compatibilism

[Flannel Jesus]

I provided a definition of free will and I explained what I think the word "free" means in that context. Both things you've said I haven't done, I have done. You may not be satisfied with my answers, but I have tried to honestly answer them. Your frustration isn't something I can solve.

[Belinda]

Wikipedia has this to say:

Compatibilists often define an instance of "free will" as one in which the agent had the freedom to act according to their own motivation. That is, the agent was not coerced or restrained. Arthur Schopenhauer famously said: "Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills."[14] In other words, although an agent may often be free to act according to a motive, the nature of that motive is determined. This definition of free will does not rely on the truth or falsity of causal determinism.[2] This view also makes free will close to autonomy, the ability to live according to one's own rules, as opposed to being submitted to external domination.

That seems fine to me. I reason, I want, I desire, I have ethical motivations, and if all of those things combined in my brain produce what we call a "choice" that I can then act on, then I've acted according to my free will.

No, you have not. You have acted based on a combination of chance and reasoned choice.

[Flannel Jesus]

No, you have not. You have acted based on a combination of chance and reasoned choice.

I accept that the type of free will that compatibilists think is good enough, is not satisfying to everyone. You are not satisfied with that type of freedom, not satisfied with to call it "free will". That's okay, I understand why you feel that way. I agree with it mostly, actually, but not entirely.

I don't believe you're explicitly incorrect to reject the compatibilist approach.

The main thing I think is explicitly incorrect is libertarian free will. Incorrect not just that it doesn't exist, but that it's not even coherent.

[Belinda]

No, you have not. You have acted based on a combination of chance and reasoned choice.

I accept that the type of free will that compatibilists think is good enough, is not satisfying to everyone. You are not satisfied with that type of freedom, not satisfied with to call it "free will". That's okay, I understand why you feel that way. I agree with it mostly, actually, but not entirely.

I don't believe you're explicitly incorrect to reject the compatibilist approach.

The main thing I think is explicitly incorrect is libertarian free will.

Do you believe it's possible to have a tiny admixture of Free Will such that sometimes this Free Will thingy actually originates a choice?

You should think about the idea of origination. Some people say that God originates. Maybe so. However it's a ludicrous belief that human beings can do so.

[Flannel Jesus]

Do you believe it's possible to have a tiny admixture of Free Will such that sometimes this Free Will thingy actually originates a choice?

To my mind, if something is uncaused, it's random, so if when you say it "originates" a choice you mean that that choice exists outside of any previous cause, it's just spontaneous, then... that sort of thing might happen, yes, but I wouldn't describe it as "freedom". It doesn't feel any more free to me than pure determinism.

However, if the idea of a mind originating a choice doesn't require it to be uncaused, then it starts looking like compatibilism.

[Immanuel Can]

However, if the idea of a mind originating a choice doesn't require it to be uncaused, then it starts looking like compatibilism.

I think I understand why it "starts looking" like that to you.

There are things we proponents of free will have to acknowledge have a causal-materialist element in them. For example, when faced with a choice, you often do not have any say at all about which circumstances you're in, or what your range of options might be. We even have to point out that volition can be influenced by material things like chemical factors...if you're hungry, then food looks more compelling; if you have eaten, it looks less.

All of that is routinely recognized by all proponents of free will, however; so none of that really gets to the key issue. The key issue is that when one is in that given set of circumstances, and subject to those various chemical, biological, material incentives, is the choice that is made compelled by one or more of these, or is the choice made by the chooser.

If its' "the choice is compelled by the prior causes," then it's Determinism. If it's "the choice among the various alternatives is ultimately made by you," then it's free will.

But Compatibilism, as it has been formally defined, is just incoherent; so it doesn't even really belong in the conversation. The choice is between Determinism and free will. There's no third alternative by way of Compatibilism. And however much free will and Determinism may agree on the circumstances, the incentives, and so on, the two are, at the deepest level, utterly incompatible.

It's all about that final moment of choice: predetermined, or volitional?

[iambiguous]

Okay, in regard to Mary and Jane what do you think is "obvious" in regard to compatibilism? I must have missed that post. Or I don't remember it.

