Newcomb's Paradox - the modern version of the determinism vs non-determinism

[Flannel Jesus]

I gave a good argument, in my reply to noah. You didn't have anything to say about it.

[Noax]

Because determinism is the view that all events and states of affairs are the necessary and inevitable consequences of previous events and conditions, combined with the laws of nature retrocausality is impossible on determinism.

Actually, retrocausality is in contradiction with the principle of locality, regardless of whether physics is deterministic or not. You seem to acknowledge at least the latter here:

In fact, no common philosophical views or scientific theories allow for genuine retrocausality

There you go, so why are you going on about it so much?

And because retrocausality is impossible on determinism one's choice cannot retroactively change any past physical states, including the current contents of the boxes.

The boxes have a definite state that your choice cannot alter.

I will agree that one's decision does not change the contents of the boxes once the boxes have been sealed. Ditto for the non-determinists though. As I said, this has zero to do with determinism. But no retrocausality is being invoked either, except perhaps by you for some reason. Your OP doesn't suggest it.

No present event can remove $1M that's already there by choosing both boxes; or $1M that's not there by choosing one box.

Agree. Still best to choose one box. You need to show how it follows that choosing both boxes is the optimal choice. You haven't done that, not to my satisfaction anyway.

and there's no argument to be made for one-boxing.

Maybe I want the million. Sounds like an argument to me.

If you insist on one-boxing you can't commit to ANY of those determinism-equivalent view ergo the class of beliefs which are not functionally equivalent to determinism and let you commit to one-boxing is non-determinism.

Non sequitur. My choice need not in any way be based on my personal beliefs. OK, you said I cannot commit to my beliefs if I betray them for money, but that is also a non-sequitur.

One-boxing reven requires one rejecting the metaphysical view that reality has determinate physical states.

Don't follow. The Omega knows what I am going to choose, so it seems prudent for it to know that I'm going to one-box despite it even having been proved (for arguments sake) that the universe is hard deterministic. It's actually more plausible that the Omega can do its predicting under determinism since there's no chance involved. It's forward causality all the way.

None are so blind as those who cannot see...

I think you already used that insult on somebody else. Think of original ones.

It's not so obvious to people who believe in causality; or realism.

Hah! Realism allows retro-causality. They recently gave a Nobel prize to the group showing that the universe isn't locally real. Funny since that was already shown 55 years earlier by Bell. Point is: real or local, but not both, and it is locality that forbids retrocausality. But again, none of that is relevant to the boxes, which is normal causality, deterministic or not. Same answer regardless of any of it.

Either the opaque box is empty; or it's not empty. By taking both you'll get $1000 over whatever's already in the opaque box.

That's also correct. By taking both I'll get $1000. The million was never in there. You make it sound like my choosing to 2-box will make the money vanish from the box. It doesn't since it was never there if I was going to choose that. Especially if determinism is the case, since I lack the free will to 'alter what I was going to choose', if that phrase makes any sense. You're the one who dragged in determinism, not me.

Causal determinism is, roughly speaking, the idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature.

Hmm. Naive definition. 'antecedent states' is ambiguously defined given relativity of simultaneity. I think that's what they mean by 'roughly speaking'. They don't want to get into a formal definition where things like locality are important.

This is off topic. I'm fine with no retrocausality since it isn't relevant to me one-boxing.

For retrocausality you need events necessitated by consequent events.

As has been demonstrated by realists with experiments with names like 'spooky action' and 'delayed choice'. Again, off topic. We'll presume only forward causality.

You can't simultaneously believe:

* The boxes have definite contents prior to you choosing
* Your choice cannot affect the definite contents of the boxes.
* You should one-box

You forgot one: That there is this Omega. And yes, my belief can encompass all three points without contradiction. I'm willing to claim that.

[Skepdick]

I gave a good argument, in my reply to noah. You didn't have anything to say about it.

Idiot.

