Re: Newcomb's Paradox - the modern version of the determinism vs non-determinism
Posted: Tue Jan 07, 2025 11:50 pm
I gave a good argument, in my reply to noah. You didn't have anything to say about it.
For the discussion of all things philosophical.
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Actually, retrocausality is in contradiction with the principle of locality, regardless of whether physics is deterministic or not. You seem to acknowledge at least the latter here:
There you go, so why are you going on about it so much?In fact, no common philosophical views or scientific theories allow for genuine retrocausality
And because retrocausality is impossible on determinism one's choice cannot retroactively change any past physical states, including the current contents of the boxes.
I will agree that one's decision does not change the contents of the boxes once the boxes have been sealed. Ditto for the non-determinists though. As I said, this has zero to do with determinism. But no retrocausality is being invoked either, except perhaps by you for some reason. Your OP doesn't suggest it.
Agree. Still best to choose one box. You need to show how it follows that choosing both boxes is the optimal choice. You haven't done that, not to my satisfaction anyway.No present event can remove $1M that's already there by choosing both boxes; or $1M that's not there by choosing one box.
Maybe I want the million. Sounds like an argument to me.and there's no argument to be made for one-boxing.
Non sequitur. My choice need not in any way be based on my personal beliefs. OK, you said I cannot commit to my beliefs if I betray them for money, but that is also a non-sequitur.If you insist on one-boxing you can't commit to ANY of those determinism-equivalent view ergo the class of beliefs which are not functionally equivalent to determinism and let you commit to one-boxing is non-determinism.
Don't follow. The Omega knows what I am going to choose, so it seems prudent for it to know that I'm going to one-box despite it even having been proved (for arguments sake) that the universe is hard deterministic. It's actually more plausible that the Omega can do its predicting under determinism since there's no chance involved. It's forward causality all the way.One-boxing reven requires one rejecting the metaphysical view that reality has determinate physical states.
I think you already used that insult on somebody else. Think of original ones.
Hah! Realism allows retro-causality. They recently gave a Nobel prize to the group showing that the universe isn't locally real. Funny since that was already shown 55 years earlier by Bell. Point is: real or local, but not both, and it is locality that forbids retrocausality. But again, none of that is relevant to the boxes, which is normal causality, deterministic or not. Same answer regardless of any of it.
That's also correct. By taking both I'll get $1000. The million was never in there. You make it sound like my choosing to 2-box will make the money vanish from the box. It doesn't since it was never there if I was going to choose that. Especially if determinism is the case, since I lack the free will to 'alter what I was going to choose', if that phrase makes any sense. You're the one who dragged in determinism, not me.Either the opaque box is empty; or it's not empty. By taking both you'll get $1000 over whatever's already in the opaque box.
Hmm. Naive definition. 'antecedent states' is ambiguously defined given relativity of simultaneity. I think that's what they mean by 'roughly speaking'. They don't want to get into a formal definition where things like locality are important.Causal determinism is, roughly speaking, the idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature.
As has been demonstrated by realists with experiments with names like 'spooky action' and 'delayed choice'. Again, off topic. We'll presume only forward causality.For retrocausality you need events necessitated by consequent events.
You forgot one: That there is this Omega. And yes, my belief can encompass all three points without contradiction. I'm willing to claim that.You can't simultaneously believe:
* The boxes have definite contents prior to you choosing
* Your choice cannot affect the definite contents of the boxes.
* You should one-box
Idiot.Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Tue Jan 07, 2025 11:50 pm I gave a good argument, in my reply to noah. You didn't have anything to say about it.
Skepdick wrote: ↑Tue Jan 07, 2025 10:49 pm If you want to one-box - fine. But then you can't hold onto realism/causality in your metaphysic.
You can't simultaneously believe:
* The boxes have definite contents prior to you choosing
* Your choice cannot affect the definite contents of the boxes.
* You should one-box
That's not a reply to what I said, that's just repeating yourself. What I said is explicitly an argument for why I can simultaneously believe that. You're just begging the question now.Skepdick wrote: ↑Tue Jan 07, 2025 11:52 pmIdiotic.Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Tue Jan 07, 2025 11:50 pm I gave a good argument, in my reply to noah. You didn't have anything to say about it.
Skepdick wrote: ↑Tue Jan 07, 2025 10:49 pm If you want to one-box - fine. But then you can't hold onto realism/causality in your metaphysic.