I didn't say anything was obvious about Mary and Jane being obvious in relation to compatiblism. I pointed out what I thought was obvious about what you were doing, by parodying the post where you were critical of me and FJ. It's obvious you were doing this, since, well, the post is right there. Your post, the one I parodied. What we were doing was also obvious. You didn't like it and implied we were doing something wrong. Don't make this more complicated than it was.

Click.

Oh, right. A parody.

And, for me, it's less a question of someone being right or wrong about compatibilism philosophically and more the extent to which those who embrace compatibilism philosophically are willing to bring their theoretical conclusions down out of the "intellectual contraption" clouds and note how they are applicable in regard to an actual contexts involving human interactions that revolve around conflicting goods.

My thing here. Not their thing? No problem. They can just move on to others. Though, sure, if someone here strikes me as having an exceptional intelligence I'm going to ask them if they will bring their definitions and deductions "down here".

Thus...

My interest in compatibilism revolves around the extent to which technical philosophical arguments regarding free will can be made applicable to actual human behaviors. And since some argue that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility why not go right to the top: abortion.

And that's a perfectly reasonable interest. It's not as if I think you shouldn't have that interest.

That plus my main interest [in turn] revolves around bringing conclusions reached about compatibilism down out of the intellectual clouds and noting their relevance to situations like abortion...or regarding any other conflicting goods such that, if we do possess free will, than holding someone morally responsible takes on a whole other meaning. As opposed to a world where Mary was not able to not abort Jane. Yes, Mary could have opted to give birth to Jane. Somehow that can be substantiated. What, philosophically, ethically, are we to make of that?

Right, so what do you think would happen if someone could prove that she had free will or could prove that she didn't? You seem to find it problematic if someone here does not bring this down to the ground. They should be, it seems according to you, demonstrate something about Mary's situation. It seems from reading the above quote of yours and other quotes, that you think it makes a difference to the situation and perhaps how you would view it and act if you knew that determinism or free will was the case or if somehow free will was compatible with determinism. Where did you get that impression? What did difference would it make? How might it help you feel less fractured and fragmented? With specifics....

Back again to just how surreal it is discussing this at all. Until science is able to pin down how matter acquired biological life acquired consciousness acquired self-consciousness, how on earth can we ever be sure about anything? Not to mention the gap between what we think we know about the "human condition" and all that would need to be known about how and why the human condition itself fits into the profoundly problematic existence of existence.

Well, if I know that the universe is determined, then I will do X or I will view Mary as Y, and thus I will feel less fractured because of Z. These actions and views being concrete and specific. Likewise with Free Will or Compatiblism.

Take us through the Mary situation and tell us what differences you think it would make if you, personally, viewed determinism or free will as the case, or a compatiblist combination?

Again, of course: click.

Given the manner in which I and others construe the "for all practical purposes" existential reality of determinism, what unfolded back then at Essex Community College exactly overlaps with what is unfolding in this exchange today. Everything that did unfold then and is unfolding now unfolds in the only possible manner in which if ever could have unfolded. Why? Because human brains are still no less wholly embedded in the laws of matter. At least until a God, the God reveals how He created autonomous souls or until the No God scientists pin down how lifeless matter did become living matter did become conscious matter did become self-conscious matter.

How come you are fractured and fragmented about everything except the psychology of people you disagree with or who don't focus on topics the way you want? There you just present a unified front.

Not sure what you mean here. I am as much fractured and fragmented regarding my own psychology...The closest I have come to understanding why I think I am the way I am revolves around this...

"He was like a man who wanted to change all; and could not; so burned with his impotence; and had only me, an infinitely small microcosm to convert or detest." John Fowles

The provocative, polemical part of myself here, in particular.

As for this...

Why are you so confident about your beliefs about what goes on in other people's minds my motives and psychology, even to the point where you refuse to believe their sense of what is going on in their minds?

Somehow you solved the problem of other minds.

...again, that's your iambiguous, not mine. i don't recognize myself in that way at all.

OK, well when someone tells me my motivations and I notice that this person does this with some regularlity, tell people why they do things or what they are feeling, and even though he knows this is not what they would say, this person is making a claim to having some direct access to other minds.

Again, given some measure of free will, your own rendition of what I am doing here. I still don't recognize myself here.