If you want to one-box - fine. But then you can't hold onto realism/causality in your metaphysic.
You can't simultaneously believe:

* The boxes have definite contents prior to you choosing
* Your choice cannot affect the definite contents of the boxes.
* You should one-box

[Flannel Jesus]

I gave a good argument, in my reply to noah. You didn't have anything to say about it.

Idiotic.

If you want to one-box - fine. But then you can't hold onto realism/causality in your metaphysic.
You can't simultaneously believe:

* The boxes have definite contents prior to you choosing
* Your choice cannot affect the definite contents of the boxes.
* You should one-box

That's not a reply to what I said, that's just repeating yourself. What I said is explicitly an argument for why I can simultaneously believe that. You're just begging the question now.

[Skepdick]

Actually, retrocausality is in contradiction with the principle of locality, regardless of whether physics is deterministic or not. You seem to acknowledge at least the latter here:

In fact, no common philosophical views or scientific theories allow for genuine retrocausality

There you go, so why are you going on about it so much?

Eh? Locality has nothing to do with ordering. From the PoV of the Big Bang singularity everything in its light cone is local.

I will agree that one's decision does not change the contents of the boxes once the boxes have been sealed. Ditto for the non-determinists though.

The non-determinists doesn't have to believe in a definite states. They can accept a box in superposition of states.

This is standard measurement problem stuff.

As I said, this has zero to do with determinism.

And I keep explaining why it has everything to do with detemrinism. But I am sure you'll keep saying otherwise.

But no retrocausality is being invoked either, except perhaps by you for some reason. Your OP doesn't suggest it.

Retrocausality follows directly from the measurement problem.

If you choose one-box you will find the opaque box to contain $1mil.
If you choose to two-box you will find the opaque box to contain nothing.

If choice is the strongest predictor for the contents of the boxes; and you reject retrocausality as the simplest possible explanation; then explain why that is.

Agree. Still best to choose one box. You need to show how it follows that choosing both boxes is the optimal choice. You haven't done that, not to my satisfaction anyway.

Ah well... if it's about satisfaction then, you haven't explained why one-boxing is the best choice. Not to my satisfaction anyway.

Maybe I want the million. Sounds like an argument to me.

You don't want the million + $1000?

Non sequitur. My choice need not in any way be based on my personal beliefs.

Unless your choices are as random as flipping a coin I can't see how that could possibly be true.

OK, you said I cannot commit to my beliefs if I betray them for money, but that is also a non-sequitur.

You can do whatever you like. I'm just interested in your reasoning for arriving at your choices.

Don't follow. The Omega knows what I am going to choose

That doesn't seem like much of a choice then...

so it seems prudent for it to know that I'm going to one-box despite it even having been proved (for arguments sake) that the universe is hard deterministic. It's actually more plausible that the Omega can do its predicting under determinism since there's no chance involved. It's forward causality all the way.

So if it knows you'll onebox, and then in the last second you had a change of mind you walk away with $1000 extra...

It's not so obvious to people who believe in causality; or realism.

Hah! Realism allows retro-causality.
[/quote]
It does? What does that look like then? The box has a definite state which can change based on your future choices?

They recently gave a Nobel prize to the group showing that the universe isn't locally real.

Funny since that was already shown 55 years earlier by Bell. Point is: real or local, but not both, and it is locality that forbids retrocausality. But again, none of that is relevant to the boxes, which is normal causality, deterministic or not. Same answer regardless of any of it.

That's because the notion of "locality" used in quantum physics is explicitly defined in relation to some observer - it's anthropocentric.
The universe is locally-real from the locus of the Big Bang singularity. Everything's in its light cone.

That's also correct. By taking both I'll get $1000. The million was never in there. You make it sound like my choosing to 2-box will make the money vanish from the box.

And you are making it sound like you choosing to one-box will make the million that was never in there appear.

It doesn't since it was never there if I was going to choose that.

So do you really have a choice then?

Especially if determinism is the case, since I lack the free will to 'alter what I was going to choose', if that phrase makes any sense. You're the one who dragged in determinism, not me.

