Is morality objective or subjective?

[Belinda]

I wasn't being sarcastic. To be honest, I didn't pay VA's post much attention, I'm afraid, because I'm reluctant to waste time reading his nonsense. But I just checked back - and, yes, his argument is nonsense once again. Here it is.

Who are humans to say what reality really is? How do we know that what we call reality really is reality? After all, we can be fooled by visual tricks. And if we were bats, we'd think reality was completely different.

Okay. So how do we get from this bombshell insight to the existence of moral facts? What's the argument - that we invent facts, so there's no reason why we can't or don't invent moral facts? And are they what we can empirically show to exist - things we invented in the first place?

If you can straighten out this mess and present a coherent account, please do. And then I'll show you why the argument is fallacious.

Sometimes we can't establish what is true and what false. This is because of 1. our understanding is limited as the convex/concave picture demonstrates. And 2. sometimes we cannot know all the relevant causes of an event.

Because of our perennial lack of understanding we understand some events emotionally . When you call a judgement a moral fact what is happening is you feel it subjectively and either blame or praise based on your own feelings.

Any individual's own feelings are conditioned by a compound of her nurture
and her nature.

I agree that we can feel there are moral facts. And I think that's where the claim that there are moral facts comes from. And I agree that sometimes we can't tell if a factual assertion is true or false, in context. But the crux is whether a moral assertion has a truth-value at all - whether its function is to make a truth-claim about reality. And I don't think that's its function.

The analogy with aesthetic assertions is very precise. To say 'this is beautiful' is to express an opinion - a value-judgement. The claim that the thing's beauty is a fact - say, a property - of that thing, so that the claim that it's not beautiful is false - is false. And the invention of an 'aesthetic framework and system of knowledge' doesn't confer factuality, and therefore objectivity, on aesthetic assertions. It just means: against this standard of beauty, this thing is beautiful and is not not beautiful.

And this is nothing like the claim: against this use of the word 'red', this colour patch is red. The idea that we use the word red in the way we use the word beautiful is a nomenclaturist delusion that goes like this: 'red' and 'beauty' are both nouns, so they must both be names of something; 'red' and 'beautiful' are both adjectives, so they must both label properties that exist.

Objectification is what your are doing . Objectification is treating something abstract as if it is concrete i.e. exists in space-time. As any colourist can tell you , red is relative to what other colours are present. In extreme form you could not identify red if other hues were lacking.
Same with beauty, you could not identify beauty if ugliness was not another value. Same with good/evil you could not identify either in the absence of the other. Conclude: an ethic relates to its absence as in 'your ability to identify a good depends on your ability to identify its relative evil'.

Plato thought there was an ideal, i.e. non-relative, Form of the good. Do you?

[Peter Holmes]

Sometimes we can't establish what is true and what false. This is because of 1. our understanding is limited as the convex/concave picture demonstrates. And 2. sometimes we cannot know all the relevant causes of an event.

Because of our perennial lack of understanding we understand some events emotionally . When you call a judgement a moral fact what is happening is you feel it subjectively and either blame or praise based on your own feelings.

Any individual's own feelings are conditioned by a compound of her nurture
and her nature.

I agree that we can feel there are moral facts. And I think that's where the claim that there are moral facts comes from. And I agree that sometimes we can't tell if a factual assertion is true or false, in context. But the crux is whether a moral assertion has a truth-value at all - whether its function is to make a truth-claim about reality. And I don't think that's its function.

The analogy with aesthetic assertions is very precise. To say 'this is beautiful' is to express an opinion - a value-judgement. The claim that the thing's beauty is a fact - say, a property - of that thing, so that the claim that it's not beautiful is false - is false. And the invention of an 'aesthetic framework and system of knowledge' doesn't confer factuality, and therefore objectivity, on aesthetic assertions. It just means: against this standard of beauty, this thing is beautiful and is not not beautiful.

And this is nothing like the claim: against this use of the word 'red', this colour patch is red. The idea that we use the word red in the way we use the word beautiful is a nomenclaturist delusion that goes like this: 'red' and 'beauty' are both nouns, so they must both be names of something; 'red' and 'beautiful' are both adjectives, so they must both label properties that exist.

Objectification is what your are doing . Objectification is treating something abstract as if it is concrete i.e. exists in space-time. As any colourist can tell you , red is relative to what other colours are present. In extreme form you could not identify red if other hues were lacking.
Same with beauty, you could not identify beauty if ugliness was not another value. Same with good/evil you could not identify either in the absence of the other. Conclude: an ethic relates to its absence as in 'your ability to identify a good depends on your ability to identify its relative evil'.

Plato thought there was an ideal, i.e. non-relative, Form of the good. Do you?

1 Believing there are abstract things in the first place is objectification. I say we need to abandon the whole idea.

2 Red is not an abstract thing, and nor is the colour system it fits into.

3 We don't use the words 'beauty' and 'ugliness' in the way we use colour words, to label properties. And that's why 'beauty is in the eye of the beholder', whereas a thing some English-speakers call red is unlikely to be called not red - say, blue - by other English speakers.

4 That we use some words in pairs, such as 'beautiful' and 'ugly', doesn't mean they must be names of abstract things or properties.

5 Plato was wrong, and so have been all peddlers of belief in abstract or non-physical things.

[Skepdick]

1 Believing there are abstract things in the first place is objectification. I say we need to abandon the whole idea.

OK. lead the way. Beliefs are abstract things. Abandon yours.

2 Red is not an abstract thing, and nor is the colour system it fits into.

Yes it is. It's just three letters. R,E,D. It has absolutely no semblance RED

3 We don't use the words 'beauty' and 'ugliness' in the way we use colour words, to label properties.

"Color" is an abstract idea. I suggest you abandon it. Pronto!!!

[Veritas Aequitas]

5 Plato was wrong, and so have been all peddlers of belief in abstract or non-physical things.

You are creating your own straw-men and shooting at them as if they are real.
Show me who in here are defending platonic ideals and forms as real?

The term 'physical' is confined to the following;
-of or relating to that which is material:
-pertaining to the physical sciences, especially physics.
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/physical?s=t

Philosophically "Materialism" has been debunked by Berkeley as not realistic. What is held as 'physical' is that of Physicalism which hinges on 'what is recognized by Physics as physical'.

In the above sense what is not recognized by Physics is non-physical, especially of non-physical things from credible subjects of psychology, psychiatry, neurosciences, cognitive science, evolutionary psychology and others.

Emotions [despite various controversies at the fringes] are non-physical 'things' by recognized by various scientists as real within psychology, psychiatry, neuroscience, cognitive science, evolutionary psychology, and others.
The realization of emotions as real within the above fields of knowledge has contributed positively to individuals and humanity tremendously.

WHO ARE YOU [what grounds and authority] to insist emotions as non-physical things do not exist as real?

I know you will refer to the inherited bastardized philosophies of the logical positivists [defunct] and classical analytic philosophies to defend your point, but they are bankrupt and toothless against the various advanced modern scientific knowledge whose concern is to develop knowledge for the positive progress of mankind and they have done so.

[Peter Holmes]

5 Plato was wrong, and so have been all peddlers of belief in abstract or non-physical things.

You are creating your own straw-men and shooting at them as if they are real.
Show me who in here are defending platonic ideals and forms as real?

The term 'physical' is confined to the following;
-of or relating to that which is material:
-pertaining to the physical sciences, especially physics.
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/physical?s=t

Philosophically "Materialism" has been debunked by Berkeley as not realistic. What is held as 'physical' is that of Physicalism which hinges on 'what is recognized by Physics as physical'.

In the above sense what is not recognized by Physics is non-physical, especially of non-physical things from credible subjects of psychology, psychiatry, neurosciences, cognitive science, evolutionary psychology and others.

Emotions [despite various controversies at the fringes] are non-physical 'things' are recognized by various scientists as real within psychology, psychiatry, neuroscience, cognitive science, evolutionary psychology, and others.
The realization of emotions as real within the above fields of knowledge has contributed positively to individuals and humanity tremendously.

WHO ARE YOU [what grounds and authority] to insist emotions as non-physical things do not exist as real?

I know you will refer to the inherited bastardized philosophies of the logical positivists [defunct] and classical analytic philosophies to defend your point, but they are bankrupt and toothless against the various advanced modern scientific knowledge.

1 Ah, so now you're appealing to Berkeleyan idealism. Ooookay.

2 Look at this: 'WHO ARE YOU [what grounds and authority] to insist emotions as non-physical things do not exist as real?'

Why do you think emotions are non-physical things? It's because the myth of abstract things is so potent: emotions must be abstract or non-physical things; but emotions exist; therefore, abstract or non-physical things exist.

What we call emotions do exist - we 'have' emotions in the way that we 'have' thoughts. (Really we're talking about brain activity, but never mind for now.) The delusion that WHAT we 'have' are non-physical things comes from mistaking abstract nouns for things of some kind. The long sleep of metaphysical philosophy.

Time to wake up.

[Belinda]

Peter Holmes wrote:

What we call emotions do exist - we 'have' emotions in the way that we 'have' thoughts. (Really we're talking about brain activity,

Emotions exist as physical events.
What does the word ' sentient' mean to you?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentience

[Peter Holmes]

Peter Holmes wrote:

What we call emotions do exist - we 'have' emotions in the way that we 'have' thoughts. (Really we're talking about brain activity,

Emotions exist as physical events.
What does the word ' sentient' mean to you?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentience

It doesn't mean anything non-physical. There's no evidence for anything non-physical. We've been suckered by ways of talking.

[Belinda]

Peter Holmes wrote:

What we call emotions do exist - we 'have' emotions in the way that we 'have' thoughts. (Really we're talking about brain activity,

Emotions exist as physical events.
What does the word ' sentient' mean to you?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentience

It doesn't mean anything non-physical. There's no evidence for anything non-physical. We've been suckered by ways of talking.

What does 'physical' usually refer to? Is there anything that is not physical?

What would be evidence that your hand, or the cat, is physical?

[Skepdick]

It doesn't mean anything non-physical. There's no evidence for anything non-physical. We've been suckered by ways of talking.

Seems the only one who's been suckered is you.

You are the only one feeling the need to stress the non-existence of non-existent things.

We feel no such need, because we know. It's not even relevant or important.

[Peter Holmes]

Peter Holmes wrote:



Emotions exist as physical events.
What does the word ' sentient' mean to you?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentience

It doesn't mean anything non-physical. There's no evidence for anything non-physical. We've been suckered by ways of talking.

What does 'physical' usually refer to? Is there anything that is not physical?

What would be evidence that your hand, or the cat, is physical?

This is what Moore was asking, and it's why Wittgenstein gently satirised the question in 'On Certainty'. Doubt can exist only against a background of certainty.

I think physicalism, naturalism and materialism are near-as-dammit synonyms. And treated methodologically, they needn't incur the burden of proving that non-physical, non-natural or non-material things don't exist. The burden is with those who claim they do.

[Peter Holmes]

If we agree there's no evidence for the existence of non-physical things - abandoning millennia of philosophical speculation down the rabbit hole - we're free to understand that what we've always been talking about is the use of what we confusingly call abstract nouns.

Philosophy is, and has always been, nothing more than talk about the ways we use, or could use, words in general, and abstract nouns in particular. And that's what so-called philosophical problems have always really been about. In my opinion, that was the later Wittgenstein's profound and hard-won insight - one whose implications many philosophers still haven't taken on board.

[Skepdick]

If we agree there's no evidence for the existence of non-physical things - abandoning millennia of philosophical speculation down the rabbit hole - we're free to understand that what we've always been talking about is the use of what we confusingly call abstract nouns.

I think the confusion is all yours.

There are NO non-physical things - nobody is disputing that.

All that implies is that everything is physical.

Abstractions are physical.
Minds are physical.
Abstract nouns are physical.

That's just how deduction works.

Philosophy is, and has always been, nothing more than talk about the ways we use, or could use, words in general, and abstract nouns in particular. And that's what so-called philosophical problems have always really been about. In my opinion, that was the later Wittgenstein's profound and hard-won insight - one whose implications many philosophers still haven't taken on board.

Yes, perfectly fine. Nothing disagreeable there.

One of ways in which I use language (independent of any Philosopher's permission to do so) is towards the achievement of my objectively moral goals.

Which exist a priori and outside of language itself.

[Veritas Aequitas]

5 Plato was wrong, and so have been all peddlers of belief in abstract or non-physical things.

You are creating your own straw-men and shooting at them as if they are real.
Show me who in here are defending platonic ideals and forms as real?

The term 'physical' is confined to the following;
-of or relating to that which is material:
-pertaining to the physical sciences, especially physics.
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/physical?s=t

Philosophically "Materialism" has been debunked by Berkeley as not realistic. What is held as 'physical' is that of Physicalism which hinges on 'what is recognized by Physics as physical'.

In the above sense what is not recognized by Physics is non-physical, especially of non-physical things from credible subjects of psychology, psychiatry, neurosciences, cognitive science, evolutionary psychology and others.

Emotions [despite various controversies at the fringes] are non-physical 'things' are recognized by various scientists as real within psychology, psychiatry, neuroscience, cognitive science, evolutionary psychology, and others.
The realization of emotions as real within the above fields of knowledge has contributed positively to individuals and humanity tremendously.

WHO ARE YOU [what grounds and authority] to insist emotions as non-physical things do not exist as real?

I know you will refer to the inherited bastardized philosophies of the logical positivists [defunct] and classical analytic philosophies to defend your point, but they are bankrupt and toothless against the various advanced modern scientific knowledge.

1 Ah, so now you're appealing to Berkeleyan idealism. Ooookay.

What is the problem with that?
Your problem is you are so ignorant of what is going within the philosophical community.

Berkeley's argument against 'materialism' is very valid to an extent with limits.
There two phases to Berkeley's argument against materialism.
What is not sound is the 2nd part where he appealed to a God to ground his argument.

I am with Kant's Refutation of Idealism [of the Berkelyan kind].

You are still in your archaic silo and not aware philosophers who used to cling to 'materialism' has given that up for Physicalism.

[]2 Look at this: 'WHO ARE YOU [what grounds and authority] to insist emotions as non-physical things do not exist as real?'

Why do you think emotions are non-physical things? It's because the myth of abstract things is so potent: emotions must be abstract or non-physical things; but emotions exist; therefore, abstract or non-physical things exist.

What we call emotions do exist - we 'have' emotions in the way that we 'have' thoughts. (Really we're talking about brain activity, but never mind for now.) The delusion that WHAT we 'have' are non-physical things comes from mistaking abstract nouns for things of some kind. The long sleep of metaphysical philosophy.

Time to wake up.

You think 'thoughts' are physical [generally conceptualized] things?

If you agree emotions exist then non-physical [as defined above] things exists.

You are the one who is delusional in being dogmatic with words and definition without regard for reality.
You have even bothered to present your definition of the relevant terms, i.e. physical, non-physical, emotions, brain activities, and whatever is relevant.

[Veritas Aequitas]

If we agree there's no evidence for the existence of non-physical things - abandoning millennia of philosophical speculation down the rabbit hole - we're free to understand that what we've always been talking about is the use of what we confusingly call abstract nouns.

Philosophy is, and has always been, nothing more than talk about the ways we use, or could use, words in general, and abstract nouns in particular. And that's what so-called philosophical problems have always really been about. In my opinion, that was the later Wittgenstein's profound and hard-won insight - one whose implications many philosophers still haven't taken on board.

What are you blabbering about and groping at illusions?

If you are hinging on Wittgenstein's On Certainty, show the relevant references to support your argument.

Re Abstract Noun, note

• Abstract Noun = a noun denoting an idea, quality, or state rather than a concrete object, e.g. truth, danger, happiness.

Here you are entrapped within the linguistic FSK which is not credible in representing reality by itself.

You cannot assume all abstract nouns [non-physical] are not real things.
Whatever is a real thing [physical or non-physical] must be verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a credible FSK, i.e. science being the standard bearer of the credibility of reality.

As such emotions [not concrete objects] i.e. being non-physical are real things as verified and justified empirically and philosophically within the scientific FSK [within neuroscience, psychology, psychiatry, evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, etc.].

[Sculptor]

If we agree there's no evidence for the existence of non-physical things - abandoning millennia of philosophical speculation down the rabbit hole - we're free to understand that what we've always been talking about is the use of what we confusingly call abstract nouns.

Philosophy is, and has always been, nothing more than talk about the ways we use, or could use, words in general, and abstract nouns in particular. And that's what so-called philosophical problems have always really been about. In my opinion, that was the later Wittgenstein's profound and hard-won insight - one whose implications many philosophers still haven't taken on board.

What are you blabbering about and groping at illusions?

If you are hinging on Wittgenstein's On Certainty, show the relevant references to support your argument.

Re Abstract Noun, note

• Abstract Noun = a noun denoting an idea, quality, or state rather than a concrete object, e.g. truth, danger, happiness.

Here you are entrapped within the linguistic FSK which is not credible in representing reality by itself.

You cannot assume all abstract nouns [non-physical] are not real things.
Whatever is a real thing [physical or non-physical] must be verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a credible FSK, i.e. science being the standard bearer of the credibility of reality.

As such emotions [not concrete objects] i.e. being non-physical are real things as verified and justified empirically and philosophically within the scientific FSK [within neuroscience, psychology, psychiatry, evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, etc.].

Has anyone ever mentioned "special needs" or "cognitive impairment" in connection with your thinking?
I just wondered if autism, or obsessive compulsive disorder were part of your make-up?

I'm not trying to be insulting or "funny", I simply ask, that I might try to understand your ideosyncratic thinking on this issue.