You present yourself as being torn between different philosophical positions on a range of issues including the main one in this thread. You see other people as being certain and you are often critical of this certainty.

Note to others:

Who here is certain that their own assessment of free will reflects the most rational and objective understanding of it? And who isn't? Anyone come close to being as "fractured and fragmented" regarding it as "I" am?

Then back to your me:

But here you are acting as if you are psychic or know other people's minds and can dismiss their takes on their own motivations, for example.

So, on this issue you are fairly objectivist. How did you develop this certainty about what is going on in other people's minds?

Right, I'm "fairly objectivist" here. Okay, note the parts that do indicate to you that my assessment here given my own ignorance regarding this...

All of this going back to how the matter we call the human brain was "somehow" able to acquire autonomy when non-living matter "somehow" became living matter "somehow" became conscious matter "somehow" became self-conscious matter.

...my assessment of dasein here...

https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtop ... 1&t=176529

...and my ever and always coming back to "the gap" and "Rummy's Rule" with respect to all of us, is just shrugged aside allowing you to truly believe that I am no less an objectivist than those I go after here who will themselves insist that if you don't think as they do about both the Big Questions and conflicting goods you are, among other things, an idiot, a moron or just flat out wrong.

"One of them".

If you still don't understand, no worries. What I am most interested in is how you see resolving this issue leads to concrete changes in how you would deal with an abortion situation.

Huh? In regard to abortion, given free will, my frame of mind revolves around the OPs of these two threads:

https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtop ... 1&t=175121
https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtop ... 1&t=194382

Both sides are fully capable of offering up "concrete changes" in order to [legally, politically] "resolve" the abortion conflagration. They simply start with different assumptions about the "natural rights" of the unborn and the "political rights" of the pregnant woman.

Then what? The "right makes might" agenda of the moral objectivists...or the "moderation, negotiation and compromise" agenda of the moral nihilists?

Me, personally, the determinism free will issue does not affect the way I view concrete decisions (re:abortion).

What could possibly be more important than pinning down whether or not what we think, feel, say and do we think, feel, say and do of our own volition? Given that neither philosophers nor scientists are really certain about it one way or the other. Unless that's changed. If so, link me to it.

Thank you. There you have clearly expressed that this is an important issue and resolving it is important.

On the contrary, I always note that to the extent it is an important issue and/or becomes important to resolve is embedded existentially in dasein. And that using the tools of philosophy in a No God world there does not appear to be a way to establish that it ought to be an important issue...let alone that there is an objective way in which to resolve it.

Again, as with someone like gib here -- https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtop ... 70dc5f5118 -- I'm curious to explore these things with those who do seem to grasp on some level the manner in which I construe the meaning of dasein in the is/ought world...but they are not themselves "fractured and fragmented".

What concrete and specific differences would it make in that situation?
What actions would change for you?
What attitude would you have in relation to Mary that you don't have now?
Let's say it is the day you are going to meet Mary, the day she is going to the clinic.
What specific differences are there that you see? (given that you see resolving this as so important.)

I tried to explain that above. I'm the wrong person to ask if you expect the sort of answers you'd get from those who actually are objectivists.

I don't see myself acting differently if, just before going to sleep, I read the overwhelmingly perfect argument that convinces me utterly - and I see it has also convinced a long list of experts from many fields.

Run through this for us. And then if you think the changes KNOWING would make in you are ones that all rational people should have also. IOW what concrete changes would resolving this issue lead to in you AND (a second issue) do you think others should also be influenced this way. That they should be compelled to feel and act more like X and Y.

Again, it's not clear [to me] what you are referring to in regard to "not knowing". Not knowing if I have free will or I am wholly determine? Well, I don't know. Though, okay, if it could be determined that I do have free will, not knowing what I would tell Mary that will change anything?

My point however is that those on both sides of the moral divide can make reasonable points for and against abortion. And then given the zillions of "sets of circumstances" the unwanted pregnancy might play out in.

What could possibly be more important than pinning down whether or not what we think, feel, say and do we think, feel, say and do of our own volition?

So, it would see like you think all or many would be changed in down to earth ways or SHOULD be and should share your sense of the importance.

What do you see knowing which is true (free will or determinism or the combination compatibilism is true) would lead to? And why is it so wrong that I do not think it would change how I would act and think of others?

Would I treat the guy in my theater group differently? Should I if I knew?

As though you are saying, "okay, we do have free will and you are not fractured and fragmented regarding conflicting goods such as this. What then?"

But I don't know if I have free will and, if I do, I'm still no less fractured and fragmented. What then?

[Iwannaplato]

Take us through the Mary situation and tell us what differences you think it would make if you, personally, viewed determinism or free will as the case, or a compatiblist combination?

Again, of course: click.

Given the manner in which I and others construe the "for all practical purposes" existential reality of determinism, what unfolded back then at Essex Community College exactly overlaps with what is unfolding in this exchange today. Everything that did unfold then and is unfolding now unfolds in the only possible manner in which if ever could have unfolded. Why? Because human brains are still no less wholly embedded in the laws of matter. At least until a God, the God reveals how He created autonomous souls or until the No God scientists pin down how lifeless matter did become living matter did become conscious matter did become self-conscious matter.

I don't think that's answering my question. My question is
given that you asked

What could possibly be more important than pinning down whether or not what we think, feel, say and do we think, feel, say and do of our own volition?

My question is: how so?

You have often talked about philosophers being up in the clouds, keeping issues at abstract levels, and asking posters here to show the concrete effects of their positions. Great.

Since you think finding out which is true, determinism or free will, is extremely important, what concrete difference do you think it would make if you knew?

You can use the Mary situation.

A down to earth explanation of how this importance plays out.

But explain in concrete terms what finding out would do that is important.

As though you are saying, "okay, we do have free will and you are not fractured and fragmented regarding conflicting goods such as this. What then?"

I don't know if your being fractured and fragmented has to do with this issue or moral issues or something else or a mixture. That's all beside the point. You've said that nothing could be more important than knowing this. How do you know that or what makes you think it is important to know? What practical difference would knowing which is the case make? What future difference would it make?

[iambiguous]

Back again to how far he takes this. Does it include his brain compelling him to post this? ... Does it include my brain compelling me to react to the post in the only manner in which I am able to?

Of course: straight back up into the clouds...

This is a language confusion. You're using the terms "him" and "his brain", or "me" and "my brain" as separate things.

In physical materialism, you ARE your brain. You brain isn't compelling you, your brain IS you.

Right. Tell that to Mary. And then when she asks you, "if, in a determined universe...one where I was never able not to abort Jane...am I still morally responsible for doing so?", what do you tell her?

You and/or your brain.

If yes to both then then how is anything that we argue in our posts here not essentially interchangeable. Someone might argue that others ought to argue the same thing as they do...but only because they were never able not to argue this.

You bring this idea up a lot but you haven't made much sense of it. Why are words meaningless in determinism but not indeterminism? What about randomness existing makes words meaningful?

Note to others:

Click.

Here is my attempt above to explain to him how I make "sense" of it:

How can anyone not understand this...

All of this going back to how the matter we call the human brain was "somehow" able to acquire autonomy when non-living matter "somehow" became living matter "somehow" became conscious matter "somehow" became self-conscious matter.

...profound mystery in the same way? First [they tell us] was the Big Bang. Then eventually stars. Then eventually stars big enough to produce supernovas. Then out of those supernovas came all the heavier elements that eventually became the planets. Then "somehow" these heavier elements eventually produced living matter "somehow" produced conscious matter "somehow" produced us. That's what the astronomers mean when they tell us we are all born of "star stuff".

With a God, the God thrown in there or not. God thrown in because -- presto! -- instant answer.

How preposterous can it be to actually assert definitively conclusions about human brains "here and now" without grasping how human brains themselves were able to evolve in the first place. Sure, we do it because we can. But why can we?

Though, sure, by all means, note [contemptuously] how you don't understand any of it yourself.

[Flannel Jesus]

Right. Tell that to Mary. And then when she asks you, "if, in a determined universe...one where I was never able not to abort Jane...am I still morally responsible for doing so?", what do you tell her?

Exactly as responsible as she'd be in a world with randomness.

Here is my attempt above to explain to him how I make "sense" of it:

But none of those words were explicitly about what I asked. I asked a question about why you think randomness makes words meaningful. You didn't make reference to randomness once in all of that.

You ask all of these questions of determinism, but the problem with the questions you ask of determinism, to me, is that there's no reason you should not also be asking them of indeterminism. You've somehow let indeterminism off the hook for these questions, but you shouldn't.

So any question Mary has for a determinist, she should also have for an indeterminist. Any question about the meaning of words in determinism, should also be a question about the meaning of words in indeterminism.

It would be like me asking, "well if Jesus is the saviour, why do we only have taco Tuesdays and not taco Thursdays?" Like, maybe that's a good question, but it has nothing to do with Jesus, so you shouldn't be directing that question specifically at Christians.

The questions you ask are questions for indeterminism too.

[BigMike]

Here is my attempt above to explain to him how I make "sense" of it:

How can anyone not understand this...

All of this going back to how the matter we call the human brain was "somehow" able to acquire autonomy when non-living matter "somehow" became living matter "somehow" became conscious matter "somehow" became self-conscious matter.

...profound mystery in the same way? First [they tell us] was the Big Bang. Then eventually stars. Then eventually stars big enough to produce supernovas. Then out of those supernovas came all the heavier elements that eventually became the planets. Then "somehow" these heavier elements eventually produced living matter "somehow" produced conscious matter "somehow" produced us. That's what the astronomers mean when they tell us we are all born of "star stuff".

With a God, the God thrown in there or not. God thrown in because -- presto! -- instant answer.

How preposterous can it be to actually assert definitively conclusions about human brains "here and now" without grasping how human brains themselves were able to evolve in the first place. Sure, we do it because we can. But why can we?

That passage appears to express frustration with the lack of understanding of how human brains were able to evolve and become conscious. You appear to be skeptical of explanations that invoke a deity or rely on words like "somehow." However, the passage itself relies on similar vague language and lacks a clear argument.

You seem to be arguing that it is preposterous to assert conclusions about human brains without understanding how they evolved. While this may be true, the passage does not provide evidence or a clear argument to support this claim. Your frustration with the lack of understanding of the origin of consciousness is understandable, but the passage does not provide a coherent critique of any particular position or argument.

Furthermore, the passage dismisses the possibility of a deity as an "instant answer," but does not engage with any arguments or evidence for the existence or non-existence of a deity. This detracts from the strength of the argument and suggests that you are more interested in expressing frustration than in engaging with the issue.

Overall, while your frustration with the lack of understanding of the origin of consciousness is understandable, the passage does not provide a coherent argument or engage with opposing views in a meaningful way. Furthermore, the passage is not an explanation of anything, as promised in your opening line.

[phyllo]

Ignorance is the argument.

No argument is valid because of our ignorance.

No conclusion is valid because of our ignorance.

No analysis is required because of our ignorance.

There is no right or wrong because of our ignorance.

[Iwannaplato]

Ignorance is the argument.

No argument is valid because of our ignorance.

No conclusion is valid because of our ignorance.

No analysis is required because of our ignorance.

There is no right or wrong because of our ignorance.

Was this directed at someone in particular or the post it followed?
Can you word it differently. I couldn't understand it.

[Flannel Jesus]

Ignorance is the argument.

No argument is valid because of our ignorance.

No conclusion is valid because of our ignorance.

No analysis is required because of our ignorance.

There is no right or wrong because of our ignorance.

Was this directed at someone in particular or the post it followed?
Can you word it differently. I couldn't understand it.

I think he's responding to Biggys post, which at parts of it seems to imply that all philosophical conversation must stop until we have very specific and detailed answers to certain questions, like the origin of the human brain, or consciousness itself.

Phyllo is, I guess, using sarcasm to make the point that that specific blind spot doesn't really have any good reason to stop conversations otherwise. I agree with phyllo on that - I don't see why we explicitly need very detailed answers to those kinds of questions in order to discuss the ideas at hand.

[phyllo]

I was responding to BigMike's post. (The immediately preceding post.)

BM thinks that Biggus is not presenting an argument ... that the post "lacks a clear argument", that "the passage is not an explanation of anything".

In fact, Biggus is presenting his position:

We lack the knowledge to say/argue anything. Therefore, he does not argue anything.