Prove me wrong: there is no God

[MikeNovack]

My argument is that there was at least one First Cause. Yours is that there plausibly could have been more or many. Prima facie, my argument is in a better position relative to Occam's Rule. So the burden of proof falls on the one supposing a multiplicity.

That would be you. Having seen that at least one First Cause is necessary, make your case for more...

I don't have to (demonstrate more than one chain exists) to claim you can't PROVE "if C1 and C2 are chains of causality in the universe, C1 = C2". That is the formal statement of "only one chain/First Cause". That you need another axiom for that.

Occam's razor not useful for proofs, and in any case, why would you imagine it applied here. I can see how you might argue one chain is simpler/more likely than any other specific number of chains, but more likely than ANY other number? There are an awful lot lot of them. Saying "one more likely than two, one more likely than three, ..... Pick any amount of "more likely" you want. For example, if you say (by Occam) one is a hundred times more likely than two, than three, etc. I am not going to PICK a particular number but instead point out that (1 - .01) ** N << the likelihood by which one is more likely than all number up to N >> approaches zero as N increases, and N is without limit.

[Immanuel Can]

My argument is that there was at least one First Cause. Yours is that there plausibly could have been more or many. Prima facie, my argument is in a better position relative to Occam's Rule. So the burden of proof falls on the one supposing a multiplicity.

That would be you. Having seen that at least one First Cause is necessary, make your case for more...

Occam's razor not useful for proofs, and in any case, why would you imagine it applied here.

That's why I call it a "rule," not an absolute law. There are cases in which the more complicated explanation turns out to be the right one: but that's also why I underlined the fact that it must explain exactly the same phenomena equally well, or the rule doesn't stick.

But it is useful when things are equal. And it is useful for establishing who has the burden of proof. Granted the same phenomena, which, in this case, is the whole observable universe, it's the person who multiplies explanations without necessity that needs to do the explaining.

So the question comes back: granted the necessity of a First Cause, how is a multiple-first-causes kind of explanation to be preferred to the one-first-cause explanation? The advocate of the more complex theory has the burden to show his theory is better.

Can you?

[MikeNovack]

My argument is that there was at least one First Cause. Yours is that there plausibly could have been more or many. Prima facie, my argument is in a better position relative to Occam's Rule. So the burden of proof falls on the one supposing a multiplicity.
That's why I call it a "rule," not an absolute law. There are cases in which the more complicated explanation turns out to be the right one: but that's also why I underlined the fact that it must explain exactly the same phenomena equally well, or the rule doesn't stick.

But it is useful when things are equal. And it is useful for establishing who has the burden of proof. Granted the same phenomena, which, in this case, is the whole observable universe, it's the person who multiplies explanations without necessity that needs to do the explaining.

So the question comes back: granted the necessity of a First Cause, how is a multiple-first-causes kind of explanation to be preferred to the one-first-cause explanation? The advocate of the more complex theory has the burden to show his theory is better.

Can you?

NOT the issue. I am not even claiming more than one. I am saying you can't DERIVE only one (without another axiom). Stating "one exists" says NOTHING about more than one IMPOSSIBLE. And while formal, note there are no numbers involved, not counting. When you say "there is exactly one" you are saying "A First Cause exists" and "IF there was another First Cause it would be the same". Remember how a First Cause was defined, just didn't have a cause, What about JUST that leads to the statement of uniqueness.

There is a basket.
It has an apple in it.
Therefore there is one apple in the basket.

That's your argument? That it's simpler to have just one apple than three, or seventeen?

BTW: I do understand WHY you are so desperate, since when identifying a First Cause as a deity, if multiple First Causes are POSSIBLE then so is polytheism.

PS: Extra credit: Have we shown that a First Cause has effects? In other words, derived "if C is a First Cause, then there exists a T such that C is the cause of T". We defined a First Cause simply as having no cause, never said it had to have an effect.

[Impenitent]

Occam didn't have a beard

-Imp

[Immanuel Can]

My argument is that there was at least one First Cause. Yours is that there plausibly could have been more or many. Prima facie, my argument is in a better position relative to Occam's Rule. So the burden of proof falls on the one supposing a multiplicity.
That's why I call it a "rule," not an absolute law. There are cases in which the more complicated explanation turns out to be the right one: but that's also why I underlined the fact that it must explain exactly the same phenomena equally well, or the rule doesn't stick.

But it is useful when things are equal. And it is useful for establishing who has the burden of proof. Granted the same phenomena, which, in this case, is the whole observable universe, it's the person who multiplies explanations without necessity that needs to do the explaining.

