aphilosophy

[lancek4]

Yes I thought of saving a copy just before I submitted and this site sent it to oblivion. I couldnt page back cuz I was logged off.

[lancek4]

I will have to do a little research in the idea of phil teching one how to die. I am pretty sure it is in more than 'Apology' or a mere mentioning of the manner of his death.

And I will admit, for the sake of furthering discussion, that my memory may be faulty but so at least: i used the statement to make a point about philsophy.

And Yes, Hume does not mention it.

But still I am not sure what "a philsophy that does not exist" means. Do you mean it is not a philsophy that any of the Big Names discuss? Or that it has not been overtly mentioned by degreed academic philsophers, or been published such that it might have attained acreditation from widespread consideration? Im not sure what you mean Chaz.

ArisingUK: This essay might be suggesting religion or spirituality but i do not think the religious is a valid way of speaking about reaitly, niether sprituality. Such idea collapse in the same type of motion as the idea of 'philsophy', or at least that is what the essay is suggesting. But particularly with the religious or spiritual, such terms bring to mind a particular type of situating reality that is typically debunked by critical discussion. If I am asserting a type of religious or spiritual in the essay then i am recalling such a motion before i have even suggested it: thus I dont suggest it. In that when one reads the essay and come upon a religious or spritual implication, they should then react to the pairing of inconsistent propositions: that the essay seems to suggest the religious, but denies that the religious is viable.

So far as to support from others, i do not propose that many (if any) spoke of "phil teching one how to die"; that is not the point. But I am suggesting that philsophy is typically "misread" or, ala Lacan, "misunderstood" or "mis-taken", in the reader mistaking the symbol for the object.
From this situation Levinas offers a solution but is creates a polemic by it that I take advantage of in my essay on aphilsophy.
As an indicator of his "mistakenness", he proposes that in the situation of the Other and the Subject (the object and subject), the Other is come upon by the subject as saying "Do not kill me". This is what puts Levinas in the religious, because he is attempting to reconcile ethics in philsoophy.
The 'more correct' situation here is that the Other (Object) is come upon by the Subject as saying "You must die".
This is significant and goes tot he heart of my essay.

I would ask: how do you read Sarte? and Wittgestein? If one removes from Hegel his more overtly 'systematic' proclaimations, such as a "world histoical consciousnes" (as an aside --is that the term?), how do you read him? what about Neitche (sp?)?
Lanaguage determines reality. This is the problem that everyone has been dealing with in different ways, and the history of philsophy might be said to be the progress of coming to understand this principle. Once this was capable of being known in lanaguage (the convention of lanaguage as the expression of being human), then we have Sartre, who describes how language must define itself if we merely exist.
Even as far back as Hobbes in 'leviathan' bases his projection, or his solution to the probelm from the same premises, which are put in the language of his time by which he was limited in conception. Even as far back as Plato.
Slavoj Zizek is saying just as much all the time, and using our current language to 'speak the necessary reality of lanaguage expressing itself as reality' all the time.

Do you see them saying different things?
Obviously they are using different words and situating different definitions, but all of them deal with the same problem, but limited by the moment lanaguage's ability to express.

What seems tending religious or spiritual is actually the resitance that language holds in itself against itself for the creation of reality being exposed for what it is. In this, Truth is offensive and so is defended against by the scheme which grants reality, all the while asserting the Truth of the lanaguage's ability to come upon a True object. A system can only reveal itself through itself by its own demise.

As to philsophy and aphilosphy, if philosophy is seen to be able to discover new truth, as if come upon a more proper object, then this is because it rellies upon the scheme, the system of truth, that which makes truth-value, in order to do so, all the while in denial of the scheme's fault (Kant sees this fault). Thus, if this is true, then the essay suggests that aphilsophy is more proper for locating the possibility of truth.