Naive definition. 'antecedent states' is ambiguously defined given relativity of simultaneity. I think that's what they mean by 'roughly speaking'. They don't want to get into a formal definition where things like locality are important.

Locality doesn't matter. All causes in a causal chain are local to each other.

For retrocausality you need events necessitated by consequent events.

As has been demonstrated by realists with experiments with names like 'spooky action' and 'delayed choice'. Again, off topic. We'll presume only forward causality.

You can't simultaneously believe:

* The boxes have definite contents prior to you choosing
* Your choice cannot affect the definite contents of the boxes.
* You should one-box

You forgot one: That there is this Omega. And yes, my belief can encompass all three points without contradiction. I'm willing to claim that.

Well, of course you are willimg to claim it. As you do. It's just that your claim is false.

If you believe 1&2 are true, then 3 doesn't follow.

Two-boxing follows.

This is simple case analysis.

Case 1: The opaque box is empty (and nothing I do can change that):
* If you take the opaque box you get 0
* If you take both boxes you get 1000.

Case 2: The opaque box is full (and nothing I do can change that):
* if you take the opaque box you get 1000000
* If you take both boxes you get 1001000

If you truly believe the contents are definite and unchangeable at choice time, two-boxing gives you more money in every possible case.

Since you are choosing to one-box then it trivially follows by (modus tollens) that you don't truly believe the contents are definite and unchangeable by your choice.

[Skepdick]

That's not a reply to what I said, that's just repeating yourself. What I said is explicitly an argument for why I can simultaneously believe that. You're just begging the question now.

You can claim to simultaneously believe that. Sure.

Just like you could claim to simultaneously believe that you are 2 meters tall and 1.5 meters tall.

It's precisely because you claim to believe such things simultaneously is why I am calling you an idiot.
Mere assertion of simultaneous belief doesn't overcome the logical impossibility of holding those beliefs simultaneously.

Rather than trying to pretend there's no contradiction you could simply admit to choosing pragmatic success over consistency.
Instead you choose post-hoc rationalization just to rescue your metaphysic.

[phyllo]

But the way you worded the problem suggests that somehow in the future, a million dollars will be inserted or teleported into the opaque box based on the selection you have made.

Specifically this phrase ... "If Omega had already predicted you'll take only Box B, they will put $1,000,000 in it before you get to make your choice" ... suggests some future change in the state of the opaque box.
What you are now saying is ... "If Omega had already predicted you'll take only Box B, Omega had put $1,000,000 in it.

Let me help your confusion. See the additional clarification in red.

To simplify this is the order of events:

1. Omega makes prediction about you.
2. Omega puts money in the boxes.
3. Omega places boxes before you.
4. You choose.

Yes, that's great.

I choose both boxes because I either get $1000 or $1000 plus one million.

This nutjob Omega's predictions and his decisions on what to place in the boxes are independent of my choice of boxes. I don't care what he predicted.

Determinism, indeterminism and free-will got nothing to do with it.

[Noax]

The non-determinists doesn't have to believe in a definite states. They can accept a box in superposition of states.

Are you going to try to pull superpositional stunts then? Determinist interpretations support superposition.

A box cannot be in superposition of having a suitcase of cash in it and not having that suitcase. There is also nothing the Omega nor the chooser can do to force a desired state from one of superposition. I suspect that as Flannel Jesus suggested, you are suggesting that somebody (perhaps even yourself) believes that cash can be teleported into or out of the box after the decision has been made, but before the box is opened. Hey, if we have this Omega thing, we can have Star Trek too. We can cheat.

And I keep explaining why it has everything to do with detemrinism. But I am sure you'll keep saying otherwise.

I am fine with the assertion. We will presume deterministic physics. That supports retro-causality, but it does not support retro information transfer, and doing anything with the contents of the box is definitely information transfer, so we will indeed forbid any retro-anything-that-matters. I am fine with all those conditions, even if I don't agree with all of them. It actually helps support my case because it makes Omega more plausible. Still, Omega isn't that big of a fiction. Humans are far more predictable than they like to admit.

If choice is the strongest predictor for the contents of the boxes

But it isn't. The Omega was the strongest predictor you said. I didn't drag that in, you did. That's the cause of my explanation, not any kind of retrocausality, which, as we agreed, isn't going on.

Ah well... if it's about satisfaction then, you haven't explained why one-boxing is the best choice.

Getting a million isn't a good reason to make the choice? Every one-boxer gets a million. Every two-boxer walks away with a thousand. Said determinist would indeed be an idiot if he chose both.

I think you need to show me why his choice of just the one violates his deterministic belief. Not show why he's wrong, but why he's not consistent with himself. I think that's what you're after, but correct me if I got it wrong there. I know it's based on the box contents not changing due to his choice, and I agree that the box contents never change between being closed by Omega and subsequently opened by our idiot.

The key of course is this Omega. Can such a thing exist in a deterministic universe? Can it exist in a non-deterministic one? I think not the latter case, which is why I said I think a determinism assertion helps support my case. Of course you're not asserting determinism, you're only asserting an idiot with belief in determinism.

You don't want the million + $1000?

There's no option to get that. Not by your rules.

The Omega knows what I am going to choose

That doesn't seem like much of a choice then...

It is still a choice, but perhaps not a free one (as free choice is typically defined). There never was a free choice given determinism, although it has nothing at all to do with a mere belief in determinism.

So if [the Omega] knows you'll onebox, and then in the last second you had a change of mind you walk away with $1000 extra...

That violates the OP asserting that the Omega knows what I'll choose. It says nothing about how much I waffle about it. I wouldn't waffle at all. Go straight for the one box, a total no-brainer.

It's not so obvious to people who believe in causality; or realism.

Hah! Realism allows retro-causality.

It does? What does that look like then? The box has a definite state which can change based on your future choices?[/quote]No, it doesn't 'change'. The state of the box is simply caused by a set of events, not all of which are in the past light cone of the state in question. That's one of the reasons I don't like realist interpretations. Again, off topic since information transfer cannot work this way, and the topic is about information. I can send a message with cash, but I cannot send one using spooky action.

They recently gave a Nobel prize to the group showing that the universe isn't locally real.

That's because the notion of "locality" used in quantum physics is explicitly defined in relation to some observer - it's anthropocentric.

[citation needed]
Wow. What the heck gave you that idea?? Tiktok video?

And you are making it sound like you choosing to one-box will make the million that was never in there appear.

Where did I ever suggest any such thing? Please quote where I said/implied that. In fact, I agreed to your 2nd bullet point that explicitly said "Your choice cannot affect the definite contents of the boxes", and yet here you say I make it sound like the choice does make the box contents change. You're not being at all consistent, but are instead attributing false assertions to me.

So do you really have a choice then?

Sure. I can pick both and go home with a K, an especially great choice if I watched 20 people ahead of me in line do it, and each going home with either 1M or 1K.

You forgot one: That there is this Omega. And yes, my belief can encompass all three points without contradiction. I'm willing to claim that.

Well, of course you are willimg to claim it. As you do. It's just that your claim is false.

If you believe 1&2 are true, then 3 doesn't follow.

Agree that it doesn't follow from 1&2. 3 follows from watching the 20 people ahead of me walk away with only two possible outcomes, and 3 is not in contradiction with 1 & 2, or if it is, you've not demonstrated it so.

Two-boxing follows.

Without the Omega, and without witness of the 20 prior participants, perhaps this logic holds, but that's not what the OP describes.

Case 1: The opaque box is empty (and nothing I do can change that):
* If you take the opaque box you get 0
...

Case 2: The opaque box is full (and nothing I do can change that):
...
* If you take both boxes you get 1001000

Wrong! Did you not read your own OP? Nobody gets 0 or 1001000. This is where your logic is failing.

Where did determinism go? None of that analysis (however wrong) depended on determinism at all.