You can't simultaneously believe:
* The boxes have definite contents prior to you choosing
* Your choice cannot affect the definite contents of the boxes.
* You should one-box
Eh? Locality has nothing to do with ordering. From the PoV of the Big Bang singularity everything in its light cone is local.Noax wrote: ↑Tue Jan 07, 2025 11:50 pm Actually, retrocausality is in contradiction with the principle of locality, regardless of whether physics is deterministic or not. You seem to acknowledge at least the latter here:There you go, so why are you going on about it so much?In fact, no common philosophical views or scientific theories allow for genuine retrocausality
The non-determinists doesn't have to believe in a definite states. They can accept a box in superposition of states.
And I keep explaining why it has everything to do with detemrinism. But I am sure you'll keep saying otherwise.
Retrocausality follows directly from the measurement problem.
Ah well... if it's about satisfaction then, you haven't explained why one-boxing is the best choice. Not to my satisfaction anyway.
You don't want the million + $1000?
Unless your choices are as random as flipping a coin I can't see how that could possibly be true.
You can do whatever you like. I'm just interested in your reasoning for arriving at your choices.
That doesn't seem like much of a choice then...
So if it knows you'll onebox, and then in the last second you had a change of mind you walk away with $1000 extra...Noax wrote: ↑Tue Jan 07, 2025 11:50 pm so it seems prudent for it to know that I'm going to one-box despite it even having been proved (for arguments sake) that the universe is hard deterministic. It's actually more plausible that the Omega can do its predicting under determinism since there's no chance involved. It's forward causality all the way.
Hah! Realism allows retro-causality.
That's because the notion of "locality" used in quantum physics is explicitly defined in relation to some observer - it's anthropocentric.Noax wrote: ↑Tue Jan 07, 2025 6:30 pm They recently gave a Nobel prize to the group showing that the universe isn't locally real.
Funny since that was already shown 55 years earlier by Bell. Point is: real or local, but not both, and it is locality that forbids retrocausality. But again, none of that is relevant to the boxes, which is normal causality, deterministic or not. Same answer regardless of any of it.
And you are making it sound like you choosing to one-box will make the million that was never in there appear.
So do you really have a choice then?
Locality doesn't matter. All causes in a causal chain are local to each other.
As has been demonstrated by realists with experiments with names like 'spooky action' and 'delayed choice'. Again, off topic. We'll presume only forward causality.For retrocausality you need events necessitated by consequent events.
Well, of course you are willimg to claim it. As you do. It's just that your claim is false.Noax wrote: ↑Tue Jan 07, 2025 11:50 pmYou forgot one: That there is this Omega. And yes, my belief can encompass all three points without contradiction. I'm willing to claim that.You can't simultaneously believe:
* The boxes have definite contents prior to you choosing
* Your choice cannot affect the definite contents of the boxes.
* You should one-box
You can claim to simultaneously believe that. Sure.Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Tue Jan 07, 2025 11:55 pm That's not a reply to what I said, that's just repeating yourself. What I said is explicitly an argument for why I can simultaneously believe that. You're just begging the question now.
Yes, that's great.Skepdick wrote: ↑Tue Jan 07, 2025 11:33 pmLet me help your confusion. See the additional clarification in red.phyllo wrote: ↑Tue Jan 07, 2025 11:30 pm But the way you worded the problem suggests that somehow in the future, a million dollars will be inserted or teleported into the opaque box based on the selection you have made.
Specifically this phrase ... "If Omega had already predicted you'll take only Box B, they will put $1,000,000 in it before you get to make your choice" ... suggests some future change in the state of the opaque box.
What you are now saying is ... "If Omega had already predicted you'll take only Box B, Omega had put $1,000,000 in it.
To simplify this is the order of events:
1. Omega makes prediction about you.
2. Omega puts money in the boxes.
3. Omega places boxes before you.
4. You choose.
Are you going to try to pull superpositional stunts then? Determinist interpretations support superposition.
I am fine with the assertion. We will presume deterministic physics. That supports retro-causality, but it does not support retro information transfer, and doing anything with the contents of the box is definitely information transfer, so we will indeed forbid any retro-anything-that-matters. I am fine with all those conditions, even if I don't agree with all of them. It actually helps support my case because it makes Omega more plausible. Still, Omega isn't that big of a fiction. Humans are far more predictable than they like to admit.And I keep explaining why it has everything to do with detemrinism. But I am sure you'll keep saying otherwise.