If this latter is true, is philsophy proper, then the former becomes the aphilosophy.
It is a situating of terms to reveal the short comings of the scheme by which we are coming upon what may be true.
Like Witt, lanaguge games. Like Sarte, we must revolt, and this is what methodoligcal philsophy supports, from the determined fate. But as Sartre knew, even this revolt is a part of the determination, thus we cannot revolt from that fate of language.

[chaz wyman]

I will have to do a little research in the idea of phil teching one how to die. I am pretty sure it is in more than 'Apology' or a mere mentioning of the manner of his death.

And I will admit, for the sake of furthering discussion, that my memory may be faulty but so at least: i used the statement to make a point about philsophy.

And Yes, Hume does not mention it.

But still I am not sure what "a philsophy that does not exist" means. Do you mean it is not a philsophy that any of the Big Names discuss? Or that it has not been overtly mentioned by degreed academic philsophers, or been published such that it might have attained acreditation from widespread consideration? Im not sure what you mean Chaz.

I meant exactly what I said. You characterised philosophy as teaching you how to die, I disagreed.

ArisingUK: This essay might be suggesting religion or spirituality but i do not think the religious is a valid way of speaking about reaitly, niether sprituality.

I mentioned this. That religion tells you all about what is going to happened when you die. That is why your caricature was more like religion, I thought.

Such idea collapse in the same type of motion as the idea of 'philsophy', or at least that is what the essay is suggesting. But particularly with the religious or spiritual, such terms bring to mind a particular type of situating reality that is typically debunked by critical discussion. If I am asserting a type of religious or spiritual in the essay then i am recalling such a motion before i have even suggested it: thus I dont suggest it. In that when one reads the essay and come upon a religious or spritual implication, they should then react to the pairing of inconsistent propositions: that the essay seems to suggest the religious, but denies that the religious is viable.

So far as to support from others, i do not propose that many (if any) spoke of "phil teching one how to die"; that is not the point. But I am suggesting that philsophy is typically "misread" or, ala Lacan, "misunderstood" or "mis-taken", in the reader mistaking the symbol for the object.

This is not an original idea. This is Kantian too. It is part of what many philosophers do to try to release the strangle hold of Platonic ideals which insist that objects in the world aspire to a pure form of themselves in the world beyond. THis hideous misconception of metaphysics has plagued humanity for over 2000 years.

From this situation Levinas offers a solution but is creates a polemic by it that I take advantage of in my essay on aphilsophy.
As an indicator of his "mistakenness", he proposes that in the situation of the Other and the Subject (the object and subject), the Other is come upon by the subject as saying "Do not kill me". This is what puts Levinas in the religious, because he is attempting to reconcile ethics in philsoophy.
The 'more correct' situation here is that the Other (Object) is come upon by the Subject as saying "You must die".
This is significant and goes tot he heart of my essay.

I fail to see how this is relevant to the confusion of symbol and object.

I would ask: how do you read Sarte? and Wittgestein? If one removes from Hegel his more overtly 'systematic' proclaimations, such as a "world histoical consciousnes" (as an aside --is that the term?), how do you read him? what about Neitche (sp?)?

Hegel is a Platonic idiot, who subverted a practical and coherent subjectivist philosophy developed by Kant. He set idealism on the road to ruin by turning it into mystical nonsense. I don't think Sartre and Wittgenstein owe him anything. Russell, Wittgenstein's teacher certainly rejected the whole shooting match. This was a tragic backlash against a good philosophical position.

Lanaguage determines reality.

Did you REALLY want to say that?

This is the problem that everyone has been dealing with in different ways, and the history of philsophy might be said to be the progress of coming to understand this principle. Once this was capable of being known in lanaguage (the convention of lanaguage as the expression of being human), then we have Sartre, who describes how language must define itself if we merely exist.
Even as far back as Hobbes in 'leviathan' bases his projection, or his solution to the probelm from the same premises, which are put in the language of his time by which he was limited in conception.

I don't think this is so. Please cite! I've just finished reading Leviathan and DeCive, and do not recognise your characterisation at all.

