Is morality objective or subjective?

[Peter Holmes]

As I understand it, VA's argument for the supposed basic moral fact that no human ought to kill humans goes something like this.

P1 Morality is about promoting good (as defined) and avoiding evil (as defined).
P2 The killing of humans is evil.
C Therefore, it's a moral fact that no human ought to kill humans.

But VA insists on the following conditions:

1 What we call a fact must be empirically and philosophically demonstrated to exist within a credible framework and system of knowledge (FSK).
2 There is a credible moral FSK, within which moral facts exist.

I and others have repeatedly explained why this is all embarrassingly question-begging nonsense that does nothing to establish the existence of moral facts, and therefore of moral objectivity. But to no avail. VA either doesn't understand or ignores refutation of her/his argument, whose conclusion is clearly an article of faith.

As the man said: I kan namoore.

[Belinda]

It doesn't mean anything non-physical. There's no evidence for anything non-physical. We've been suckered by ways of talking.

What does 'physical' usually refer to? Is there anything that is not physical?

What would be evidence that your hand, or the cat, is physical?

This is what Moore was asking, and it's why Wittgenstein gently satirised the question in 'On Certainty'. Doubt can exist only against a background of certainty.

I think physicalism, naturalism and materialism are near-as-dammit synonyms. And treated methodologically, they needn't incur the burden of proving that non-physical, non-natural or non-material things don't exist. The burden is with those who claim they do.

Do you agree to use the usual jargon of academic philosophy? If so, I may tell you 'physicalism' means exactly the same as 'materialism' in the jargon. The historical reason for there being the two words is the former is more favoured by American philosophers and the latter by the English.

Do you know what substance monism means ?

If you would, please think of how a medic does some patient's diagnosis. Obviously the medic cannot feel what her patient feels; it would be a big help with diagnosis if this were possible. So the medic has to rely on visible, smellable, tangible, and audible signs (i.e. evidences)of possible disease. The medic also ask her patient to describe symptoms or say if various symptoms are present. N.B. any symptoms the patient mentions may delusional, illusional, or they may correlate with something tangible. In all three cases (delusional, illusional, physical correlate) the patient is undoubtedly reporting existential phenomena and is probably not telling lies. Therefore the patient's mind exists.

[Peter Holmes]

What does 'physical' usually refer to? Is there anything that is not physical?

What would be evidence that your hand, or the cat, is physical?

This is what Moore was asking, and it's why Wittgenstein gently satirised the question in 'On Certainty'. Doubt can exist only against a background of certainty.

I think physicalism, naturalism and materialism are near-as-dammit synonyms. And treated methodologically, they needn't incur the burden of proving that non-physical, non-natural or non-material things don't exist. The burden is with those who claim they do.

Do you agree to use the usual jargon of academic philosophy? If so, I may tell you 'physicalism' means exactly the same as 'materialism' in the jargon. The historical reason for there being the two words is the former is more favoured by American philosophers and the latter by the English.

Do you know what substance monism means ?

If you would, please think of how a medic does some patient's diagnosis. Obviously the medic cannot feel what her patient feels; it would be a big help with diagnosis if this were possible. So the medic has to rely on visible, smellable, tangible, and audible signs (i.e. evidences)of possible disease. The medic also ask her patient to describe symptoms or say if various symptoms are present. N.B. any symptoms the patient mentions may delusional, illusional, or they may correlate with something tangible. In all three cases (delusional, illusional, physical correlate) the patient is undoubtedly reporting existential phenomena and is probably not telling lies. Therefore the patient's mind exists.

Yes, I know what substance monism is. And your description of what goes on between doctor and patient - what the patient talks about - is not evidence for the existence of anything non-physical. Of course we can say 'the patient's mind exists' - because that's how we've always talked about our experiences. But it was always really just a way of talking about brain activity - as is all 'mentalist' talk. Substance monism is the rational position - but substance dualism was never even at the races, so ... nothing to see here. Move on.

[Skepdick]

Yes, I know what substance monism is. And your description of what goes on between doctor and patient - what the patient talks about - is not evidence for the existence of anything non-physical.

But non-physical is synonymous for non-existing. Why are you still talking about evidence for non-existence? This is incoherent!

Of course we can say 'the patient's mind exists' - because that's how we've always talked about our experiences.

And we can say that experience exists. And we can speak about "existence" and observe that it serves the same function as any subtance-monism.

