Can the Secularists be Trusted?

[attofishpi]

Wizard22, I see where your confusion lies..

I've noticed Mike, this is always your opening line with anyone that disagrees with your nonsense.

You condescend in stating that somehow, they are confused (* by your amazing deep knowledge of the nature of reality).

FFS.

U R wrong. GOD exists and as per your definition of a requirement for determinism, that makes determinism less real than BULLSHIT.

Attofishpi, if you believe determinism is "less real than BULLSHIT," then by all means, formulate an adult argument to support that claim. Saying "GOD exists" without evidence or explanation doesn’t cut it. Show how determinism violates observable reality or logical consistency—otherwise, you're just waving your hands and hoping no one notices the lack of substance.

Mike, I've got shed loads of evidence beyond a REASONABLE doubt that GOD exists per evidence that you also can observe.


U could get a head-start here: www.androcies.com

[BigMike]

What you’re calling freedom—innovation, creativity, overcoming obstacles—is itself the product of deterministic factors: unique combinations of genetics, environment, and experiences. These factors don’t diminish human achievement; they provide the framework within which it occurs.

You don't know that--and you can't prove it if you did know it. Freedom is in spite of determinism, not because of it.

To be Free, is to be Un-determined.

Wizard22, the claim that "to be free is to be un-determined" raises an important question: what does it actually mean for something to be "un-determined"? If by "un-determined," you mean actions that arise without cause, you’re proposing something that contradicts not only physics but also basic logic. An uncaused action would be completely random—something arising from nowhere, influenced by nothing. How could such randomness ever resemble freedom or intentionality?

What you describe as "freedom in spite of determinism" is more likely a subjective experience—our sense of making choices or taking control. But that feeling doesn’t mean the underlying process is free from causation. Just as the laws of nature govern physical systems, the same principles guide the neural, genetic, and environmental factors that create your experience of agency.

To argue that freedom exists outside of determinism is to assert that actions can happen independently of the causes that give rise to them. If that were true, we would have to abandon the very framework that allows us to understand and predict reality—including the framework that gives us science, technology, and reason itself. That’s a high price to pay for preserving an unprovable notion of freedom.

The real marvel is not that freedom exists independently of determinism, but that the deterministic web of causes produces the rich complexity we experience as choice, creativity, and agency. That’s where human excellence truly shines—not in defiance of causation, but as its extraordinary result.

[BigMike]

I've noticed Mike, this is always your opening line with anyone that disagrees with your nonsense.

You condescend in stating that somehow, they are confused (* by your amazing deep knowledge of the nature of reality).

FFS.

U R wrong. GOD exists and as per your definition of a requirement for determinism, that makes determinism less real than BULLSHIT.

Attofishpi, if you believe determinism is "less real than BULLSHIT," then by all means, formulate an adult argument to support that claim. Saying "GOD exists" without evidence or explanation doesn’t cut it. Show how determinism violates observable reality or logical consistency—otherwise, you're just waving your hands and hoping no one notices the lack of substance.

Mike, I've got shed loads of evidence beyond a REASONABLE doubt that GOD exists per evidence that you also can observe.


U could get a head-start here: www.androcies.com

Attofishpi, presenting evidence "beyond a reasonable doubt" for the existence of God is a bold claim, and I welcome substantive arguments or evidence that can be critically examined. However, linking to a website without providing specifics isn't making a case—it's sidestepping the discussion.

If your evidence is observable and robust, as you suggest, then articulate it here. Show how it directly challenges the deterministic framework or how it establishes God as a necessary condition for causality. Otherwise, we’re left with rhetoric instead of a reasoned debate. Let’s keep this focused and grounded in arguments that can be evaluated on their merits.

[Alexiev]

Alexiev, your response raises an important question: what does it mean for a concept to "work," and how does determinism fit into that standard? Let's tackle this head-on, because your concerns about its relevance to human behavior and society deserve a clear, thoughtful answer.

First, let’s clarify something fundamental. Determinism isn’t a tool for predicting every micro-decision a person will make, like which shirt they’ll wear tomorrow. That would be absurd—just as it would be absurd to criticize evolutionary theory for not predicting the exact patterns of spots on a leopard. What determinism does offer is a framework for understanding the forces shaping human behavior. And while you claim that determinism is irrelevant to enumerating these causes, it’s actually central to identifying them. Here’s why.

When we acknowledge that every action is caused, we shift the focus from blame to causation. This is not just a philosophical sleight of hand; it’s a paradigm shift that changes how we address societal problems. Take criminal justice. If we cling to the illusion of free will, we justify punishment as retribution—a moral payback for a freely chosen act. But if we accept that behavior is determined by biology, environment, and circumstance, we begin to ask different questions: What factors caused this behavior? How can we address those factors to reduce harm in the future? This is why, for example, rehabilitation programs grounded in neuroscience—like cognitive behavioral therapy for offenders—often outperform punitive measures in reducing recidivism. That’s determinism at work.

You argue that the web of causes is too complex, too "dimly lit," to be useful. But isn’t that an argument for doing the hard work of illuminating it further, not dismissing its importance? Scientists, sociologists, and policymakers are already using deterministic principles—whether they call them that or not—to identify patterns and intervene effectively. Behavioral economists study how predictable biases like loss aversion shape decision-making. Public health experts design interventions based on the social determinants of health. Even the move away from zero-tolerance policies in schools toward restorative practices reflects a deterministic understanding of behavior. These efforts are yielding measurable results, and they all rest on the premise that behavior is caused, not chosen freely in some vacuum.

Your analogy of the gambler and the cards overlooks a critical distinction: gamblers operate under uncertainty, but the deterministic framework aims to reduce uncertainty by uncovering patterns in the causes of behavior. You’re right that economists once assumed people were rational actors, but when behavioral economists showed that decisions are predictably irrational, they didn’t abandon determinism—they embraced it. They dug into the causal factors behind that irrationality, from cognitive biases to social influences. That’s determinism advancing our understanding, not standing in its way.

