TRUMP AHEAD?

[accelafine]

Why would someone need to be Jewish to know that there's no such place as 'palestine'? It's just fact. It's all Israel, including Gaza and the West Bank. Those so-called 'palestinians' are squatters.

This is trolling. It's not even good trolling. It's moron level.

Pot calling kettle black. Where is it then?

[Sculptor]

Are you muslim?

I'm not religious

Why would someone need to be Jewish to know that there's no such place as 'palestine'? It's just fact. It's all Israel, including Gaza and the West Bank. Those so-called 'palestinians' are squatters.

TROLL

[accelafine]

The wokesters never let you down. Everyone who doesn't share their idiocy is 'troll, bigot, racist, ____phobe'. I think that about covers their entire arsenal of 'counterarguments'

[Sculptor]

trump interview.jpg

This is a real transcript from an interview..

Not a fake. It's really how Trump speaks.

[Harbal]

In order for morality to be effective -result in some "good"- there needs to be some compulsion to abide by it, so some feeling of obligation, or "duty", would be necessary in that respect.

I think we're starting to find a point of agreement here. If somebody had a desire or idea, but had no sense of...to use your word..."compulsion," then it would lack something we require of any genuine "morality". And this gives us another criterion:

You are free to explore whatever aspects of morality you like, of course, but I should just point out that while the practice, or exercising, of morality collectively seems to be your main point of interest, it isn't really mine, and most of what I have said up to now hasn't really been in the context of morality on a social scale. But go ahead, I'll still comment on what you have to say.

Morality has to be capable of coming with some 'compulsive' property, at least in the way of a legitimate feeling of obligation, if not something more definite than that.

Well there are a number of things that could act as incentives to abide by a moral code, such as conscience, social pressure, and legal enforcement. How important do you think it is that those being compelled are willing subjects? I'm thinking now of behaviour that might be considered immoral by some people, but isn't prohibited by law.

That obligation could be placed on us by some legal system, or other authority, but if we experience it as a duty, I think that has to be self imposed.

Okay. Can I first summarize that, just to see if I've got your point? I think what you're saying is that you don't regard a...let's use your word..."compulsion" derived from outside of yourself to be genuinely "moral." Is that the substance of it?

There are a number of things that are more or less universally accepted as moral among "civilised" people and societies, so those things would, I suppose, be acceptable to most people, but there will always be instances of differing opinions about certain moral issues. You can force someone to comply with a moral rule, but you can't make him believe in its morality, in which case he would see that thing as a requirement, or obligation, but not as a duty. To feel a sense of duty, it seems to me, you have to believe in the thing you are required to do.

But then we have a further problem. If self-imposition is all that's required, can one "self-impose" something that is not moral? Can one be misguided by one's desires, or misinterpret one's obligation to one's "self-compulsion"? Or does everything one "self-imposes" automatically become "right" just because one "self-imposed" it?

Yes, we do have a problem if our mission is to get everyone singing from the same moral hymn sheet. The problem with trying to impose objectively moral standards on everyone is that we are depending on the choir master knowing what is objectively moral, and how can we be sure that he's got it right, and not misguided by his desires?

And one more problem: how are we to judge morally among opposite "compulsions"? If you find that beating women is immoral (which I assume you do), what do you do when your neighbour believes in Sharia and feels a "moral compulsion" or "moral obligation" to beat his wife (with the Koranic limits, of course; no using a stick thicker than a man's finger) when she displeases him or fails in some perceived responsibility?

I suppose I report him to the police.

I suspect that doesn't answer your question, but your use of the word, duty, is giving me a problem.

Well, let's not make that a sticking point. After all, I gave you alternate words, such as "should" and "ought." You can pick the one you want, if the word "duty" offends you.

The word doesn't offend me, I think it is your expectations of it that are the problem. You can make somebody do something, but you can't make them feel they have a duty to do it, or should do it, or ought to do it.

The important point is that at least one person has to gain some clear sense of obligation to do some particular thing (or to refrain from one), or "morality" isn't achieving what we definitionally expect of "morality." So really, you agree with my first criterion, so long as we change the word "duty" to something else, right?

As I have said, most of my comments on this thread have been in relation to our personal sense of morality, and as long as we have a sense of morality, we probably have at least some feeling of obligation to abide by it. I really haven't given any thought to how we get society as a whole to behave morally.

It seems to me that a duty is something one has to agree to, or accept, otherwise it is just an authoritative demand.

Okay. Let me repeat back, just so I get what you're saying right.

Your first criterion of morality would be that it has to be "self-imposed," and not "imposed" by an "authority"? Is that right?

If I am to believe it is morally right, yes.

But to adopt a system, or impose duties, without knowing what you want to achieve by it makes no sense.

This would be a serious problem with the "self-imposed" criterion. It would give you no way of assessing, among all the desires it's possible for you (or others) to have, which of those desires is genuinely moral. And I'm pretty sure you're going to see the reasonableness of somebody doubting that, say, bloodlust or vengeance, or the desire to humiliate or rape, among other desires, are not likely to be appropriately moral. So if there are desire that one might "self-impose," but are not moral, we're going to need an additional criterion to divide between the things self-imposed on the basis of moral desires, and the things self-imposed by base, vile, violent or unworthy desires.

What can you supplement your first criterion with, so we eliminate the bad stuff?

I can't help you with that, I'm afraid. I just know that if I impose some moral "duty" on myself, I know what I want to achieve by it beforehand, otherwise I would have no reason to impose it.

Well, basically, I think morality is what the dictionary says it is: Principles concerning the distinction between right and wrong or good and bad behaviour. I think I've said this a few times, in various ways.

It doesn't say where those "principles" come from, so it's really not very useful as a definition, I have to say.

I don't expect the dictionary to tell me what my moral values should be, so I don't share your disappointment at their absence from its pages. I prefer to sort those out for myself.

It also doesn't tell us how to discern between "wrong" and "right" or "good" and "bad," so it really just says, "Somebody got something he/she calls 'a principle' from somewhere, and that's what morality is." If we can't do better than that, I'm afraid we'll never really have a definition for morality at all. It offers no criteria.

It seems to me I have two choices: I either work out how to discern between wrong and right myself, or I let somebody else tell me how to do it. I think you know which option I'm going to choose.

I think there is a distinction between what might be called personal morality, and social morality,

I'm much more interested in the more basic issue of what qualities a thing must have before we call it "moral," whether it's applied to the personal, the social or the universal.

It is sometimes hard to put into words what we just experience as feelings and emotional responses, but if I had to, and given time, I could probably give some account of what qualities a thing must have before I would call it moral. It would be a very subjective account, and I still don't see how any other kind is possible.

[accelafine]

trump interview.jpg

This is a real transcript from an interview..

Not a fake. It's really how Trump speaks.

What's wrong with it?

[Harbal]

In order to be called moral, meaning ethically right, something must conform to a set of criteria that is deemed to be morally desirable. That in itself imposes no duty on anyone.

Please note that, in your case, and in the case of so many who write on this forum, the notion of a *metaphysical authority* and certainly a *divine authority*, which stands apart from time and being and which has established morals and moral obligations, is not a notion, not a fact, that you can now believe in (and will likely never believe in). So when you converse with IC, as well as with me (and possibly with some others but they do not seem to sound off here with much force or insistence), little and possibly no agreement will ever be possible.

The entire topic of morality, and justice, and social justice, economic justice, as well as the philosophy of right and decent relations between people in civil society, has been and still is largely determined by Christian theology and philosophy. Our entire jurisprudential system is an off-shoot, a development from those times when there was a far greater unity between theological authority and civil authority. The jurisprudential concepts -- laws and law's logics -- were in our cultures established when society was, let's say, ruled by Christian principles. And that does mean, or did mean, the recognition of an authority that determines and determined what is moral and what is not.

At one time that Authority was understood as *real* but now, for many, the entire idea has faded into a sort of shadow. A dim outline of what once was taken as the really real.

The problem in what you have written -- the semantic structure -- is that you can only believe that a morality, or a moral system, or a jurisprudential rule (law, command) must be determined by those who comprise the society. That is to say, by social agreement.

But when there is no, say, structure of morals, nor that *metaphysical basis* which sees, recognizes and conforms to the invisible order (which is what metaphysical order refers to: a set of concepts that are conceived in an invisible realm and which cannot ever be tangible located) the basis of agreement falls apart. There is no recognized and accepted basis for a moral system and, logically, it is left up to each person to make their own decision.

But if that is the case -- if morals becomes the elective choice -- then in truth the only sustaining constraint is law itself. That means the State or municipal authority.

If in a given society the people in it can no longer agree on what morality is and what is moral, then the result is a society where only the legal, municipal authority has the power to define and to punish infractions.

In theological terms -- and in Catholic theological terms (which I study) -- you defend a *naturalist* position. So for example does Iambiguous and many others. But IC, and I as well, defend and try to explain the reasoning behind the *supernaturalist* position. And in my own case the great benefit I have received when I am forced to confront your position, and Iambiguous's, and the general position held by most on this forum, is to be forced to see that there is a conflict that cannot be bridged.

So for example Christian morals and Catholic morals state that it is immoral in a very high degree (a 'mortal sin') to abort a baby. But the reasoning here is not naturalistic but entirely supernaturalistic. The argument against abortion is based solely in a supernaturalistic view of reality. That is, that it is an extreme crime to murder a nascent life. And it is *murder* when the supernatural view is taken as real and determining.

But from a naturalistic perspective there is no metaphysical rule that one violates when one excises that nascent being. And it is left to the choice and the decision of the mother or the couple. If once the state had authority (prohibiting it which it once did) it did so because of recognition of the supernatural right of that nascent life.

Curiously, and I think weirdly, once the notion of metaphysical and divine authority is no longer *believed in*, then all decisions fall back to individuals. And it stands to reason that in our societies that the entire notion of what is *moral* and *immoral* disengages from the very structures that originally defined them. In fact any *morality* is understood to be arbitrary -- simply an expedient choice made by the individual in the moment. There is no *bedrock* and there is no basis for moral rule. What does it come down to then? Vox populi on one side and civil authority (the State) on the other.

But on what basis would they, or will they, make their decisions? Who will determine ultimately what is right and what is wrong?

That in itself imposes no duty on anyone.

In fact I think that what you have said is quite wrong. The criteria establish laws, rules and regulations that must be obeyed (traffic laws, contract law, etc.). And if one believes in the rightness and goodness of those laws then one certainly has a *duty* to obey them because one believes in them.

The area that you disagree with is when the notion of supernaturally-defined laws is brought out as the basis of laws and morality. What you might not understand very well is that when individuals are formed through education to see, understand and believe in those moral precepts that have come into our world through religious authority, that their *duty* is to abide by those rules. And this is what you and so many others simply cannot accept.

The idea that a given society could be or would be oriented to Christian ethics and morality (let's say through democratic processes) and that would set down rules about proper and improper behavior and action, is intolerable to you. And yet oddly it also stands to reason that a given society could be composed of atheists and sheer *naturalists* who would, because their vote would control the education system and civil jurisprudence, set the general rules.

You might not be (enough) aware but this conflict between naturalist and supernaturalist systems of moral thought is playing out starkly today in our own culture. It plays out in rather crude terms but the real structures that stand behind each of the poles has not been sufficiently and clearly defined.

It is true that I have no wish to be dictated to by any religious authority, but I haven't made any argument to that effect. All I have talked about is my interpretation of what morality actually is. Not what I think it should be, or what I would like it to be, but what it really is. I think it worth noting, though, that all religion is devised by man, so whatever morality comes out of it is purely human based. And religious authorities are just the few dictating to the many.

[accelafine]

In order to be called moral, meaning ethically right, something must conform to a set of criteria that is deemed to be morally desirable. That in itself imposes no duty on anyone.

Please note that, in your case, and in the case of so many who write on this forum, the notion of a *metaphysical authority* and certainly a *divine authority*, which stands apart from time and being and which has established morals and moral obligations, is not a notion, not a fact, that you can now believe in (and will likely never believe in). So when you converse with IC, as well as with me (and possibly with some others but they do not seem to sound off here with much force or insistence), little and possibly no agreement will ever be possible.

The entire topic of morality, and justice, and social justice, economic justice, as well as the philosophy of right and decent relations between people in civil society, has been and still is largely determined by Christian theology and philosophy. Our entire jurisprudential system is an off-shoot, a development from those times when there was a far greater unity between theological authority and civil authority. The jurisprudential concepts -- laws and law's logics -- were in our cultures established when society was, let's say, ruled by Christian principles. And that does mean, or did mean, the recognition of an authority that determines and determined what is moral and what is not.

At one time that Authority was understood as *real* but now, for many, the entire idea has faded into a sort of shadow. A dim outline of what once was taken as the really real.

The problem in what you have written -- the semantic structure -- is that you can only believe that a morality, or a moral system, or a jurisprudential rule (law, command) must be determined by those who comprise the society. That is to say, by social agreement.

But when there is no, say, structure of morals, nor that *metaphysical basis* which sees, recognizes and conforms to the invisible order (which is what metaphysical order refers to: a set of concepts that are conceived in an invisible realm and which cannot ever be tangible located) the basis of agreement falls apart. There is no recognized and accepted basis for a moral system and, logically, it is left up to each person to make their own decision.

But if that is the case -- if morals becomes the elective choice -- then in truth the only sustaining constraint is law itself. That means the State or municipal authority.

If in a given society the people in it can no longer agree on what morality is and what is moral, then the result is a society where only the legal, municipal authority has the power to define and to punish infractions.