Even as far back as Plato.

Slavoj Zizek is saying just as much all the time, and using our current language to 'speak the necessary reality of lanaguage expressing itself as reality' all the time.

Run that again - what is it EXACTLY that you are claiming all these philosophers are saying?

Do you see them saying different things?
Obviously they are using different words and situating different definitions, but all of them deal with the same problem, but limited by the moment lanaguage's ability to express.

That would depend on how bland and platitudinous your statement is; the devil is always in the detail.


What seems tending religious or spiritual is actually the resitance that language holds in itself against itself for the creation of reality being exposed for what it is. In this, Truth is offensive and so is defended against by the scheme which grants reality, all the while asserting the Truth of the lanaguage's ability to come upon a True object. A system can only reveal itself through itself by its own demise.

I get the feeling that you have fallen backwards into the Post-modern swamp, and you don't have a paddle.

As to philsophy and aphilosphy, if philosophy is seen to be able to discover new truth, as if come upon a more proper object, then this is because it rellies upon the scheme, the system of truth, that which makes truth-value, in order to do so, all the while in denial of the scheme's fault (Kant sees this fault). Thus, if this is true, then the essay suggests that aphilsophy is more proper for locating the possibility of truth.

I don't recognise aphilosphy as a category with any value or validity. As it is not possible to write without thinking, it is not possible to write anything about aphilosophy.

If this latter is true, is philsophy proper, then the former becomes the aphilosophy.

Oh um!

It is a situating of terms to reveal the short comings of the scheme by which we are coming upon what may be true.
Like Witt, lanaguge games. Like Sarte, we must revolt, and this is what methodoligcal philsophy supports, from the determined fate. But as Sartre knew, even this revolt is a part of the determination, thus we cannot revolt from that fate of language.

How does this follow from anything you have said? and waht does it mean?

[lancek4]

Perhaps this forum is too limited to present the proofs needed to appraoch this stalemate. To address each of the Big Name authors/philsophers and point out where perhaps you are asserting traditional 'object oriented' interpretations is much too large and tedious for this forum.

What I see in your responses, is exactly the example of what I am saying.

I suppose to say "does not exist" could be taken to mean "I disagree", but it seems you that your disagrement was about that there could be not philsophy as I have stated it, which is evidently untrue because I have an argument -- with which you disagree, i understand now.


the confusion of the subject and object stem from an associating the object "out there" with the symbols that we have for them. Such symbols do not present a True object - the meaning of the symbol grants us reality through the scheme of meaning that our particular "culture", and more particularly the individual, has developed. This scheme is faulty, except as much as one has faith that it is not. When an individual has faith in the truth of the scheme of symbols, then that reality given to that individual is True: it is an intrinsic mythology. It cannot be argued against to those faithful individuals. One can only use the scheme to attempt to argue true or false, but this always leads the one of faith to assert the truth of the scheme.

It is the same, say, with born again Christians or fundamentalists. You cannot ague away that sheme of reality they have. Have you ever tried? it is useless, they will always refer to a truth a things that you are attempting to show incorrect. But they simpy do not see it.

this is the case with any scheme of reality. And in this case, what I try to designate by the dialectical 'philsophy' and 'aphilosphy', while showing that both exist as valid forms only against the definitions that grant them a truth-value, such desigation of reality is shown problematic. The course, as for any faith, when a probelm arises that challenges the truth-value of the scheme by which the individual knows itself, is to default back into the system and assert its truth, instead of moving forth into the probelm. This is to say, that when a mythology is confronted with its 'fasilty', the mythology is re-asserted, or it is destroyed, is made impotent, it "dies".

This is what you are doing; you are defending against the death of that which jusitifes you existence: reality. You are reiterating the truth value of the scheme that grants you your reality, which is substantiated by 'traditional' routes for making argument the re-establish the truth-value of the scheme of symbols.
The terms of the scheme are taken, in faith, as representing potential true objects, which are then argued along a scheme-reifyng-route in order that the potential for the true object might be found.