Finally, let’s address your claim that determinism is "meaningless" unless it enumerates causes. That’s like saying gravity is meaningless unless it can account for the trajectory of every falling leaf. Determinism isn’t about listing every cause in an infinite chain; it’s about recognizing that such a chain exists and using that recognition to focus on actionable causes. It’s the difference between saying, “People commit crimes because they’re bad” and saying, “What circumstances—poverty, trauma, lack of education—lead to criminal behavior, and how can we change them?”

So, how does determinism "work"? It works by reframing problems in a way that leads to solutions. It dismantles the futile cycle of blame and replaces it with a focus on understanding and intervention. It works in the courtroom, in the classroom, and in the lab. It works because it aligns with reality—and that’s what science is supposed to do. If you want a more just, effective society, determinism isn’t irrelevant; it’s indispensable.

Your conclusions do not follow from your premises, Mike.

You state that shifting the focus from "blame" to "understanding and intervention" will lead to a kinder, juster society. But why would it? Perhaps blame-avoidance is one of the "causes" that determines morally sound behaviors. Morally commendable individuals used to be called "God-fearing". That makes sense. The fear of God's disapproval (or of that of your fellow humans) might be one "cause" of people choosing to avoid anti-social behaviors. Indeed, it seems likely that shifting the focus away from blame would increase crime rather than reducing it.

Besides, everyone (whether determinists or not) would like to discover practical ways in which to reduce crime, improve the education system, and promote human welfare. One need not be a determinist to recognize that eliminating poverty might reduce crime. So how does a determinist worldview help? It doesn't.

In addition, the strictly determinist worldview posits that there are infinite "causes" for everything -- a chain of causality that stretches back to the Big Bang. Instead of helping improve the world, this leads to a culture of helplessness. Since you don't like my analogy of the card player, let's turn to chess.

Suppose a chess player loses 3 games in a row after opening E4. So he goes to the library, gets a book on modern openings, and chooses to open C3 next time he plays. What "caused" this choice? What possible good does it do to claim the choice was destined from the Big Bang? Wouldn't it be more reasonable to say he was tired of losing and so chose to go to the library and study a different opening? Why muddle his motivations with ancient history, when they are explicable far more easily? He wants to win, he has been losing with E4, he studied a new opening, and he chose to try it. What possible difference would it make if his desire to win, his choice to go to the library, etc., etc. were destined from eternity? The more proximate causes I mention are better explanations of his choice.

In addition, your thought that a determinist worldview will prevent "blame" is incorrect. Why would it? Why is evil less evil if it is unavoidable? The Calvinists believed in predetermination, but they can hardly be described as a group that refused to ascribe blame. INstead, they were, if anything, overly censorious.

My position: it's impossible to discover whether everything is determined or not. It's also irrelevant. I'd guess that your approach of refusing to ascribe blame to murderers, rapists, and child molesters would hardly be an effective way to limit such behaviors. On the contrary, it would encourage them. Also, it is a non-sequitur to claim that we should not ascribe blame to predetermined actions. If the chess player makes a mistake and loses his queen, he SHOULD blame himself. How else will he learn to avoid the mistake in the future? If he thinks "Oh, well, I was fated to make that stupid move," his chances of improvement will be severely limited (even it his analysis is correct).

[BigMike]

Alexiev, your response raises an important question: what does it mean for a concept to "work," and how does determinism fit into that standard? Let's tackle this head-on, because your concerns about its relevance to human behavior and society deserve a clear, thoughtful answer.

First, let’s clarify something fundamental. Determinism isn’t a tool for predicting every micro-decision a person will make, like which shirt they’ll wear tomorrow. That would be absurd—just as it would be absurd to criticize evolutionary theory for not predicting the exact patterns of spots on a leopard. What determinism does offer is a framework for understanding the forces shaping human behavior. And while you claim that determinism is irrelevant to enumerating these causes, it’s actually central to identifying them. Here’s why.

When we acknowledge that every action is caused, we shift the focus from blame to causation. This is not just a philosophical sleight of hand; it’s a paradigm shift that changes how we address societal problems. Take criminal justice. If we cling to the illusion of free will, we justify punishment as retribution—a moral payback for a freely chosen act. But if we accept that behavior is determined by biology, environment, and circumstance, we begin to ask different questions: What factors caused this behavior? How can we address those factors to reduce harm in the future? This is why, for example, rehabilitation programs grounded in neuroscience—like cognitive behavioral therapy for offenders—often outperform punitive measures in reducing recidivism. That’s determinism at work.

You argue that the web of causes is too complex, too "dimly lit," to be useful. But isn’t that an argument for doing the hard work of illuminating it further, not dismissing its importance? Scientists, sociologists, and policymakers are already using deterministic principles—whether they call them that or not—to identify patterns and intervene effectively. Behavioral economists study how predictable biases like loss aversion shape decision-making. Public health experts design interventions based on the social determinants of health. Even the move away from zero-tolerance policies in schools toward restorative practices reflects a deterministic understanding of behavior. These efforts are yielding measurable results, and they all rest on the premise that behavior is caused, not chosen freely in some vacuum.

Your analogy of the gambler and the cards overlooks a critical distinction: gamblers operate under uncertainty, but the deterministic framework aims to reduce uncertainty by uncovering patterns in the causes of behavior. You’re right that economists once assumed people were rational actors, but when behavioral economists showed that decisions are predictably irrational, they didn’t abandon determinism—they embraced it. They dug into the causal factors behind that irrationality, from cognitive biases to social influences. That’s determinism advancing our understanding, not standing in its way.

Finally, let’s address your claim that determinism is "meaningless" unless it enumerates causes. That’s like saying gravity is meaningless unless it can account for the trajectory of every falling leaf. Determinism isn’t about listing every cause in an infinite chain; it’s about recognizing that such a chain exists and using that recognition to focus on actionable causes. It’s the difference between saying, “People commit crimes because they’re bad” and saying, “What circumstances—poverty, trauma, lack of education—lead to criminal behavior, and how can we change them?”

So, how does determinism "work"? It works by reframing problems in a way that leads to solutions. It dismantles the futile cycle of blame and replaces it with a focus on understanding and intervention. It works in the courtroom, in the classroom, and in the lab. It works because it aligns with reality—and that’s what science is supposed to do. If you want a more just, effective society, determinism isn’t irrelevant; it’s indispensable.

Your conclusions do not follow from your premises, Mike.

You state that shifting the focus from "blame" to "understanding and intervention" will lead to a kinder, juster society. But why would it? Perhaps blame-avoidance is one of the "causes" that determines morally sound behaviors. Morally commendable individuals used to be called "God-fearing". That makes sense. The fear of God's disapproval (or of that of your fellow humans) might be one "cause" of people choosing to avoid anti-social behaviors. Indeed, it seems likely that shifting the focus away from blame would increase crime rather than reducing it.

Besides, everyone (whether determinists or not) would like to discover practical ways in which to reduce crime, improve the education system, and promote human welfare. One need not be a determinist to recognize that eliminating poverty might reduce crime. So how does a determinist worldview help? It doesn't.

In addition, the strictly determinist worldview posits that there are infinite "causes" for everything -- a chain of causality that stretches back to the Big Bang. Instead of helping improve the world, this leads to a culture of helplessness. Since you don't like my analogy of the card player, let's turn to chess.

Suppose a chess player loses 3 games in a row after opening E4. So he goes to the library, gets a book on modern openings, and chooses to open C3 next time he plays. What "caused" this choice? What possible good does it do to claim the choice was destined from the Big Bang? Wouldn't it be more reasonable to say he was tired of losing and so chose to go to the library and study a different opening? Why muddle his motivations with ancient history, when they are explicable far more easily? He wants to win, he has been losing with E4, he studied a new opening, and he chose to try it. What possible difference would it make if his desire to win, his choice to go to the library, etc., etc. were destined from eternity? The more proximate causes I mention are better explanations of his choice.

In addition, your thought that a determinist worldview will prevent "blame" is incorrect. Why would it? Why is evil less evil if it is unavoidable? The Calvinists believed in predetermination, but they can hardly be described as a group that refused to ascribe blame. INstead, they were, if anything, overly censorious.

My position: it's impossible to discover whether everything is determined or not. It's also irrelevant. I'd guess that your approach of refusing to ascribe blame to murderers, rapists, and child molesters would hardly be an effective way to limit such behaviors. On the contrary, it would encourage them. Also, it is a non-sequitur to claim that we should not ascribe blame to predetermined actions. If the chess player makes a mistake and loses his queen, he SHOULD blame himself. How else will he learn to avoid the mistake in the future? If he thinks "Oh, well, I was fated to make that stupid move," his chances of improvement will be severely limited (even it his analysis is correct).

Alexiev, let’s tackle this point by point, starting with your claim that determinism leads to helplessness or irrelevance. Determinism, grounded in science, doesn’t prove anything in the absolute sense—that’s not its role. It’s a model based on evidence that everything in the universe is governed by cause and effect, as demonstrated by the four fundamental forces. Determinism can only be falsified if we observe an event that has no cause—a true uncaused phenomenon within our physical universe. Until such evidence appears, determinism remains the most parsimonious explanation for how the universe operates.

Your chess analogy is insightful but actually reinforces the deterministic view. The chess player’s decision to change openings is not uncaused or “free” in the sense of being disconnected from prior events. It’s driven by a series of causes: their past losses, their frustration, their access to books, and their motivation to improve. Focusing on proximate causes—like the desire to win or the decision to study a new opening—doesn’t negate the deterministic framework; it’s part of it. Proximate causes are simply closer in the causal chain, but they are still part of the unbroken web of causality.

Now, regarding blame: determinism doesn’t deny that certain actions are harmful or that people should be held accountable in practical terms. What it does challenge is the moralistic notion of blame—that people "deserve" punishment because they freely chose evil. From a deterministic perspective, harmful actions arise from causes—biological, psychological, and social. Addressing those causes is far more effective than focusing on retribution.

You argue that shifting focus away from blame could increase crime, suggesting that fear of God or societal disapproval is necessary to enforce moral behavior. But this assumes that blame and fear are the only tools for maintaining order, which isn’t supported by evidence. Countries with rehabilitative justice systems—like Norway—have far lower crime and recidivism rates than those with punitive systems. These models work not by abandoning accountability but by addressing the root causes of harmful behavior and fostering conditions for change.

Your point that determinism doesn’t help improve the world because non-determinists also seek solutions is a straw man. Determinism isn’t a prerequisite for wanting to reduce crime or improve society; it’s a framework that emphasizes understanding the causes of behavior. This understanding allows for more targeted and effective interventions. For instance, recognizing that poverty correlates with crime doesn’t emerge from moral judgment but from analyzing causal factors—a fundamentally deterministic approach.

Lastly, your assertion that determinism encourages people to resign themselves to fate misses the point entirely. Determinism explains why things happen, but it doesn’t dictate inaction. Understanding that our actions are caused doesn’t preclude us from making choices—it helps us make better ones. The chess player who blames himself for losing can still improve because understanding mistakes is itself a causal factor in learning.

In sum, determinism doesn’t make morality, accountability, or improvement irrelevant. It reframes them in a way that prioritizes understanding over judgment and solutions over blame. The idea that determinism undermines human progress is a misconception; in practice, it’s a lens for achieving it.

[Alexiev]

Alexiev, let’s tackle this point by point, starting with your claim that determinism leads to helplessness or irrelevance. Determinism, grounded in science, doesn’t prove anything in the absolute sense—that’s not its role. It’s a model based on evidence that everything in the universe is governed by cause and effect, as demonstrated by the four fundamental forces. Determinism can only be falsified if we observe an event that has no cause—a true uncaused phenomenon within our physical universe. Until such evidence appears, determinism remains the most parsimonious explanation for how the universe operates.

Your chess analogy is insightful but actually reinforces the deterministic view. The chess player’s decision to change openings is not uncaused or “free” in the sense of being disconnected from prior events. It’s driven by a series of causes: their past losses, their frustration, their access to books, and their motivation to improve. Focusing on proximate causes—like the desire to win or the decision to study a new opening—doesn’t negate the deterministic framework; it’s part of it. Proximate causes are simply closer in the causal chain, but they are still part of the unbroken web of causality.

Now, regarding blame: determinism doesn’t deny that certain actions are harmful or that people should be held accountable in practical terms. What it does challenge is the moralistic notion of blame—that people "deserve" punishment because they freely chose evil. From a deterministic perspective, harmful actions arise from causes—biological, psychological, and social. Addressing those causes is far more effective than focusing on retribution.

You argue that shifting focus away from blame could increase crime, suggesting that fear of God or societal disapproval is necessary to enforce moral behavior. But this assumes that blame and fear are the only tools for maintaining order, which isn’t supported by evidence. Countries with rehabilitative justice systems—like Norway—have far lower crime and recidivism rates than those with punitive systems. These models work not by abandoning accountability but by addressing the root causes of harmful behavior and fostering conditions for change.

Your point that determinism doesn’t help improve the world because non-determinists also seek solutions is a straw man. Determinism isn’t a prerequisite for wanting to reduce crime or improve society; it’s a framework that emphasizes understanding the causes of behavior. This understanding allows for more targeted and effective interventions. For instance, recognizing that poverty correlates with crime doesn’t emerge from moral judgment but from analyzing causal factors—a fundamentally deterministic approach.

Lastly, your assertion that determinism encourages people to resign themselves to fate misses the point entirely. Determinism explains why things happen, but it doesn’t dictate inaction. Understanding that our actions are caused doesn’t preclude us from making choices—it helps us make better ones. The chess player who blames himself for losing can still improve because understanding mistakes is itself a causal factor in learning.

In sum, determinism doesn’t make morality, accountability, or improvement irrelevant. It reframes them in a way that prioritizes understanding over judgment and solutions over blame. The idea that determinism undermines human progress is a misconception; in practice, it’s a lens for achieving it.

As usual you misunderstand (or misstate) my position. My point: the paradigm you propose for determinism is not unique in emphasizing the "causes of behavior". Determinists and non-determinists alike try to figure out why people do things. In fact, many religious people think religious faith HELPS people behave better. That makes sense. Why wouldn't it? Others think blaming people for immoral behavior reduces immorality. That makes sense. Why wouldn't it?

Argue in favor of determinism if you wish -- but there is no evidence (scientific or otherwise) that if we all accepted a determinist worldview, human society would be a happier place. Indeed, as I've claimed, common sense suggests exactly the opposite.

[BigMike]

As usual you misunderstand (or misstate) my position. My point: the paradigm you propose for determinism is not unique in emphasizing the "causes of behavior". Determinists and non-determinists alike try to figure out why people do things. In fact, many religious people think religious faith HELPS people behave better. That makes sense. Why wouldn't it? Others think blaming people for immoral behavior reduces immorality. That makes sense. Why wouldn't it?

Argue in favor of determinism if you wish -- but there is no evidence (scientific or otherwise) that if we all accepted a determinist worldview, human society would be a happier place. Indeed, as I've claimed, common sense suggests exactly the opposite.

Alexiev, your point that both determinists and non-determinists seek to understand behavior is absolutely valid. The difference lies not in the act of seeking explanations but in the framework used to interpret them. Determinism rejects the idea of free will as a necessary ingredient in moral and social systems, shifting focus from moral blame to practical causation. Religious faith or punitive systems, as you mention, may indeed influence behavior, but determinism reframes such influences as effects of larger causal chains rather than outcomes of freely willed choices.

Your assertion that there's no evidence society would be happier under a determinist worldview overlooks key examples where deterministic principles have already led to positive changes. Rehabilitative justice systems, which focus on addressing root causes of crime rather than assigning moral blame, often achieve better outcomes. Public health initiatives targeting the social determinants of health—like poverty or lack of education—are another application of determinism in action, emphasizing prevention rather than punishment.

Common sense, as you claim, might suggest otherwise, but "common sense" has often been wrong—it once suggested the sun orbited the earth. Determinism doesn’t promise instant utopia. It provides a clearer lens for understanding and addressing the factors shaping behavior, whether societal or individual.

Now, if you believe common sense or non-deterministic paradigms offer better solutions, I invite you to present the evidence for their superiority. How would they address systemic issues or improve human well-being more effectively than a deterministic approach focused on understanding and intervention?

[Alexiev]

Alexiev, your point that both determinists and non-determinists seek to understand behavior is absolutely valid. The difference lies not in the act of seeking explanations but in the framework used to interpret them. Determinism rejects the idea of free will as a necessary ingredient in moral and social systems, shifting focus from moral blame to practical causation. Religious faith or punitive systems, as you mention, may indeed influence behavior, but determinism reframes such influences as effects of larger causal chains rather than outcomes of freely willed choices.

Your assertion that there's no evidence society would be happier under a determinist worldview overlooks key examples where deterministic principles have already led to positive changes. Rehabilitative justice systems, which focus on addressing root causes of crime rather than assigning moral blame, often achieve better outcomes. Public health initiatives targeting the social determinants of health—like poverty or lack of education—are another application of determinism in action, emphasizing prevention rather than punishment.

Common sense, as you claim, might suggest otherwise, but "common sense" has often been wrong—it once suggested the sun orbited the earth. Determinism doesn’t promise instant utopia. It provides a clearer lens for understanding and addressing the factors shaping behavior, whether societal or individual.

Now, if you believe common sense or non-deterministic paradigms offer better solutions, I invite you to present the evidence for their superiority. How would they address systemic issues or improve human well-being more effectively than a deterministic approach focused on understanding and intervention?

If causes are "effects of larger causal chains rather than outcomes of freely willed choices" we might as well dispense with talking about causation at all. Everything (apparently)_ "causes" everything else. If someone shoots someone, he did not "cause" his death -- he was only one small link in a giant causal chain stretching back to the big bang. Maybe that's true -- but who cares? There's no handle to manipulate.

Rehabilitative justice systems are not dependent on faith in determinism. Free will advocates can trust the laws of physics just as well as determinists. You are making a false dichotomy. Same with public health initiatives. You act as if only determinists can support these policies. That's nonsense.

Your contention that ascribing moral blame to evil behavior somehow prevents one from believing in rehabilitative justice or public health programs is silly. Why would it? A person can believe that smokers are morally weak, yet support programs to prevent smoking,

Non-deterministic paradigms have been addressing systematic issues to improve human well-being for centuries untold. Of course nobody can say whether we would be happier and healthier if things had been different -- but we're definitely happier and healthier than we have been in the past, so something seems to be working. The more "scientific" forms of government (communism, for example) haven't been complete successes, have they? Reformers who think they have all the answers (is that you, MIke?) should be careful not to throw out the baby with the bath water.

[BigMike]

Alexiev, your point that both determinists and non-determinists seek to understand behavior is absolutely valid. The difference lies not in the act of seeking explanations but in the framework used to interpret them. Determinism rejects the idea of free will as a necessary ingredient in moral and social systems, shifting focus from moral blame to practical causation. Religious faith or punitive systems, as you mention, may indeed influence behavior, but determinism reframes such influences as effects of larger causal chains rather than outcomes of freely willed choices.

Your assertion that there's no evidence society would be happier under a determinist worldview overlooks key examples where deterministic principles have already led to positive changes. Rehabilitative justice systems, which focus on addressing root causes of crime rather than assigning moral blame, often achieve better outcomes. Public health initiatives targeting the social determinants of health—like poverty or lack of education—are another application of determinism in action, emphasizing prevention rather than punishment.

Common sense, as you claim, might suggest otherwise, but "common sense" has often been wrong—it once suggested the sun orbited the earth. Determinism doesn’t promise instant utopia. It provides a clearer lens for understanding and addressing the factors shaping behavior, whether societal or individual.

Now, if you believe common sense or non-deterministic paradigms offer better solutions, I invite you to present the evidence for their superiority. How would they address systemic issues or improve human well-being more effectively than a deterministic approach focused on understanding and intervention?

If causes are "effects of larger causal chains rather than outcomes of freely willed choices" we might as well dispense with talking about causation at all. Everything (apparently)_ "causes" everything else. If someone shoots someone, he did not "cause" his death -- he was only one small link in a giant causal chain stretching back to the big bang. Maybe that's true -- but who cares? There's no handle to manipulate.

Rehabilitative justice systems are not dependent on faith in determinism. Free will advocates can trust the laws of physics just as well as determinists. You are making a false dichotomy. Same with public health initiatives. You act as if only determinists can support these policies. That's nonsense.

Your contention that ascribing moral blame to evil behavior somehow prevents one from believing in rehabilitative justice or public health programs is silly. Why would it? A person can believe that smokers are morally weak, yet support programs to prevent smoking,

Non-deterministic paradigms have been addressing systematic issues to improve human well-being for centuries untold. Of course nobody can say whether we would be happier and healthier if things had been different -- but we're definitely happier and healthier than we have been in the past, so something seems to be working. The more "scientific" forms of government (communism, for example) haven't been complete successes, have they? Reformers who think they have all the answers (is that you, MIke?) should be careful not to throw out the baby with the bath water.

Alexiev, you’re highlighting a core concern about determinism: its apparent breadth and whether it provides practical tools or simply abstracts everything into an endless chain of causes. But this concern misunderstands determinism’s role. Determinism isn’t a claim that “everything causes everything else” in a chaotic soup of effects; it’s the principle that every effect has a preceding cause, governed by identifiable laws. This framework isn’t meant to dissolve causation into meaninglessness but to give us a coherent way of understanding why things happen and how we can intervene effectively.

If someone shoots another person, determinism doesn’t deny that their action was the immediate cause of the victim’s death. What it does is place that action within a broader causal context—one that includes their upbringing, psychological state, societal influences, and more. This isn’t to excuse the act but to ask better questions: How do we address the conditions that lead to violence? How do we reduce the likelihood of similar actions in the future? These are handles we can manipulate.

You’re correct that rehabilitative justice and public health aren’t exclusive to determinists. But determinism strengthens these approaches by providing a framework that prioritizes understanding over retribution. While a free-will advocate can support these policies, their belief in moral blame often leads to punitive approaches that have historically failed to address root causes. Determinism explicitly shifts the focus to causation, ensuring solutions are evidence-based rather than rooted in notions of deserved punishment.

Your argument that non-deterministic paradigms have “been working” for centuries deserves scrutiny. Human well-being has improved, but not because free-will paradigms are inherently better. Advances in science, medicine, and governance—all grounded in understanding causation—have driven this progress. These advancements align with deterministic thinking, even if not explicitly framed that way.

Finally, I don’t claim to have “all the answers,” nor does determinism. What it offers is a lens—a way of looking at problems that avoids the pitfalls of moralistic blame and focuses on understanding and intervention. If you believe non-deterministic paradigms are more effective, I invite you to articulate how they uniquely address systemic issues without relying on deterministic principles like causation, evidence, and intervention. What does the free-will framework offer that determinism doesn’t? Let’s dig into that.

[ThinkOfOne]

Alexiev, your point that both determinists and non-determinists seek to understand behavior is absolutely valid. The difference lies not in the act of seeking explanations but in the framework used to interpret them. Determinism rejects the idea of free will as a necessary ingredient in moral and social systems, shifting focus from moral blame to practical causation. Religious faith or punitive systems, as you mention, may indeed influence behavior, but determinism reframes such influences as effects of larger causal chains rather than outcomes of freely willed choices.

Your assertion that there's no evidence society would be happier under a determinist worldview overlooks key examples where deterministic principles have already led to positive changes. Rehabilitative justice systems, which focus on addressing root causes of crime rather than assigning moral blame, often achieve better outcomes. Public health initiatives targeting the social determinants of health—like poverty or lack of education—are another application of determinism in action, emphasizing prevention rather than punishment.