In theological terms -- and in Catholic theological terms (which I study) -- you defend a *naturalist* position. So for example does Iambiguous and many others. But IC, and I as well, defend and try to explain the reasoning behind the *supernaturalist* position. And in my own case the great benefit I have received when I am forced to confront your position, and Iambiguous's, and the general position held by most on this forum, is to be forced to see that there is a conflict that cannot be bridged.

So for example Christian morals and Catholic morals state that it is immoral in a very high degree (a 'mortal sin') to abort a baby. But the reasoning here is not naturalistic but entirely supernaturalistic. The argument against abortion is based solely in a supernaturalistic view of reality. That is, that it is an extreme crime to murder a nascent life. And it is *murder* when the supernatural view is taken as real and determining.

But from a naturalistic perspective there is no metaphysical rule that one violates when one excises that nascent being. And it is left to the choice and the decision of the mother or the couple. If once the state had authority (prohibiting it which it once did) it did so because of recognition of the supernatural right of that nascent life.

Curiously, and I think weirdly, once the notion of metaphysical and divine authority is no longer *believed in*, then all decisions fall back to individuals. And it stands to reason that in our societies that the entire notion of what is *moral* and *immoral* disengages from the very structures that originally defined them. In fact any *morality* is understood to be arbitrary -- simply an expedient choice made by the individual in the moment. There is no *bedrock* and there is no basis for moral rule. What does it come down to then? Vox populi on one side and civil authority (the State) on the other.

But on what basis would they, or will they, make their decisions? Who will determine ultimately what is right and what is wrong?

That in itself imposes no duty on anyone.

In fact I think that what you have said is quite wrong. The criteria establish laws, rules and regulations that must be obeyed (traffic laws, contract law, etc.). And if one believes in the rightness and goodness of those laws then one certainly has a *duty* to obey them because one believes in them.

The area that you disagree with is when the notion of supernaturally-defined laws is brought out as the basis of laws and morality. What you might not understand very well is that when individuals are formed through education to see, understand and believe in those moral precepts that have come into our world through religious authority, that their *duty* is to abide by those rules. And this is what you and so many others simply cannot accept.

The idea that a given society could be or would be oriented to Christian ethics and morality (let's say through democratic processes) and that would set down rules about proper and improper behavior and action, is intolerable to you. And yet oddly it also stands to reason that a given society could be composed of atheists and sheer *naturalists* who would, because their vote would control the education system and civil jurisprudence, set the general rules.

You might not be (enough) aware but this conflict between naturalist and supernaturalist systems of moral thought is playing out starkly today in our own culture. It plays out in rather crude terms but the real structures that stand behind each of the poles has not been sufficiently and clearly defined.

It is true that I have no wish to be dictated to by any religious authority, but I haven't made any argument to that effect. All I have talked about is my interpretation of what morality actually is. Not what I think it should be, or what I would like it to be, but what it really is. I think it worth noting, though, that all religion is devised by man, so whatever morality comes out of it is purely human based. And religious authorities are just the few dictating to the many.

I think you're on the wrong thread.

[Alexis Jacobi]

John Mearsheimer explains Israel and Hamas in coherent, realistic terms.

[commonsense]

The Jews dragged the Christian world into that conflict, otherwise the Christians don't even care about the Middle East...

Not true.
CHristians have always been front and centre of Israel/Palestine. Sir Arthur Balfour, a Christian wrote the Declaration handing the territory over to the Jews. Sykes/Pichot the ENglsih and French Officials that carved up the ME after WW1, both CHristian.
Every president of the USA< and France from then to the present day, as well as the Chencellors of Germany and the UK Prime Ministers have all funded and feed the monstrous wars and atrocities over 70+ years.
Without their help Israel would never have been established, and having been established would never have survived.
Now the religious right, (especially) Republicans, push funding decisions, and politicians on both sides love the AIPAC money.
THe shocking irony is that the governments of UK, US, and Germany tax the people, hand over billions to Isreal and Israeli politicians hand some of that money back in millions in open bribes to ensure that the billions contonue to flow. Israel uses that "aid" to buy British and American arms to slaughter women and children.

Yeah but those countries were all under Jewish control in the last 70+ years.

Whaaat?

[Immanuel Can]

I should just point out that while the practice, or exercising, of morality collectively seems to be your main point of interest, it isn't really mine,

I have not the slightest idea why you would think that. I've been speaking about the definition and meaning of morality, not the exercising thereof. But morality is nothing if not "practical." What would an "unpracticed morality" even look like?

Morality has to be capable of coming with some 'compulsive' property, at least in the way of a legitimate feeling of obligation, if not something more definite than that.

Well there are a number of things that could act as incentives to abide by a moral code, such as conscience, social pressure, and legal enforcement. How important do you think it is that those being compelled are willing subjects?

I don't think it's an either-or. One can be quite "willing" while assenting to a morality first suggested to one by somebody else.

But "compulsion" was your word, and I think it has an even worse susceptibility than the word "duty": namely, that while "duty" may be imposed, a "sense of duty" is not; but one of its meanings of "compulsion" is the idea of force being used -- which is not, I think, the nuance you intended it to have at all. I think you were aiming to point to a kind of inner compulsion, a sense of duty-arising-from-within, one in which the moral person participates by consent and agreement with the relevant moral principle. And I have no problem with that.

I'm thinking now of behaviour that might be considered immoral by some people, but isn't prohibited by law.

Human law isn't the source of morality, of course. Human laws are highly variable and changing, and we have many cases of laws that have been highly immoral. What the law is, at its best, is an attempt to reflect the truth about morality. To do justice. To show mercy. To deliver what is deserved and appropriate. But the ideal to which such law, the law as it should be, aspires is not given vision by the mere fact of law, but by an ideal...such as the ideal of justice.

That obligation could be placed on us by some legal system, or other authority, but if we experience it as a duty, I think that has to be self imposed.

Okay. Can I first summarize that, just to see if I've got your point? I think what you're saying is that you don't regard a...let's use your word..."compulsion" derived from outside of yourself to be genuinely "moral." Is that the substance of it?

There are a number of things that are more or less universally accepted as moral among "civilised" people and societies,

That's problematic. Who gets to say which societies count as "civilized"?

You can force someone to comply with a moral rule, but you can't make him believe in its morality, in which case he would see that thing as a requirement, or obligation, but not as a duty. To feel a sense of duty, it seems to me, you have to believe in the thing you are required to do.

Yes, I think that's right. But I trust you understand I'm not proposing we use any force. And I recognize the value of consent.

There are two different issues here: morality and law. They're not the same. Morality is the ideals with which people should agree. But it must be quite obvious that these are not always, and are never perfectly, reflected in laws. Laws are very fallible. And some are downright unjust.

But then we have a further problem. If self-imposition is all that's required, can one "self-impose" something that is not moral? Can one be misguided by one's desires, or misinterpret one's obligation to one's "self-compulsion"? Or does everything one "self-imposes" automatically become "right" just because one "self-imposed" it?

Yes, we do have a problem if our mission is to get everyone singing from the same moral hymn sheet.

No, that's not the problem, really.
Even if we have different people doing different things, there are things which arise inside every person that are not moral. And one may have a compulsion for revenge, lust, gluttony, covetousness, cruelty, hatred, cowardice and so on. The real problem is what to do with the fact that our inner "compulsions," including those of every individual, are actually often quite dark. How then can we use our "inner compulsions" to deliver to us reliable information about what we should morally do?

The problem with trying to impose objectively moral standards on everyone is that we are depending on the choir master knowing what is objectively moral, and how can we be sure that he's got it right, and not misguided by his desires?

Well, we'd better pick a reliable choir-master. And I know of no human being whose fit for that task, do you?

And one more problem: how are we to judge morally among opposite "compulsions"? If you find that beating women is immoral (which I assume you do), what do you do when your neighbour believes in Sharia and feels a "moral compulsion" or "moral obligation" to beat his wife (with the Koranic limits, of course; no using a stick thicker than a man's finger) when she displeases him or fails in some perceived responsibility?

I suppose I report him to the police.

But on what basis do you know that your "compulsion" to call the law on him is better than his "compulsion" to beat his wife? Absent an external standard that governs you both, you simply don't. So both your calling of the law and their use of force in imprisoning him are no longer known reliably to be "moral," because we can't explain to ourselves what makes you and your law right, and him and Sharia wrong.

I suspect that doesn't answer your question, but your use of the word, duty, is giving me a problem.

Well, let's not make that a sticking point. After all, I gave you alternate words, such as "should" and "ought." You can pick the one you want, if the word "duty" offends you.

The word doesn't offend me, I think it is your expectations of it that are the problem. You can make somebody do something,

I'm glad I've cleared up your misunderstanding of me, then. By "duty" I mean the same thing you mean by "inner compulsion." I'm not talking about external force.

...as long as we have a sense of morality, we probably have at least some feeling of obligation to abide by it. I really haven't given any thought to how we get society as a whole to behave morally.

It's maybe time for that, then.

It seems to me that a duty is something one has to agree to, or accept, otherwise it is just an authoritative demand.

Okay. Let me repeat back, just so I get what you're saying right.

Your first criterion of morality would be that it has to be "self-imposed," and not "imposed" by an "authority"? Is that right?

If I am to believe it is morally right, yes.

Okay, I see. Thanks.

But to adopt a system, or impose duties, without knowing what you want to achieve by it makes no sense.

This would be a serious problem with the "self-imposed" criterion. It would give you no way of assessing, among all the desires it's possible for you (or others) to have, which of those desires is genuinely moral. And I'm pretty sure you're going to see the reasonableness of somebody doubting that, say, bloodlust or vengeance, or the desire to humiliate or rape, among other desires, are not likely to be appropriately moral. So if there are desire that one might "self-impose," but are not moral, we're going to need an additional criterion to divide between the things self-imposed on the basis of moral desires, and the things self-imposed by base, vile, violent or unworthy desires.

What can you supplement your first criterion with, so we eliminate the bad stuff?

I can't help you with that, I'm afraid. I just know that if I impose some moral "duty" on myself, I know what I want to achieve by it beforehand, otherwise I would have no reason to impose it.

Well, here we need to make another distinction. It's between the pragmatic and the moral. To be pragmatic is to do something that gets you some goal. To be moral, though, is to make sacrifices...to set aside one's pragmatic goals in order to respond to a higher good.

So, for example, we don't tend to think of a man as behaving "morally" for strategizing to fill his bank account or to buy himself a boat. We don't accuse him of being immoral, but we don't see any reason to regard him as virtuous or special in any way. He's just looking out for himself, and doing what makes sense. What's so "moral" about that?

But we start to admire the man's morals when he gives up his bank account to feed the hungry, or when he risks his boat to save soldiers from Dunkirk. Moral behaviour, in such cases, is the opposite of pragmatic. And that's why we admire it.

Well, basically, I think morality is what the dictionary says it is: Principles concerning the distinction between right and wrong or good and bad behaviour. I think I've said this a few times, in various ways.

It doesn't say where those "principles" come from, so it's really not very useful as a definition, I have to say.

I don't expect the dictionary to tell me what my moral values should be, so I don't share your disappointment at their absence from its pages. I prefer to sort those out for myself.

I don't expect a dictionary to tell me anything about morality but the most superficial. Its job is to define words, not to provide exhaustive information. Which is why it wasn't really useful in giving us the information we need.

It also doesn't tell us how to discern between "wrong" and "right" or "good" and "bad," so it really just says, "Somebody got something he/she calls 'a principle' from somewhere, and that's what morality is." If we can't do better than that, I'm afraid we'll never really have a definition for morality at all. It offers no criteria.

It seems to me I have two choices: I either work out how to discern between wrong and right myself, or I let somebody else tell me how to do it.

What if somebody suggests a moral precept, such as "You shouldn't steal," and it turns out your inner sense or conscience recognizes it as morally right? Do you think there's a conflict there?

... if I had to, and given time, I could probably give some account of what qualities a thing must have before I would call it moral.

Well, we've got a start. We agree that a "moral" value 1) should come with some sort of sense of duty or "compulsion," as you put it, to act on it. If you agree, we also know that 2) the "moral" should not be subject merely to the pragmatic, but involve a sacrifice for principle or a higher good. And I think we can go further, too: 3) the "moral" will inevitably involve social relations, or interactions with others -- and I think I can make that case. So we're making headway here.

[Harbal]

I should just point out that while the practice, or exercising, of morality collectively seems to be your main point of interest, it isn't really mine,

I have not the slightest idea why you would think that. I've been speaking about the definition and meaning of morality, not the exercising thereof. But morality is nothing if not "practical." What would an "unpracticed morality" even look like?

What I mean is that I have mainly talked about my own sense of morality, and why I try to put it into practice. Your interest seems to have been more in why others should adopt any particular moral stance. So I am just making it clear that my main concern is my own moral conduct, not that of others.

Well there are a number of things that could act as incentives to abide by a moral code, such as conscience, social pressure, and legal enforcement. How important do you think it is that those being compelled are willing subjects?

I don't think it's an either-or. One can be quite "willing" while assenting to a morality first suggested to one by somebody else.

Yes, I suppose one could be.

There are a number of things that are more or less universally accepted as moral among "civilised" people and societies,

That's problematic. Who gets to say which societies count as "civilized"?

By civilised, I mean most societies. I was just allowing for the exclusion of the odd cannibalistic tribe that might exist in some remote part of some rain forest, or something.

There are two different issues here: morality and law. They're not the same. Morality is the ideals with which people should agree. But it must be quite obvious that these are not always, and are never perfectly, reflected in laws. Laws are very fallible. And some are downright unjust.

Yes, I agree with that.

Yes, we do have a problem if our mission is to get everyone singing from the same moral hymn sheet.

No, that's not the problem, really.
Even if we have different people doing different things, there are things which arise inside every person that are not moral. And one may have a compulsion for revenge, lust, gluttony, covetousness, cruelty, hatred, cowardice and so on. The real problem is what to do with the fact that our inner "compulsions," including those of every individual, are actually often quite dark. How then can we use our "inner compulsions" to deliver to us reliable information about what we should morally do?

I agree that the moral conduct of some people is a social problem, and that it is legitimate for it to be addressed.

The problem with trying to impose objectively moral standards on everyone is that we are depending on the choir master knowing what is objectively moral, and how can we be sure that he's got it right, and not misguided by his desires?

Well, we'd better pick a reliable choir-master. And I know of no human being whose fit for that task, do you?

Wherever the moral message is purported to have originated, it is always delivered by a human being, and I don't know how we can be sure that the human being is fit for that task.

I suppose I report him to the police.

But on what basis do you know that your "compulsion" to call the law on him is better than his "compulsion" to beat his wife? Absent an external standard that governs you both, you simply don't. So both your calling of the law and their use of force in imprisoning him are no longer known reliably to be "moral," because we can't explain to ourselves what makes you and your law right, and him and Sharia wrong.

The only basis I have is my own sense of morality. I am yet to be convinced there is any other basis on which I could do it and still feel morally right.

...as long as we have a sense of morality, we probably have at least some feeling of obligation to abide by it. I really haven't given any thought to how we get society as a whole to behave morally.

It's maybe time for that, then.

Try to think of a way to get my moral values universally accepted, you mean?

I just know that if I impose some moral "duty" on myself, I know what I want to achieve by it beforehand, otherwise I would have no reason to impose it.

Well, here we need to make another distinction. It's between the pragmatic and the moral. To be pragmatic is to do something that gets you some goal. To be moral, though, is to make sacrifices...to set aside one's pragmatic goals in order to respond to a higher good.

That distinction would already have been made.

I don't expect the dictionary to tell me what my moral values should be, so I don't share your disappointment at their absence from its pages. I prefer to sort those out for myself.

I don't expect a dictionary to tell me anything about morality but the most superficial. Its job is to define words, not to provide exhaustive information. Which is why it wasn't really useful in giving us the information we need.

But it gives you the information you asked for. You asked what I thought morality was.

It seems to me I have two choices: I either work out how to discern between wrong and right myself, or I let somebody else tell me how to do it.

What if somebody suggests a moral precept, such as "You shouldn't steal," and it turns out your inner sense or conscience recognizes it as morally right? Do you think there's a conflict there?

No, but it would indicate that I wasn't in need of that somebody's suggestion in the first place.

... if I had to, and given time, I could probably give some account of what qualities a thing must have before I would call it moral.

Well, we've got a start. We agree that a "moral" value 1) should come with some sort of sense of duty or "compulsion," as you put it, to act on it. If you agree, we also know that 2) the "moral" should not be subject merely to the pragmatic, but involve a sacrifice for principle or a higher good. And I think we can go further, too: 3) the "moral" will inevitably involve social relations, or interactions with others -- and I think I can make that case. So we're making headway here.

Yes, I agree with that.

[Sculptor]

trump interview.jpg

This is a real transcript from an interview..

Not a fake. It's really how Trump speaks.

What's wrong with it?

[accelafine]

What an utter moron.

[Immanuel Can]

I should just point out that while the practice, or exercising, of morality collectively seems to be your main point of interest, it isn't really mine,

I have not the slightest idea why you would think that. I've been speaking about the definition and meaning of morality, not the exercising thereof. But morality is nothing if not "practical." What would an "unpracticed morality" even look like?

What I mean is that I have mainly talked about my own sense of morality, and why I try to put it into practice. Your interest seems to have been more in why others should adopt any particular moral stance. So I am just making it clear that my main concern is my own moral conduct, not that of others.

My actual concern is to arrive at a better definition of "morality" -- useful for both personal morality and social codes, because without such a clear conception, one cannot even think of oneself as "moral" and mean anything by the word.

There are a number of things that are more or less universally accepted as moral among "civilised" people and societies,

That's problematic. Who gets to say which societies count as "civilized"?

By civilised, I mean most societies.

Well, that isn't true, of course. For example, slavery, warfare and the subjugation of women are three of the oldest and most common features of all societies. Do we really want to argue that their popularity makes them right? I can't imagine that you do. But that's what that standard, whatever societies have commonly done, would actually rationalize, if we tried to practice it.

Yes, we do have a problem if our mission is to get everyone singing from the same moral hymn sheet.

No, that's not the problem, really.
Even if we have different people doing different things, there are things which arise inside every person that are not moral. And one may have a compulsion for revenge, lust, gluttony, covetousness, cruelty, hatred, cowardice and so on. The real problem is what to do with the fact that our inner "compulsions," including those of every individual, are actually often quite dark. How then can we use our "inner compulsions" to deliver to us reliable information about what we should morally do?

I agree that the moral conduct of some people is a social problem, and that it is legitimate for it to be addressed.

Then two questions: on what rational basis do we condemn the conduct of these "some people," and believe our own conduct to be better; and how is it "legitimate" for us to "address" somebody else's subjective view of morality? Those things need explanation, if we're going to regard ourselves as good people acting rightly.

The problem with trying to impose objectively moral standards on everyone is that we are depending on the choir master knowing what is objectively moral, and how can we be sure that he's got it right, and not misguided by his desires?

Well, we'd better pick a reliable choir-master. And I know of no human being whose fit for that task, do you?

Wherever the moral message is purported to have originated, it is always delivered by a human being,

That's the point of contention, though: you think that's true, and I think there are moral principles we get from a transcendent Source. That's the matter we'd have to settle. And unless you want to rule on it arbitrarily and just dismiss my view without reason, then you'd need more than a wish to dispatch the possibility that I, and so many other persons of faith, are simply all confused about that.

But I see why that conclusion does fit with your assumptions. But we should be able to see why they're better than assumptions, if they are.

I suppose I report him to the police.

But on what basis do you know that your "compulsion" to call the law on him is better than his "compulsion" to beat his wife? Absent an external standard that governs you both, you simply don't. So both your calling of the law and their use of force in imprisoning him are no longer known reliably to be "moral," because we can't explain to ourselves what makes you and your law right, and him and Sharia wrong.

The only basis I have is my own sense of morality.

Why, then, is the Sharia practitioner obligated to agree with somebody else's "sense of morality"? Yet you would subject him to the force of the law and to imprisonment, and all for following his own "sense of morality"?

...as long as we have a sense of morality, we probably have at least some feeling of obligation to abide by it. I really haven't given any thought to how we get society as a whole to behave morally.

It's maybe time for that, then.

Try to think of a way to get my moral values universally accepted, you mean?

Well, at least to justify your own moral beliefs sufficiently that others can say, "Yes, I see why you believe what you believe, and I can reasonably make space for you to believe and practice that.

This brings us to that other feature of all morality that I think I can prove to you.

• Morality always involves other people.

I just know that if I impose some moral "duty" on myself, I know what I want to achieve by it beforehand, otherwise I would have no reason to impose it.

Well, here we need to make another distinction. It's between the pragmatic and the moral. To be pragmatic is to do something that gets you some goal. To be moral, though, is to make sacrifices...to set aside one's pragmatic goals in order to respond to a higher good.

That distinction would already have been made.

I'm not sure I understand that response.

I don't expect the dictionary to tell me what my moral values should be, so I don't share your disappointment at their absence from its pages. I prefer to sort those out for myself.

I don't expect a dictionary to tell me anything about morality but the most superficial. Its job is to define words, not to provide exhaustive information. Which is why it wasn't really useful in giving us the information we need.

But it gives you the information you asked for. You asked what I thought morality was.

I need much more than that. And so do you, if you want to rationalize your own moral choices, or even explain precisely to yourself why you should opt to make them.

It seems to me I have two choices: I either work out how to discern between wrong and right myself, or I let somebody else tell me how to do it.

What if somebody suggests a moral precept, such as "You shouldn't steal," and it turns out your inner sense or conscience recognizes it as morally right? Do you think there's a conflict there?

No, but it would indicate that I wasn't in need of that somebody's suggestion in the first place.

That would be true only if your own internal moral register were infallible...that you could never think one thing, and then decide another, and thus that information from outside sources was totally misleading and useless to you. In other words, if you and I had nothing whatsoever to learn about morality. But is that our case?

... if I had to, and given time, I could probably give some account of what qualities a thing must have before I would call it moral.

Well, we've got a start. We agree that a "moral" value 1) should come with some sort of sense of duty or "compulsion," as you put it, to act on it. If you agree, we also know that 2) the "moral" should not be subject merely to the pragmatic, but involve a sacrifice for principle or a higher good. And I think we can go further, too: 3) the "moral" will inevitably involve social relations, or interactions with others -- and I think I can make that case. So we're making headway here.

Yes, I agree with that.

Then isn't our discussion at least marginally fruitful? We have at least three criteria we didn't have consciousness of before. We seemt to be getting somewhere, do we not?