Prove me wrong: there is no God

[MikeNovack]

My argument is that there was at least one First Cause. Yours is that there plausibly could have been more or many. Prima facie, my argument is in a better position relative to Occam's Rule. So the burden of proof falls on the one supposing a multiplicity.

That would be you. Having seen that at least one First Cause is necessary, make your case for more...

I don't have to (demonstrate more than one chain exists) to claim you can't PROVE "if C1 and C2 are chains of causality in the universe, C1 = C2". That is the formal statement of "only one chain/First Cause". That you need another axiom for that.

Occam's razor not useful for proofs, and in any case, why would you imagine it applied here. I can see how you might argue one chain is simpler/more likely than any other specific number of chains, but more likely than ANY other number? There are an awful lot lot of them. Saying "one more likely than two, one more likely than three, ..... Pick any amount of "more likely" you want. For example, if you say (by Occam) one is a hundred times more likely than two, than three, etc. I am not going to PICK a particular number but instead point out that (1 - .01) ** N << the likelihood by which one is more likely than all number up to N >> approaches zero as N increases, and N is without limit.

[Immanuel Can]

My argument is that there was at least one First Cause. Yours is that there plausibly could have been more or many. Prima facie, my argument is in a better position relative to Occam's Rule. So the burden of proof falls on the one supposing a multiplicity.

That would be you. Having seen that at least one First Cause is necessary, make your case for more...

Occam's razor not useful for proofs, and in any case, why would you imagine it applied here.

That's why I call it a "rule," not an absolute law. There are cases in which the more complicated explanation turns out to be the right one: but that's also why I underlined the fact that it must explain exactly the same phenomena equally well, or the rule doesn't stick.

But it is useful when things are equal. And it is useful for establishing who has the burden of proof. Granted the same phenomena, which, in this case, is the whole observable universe, it's the person who multiplies explanations without necessity that needs to do the explaining.

So the question comes back: granted the necessity of a First Cause, how is a multiple-first-causes kind of explanation to be preferred to the one-first-cause explanation? The advocate of the more complex theory has the burden to show his theory is better.

Can you?

[MikeNovack]

My argument is that there was at least one First Cause. Yours is that there plausibly could have been more or many. Prima facie, my argument is in a better position relative to Occam's Rule. So the burden of proof falls on the one supposing a multiplicity.
That's why I call it a "rule," not an absolute law. There are cases in which the more complicated explanation turns out to be the right one: but that's also why I underlined the fact that it must explain exactly the same phenomena equally well, or the rule doesn't stick.

But it is useful when things are equal. And it is useful for establishing who has the burden of proof. Granted the same phenomena, which, in this case, is the whole observable universe, it's the person who multiplies explanations without necessity that needs to do the explaining.

So the question comes back: granted the necessity of a First Cause, how is a multiple-first-causes kind of explanation to be preferred to the one-first-cause explanation? The advocate of the more complex theory has the burden to show his theory is better.

Can you?

NOT the issue. I am not even claiming more than one. I am saying you can't DERIVE only one (without another axiom). Stating "one exists" says NOTHING about more than one IMPOSSIBLE. And while formal, note there are no numbers involved, not counting. When you say "there is exactly one" you are saying "A First Cause exists" and "IF there was another First Cause it would be the same". Remember how a First Cause was defined, just didn't have a cause, What about JUST that leads to the statement of uniqueness.

There is a basket.
It has an apple in it.
Therefore there is one apple in the basket.

That's your argument? That it's simpler to have just one apple than three, or seventeen?

BTW: I do understand WHY you are so desperate, since when identifying a First Cause as a deity, if multiple First Causes are POSSIBLE then so is polytheism.

PS: Extra credit: Have we shown that a First Cause has effects? In other words, derived "if C is a First Cause, then there exists a T such that C is the cause of T". We defined a First Cause simply as having no cause, never said it had to have an effect.

[Impenitent]

Occam didn't have a beard

-Imp

[Immanuel Can]

My argument is that there was at least one First Cause. Yours is that there plausibly could have been more or many. Prima facie, my argument is in a better position relative to Occam's Rule. So the burden of proof falls on the one supposing a multiplicity.
That's why I call it a "rule," not an absolute law. There are cases in which the more complicated explanation turns out to be the right one: but that's also why I underlined the fact that it must explain exactly the same phenomena equally well, or the rule doesn't stick.

But it is useful when things are equal. And it is useful for establishing who has the burden of proof. Granted the same phenomena, which, in this case, is the whole observable universe, it's the person who multiplies explanations without necessity that needs to do the explaining.

So the question comes back: granted the necessity of a First Cause, how is a multiple-first-causes kind of explanation to be preferred to the one-first-cause explanation? The advocate of the more complex theory has the burden to show his theory is better.

Can you?

NOT the issue. I am not even claiming more than one.

You were saying polytheism could be made coherent. That means more than one "god."

Okay, let's see your coherent account of multiple First Causes.