Common sense, as you claim, might suggest otherwise, but "common sense" has often been wrong—it once suggested the sun orbited the earth. Determinism doesn’t promise instant utopia. It provides a clearer lens for understanding and addressing the factors shaping behavior, whether societal or individual.

Now, if you believe common sense or non-deterministic paradigms offer better solutions, I invite you to present the evidence for their superiority. How would they address systemic issues or improve human well-being more effectively than a deterministic approach focused on understanding and intervention?

If causes are "effects of larger causal chains rather than outcomes of freely willed choices" we might as well dispense with talking about causation at all. Everything (apparently)_ "causes" everything else. If someone shoots someone, he did not "cause" his death -- he was only one small link in a giant causal chain stretching back to the big bang. Maybe that's true -- but who cares? There's no handle to manipulate.

Rehabilitative justice systems are not dependent on faith in determinism. Free will advocates can trust the laws of physics just as well as determinists. You are making a false dichotomy. Same with public health initiatives. You act as if only determinists can support these policies. That's nonsense.

Your contention that ascribing moral blame to evil behavior somehow prevents one from believing in rehabilitative justice or public health programs is silly. Why would it? A person can believe that smokers are morally weak, yet support programs to prevent smoking,

Non-deterministic paradigms have been addressing systematic issues to improve human well-being for centuries untold. Of course nobody can say whether we would be happier and healthier if things had been different -- but we're definitely happier and healthier than we have been in the past, so something seems to be working. The more "scientific" forms of government (communism, for example) haven't been complete successes, have they? Reformers who think they have all the answers (is that you, MIke?) should be careful not to throw out the baby with the bath water.

Alexiev, you’re highlighting a core concern about determinism: its apparent breadth and whether it provides practical tools or simply abstracts everything into an endless chain of causes. But this concern misunderstands determinism’s role. Determinism isn’t a claim that “everything causes everything else” in a chaotic soup of effects; it’s the principle that every effect has a preceding cause, governed by identifiable laws. This framework isn’t meant to dissolve causation into meaninglessness but to give us a coherent way of understanding why things happen and how we can intervene effectively.

If someone shoots another person, determinism doesn’t deny that their action was the immediate cause of the victim’s death. What it does is place that action within a broader causal context—one that includes their upbringing, psychological state, societal influences, and more. This isn’t to excuse the act but to ask better questions: How do we address the conditions that lead to violence? How do we reduce the likelihood of similar actions in the future? These are handles we can manipulate.

You’re correct that rehabilitative justice and public health aren’t exclusive to determinists. But determinism strengthens these approaches by providing a framework that prioritizes understanding over retribution. While a free-will advocate can support these policies, their belief in moral blame often leads to punitive approaches that have historically failed to address root causes. Determinism explicitly shifts the focus to causation, ensuring solutions are evidence-based rather than rooted in notions of deserved punishment.

Your argument that non-deterministic paradigms have “been working” for centuries deserves scrutiny. Human well-being has improved, but not because free-will paradigms are inherently better. Advances in science, medicine, and governance—all grounded in understanding causation—have driven this progress. These advancements align with deterministic thinking, even if not explicitly framed that way.

Finally, I don’t claim to have “all the answers,” nor does determinism. What it offers is a lens—a way of looking at problems that avoids the pitfalls of moralistic blame and focuses on understanding and intervention. If you believe non-deterministic paradigms are more effective, I invite you to articulate how they uniquely address systemic issues without relying on deterministic principles like causation, evidence, and intervention. What does the free-will framework offer that determinism doesn’t? Let’s dig into that.

This framework isn’t meant to dissolve causation into meaninglessness but to give us a coherent way of understanding why things happen and how we can intervene effectively...This isn’t to excuse the act but to ask better questions: How do we address the conditions that lead to violence? How do we reduce the likelihood of similar actions in the future? These are handles we can manipulate.

How we can intervene effectively? How do we address? Handles we can manipulate?

How does this not entail volition by those choosing to "intervene", "address", "manipulate"?

[henry quirk]

How does this not entail volition?

What Mike will tell you, essentially, is: it's all about inputs and outputs.

In some way certain inputs will trigger or drive brains open to the stimulus to do certain things (that there is the output). A myriad of deterministic forces driving certain brains in certain directions at certain times will result in rehabilitative justice systems and public health initiatives and education and all the other good things Mike wants.

Somehow, blind, amoral, deterministic forces, by way of us, can and will make the world a better place.

So: trust the Force, Luke.

[BigMike]

If causes are "effects of larger causal chains rather than outcomes of freely willed choices" we might as well dispense with talking about causation at all. Everything (apparently)_ "causes" everything else. If someone shoots someone, he did not "cause" his death -- he was only one small link in a giant causal chain stretching back to the big bang. Maybe that's true -- but who cares? There's no handle to manipulate.

Rehabilitative justice systems are not dependent on faith in determinism. Free will advocates can trust the laws of physics just as well as determinists. You are making a false dichotomy. Same with public health initiatives. You act as if only determinists can support these policies. That's nonsense.

Your contention that ascribing moral blame to evil behavior somehow prevents one from believing in rehabilitative justice or public health programs is silly. Why would it? A person can believe that smokers are morally weak, yet support programs to prevent smoking,

Non-deterministic paradigms have been addressing systematic issues to improve human well-being for centuries untold. Of course nobody can say whether we would be happier and healthier if things had been different -- but we're definitely happier and healthier than we have been in the past, so something seems to be working. The more "scientific" forms of government (communism, for example) haven't been complete successes, have they? Reformers who think they have all the answers (is that you, MIke?) should be careful not to throw out the baby with the bath water.

Alexiev, you’re highlighting a core concern about determinism: its apparent breadth and whether it provides practical tools or simply abstracts everything into an endless chain of causes. But this concern misunderstands determinism’s role. Determinism isn’t a claim that “everything causes everything else” in a chaotic soup of effects; it’s the principle that every effect has a preceding cause, governed by identifiable laws. This framework isn’t meant to dissolve causation into meaninglessness but to give us a coherent way of understanding why things happen and how we can intervene effectively.

If someone shoots another person, determinism doesn’t deny that their action was the immediate cause of the victim’s death. What it does is place that action within a broader causal context—one that includes their upbringing, psychological state, societal influences, and more. This isn’t to excuse the act but to ask better questions: How do we address the conditions that lead to violence? How do we reduce the likelihood of similar actions in the future? These are handles we can manipulate.

You’re correct that rehabilitative justice and public health aren’t exclusive to determinists. But determinism strengthens these approaches by providing a framework that prioritizes understanding over retribution. While a free-will advocate can support these policies, their belief in moral blame often leads to punitive approaches that have historically failed to address root causes. Determinism explicitly shifts the focus to causation, ensuring solutions are evidence-based rather than rooted in notions of deserved punishment.

Your argument that non-deterministic paradigms have “been working” for centuries deserves scrutiny. Human well-being has improved, but not because free-will paradigms are inherently better. Advances in science, medicine, and governance—all grounded in understanding causation—have driven this progress. These advancements align with deterministic thinking, even if not explicitly framed that way.

Finally, I don’t claim to have “all the answers,” nor does determinism. What it offers is a lens—a way of looking at problems that avoids the pitfalls of moralistic blame and focuses on understanding and intervention. If you believe non-deterministic paradigms are more effective, I invite you to articulate how they uniquely address systemic issues without relying on deterministic principles like causation, evidence, and intervention. What does the free-will framework offer that determinism doesn’t? Let’s dig into that.

This framework isn’t meant to dissolve causation into meaninglessness but to give us a coherent way of understanding why things happen and how we can intervene effectively...This isn’t to excuse the act but to ask better questions: How do we address the conditions that lead to violence? How do we reduce the likelihood of similar actions in the future? These are handles we can manipulate.

How we can intervene effectively? How do we address? Handles we can manipulate?

How does this not entail volition by those choosing to "intervene", "address", "manipulate"?

ThinkOfOne, this is a good question, but the answer lies in understanding what volition actually is under determinism. Volition—the sense of choosing, deciding, or intending—is not denied by determinism; it’s reinterpreted. What we experience as choice is the result of underlying causes: neural processes, past experiences, environmental influences, and current conditions. When we “intervene,” “address,” or “manipulate,” these actions are themselves caused by factors like knowledge, values, and external circumstances.

In a deterministic framework, volition isn’t some mystical, uncaused force. It’s a higher-level process emerging from a complex web of causation. For example, if someone advocates for better education to reduce violence, their advocacy is determined by their awareness of the issue, their empathy, their understanding of causal relationships, and countless other factors. They aren’t "free" in the sense of being uncaused, but their actions are no less real or impactful.

The handles we “manipulate” are causal factors—poverty, education, social systems—whose changes can influence outcomes. Determinism doesn’t negate the meaningfulness of these efforts; it provides the context in which they occur. In fact, by acknowledging causation, determinism makes interventions more precise and effective. Volition, in this sense, is simply the human experience of being part of this deterministic chain, not outside it.

[henry quirk]

See, ThinkOfOne? When you translate Mike's prose in the post just above, distill it down to essence, you have: inputs & outputs driven by deterministic forces. That's it, that's all. Everything else is just Mike's window dressing.

The horrible thing: Mike may be right. We all might be meat machines. If so, I consider myself fortunate to be the particular kind of meat machine I am, one driven by blind, amoral, forces to believe himself to be sumthin' other than, more than, better than, meat.

[ThinkOfOne]

Alexiev, you’re highlighting a core concern about determinism: its apparent breadth and whether it provides practical tools or simply abstracts everything into an endless chain of causes. But this concern misunderstands determinism’s role. Determinism isn’t a claim that “everything causes everything else” in a chaotic soup of effects; it’s the principle that every effect has a preceding cause, governed by identifiable laws. This framework isn’t meant to dissolve causation into meaninglessness but to give us a coherent way of understanding why things happen and how we can intervene effectively.

If someone shoots another person, determinism doesn’t deny that their action was the immediate cause of the victim’s death. What it does is place that action within a broader causal context—one that includes their upbringing, psychological state, societal influences, and more. This isn’t to excuse the act but to ask better questions: How do we address the conditions that lead to violence? How do we reduce the likelihood of similar actions in the future? These are handles we can manipulate.

You’re correct that rehabilitative justice and public health aren’t exclusive to determinists. But determinism strengthens these approaches by providing a framework that prioritizes understanding over retribution. While a free-will advocate can support these policies, their belief in moral blame often leads to punitive approaches that have historically failed to address root causes. Determinism explicitly shifts the focus to causation, ensuring solutions are evidence-based rather than rooted in notions of deserved punishment.

Your argument that non-deterministic paradigms have “been working” for centuries deserves scrutiny. Human well-being has improved, but not because free-will paradigms are inherently better. Advances in science, medicine, and governance—all grounded in understanding causation—have driven this progress. These advancements align with deterministic thinking, even if not explicitly framed that way.

Finally, I don’t claim to have “all the answers,” nor does determinism. What it offers is a lens—a way of looking at problems that avoids the pitfalls of moralistic blame and focuses on understanding and intervention. If you believe non-deterministic paradigms are more effective, I invite you to articulate how they uniquely address systemic issues without relying on deterministic principles like causation, evidence, and intervention. What does the free-will framework offer that determinism doesn’t? Let’s dig into that.

This framework isn’t meant to dissolve causation into meaninglessness but to give us a coherent way of understanding why things happen and how we can intervene effectively...This isn’t to excuse the act but to ask better questions: How do we address the conditions that lead to violence? How do we reduce the likelihood of similar actions in the future? These are handles we can manipulate.

How we can intervene effectively? How do we address? Handles we can manipulate?

How does this not entail volition by those choosing to "intervene", "address", "manipulate"?