But it isn't. The Omega was the strongest predictor you said. I didn't drag that in, you did. That's the cause of my explanation, not any kind of retrocausality, which, as we agreed, isn't going on.If choice is the strongest predictor for the contents of the boxes
Getting a million isn't a good reason to make the choice? Every one-boxer gets a million. Every two-boxer walks away with a thousand. Said determinist would indeed be an idiot if he chose both.Ah well... if it's about satisfaction then, you haven't explained why one-boxing is the best choice.
There's no option to get that. Not by your rules.You don't want the million + $1000?
It is still a choice, but perhaps not a free one (as free choice is typically defined). There never was a free choice given determinism, although it has nothing at all to do with a mere belief in determinism.
That violates the OP asserting that the Omega knows what I'll choose. It says nothing about how much I waffle about it. I wouldn't waffle at all. Go straight for the one box, a total no-brainer.So if [the Omega] knows you'll onebox, and then in the last second you had a change of mind you walk away with $1000 extra...
It does? What does that look like then? The box has a definite state which can change based on your future choices?[/quote]No, it doesn't 'change'. The state of the box is simply caused by a set of events, not all of which are in the past light cone of the state in question. That's one of the reasons I don't like realist interpretations. Again, off topic since information transfer cannot work this way, and the topic is about information. I can send a message with cash, but I cannot send one using spooky action.
[citation needed]
Where did I ever suggest any such thing? Please quote where I said/implied that. In fact, I agreed to your 2nd bullet point that explicitly said "Your choice cannot affect the definite contents of the boxes", and yet here you say I make it sound like the choice does make the box contents change. You're not being at all consistent, but are instead attributing false assertions to me.And you are making it sound like you choosing to one-box will make the million that was never in there appear.
Sure. I can pick both and go home with a K, an especially great choice if I watched 20 people ahead of me in line do it, and each going home with either 1M or 1K.So do you really have a choice then?
Agree that it doesn't follow from 1&2. 3 follows from watching the 20 people ahead of me walk away with only two possible outcomes, and 3 is not in contradiction with 1 & 2, or if it is, you've not demonstrated it so.Well, of course you are willimg to claim it. As you do. It's just that your claim is false.
If you believe 1&2 are true, then 3 doesn't follow.
Without the Omega, and without witness of the 20 prior participants, perhaps this logic holds, but that's not what the OP describes.Two-boxing follows.
Wrong! Did you not read your own OP? Nobody gets 0 or 1001000. This is where your logic is failing.Case 1: The opaque box is empty (and nothing I do can change that):
* If you take the opaque box you get 0
...
Case 2: The opaque box is full (and nothing I do can change that):
...
* If you take both boxes you get 1001000
No there isn't. Newcomb's paradox seems to be like the Monty Hall paradox, which was resolved: the world is determinisitic, but we have to take into account what already happened in the past. In this case, what the Omega choose in the past.
The OP says that you can pick the opaque box. And if it hasn't been loaded with a million then you get zero.Wrong! Did you not read your own OP? Nobody gets 0 or 1001000. This is where your logic is failing.
Newcomb was indeed an American, or at least worked there at a west coast university as a theoretical physicist.
The Monty Hall thing is in any way about determinism?? It doesn't even involve a magical predicting entity like the Newcomb one does.
Thank you for illustrating my point above.
Four cases. You can pick none of them, which admittedly contradicts my assertion that nobody gets zero. I, like you, presume nobody (at least not any of my 20 predecessors) makes that choice.So there are 3 cases ... pick clear, opaque or both.
And what point is that?The Newcomb thing is arguably paradoxical since there's a conflict between magic and not magic, between those who read the whole story and realize that the Omega is there, and those that don't such as Skepdick and apparently phyllo as well:
Thank you for illustrating my point above.phyllo wrote: ↑Wed Jan 08, 2025 8:50 am
The OP says that you can pick the opaque box. And if it hasn't been loaded with a million then you get zero.
Well maybe anything could be behind the curtains if we don't assume determinism.
I didn't see Omega as magical, it just somehow knows what people will choose.It doesn't even involve a magical predicting entity like the Newcomb one does.
I thought the MH problem was simply to illustrate the poor logic skills of the average guy on the street (or in the studio audience). There's no paradox to it at all. The Newcomb thing is arguably paradoxical since there's a conflict between magic and not magic, between those who read the whole story and realize that the Omega is there, and those that don't such as Skepdick and apparently phyllo as well: