compatibilism

[BigMike]

By removing "me" from the equation, I mean to consider only the purely physical processes in the brain. You appear to assert that this is insufficient; something else, a "me," is required for it to function.

You said earlier...

Yes, "those processes" are different in my brain and yours, because we are different. But that doesn't mean that we (my "me" and your "me") intervene in those processes. The processes operate independently of "us"; they are entirely governed by the architecture and general state of our brains, which have been shaped throughout our lives.

What is it that the processes are independent of?

Flannel Jesus hypothesized that our consciousness, which we abbreviated as "me", "we," "us", etc., somehow influenced the thought processes. This hypothesis is refuted by the statement you refer to.

[Iwannaplato]

By removing "me" from the equation, I mean to consider only the purely physical processes in the brain. You appear to assert that this is insufficient; something else, a "me," is required for it to function.

You said earlier...

Yes, "those processes" are different in my brain and yours, because we are different. But that doesn't mean that we (my "me" and your "me") intervene in those processes. The processes operate independently of "us"; they are entirely governed by the architecture and general state of our brains, which have been shaped throughout our lives.

What is it that the processes are independent of?

Flannel Jesus hypothesized that our consciousness, which we abbreviated as "me", "we," "us", etc., somehow influenced the thought processes. This hypothesis is refuted by the statement you refer to.

I thought he was saying the process was 'me'. Or me was a part of the processes of the brain, nervous system, etc.

That for example saying my brain made me do something doesn't make sense. That we are not compelled by our brains, say, because we are our brains.

For me, "me" and "the process" are borderline synonymous, so it's not meaningful to remove "me" from the process.

responding to things like...

The processes operate independently of "us"; they are entirely governed by the architecture and general state of our brains, which have been shaped throughout our lives.

How does your brain run independently of you? It runs, it's you.

Our brains don't make us do things. We are not the objects of brains' actions.

[BigMike]

How does your brain run independently of you? It runs, it's you.

Our brains don't make us do things. We are not the objects of brains' actions.

I explained my understanding of the processes here:

By brain processes, I refer to the transmission of neuronal signals via neurotransmitters, the opening and closing of ion gates, action potentials, etc. Surely you're not suggesting that is "you"?

[iambiguous]

Carroll is, like the majority of academic philosophers, a compatibilist. He's also an expert in quantum mechanics and maintains the position that I do: that randomness isn't a satisfactory source of free will, so people looking for free will in quantum indeterminacy are barking up the wrong tree.

Back again to randomness. As though scientists can pin down whether or not it exists at all. As though 10 or a 100 or a 1,000 years from now scientists -- and philosophers? -- won't look back amazed at all the erroneous things we believed today about "quantum indeterminacy".

If you think the relevance here is about pinning down if randomness exists, you're mistaken. You aren't reading the thoughts correctly.

The thoughts do not rely on the existence or non existence of randomness. The thoughts, explicitly, are saying that randomness doesn't affect the picture of free will at all.

I keep coming back to randomness, because your words about determinism imply you think randomness solves some sort of problem. As long as you think randomness solves any problem, you'll never jive with the compatibilist intuitions.

I've tried to probe into your thoughts in this direction, but you seem resistant.

No, what you keep doing, in my opinion, is piling up more and more intellectual contraptions regarding randomness such that I have no idea how they might be applicable to things like Mary aborting Jane.

You want to keep it all about "probing thoughts" because that way it the exchange always stays up in the clouds of abstraction.

And you can bet that Carroll, in delving into the quantum world, isn't likely to come up with much relating to moral responsibility and abortion.

[iambiguous]

Exactly as responsible as she'd be in a world with randomness.

What randomness?

There are all of the factors in her life that led to her becoming pregnant. And then all the factors in her brain that led her to either choose of her own volition to abort Jane, or in being compelled by her brain to "choose" an abortion, or, after Jane is shredded, the compatibilists who either choose or "choose" to hold her morally responsible.

On the other hand -- click -- given the Benjamin Button Syndrome there are so many variables in our life that we have no knowledge of or control over it can certainly seem as though things happen "randomly" to us.

Here is my attempt above to explain to him how I make "sense" of it:

How can anyone not understand this...

All of this going back to how the matter we call the human brain was "somehow" able to acquire autonomy when non-living matter "somehow" became living matter "somehow" became conscious matter "somehow" became self-conscious matter.

...profound mystery in the same way? First [they tell us] was the Big Bang. Then eventually stars. Then eventually stars big enough to produce supernovas. Then out of those supernovas came all the heavier elements that eventually became the planets. Then "somehow" these heavier elements eventually produced living matter "somehow" produced conscious matter "somehow" produced us. That's what the astronomers mean when they tell us we are all born of "star stuff".

With a God, the God thrown in there or not. God thrown in because -- presto! -- instant answer.

How preposterous can it be to actually assert definitively conclusions about human brains "here and now" without grasping how human brains themselves were able to evolve in the first place. Sure, we do it because we can. But why can we?

But none of those words were explicitly about what I asked. I asked a question about why you think randomness makes words meaningful. You didn't make reference to randomness once in all of that.

Okay, cite some examples pertaining to your own behaviors of randomness making words meaningful. From my frame of mind in a free will world, the randomness that we think is there is derived from the Benjamin Button Syndrome. We are not omniscient and can never know all of the factors that come together in the world of human interactions to explain things definitively. But that's different from randomness as examined on the quantum level. Things seemingly just happening out of the blue, or conflicting things happening at the same time, or things occurring solely because we observe them. The mystery here is still connecting the dots between the very, very small and the very, very large.

You ask all of these questions of determinism, but the problem with the questions you ask of determinism, to me, is that there's no reason you should not also be asking them of indeterminism. You've somehow let indeterminism off the hook for these questions, but you shouldn't.

Indeterminism is the idea that events are not caused, or are not caused deterministically. It is the opposite of determinism and related to chance. It is highly relevant to the philosophical problem of free will, particularly in the form of libertarianism. wiki

Compelled by my brain or not, here and now, I don't believe that any material events are "not caused", or that -- axiomatically? -- we have autonomy? It's just that the libertarians simply assume that their own ignorance of this...

All of this going back to how the matter we call the human brain was "somehow" able to acquire autonomy when non-living matter "somehow" became living matter "somehow" became conscious matter "somehow" became self-conscious matter.

...aside, their brains "somehow" did acquire free will. Not only that but their brains have figured out that capitalism is inherently more rational than socialism.

So any question Mary has for a determinist, she should also have for an indeterminist. Any question about the meaning of words in determinism, should also be a question about the meaning of words in indeterminism.

And what about Jane? If Mary was never able not to abort her, she's obliterated. But if Mary was able to choose as the libertarians insist and chose instead to give birth to Jane, then Jane is around to participate in this discussion herself. Ask Jane if determinism and indeterminism are ultimately the same thing?

It would be like me asking, "well if Jesus is the saviour, why do we only have taco Tuesdays and not taco Thursdays?" Like, maybe that's a good question, but it has nothing to do with Jesus, so you shouldn't be directing that question specifically at Christians.

The questions you ask are questions for indeterminism too.

Huh?

Comparing Mary "somehow" in possession of free will in regard to Jane with Jesus and tacos?!!!

Note to others:

Again, what crucial point do I keep missing here?[/b]

The randomness implied in the question.

"if, in a determined universe...one where I was never able not to abort Jane...am I still morally responsible for doing so?",

The randomness you're avoiding talking about by not asking this question:

"if, in a NONdetermined universe...am I still morally responsible for doing so?",

You're asking all these questions about determinism, but not non determinism. Why? Why do you think that same question is not worth asking in non determinism?

In a free will world, Mary either aborting or not aborting Jane is embedded existentially in dasein as I encompass it here: https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtop ... 1&t=176529

I delve into that part all the time.

Why not just ask the question, "am I morally reprehensible period?" Right? Why is determinism a central part of this question to you? Determinism can be described as just a complete absence of randomness, so when you talk about determinism, randomness is implicitly part of the conversation too. When you say "morality is impossible in Determinism," theres this implicit idea that you think morality is only possible with randomness. Why?

Again, in a wholly determined universe as some understand it, everything and anything comprised of matter unfolds in interacting with other matter only as the laws of matter compel it to. Nothing occurs randomly. There's just the gap between what quantum scientists conclude today about randomness in the quantum world and what they still don't understand about it such that some day they discover there really is no randomness at all.

Unless of course going back to a complete understanding of the existence of existence itself randomness really is "somehow" a component.

[Flannel Jesus]

Why not just ask the question, "am I morally reprehensible period?" Right? Why is determinism a central part of this question to you? Determinism can be described as just a complete absence of randomness, so when you talk about determinism, randomness is implicitly part of the conversation too. When you say "morality is impossible in Determinism," theres this implicit idea that you think morality is only possible with randomness. Why?

Again, in a wholly determined universe as some understand it, everything and anything comprised of matter unfolds in interacting with other matter only as the laws of matter compel it to.

Yes, and in a non-wholly determined universe, everything unfolds as the law of matter compel it to, except for a little bit of randomness. Where, specifically, does the randomness come into the picture to produce moral responsibility?

[iambiguous]

But what I need, however, is more than just an argument claiming to establish these things. I need some actual demonstrative evidence that someone's argument here is in fact the real deal.

Except that there is no "demonstrative evidence" that won't be brushed away by reference to a gap in human knowledge.

There you have the insurmountable obstacle.

Yes!

And, as I noted to zoot allures/prom75 over at ILP, that's one of the reasons the objectivists there and here go after me personally:

1] I argue that while philosophers may go in search of wisdom, this wisdom is always truncated by the gap between what philosophers think they know [about anything] and all that there is to be known in order to grasp the human condition in the context of existence itself. That bothers some. When it really begins to sink in that this quest is ultimately futile, some abandon philosophy altogether. Instead, they stick to the part where they concentrate fully on living their lives "for all practical purposes" from day to day.

2] I suggest in turn it appears reasonable that, in a world sans God, the human brain is but more matter wholly in sync [as a part of nature] with the laws of matter. And, thus, anything we think, feel, say or do is always only that which we were ever able to think, feel, say and do. And that includes philosophers. Some will inevitably find that disturbing. If they can't know for certain that they possess autonomy, they can't know for certain that their philosophical excursions are in fact of their own volition.

3] And then the part where, assuming some measure of autonomy, I suggest that "I" in the is/ought world is basically an existential contraption interacting with other existential contraptions in a world teeming with conflicting goods --- and in contexts in which wealth and power prevails in the political arena. The part where "I" becomes fractured and fragmented.

The whole point of being an objectivist...in regard to either the Big Questions or to conflicting goods...is to sustain the comfort and the consolation that is embodied in what I construe to be the "psychology of objectivism": https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtop ... 5&t=185296

Though not counting you, right?

[phyllo]

But what I need, however, is more than just an argument claiming to establish these things. I need some actual demonstrative evidence that someone's argument here is in fact the real deal.

Except that there is no "demonstrative evidence" that won't be brushed away by reference to a gap in human knowledge.

There you have the insurmountable obstacle.

Yes!

And, as I noted to zoot allures/prom75 over at ILP, that's one of the reasons the objectivists there and here go after me personally:

1] I argue that while philosophers may go in search of wisdom, this wisdom is always truncated by the gap between what philosophers think they know [about anything] and all that there is to be known in order to grasp the human condition in the context of existence itself. That bothers some. When it really begins to sink in that this quest is ultimately futile, some abandon philosophy altogether. Instead, they stick to the part where they concentrate fully on living their lives "for all practical purposes" from day to day.

2] I suggest in turn it appears reasonable that, in a world sans God, the human brain is but more matter wholly in sync [as a part of nature] with the laws of matter. And, thus, anything we think, feel, say or do is always only that which we were ever able to think, feel, say and do. And that includes philosophers. Some will inevitably find that disturbing. If they can't know for certain that they possess autonomy, they can't know for certain that their philosophical excursions are in fact of their own volition.

3] And then the part where, assuming some measure of autonomy, I suggest that "I" in the is/ought world is basically an existential contraption interacting with other existential contraptions in a world teeming with conflicting goods --- and in contexts in which wealth and power prevails in the political arena. The part where "I" becomes fractured and fragmented.

The whole point of being an objectivist...in regard to either the Big Questions or to conflicting goods...is to sustain the comfort and the consolation that is embodied in what I construe to be the "psychology of objectivism": https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtop ... 5&t=185296

Though not counting you, right?

So you admit that you are wasting everyone's time by asking for evidence and demonstrations.

Well, that's progress.

[iambiguous]

It's like me saying, "okay, I don't know whether my brain compels me to type these words and then post them but -- click -- I'll assume that I do have free will and 'somehow' opted to."

First of all, you can feel all of that inside. You can feel yourself thinking about ideas, considering them, and apparently "choosing" to type the words that in some way correspond to your thoughts.

Yo, gib!

Like our emotions are "somehow" different from our thoughts when brainless matter "somehow" evolved into biological life "somehow" evolved in conscious life "somehow" evolved into self-conscious life.

Like you don't feel intense emotions in your dreams and then wake up thinking, "wow, I didn't really feel those emotions at all...it was just my brain creating them chemically and neurologically while I was actually sound asleep.

Science can not prove that, because at the moment science doesn't have direct access to your thoughts. But you don't need science to prove it, because you've just experienced it internally. You can prove it to yourself.

Oh, I see. Because you really, really, reallly, really believe that what you feel you feel autonomously...that makes it true.

In any event, let's keep it all up in the intellectual contraption clouds:

So, knowing that, ask yourself the question: so what if it's determined or not? What in the world could adding randomness to that whole process possibly do for me? Would randomness make my mind somehow BETTER at processing information and considering the ideas?

Note to Mary:

You tell me. What you feel this time.

[iambiguous]

Except that there is no "demonstrative evidence" that won't be brushed away by reference to a gap in human knowledge.

There you have the insurmountable obstacle.

Yes!

And, as I noted to zoot allures/prom75 over at ILP, that's one of the reasons the objectivists there and here go after me personally:

1] I argue that while philosophers may go in search of wisdom, this wisdom is always truncated by the gap between what philosophers think they know [about anything] and all that there is to be known in order to grasp the human condition in the context of existence itself. That bothers some. When it really begins to sink in that this quest is ultimately futile, some abandon philosophy altogether. Instead, they stick to the part where they concentrate fully on living their lives "for all practical purposes" from day to day.

2] I suggest in turn it appears reasonable that, in a world sans God, the human brain is but more matter wholly in sync [as a part of nature] with the laws of matter. And, thus, anything we think, feel, say or do is always only that which we were ever able to think, feel, say and do. And that includes philosophers. Some will inevitably find that disturbing. If they can't know for certain that they possess autonomy, they can't know for certain that their philosophical excursions are in fact of their own volition.

3] And then the part where, assuming some measure of autonomy, I suggest that "I" in the is/ought world is basically an existential contraption interacting with other existential contraptions in a world teeming with conflicting goods --- and in contexts in which wealth and power prevails in the political arena. The part where "I" becomes fractured and fragmented.

The whole point of being an objectivist...in regard to either the Big Questions or to conflicting goods...is to sustain the comfort and the consolation that is embodied in what I construe to be the "psychology of objectivism": https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtop ... 5&t=185296

Though not counting you, right?

So you admit that you are wasting everyone's time by asking for evidence and demonstrations.

Well, that's progress.

No, I'm suggesting it is almost certainly true that all of us will go to the grave before science and philosophers are able to pin down definitive answers regarding either the Big Questions or conflicting goods.

And, in fact, my ex-wife was particularly scornful in reminding me of that. For her everything revolved around politics. Around things where resolutions [her own] actually could be accomplished. Even though almost none of them were.

Still, for reasons rooted largely in dasein, some of us simply can't let go of them. They gnaw on us, fascinate us, boggle our minds. And we can't help but come back to them in places like this over and again.

My point though still pertains largely to the objectivists among us who actually do imagine that they have figured it all out and have little but contempt for those who refuse to grasp this. Who actually dare to disagree with them!!!

Only some of them aren't pinheads [or Stooges] and I can't help but wonder if something they post might at least arouse my curiosity such that I want to hear more.

[Flannel Jesus]

It's like me saying, "okay, I don't know whether my brain compels me to type these words and then post them but -- click -- I'll assume that I do have free will and 'somehow' opted to."

First of all, you can feel all of that inside. You can feel yourself thinking about ideas, considering them, and apparently "choosing" to type the words that in some way correspond to your thoughts.

Yo, gib!

Like our emotions are "somehow" different from our thoughts when brainless matter "somehow" evolved into biological life "somehow" evolved in conscious life "somehow" evolved into self-conscious life.

Like you don't feel intense emotions in your dreams and then wake up thinking, "wow, I didn't really feel those emotions at all...it was just my brain creating them chemically and neurologically while I was actually sound asleep.

Science can not prove that, because at the moment science doesn't have direct access to your thoughts. But you don't need science to prove it, because you've just experienced it internally. You can prove it to yourself.

Oh, I see. Because you really, really, reallly, really believe that what you feel you feel autonomously...that makes it true.

In any event, let's keep it all up in the intellectual contraption clouds:

So, knowing that, ask yourself the question: so what if it's determined or not? What in the world could adding randomness to that whole process possibly do for me? Would randomness make my mind somehow BETTER at processing information and considering the ideas?

Note to Mary:

You tell me. What you feel this time.

All of this avoidance tells me one thing: you have no idea what the alternative to determinism actually is. You haven't thought about it. You don't want to think about it

You keep going on circles with everyone because you aren't engaging honestly. You'll keep going in circles.

[Flannel Jesus]

What I've found out recently was that, arguably, the first philosophical arguments about free will came from the Greek stoics, and the way they approached it was basically in a compatibilistic way!

The very first conception of free will was compatibilism.

And then Christians came along and, in order to justify their God eternally tormenting people who "couldn't have done otherwise", they brought Libertarian free will into the conversation.

Libertarian free will is only part of the conversation because of a Christian ethical conundrum. Outside of Christianity, outside of religion, I don't think libertarian free will needs to be the center of the conversation. If you're not a Christian, you have historical precedent to reject the dichotomy between free will and Determinism. You don't have to solve Christianity's ethical problem, so skip their logic entirely and go back to the source, stoic free will.

[BigMike]

What I've found out recently was that, arguably, the first philosophical arguments about free will came from the Greek stoics, and the way they approached it was basically in a compatibilistic way!

The very first conception of free will was compatibilism.

And then Christians came along and, in order to justify their God eternally tormenting people who "couldn't have done otherwise", they brought Libertarian free will into the conversation.

Libertarian free will is only part of the conversation because of a Christian ethical conundrum. Outside of Christianity, outside of religion, I don't think libertarian free will needs to be the center of the conversation. If you're not a Christian, you have historical precedent to reject the dichotomy between free will and Determinism. You don't have to solve Christianity's ethical problem, so skip their logic entirely and go back to the source, stoic free will.

Leucippus was a pre-Socratic Greek philosopher who lived in the 5th century BCE, 200 years before the stoics, and he is often credited with being one of the founders of atomism. Unfortunately, very little of Leucippus's writings have survived, and so it is difficult to say with certainty what his views on free will were.

However, based on what we know of the atomist philosophy that Leucippus is associated with, it is likely that he believed in determinism. “Nothing comes to pass without a cause, but everything happens by reason and of necessity.” According to atomism, everything in the universe is made up of indivisible, indestructible particles called atoms, which move and combine according to strict natural laws. This worldview is often seen as being incompatible with free will, because if everything is determined by the laws of nature, then it is difficult to see how there could be any room for individual choice or agency.

Some later atomist philosophers, such as Democritus (a student of Leucippus) and Epicurus, explicitly endorsed determinism and denied the existence of free will. However, we cannot say for certain what Leucippus himself thought on the subject. It is possible that he held a more nuanced view that has been lost to us over time.

[Iwannaplato]

So, what is so important about knowing whether determinism or free will is the case? If someone could show how in their own lives, perhaps using Iambiguous' Mary case or something else knowing which is true is important and how?

A few people have said it is important, one implied strongly that nothing else could be more important. So, how so?

What would it change in you? And why is this the reactions other should have if you think they should?

[Flannel Jesus]

So, what is so important about knowing whether determinism or free will is the case? If someone could show how in their own lives, perhaps using Iambiguous' Mary case or something else knowing which is true is important and how?

A few people have said it is important, one implied strongly that nothing else could be more important. So, how so?

What would it change in you? And why is this the reactions other should have if you think they should?

For me, I see sort of one moral consequence of all of this quite consistently (though not with perfect consistency):

A determinists (or compatibilists) view of justice and punishment rarely includes punishment for its own sake. For these type of people, punishment is for deterrence, punishment is for separating the dangerous from all the other pro social people, but punishment is not, generally, useful for "revenge".

Revenge style justice, for its own sake, makes a lot less sense. The idea of tormenting someone for eternity for any slight they committed in life seems infinitely needlessly cruel. The sense of justice of a determinist frequently avoids all needless cruelty and seeks to answer a simple question: what can I do that will reduce harm in the future?

So, take a murderer. What do I do with him to reduce harm in the future? Should we kill him? Should we imprison him? Should we try to rehabilitate him? The determinist and compatibilist mindset focuses on this.

Whereas other visions of justice are very revenge based a lot of time. He caused us pain, so how can we cause him pain? At this point, the pain itself that we inflict on him becomes valuable in it's own right for this type of justice.

These are generalisations of course. Not all determinists and compatibilists think like this, not all incompatibilists think contrary to this. It's a pattern I've noticed