ThinkOfOne, this is a good question, but the answer lies in understanding what volition actually is under determinism. Volition—the sense of choosing, deciding, or intending—is not denied by determinism; it’s reinterpreted. What we experience as choice is the result of underlying causes: neural processes, past experiences, environmental influences, and current conditions. When we “intervene,” “address,” or “manipulate,” these actions are themselves caused by factors like knowledge, values, and external circumstances.

In a deterministic framework, volition isn’t some mystical, uncaused force. It’s a higher-level process emerging from a complex web of causation. For example, if someone advocates for better education to reduce violence, their advocacy is determined by their awareness of the issue, their empathy, their understanding of causal relationships, and countless other factors. They aren’t "free" in the sense of being uncaused, but their actions are no less real or impactful.

The handles we “manipulate” are causal factors—poverty, education, social systems—whose changes can influence outcomes. Determinism doesn’t negate the meaningfulness of these efforts; it provides the context in which they occur. In fact, by acknowledging causation, determinism makes interventions more precise and effective. Volition, in this sense, is simply the human experience of being part of this deterministic chain, not outside it.

You seem to have misunderstood what I was driving at. My fault. I should have been more explicit. That said, I imagine its "turtles all the way down" given your responses. As such, I'll take a different tack.

You seem to have redefined "volition". Not sure, but you seem to think that volition can only be explained by some "mystical, uncaused force" OR as the "experience of being part of [a] deterministic chain" with the "illusion" of volition. Another option is that the mind has the capacity to consciously direct thought outside of the "deterministic chain". In other words, true volition.

Evidently you've drawn the conclusion that true volition does not exist. That is only an illusion, despite the fact that it does not feel like an illusion to the individual. From what I've seen, there is nothing in neuroscience that precludes true volition. If you think there is, then present it here. Or direct me to the appropriate post if you already have. I've only spot-checked your posts, so I very well could have missed it.

[BigMike]

This framework isn’t meant to dissolve causation into meaninglessness but to give us a coherent way of understanding why things happen and how we can intervene effectively...This isn’t to excuse the act but to ask better questions: How do we address the conditions that lead to violence? How do we reduce the likelihood of similar actions in the future? These are handles we can manipulate.

How we can intervene effectively? How do we address? Handles we can manipulate?

How does this not entail volition by those choosing to "intervene", "address", "manipulate"?

ThinkOfOne, this is a good question, but the answer lies in understanding what volition actually is under determinism. Volition—the sense of choosing, deciding, or intending—is not denied by determinism; it’s reinterpreted. What we experience as choice is the result of underlying causes: neural processes, past experiences, environmental influences, and current conditions. When we “intervene,” “address,” or “manipulate,” these actions are themselves caused by factors like knowledge, values, and external circumstances.

In a deterministic framework, volition isn’t some mystical, uncaused force. It’s a higher-level process emerging from a complex web of causation. For example, if someone advocates for better education to reduce violence, their advocacy is determined by their awareness of the issue, their empathy, their understanding of causal relationships, and countless other factors. They aren’t "free" in the sense of being uncaused, but their actions are no less real or impactful.

The handles we “manipulate” are causal factors—poverty, education, social systems—whose changes can influence outcomes. Determinism doesn’t negate the meaningfulness of these efforts; it provides the context in which they occur. In fact, by acknowledging causation, determinism makes interventions more precise and effective. Volition, in this sense, is simply the human experience of being part of this deterministic chain, not outside it.

You seem to have misunderstood what I was driving at. My fault. I should have been more explicit. That said, I imagine its "turtles all the way down" given your responses. As such, I'll take a different tack.

You seem to have redefined "volition". Not sure, but you seem to think that volition can only be explained by some "mystical, uncaused force" OR as the "experience of being part of [a] deterministic chain" with the "illusion" of volition. Another option is that the mind has the capacity to consciously direct thought outside of the "deterministic chain". In other words, true volition.

Evidently you've drawn the conclusion that true volition does not exist. That is only an illusion, despite the fact that it does not feel like an illusion to the individual. From what I've seen, there is nothing in neuroscience that precludes true volition. If you think there is, then present it here. Or direct me to the appropriate post if you already have. I've only spot-checked your posts, so I very well could have missed it.

ThinkOfOne, I appreciate your willingness to engage deeply with the question of volition. Let’s address this idea of "true volition" head-on, along with the role neuroscience plays in this discussion.

The crux of the deterministic argument isn’t that volition, as experienced, doesn’t feel real—it absolutely does. What determinism suggests is that this feeling arises from underlying causes, not from an independent, self-directed force that exists outside the causal chain. To claim that the mind can "consciously direct thought outside of the deterministic chain" implies the existence of phenomena that operate without prior causes. This is where we run into the principles of physics and neuroscience.

Neuroscientific evidence doesn’t explicitly rule out the possibility of "true volition," but it has revealed mechanisms that challenge its plausibility. For instance, experiments by Benjamin Libet and subsequent researchers have shown that neural activity predicting a decision occurs before a person becomes consciously aware of making that decision. While these findings don’t conclusively disprove free will, they strongly suggest that what we experience as conscious choice is shaped by unconscious processes that precede it.

Moreover, brain studies have consistently shown that our decisions are influenced by factors like genetics, environmental inputs, and prior experiences—all of which are outside our conscious control. This doesn’t mean we don’t "decide" things; it means that our decisions emerge as the result of these interacting factors. The feeling of being in control is itself part of the deterministic process—a complex outcome of neural activity that gives rise to consciousness.

If you’re suggesting that the mind has a capacity to direct thought outside this chain, it would require evidence of causeless events—a break in the physical or biological processes we observe. As far as we know, no such evidence has been observed. This doesn’t close the door entirely, but it places the burden of proof on those who posit "true volition."

In short, determinism aligns with the evidence we currently have: it’s grounded in the observable laws of physics and the causal structure revealed by neuroscience. If you believe in a concept of volition that operates outside of this framework, I’m genuinely curious to hear how you define it and what evidence supports its existence. Let’s explore that further.