So the question comes back: granted the necessity of a First Cause, how is a multiple-first-causes kind of explanation to be preferred to the one-first-cause explanation? The advocate of the more complex theory has the burden to show his theory is better.

Can you?

NOT the issue. I am not even claiming more than one.

You were saying polytheism could be made coherent. That means more than one "god."

Okay, let's see your coherent account of multiple First Causes.

[MikeNovack]

So the question comes back: granted the necessity of a First Cause, how is a multiple-first-causes kind of explanation to be preferred to the one-first-cause explanation? The advocate of the more complex theory has the burden to show his theory is better.

Can you?

<<<<NOT the issue. I am not even claiming more than one.>>>
You were saying polytheism could be made coherent. That means more than one "god."

Okay, let's see your coherent account of multiple First Causes.

I am NOT claiming more than one. No need for me to prove there IS more than one. Just (if challenged properly) to show neither an axiom stating only one nor an axiom stating more than one is possible do not conflict with the other axioms. I even gave you an example of a "possible", a set of things where some things were in a casual chain leading to a first cause and another set of things in a causal chain leading to a first cause. Your assumptions about the behavior of "caused by" << what I call axioms of "caused by" >> say that these chains will end in A first cause. They do not say will end in THE first cause. You show one by demonstrating that the proposed two first causes are equal (the same, so only one).

Occam's Razor really of no use here. Nor is it something always applied. You often do not choose the simplest possible explanation of the evidence. You come down in the morning and find scattered mouse droppings on a kitchen counter. You have excellent evidence that there is at least one mouse in the house. The simplest possible explanation for the observed droppings is just one mouse. Is that what you believe?

The reason using symbols in formal logic is to strip away your attachment to the meaning of what is being described, to remove your emotional attachment to them. It is only your association of First Cause with the one God you believe in that gives you reason to commit to "one First Cause" even though that not derivable from JUST the assumptions about "cause" you used to determine "a First Cause exists". There is nothing at all wrong about adding another axiom << like if C1 is a First Cause and C2 is a First Cause then C1 = C2 >> What's wrong is to continue thinking you had derived that by use of the other cause axioms.

BTW -- we've been a little lax about the properties of "cause", ignoring necessary causes vs sufficient causes. Take "fire", what IS the cause of "fire"? Or rather, what ARE the causes of fire --- remember the old something that can burn (oxidize) plus presence of Oxygen plus high enough temperature (energy perparticle). Thus presence of Oxygen a necessary cause but not a sufficient cause. Oxygen and high temperature will not set a lump of gold on fire, high temperature and a piece of wood cause no fire in a chamber filled with Argon.

Also lax in not considering the if A is the cause of B and A is the cause of C it is not necessarily true that B and C are in the same causal chain. We didn't need to worry about that since just trying to get to First Cause, inward bound, not outward. However in the case of "fire", we do NOT know those three "causes" are in the same causal chain << unless proven "there is only one causal chain", "there is only one First Cause", etc. >>

[Immanuel Can]

I am NOT claiming more than one.

Then you're not claiming anything about polytheism. And that's fine.

[Will Bouwman]

And if the BB had a "cause," as current science seems to insist...

It doesn't seem that way to me. There are hypotheses that posit conditions prior to the big bang, but what particular science seems to you to insist on a cause?

...and that maybe the cause was something like gasses free floating...somewhere...we're back into a causal chain.

You must be confusing gases with quantum fields.

How were the gasses there...

Well, we know that quantum fields reach to infinity. At least we know that as well as you know your infinite regress argument, because the force in a field of a single particle, tiny to start with and even diminishing according to the inverse square law, never reaches zero. In which case the question becomes how could the quantum fields not be there? It may be that the quantum fields we are familiar with were created in the big bang, but it would be an article of faith to insist there were no quantum fields of any sort, prior to the big bang.

...and where were they...

Well, without being overly facetious; in the same place your god was, somewhere like eternity.

...and what caused them to explode at that particular moment?

The thing with quantum fields is that they are subject to random fluctuations. We know that what appears to be empty space in our universe, in reality is teeming with particles popping in and out of existence. In 1948, Hendrik Casimir predicted this would give rise to the force named in his honour. In 1997, Steven K. Lamoreaux actually measured it: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casimir_effect What we don't know is whether our empty space is analogous to the emptiness we might suppose existed before the big bang, but if it is, there is no reason to think there was ever a time when it wasn't.

[Impenitent]

space is the distance between objects

if all matter was gathered in one place before the big bang, how could there have been space?

encroaching nothingness expanding

-Imp