never really have a definition for morality at all. It offers no criteria.
It seems to me I have two choices: I either work out how to discern between wrong and right myself, or I let somebody else tell me how to do it.
What if somebody suggests a moral precept, such as "You shouldn't steal," and it turns out your inner sense or conscience recognizes it as morally right? Do you think there's a conflict there?
Harbal wrote:... if I had to, and given time, I could probably give some account of what qualities a thing must have before I would call it moral.
Well, we've got a start. We agree that a "moral" value
1) should come with some sort of sense of duty or "compulsion," as you put it, to act on it. If you agree, we also know that
2) the "moral" should not be subject merely to the pragmatic, but involve a sacrifice for principle or a higher good. And I think we can go further, too:
3) the "moral" will inevitably involve social relations, or interactions with others -- and I think I can make that case. So we're making headway here.