But it was always really just a way of talking about brain activity

That's a useless generalisation. Which part of the brain? The different parts of the brain evolved at different times (some much later than others).

Do you want to tell us which part of the brain coincides with the beginning of "experience", and which part of the brain is not necessary for "experience"?

- as is all 'mentalist' talk. Substance monism is the rational position - but substance dualism was never even at the races, so ... nothing to see here. Move on.

Who is a dualist here? Minds are physical. Exactly like brains.

[Belinda]

This is what Moore was asking, and it's why Wittgenstein gently satirised the question in 'On Certainty'. Doubt can exist only against a background of certainty.

I think physicalism, naturalism and materialism are near-as-dammit synonyms. And treated methodologically, they needn't incur the burden of proving that non-physical, non-natural or non-material things don't exist. The burden is with those who claim they do.

Do you agree to use the usual jargon of academic philosophy? If so, I may tell you 'physicalism' means exactly the same as 'materialism' in the jargon. The historical reason for there being the two words is the former is more favoured by American philosophers and the latter by the English.

Do you know what substance monism means ?

If you would, please think of how a medic does some patient's diagnosis. Obviously the medic cannot feel what her patient feels; it would be a big help with diagnosis if this were possible. So the medic has to rely on visible, smellable, tangible, and audible signs (i.e. evidences)of possible disease. The medic also ask her patient to describe symptoms or say if various symptoms are present. N.B. any symptoms the patient mentions may delusional, illusional, or they may correlate with something tangible. In all three cases (delusional, illusional, physical correlate) the patient is undoubtedly reporting existential phenomena and is probably not telling lies. Therefore the patient's mind exists.

Yes, I know what substance monism is. And your description of what goes on between doctor and patient - what the patient talks about - is not evidence for the existence of anything non-physical. Of course we can say 'the patient's mind exists' - because that's how we've always talked about our experiences. But it was always really just a way of talking about brain activity - as is all 'mentalist' talk. Substance monism is the rational position - but substance dualism was never even at the races, so ... nothing to see here. Move on.

Mind is not physical by definition. Mental means not physical. Public evidence is not available for mind phenomena because mind phenomena are known from direct acquaintance only.

Mental phenomena correlate with physical (physiological) phenomena and so we presume brains and minds are aspects of the same. We can as observers look at a brain-mind(aspect 1) and we can as immediate experiences feel a brain-mind(aspect 2). I bet there is a procedure where a patient having an operation on her brain can look at a scan of her brain and report an immediate sensation that correlates with the probe activation of a bit of her anatomical brain. When I say "immediate" in this context I mean not mediated by any organs of special sense.

The aspect of mind is not the same as the aspect of brain because qualia are experienced immediately or not at all.

[Veritas Aequitas]

If we agree there's no evidence for the existence of non-physical things - abandoning millennia of philosophical speculation down the rabbit hole - we're free to understand that what we've always been talking about is the use of what we confusingly call abstract nouns.

Philosophy is, and has always been, nothing more than talk about the ways we use, or could use, words in general, and abstract nouns in particular. And that's what so-called philosophical problems have always really been about. In my opinion, that was the later Wittgenstein's profound and hard-won insight - one whose implications many philosophers still haven't taken on board.

What are you blabbering about and groping at illusions?

If you are hinging on Wittgenstein's On Certainty, show the relevant references to support your argument.

Re Abstract Noun, note

• Abstract Noun = a noun denoting an idea, quality, or state rather than a concrete object, e.g. truth, danger, happiness.

Here you are entrapped within the linguistic FSK which is not credible in representing reality by itself.

You cannot assume all abstract nouns [non-physical] are not real things.
Whatever is a real thing [physical or non-physical] must be verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a credible FSK, i.e. science being the standard bearer of the credibility of reality.

As such emotions [not concrete objects] i.e. being non-physical are real things as verified and justified empirically and philosophically within the scientific FSK [within neuroscience, psychology, psychiatry, evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, etc.].

Has anyone ever mentioned "special needs" or "cognitive impairment" in connection with your thinking?
I just wondered if autism, or obsessive compulsive disorder were part of your make-up?

I'm not trying to be insulting or "funny", I simply ask, that I might try to understand your ideosyncratic thinking on this issue.

As usual no argument with supporting evidence.

Nope I am not autistic. If I am autistic I would not have been so successful in my professional career.