Why don't you next do a topic about the prisoner's dilemma? The same sort of logic can fallaciously be applied to that, except it doesn't involve a magic Omega.

[Atla]

A smart determinist...

Now there's an oxymoron.

No there isn't. Newcomb's paradox seems to be like the Monty Hall paradox, which was resolved: the world is determinisitic, but we have to take into account what already happened in the past. In this case, what the Omega choose in the past.

(Newcomb's paradox has nothing to do with determinism/indeterminism and retrocausality, which suggests that he may have been an American trying to do philosophy.)

[phyllo]

Wrong! Did you not read your own OP? Nobody gets 0 or 1001000. This is where your logic is failing.

The OP says that you can pick the opaque box. And if it hasn't been loaded with a million then you get zero.

Presumably you can also pick the clear box with the $1000. But apparently nobody is going to do that.

So there are 3 cases ... pick clear, opaque or both.

[Noax]

Newcomb's paradox has nothing to do with determinism/indeterminism and retrocausality, which suggests that he may have been an American trying to do philosophy.

Newcomb was indeed an American, or at least worked there at a west coast university as a theoretical physicist.

Newcomb's paradox seems to be like the Monty Hall paradox, which was resolved: the world is determinisitic,

The Monty Hall thing is in any way about determinism?? It doesn't even involve a magical predicting entity like the Newcomb one does.
I thought the MH problem was simply to illustrate the poor logic skills of the average guy on the street (or in the studio audience). There's no paradox to it at all. The Newcomb thing is arguably paradoxical since there's a conflict between magic and not magic, between those who read the whole story and realize that the Omega is there, and those that don't such as Skepdick and apparently phyllo as well:

The OP says that you can pick the opaque box. And if it hasn't been loaded with a million then you get zero.

Thank you for illustrating my point above.

So there are 3 cases ... pick clear, opaque or both.

Four cases. You can pick none of them, which admittedly contradicts my assertion that nobody gets zero. I, like you, presume nobody (at least not any of my 20 predecessors) makes that choice.


The topic is well debated, and nobody here has even made it down to the critical detail that seems to be a necessary detail that is important enough that the problem was reworded. The OP shows the reworded version, not the original one proposed by Newcomb.

Good news for the 2-boxers: The wiki site says the majority of professional philosophers argue to take both boxes, 39% vs 31%, and I guess 20% declined to answer. My stance is apparently with the minority. I still stand by it. The two-boxers are attempting to leverage the dominance principle, and the one-boxers are attempting to leverage the expected utility principle. The two principles are in conflict of course, and the choice becomes less obvious depending on how much money might be in box B and exactly how reliable the predictor is.

[phyllo]

The Newcomb thing is arguably paradoxical since there's a conflict between magic and not magic, between those who read the whole story and realize that the Omega is there, and those that don't such as Skepdick and apparently phyllo as well:

phyllo wrote: ↑Wed Jan 08, 2025 8:50 am
The OP says that you can pick the opaque box. And if it hasn't been loaded with a million then you get zero.

Thank you for illustrating my point above.

And what point is that?

The Omega character does something other than loading the boxes prior to your choice?

[Atla]

The Monty Hall thing is in any way about determinism??

Well maybe anything could be behind the curtains if we don't assume determinism.

It doesn't even involve a magical predicting entity like the Newcomb one does.
I thought the MH problem was simply to illustrate the poor logic skills of the average guy on the street (or in the studio audience). There's no paradox to it at all. The Newcomb thing is arguably paradoxical since there's a conflict between magic and not magic, between those who read the whole story and realize that the Omega is there, and those that don't such as Skepdick and apparently phyllo as well:

I didn't see Omega as magical, it just somehow knows what people will choose.

[phyllo]

Omega is magical if you assume it has the ability to make perfect predictions.

[Flannel Jesus]

The Monty Hall thing is in any way about determinism??

Well maybe anything could be behind the curtains if we don't assume determinism.

Indeterminism doesn't mean the past isn't fixed. It just means the future isn't (yet).