On the other hand I grant you are a normal and average person BUT it is evident your philosophical knowledge and thinking is VERY narrow, shallow, dogmatic and archaic as I had indicated to you many times with the evidence you don't support your claims with supporting references and valid-sound arguments.
In this sense you may have some mild degree of autism within the continuum of autism.

[Veritas Aequitas]

As I understand it, VA's argument for the supposed basic moral fact that no human ought to kill humans goes something like this.

P1 Morality is about promoting good (as defined) and avoiding evil (as defined).
P2 The killing of humans is evil.
C Therefore, it's a moral fact that no human ought to kill humans.

Strawman as usual.

Your syllogism is not valid.
Logically it should be,

• P1 Morality is about promoting good (as defined) and avoiding evil (as defined).
  P2 The killing of humans is evil[as defined].
  C Therefore, killing of humans is not good, i.e. not compatible with morality.

But VA insists on the following conditions:

1 What we call a fact must be empirically and philosophically demonstrated to exist within a credible framework and system of knowledge (FSK).
2 There is a credible moral FSK, within which moral facts exist.

I and others have repeatedly explained why this is all embarrassingly question-begging nonsense that does nothing to establish the existence of moral facts, and therefore of moral objectivity. But to no avail. VA either doesn't understand or ignores refutation of her/his argument, whose conclusion is clearly an article of faith.

As the man said: I kan namoore.

There is nothing wrong with point 1 above.
Point 2 is the same with any fact from a specific FSK, e.g. scientific facts from the scientific FSK, legal facts from the legal FSK and so on.

Where is the question-begging?

On the other hand, you are the one who is begging the question with your claim of 'what is fact' by presuming facts exist before verifying and justifying they exists.

I don't beg the question like you.
I start with empirical evidences, verify and justify them and end up with an empirical based conclusion of empirically justified true moral facts.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Do you agree to use the usual jargon of academic philosophy? If so, I may tell you 'physicalism' means exactly the same as 'materialism' in the jargon. The historical reason for there being the two words is the former is more favoured by American philosophers and the latter by the English.

Do you know what substance monism means ?

If you would, please think of how a medic does some patient's diagnosis. Obviously the medic cannot feel what her patient feels; it would be a big help with diagnosis if this were possible. So the medic has to rely on visible, smellable, tangible, and audible signs (i.e. evidences)of possible disease. The medic also ask her patient to describe symptoms or say if various symptoms are present. N.B. any symptoms the patient mentions may delusional, illusional, or they may correlate with something tangible. In all three cases (delusional, illusional, physical correlate) the patient is undoubtedly reporting existential phenomena and is probably not telling lies. Therefore the patient's mind exists.

Yes, I know what substance monism is. And your description of what goes on between doctor and patient - what the patient talks about - is not evidence for the existence of anything non-physical. Of course we can say 'the patient's mind exists' - because that's how we've always talked about our experiences. But it was always really just a way of talking about brain activity - as is all 'mentalist' talk. Substance monism is the rational position - but substance dualism was never even at the races, so ... nothing to see here. Move on.

Mind is not physical by definition. Mental means not physical. Public evidence is not available for mind phenomena because mind phenomena are known from direct acquaintance only.

Mental phenomena correlate with physical (physiological) phenomena and so we presume brains and minds are aspects of the same. We can as observers look at a brain-mind(aspect 1) and we can as immediate experiences feel a brain-mind(aspect 2). I bet there is a procedure where a patient having an operation on her brain can look at a scan of her brain and report an immediate sensation that correlates with the probe activation of a bit of her anatomical brain. When I say "immediate" in this context I mean not mediated by any organs of special sense.

The aspect of mind is not the same as the aspect of brain because qualia are experienced immediately or not at all.

I believe there is a lot of semantic issues in the above.

1. PH insist on his definition of what is 'physical' which is something solid and or observable by the senses, i.e. empirical.
2. Thus what is non-physical and 'metaphysical' like ghosts, spirits, do not exist.
3. Then he claims ALL abstract nouns do not exist as real empirically.

I agree that 2 as non-physical do not exist as real empirically since they cannot be tracked to any physical grounding and referent.

But I insist whatever abstract noun that are reducible to empirical referents do exist as real empirically.

For example the 'mind' is an abstract noun is mental and 'non-physical' conventionally, but what is the 'mind' is reducible to its physical referent the brain and the body.
What is 'mind' in this case is not a free floating spirit like ghosts and other ethereal beings.

What is mind as a real thing is like what is a specific symphony orchestra that produced a specific piece of music, e.g. Beethoven Symphony No.5.
What is critical here is the element of "wholeness" connected physically or mentally.

A 'loose' group of 50 individual musicians and a conductor is not a real orchestra as a real thing, it is only an orchestra as a real thing when all their minds are connected and operate in synchrony as a group which can only produce outputs specific to the group.

As such a bunch of neurons and chemicals by themselves is not a mind, but there is mind only when all the live neurons are working in synchrony in accordance as programmed via evolution. Such a real empirical mind is reducible to its physical referents, i.e. the neurons, the chemicals and the algorithms all working in synchrony.

PH is stupid [not sufficiently intelligent] to deny such an empirical mind as described above, exists as real because he is dogmatically clinging to some olden bastardized philosophies and semantics from the logical positivists [defunct] and classical analytic philosophy.

[Peter Holmes]

Yes, I know what substance monism is. And your description of what goes on between doctor and patient - what the patient talks about - is not evidence for the existence of anything non-physical. Of course we can say 'the patient's mind exists' - because that's how we've always talked about our experiences. But it was always really just a way of talking about brain activity - as is all 'mentalist' talk. Substance monism is the rational position - but substance dualism was never even at the races, so ... nothing to see here. Move on.

Mind is not physical by definition. Mental means not physical. Public evidence is not available for mind phenomena because mind phenomena are known from direct acquaintance only.

Mental phenomena correlate with physical (physiological) phenomena and so we presume brains and minds are aspects of the same. We can as observers look at a brain-mind(aspect 1) and we can as immediate experiences feel a brain-mind(aspect 2). I bet there is a procedure where a patient having an operation on her brain can look at a scan of her brain and report an immediate sensation that correlates with the probe activation of a bit of her anatomical brain. When I say "immediate" in this context I mean not mediated by any organs of special sense.

The aspect of mind is not the same as the aspect of brain because qualia are experienced immediately or not at all.

I believe there is a lot of semantic issues in the above.

1. PH insist on his definition of what is 'physical' which is something solid and or observable by the senses, i.e. empirical.
2. Thus what is non-physical and 'metaphysical' like ghosts, spirits, do not exist.
3. Then he claims ALL abstract nouns do not exist as real empirically.

I agree that 2 as non-physical do not exist as real empirically since they cannot be tracked to any physical grounding and referent.

But I insist whatever abstract noun that are reducible to empirical referents do exist as real empirically.

For example the 'mind' is an abstract noun is mental and 'non-physical' conventionally, but what is the 'mind' is reducible to its physical referent the brain and the body.
What is 'mind' in this case is not a free floating spirit like ghosts and other ethereal beings.

What is mind as a real thing is like what is a specific symphony orchestra that produced a specific piece of music, e.g. Beethoven Symphony No.5.
What is critical here is the element of "wholeness" connected physically or mentally.

A 'loose' group of 50 individual musicians and a conductor is not a real orchestra as a real thing, it is only an orchestra as a real thing when all their minds are connected and operate in synchrony as a group which can only produce outputs specific to the group.

As such a bunch of neurons and chemicals by themselves is not a mind, but there is mind only when all the live neurons are working in synchrony in accordance as programmed via evolution. Such a real empirical mind is reducible to its physical referents, i.e. the neurons, the chemicals and the algorithms all working in synchrony.

PH is stupid [not sufficiently intelligent] to deny such an empirical mind as described above, exists as real because he is dogmatically clinging to some olden bastardized philosophies and semantics from the logical positivists [defunct] and classical analytic philosophy.

You seem confused. Let me help. A word, such as what we confusingly call an abstract noun, is a real thing that actually exists as a sound, marks on paper or screen, a signing gesture, and so on. Abstract nouns exist physically, as do brains.

The trouble is we use nouns to name things, so we fool ourselves into thinking that abstract nouns must also be the names of things - thing which must therefore exist somewhere, somehow, and which can therefore be described. Hence metaphysical theories of knowledge, truth, goodness, beauty, identity, justice, causation, and so on - insert the abstract noun of choice - hence philosophical delusion over at least two and a half millennia.

And the word 'mind' is one of those abstract nouns. Hence the absurdity of the so-called mind-body problem, the claim that consciousness can't arise from matter (a common apologetic canard supposedly justifying substance-dualism and supernaturalism) - and hence fatuous gotcha questions like 'well, if there are no abstract things, why are you talking about moral rightness and wrongness?'

We've always used metaphors to talk about our brain activity, and the orchestra/symphony comparison is one example - though notice that the symphony is a real, physical thing - not some mystical, abstract emanation. The expression 'emergent property' is another and very common metaphor: what we call 'mind' is a property of the brain. And metaphors have their uses - but they can easily lead us astray, as the history of our talk about the supposed abstract or non-physical thing we call the mind demonstrates.

[Belinda]

Philosophy of mind briefly explained:-

https://www.philosophybasics.com/branch ... _mind.html

[Peter Holmes]

Philosophy of mind briefly explained:-

https://www.philosophybasics.com/branch ... _mind.html

The philosophy of mind can be nothing more than an explanation of how we use, or could use, the word 'mind', its cognates and related words.

[Sculptor]

What are you blabbering about and groping at illusions?

If you are hinging on Wittgenstein's On Certainty, show the relevant references to support your argument.

Re Abstract Noun, note

• Abstract Noun = a noun denoting an idea, quality, or state rather than a concrete object, e.g. truth, danger, happiness.

Here you are entrapped within the linguistic FSK which is not credible in representing reality by itself.

You cannot assume all abstract nouns [non-physical] are not real things.
Whatever is a real thing [physical or non-physical] must be verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a credible FSK, i.e. science being the standard bearer of the credibility of reality.

As such emotions [not concrete objects] i.e. being non-physical are real things as verified and justified empirically and philosophically within the scientific FSK [within neuroscience, psychology, psychiatry, evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, etc.].

Has anyone ever mentioned "special needs" or "cognitive impairment" in connection with your thinking?
I just wondered if autism, or obsessive compulsive disorder were part of your make-up?

I'm not trying to be insulting or "funny", I simply ask, that I might try to understand your ideosyncratic thinking on this issue.

As usual no argument with supporting evidence.

Nope I am not autistic. If I am autistic I would not have been so successful in my professional career.

What career is that?

[Peter Holmes]

Your syllogism is not valid.
Logically it should be,

P1 Morality is about promoting good (as defined) and avoiding evil (as defined).
P2 The killing of humans is evil (as defined).
C Therefore, killing of humans is not good, i.e. not compatible with morality.

What counts as good and evil is a matter of opinion, and defining (describing) them doesn't change that fact. So, for that reason alone, this argument is uselessly question-begging. There's nothing objective here.

Where is the question-begging?

Here it is.

1 Fact: all facts exist within a descriptive context (an FSK) - for example, biological, chemical, legal, geological, and so on.

2 Conclusion: Therefore moral facts exist within a moral descriptive context (a moral FSK).

#2 doesn't follow from #1. That facts exist within a descriptive context doesn't mean that any descriptive context contains or can produce facts. For example, there are no astrological or alchemical facts.

On the other hand, you are the one who is begging the question with your claim of 'what is fact' by presuming facts exist before verifying and justifying they exists.

False. I think any factual assertion needs empirical verification - which means the existence of facts must be demonstrable. You beg the question by merely claiming that there is a moral 'FSK', so that there are moral facts.

I don't beg the question like you.
I start with empirical evidences, verify and justify them and end up with an empirical based conclusion of empirically justified true moral facts.

Nope. You're deluded. You haven't demonstrated the existence of one so-called moral fact. Your go-to example - no human ought to kill humans - is demonstrably not a fact, but rather the expression of a moral opinion.

[Belinda]

Philosophy of mind briefly explained:-

https://www.philosophybasics.com/branch ... _mind.html

The philosophy of mind can be nothing more than an explanation of how we use, or could use, the word 'mind', its cognates and related words.

The link I posted is comprehensive and the text is very brief and lucid. I recommend it.

What you mention can be found in a dictionary or a thesaurus.

[Skepdick]

The philosophy of mind can be nothing more than an explanation of how we use, or could use, the word 'mind', its cognates and related words.

That's such reductionist nonsense.

If the philosophy of mind can be nothing more than an explanation of how we use the word "mind", its cognates and related words then the philosophy of usage can be nothing more than an explanation of how we use the word "usage", its cognates and related words.
And the philosophy of "brain" can be nothing more than an explanation of how we use the word "brain", its cognates and related words.

So go ahead and explain to me how you use the word "usage" and explain to me how you use the word "brain" without using your brain.

If the philosophy of <insert any term> is about the usage of that term, then you have reduced philosophy to linguistics.

HOW you use language differs depending on WHAT we are using language for.