It is a faith based route for maintaining and justifying the individual in reality.

In a way I guess it could be seen as post-moderist in the same way as say cars have changed style, or that every year there is new fashion. And in this way 'post-modernism' dies when it was coined. But this goes to the example of the symbol and the object. If one sees the symbol as directly and implicitly being the object, then we will have new and novel ways of knowing and representation that is moving toward a solution.
If the symbol is understood as indicating only itself, then the solution has already been found, the car is the car no matter what it looks like or what it is called, chothes are clothes.
One could see this as a religious move, but I deny this because of further proofs I have said elswhere.

But I will add, so much as you have put in "the devil is in the details", it is an orientation upon the details, as such details are in themselves symbols, that the religious may exist, and in fact being advocated by those who would see thier reality and expression thereof as not religious.

This is what I enjoy about yourself, you are vehemently object based. Your faith is what I call materialist-objectivist. I could not voice the arguments the way you do though i know what they may be because I understand the dialectic involved in the creation of reality. And I need such voiced polemic to be able to understand how to approach what I write so perhaps someone might hear.

Those would be spiritual-religious I see are often too 'soft', I guess, and too soon admit to thier religiousness or spirituality. But these are just the other side of the same coin. The religious who will not admit thier religiousness yet have a substance and intesity in thier not admitting are those with whom I like to engage.

It is probably just as difficult for you to understand what might be an 'aphilsophy' that I am talking about as it is for me to understand how you could not see what i am saying. This is why sometimes I think you are just being obstinate.

Yes, and perhaps to say "language determines reality' was a bit too hasty, I thought youd jump on that. the sentence does not express the meaning i intended.

the post-modern swamp. Hummmm. ho-humm. Ok Mr. Object (I object!)

Perhaps we might step over in the "what is history" thread. Im sure that would be entertaining.

[chaz wyman]

Perhaps this forum is too limited to present the proofs needed to appraoch this stalemate. To address each of the Big Name authors/philsophers and point out where perhaps you are asserting traditional 'object oriented' interpretations is much too large and tedious for this forum.

Sour Grapes, really means you can't piss high enough to reach them.
It's always someone else's fault and not the fault os a flabby and flaccid argument.


What I see in your responses, is exactly the example of what I am saying.

Gee I forgot through all the blancmange that there was any duck of an argument in there.
Remind me again what that was?

I suppose to say "does not exist" could be taken to mean "I disagree", but it seems you that your disagrement was about that there could be not philsophy as I have stated it, which is evidently untrue because I have an argument -- with which you disagree, i understand now.

I think I said exactly what I wanted to say. Your characterisation of what philosophy "does' or is designed to do is not recognisable. A point I think you have conceded.


the confusion of the subject and object stem from an associating the object "out there" with the symbols that we have for them. Such symbols do not present a True object - the meaning of the symbol grants us reality through the scheme of meaning that our particular "culture", and more particularly the individual, has developed. This scheme is faulty, except as much as one has faith that it is not. When an individual has faith in the truth of the scheme of symbols, then that reality given to that individual is True: it is an intrinsic mythology. It cannot be argued against to those faithful individuals. One can only use the scheme to attempt to argue true or false, but this always leads the one of faith to assert the truth of the scheme.

For some things it is necessary to engage with the historical contingencies, with others things are just always true. To over emphasise the former we have Popper's effective critique the "Poverty of Historicism"


It is the same, say, with born again Christians or fundamentalists. You cannot ague away that sheme of reality they have. Have you ever tried? it is useless, they will always refer to a truth a things that you are attempting to show incorrect. But they simpy do not see it.

Their problem is that their case is based on a false claim of absolute eternal truth, when they demonstrate historically contingent and varying belief systems throughout history which are not compatible with each other.


this is the case with any scheme of reality. And in this case, what I try to designate by the dialectical 'philsophy' and 'aphilosphy', while showing that both exist as valid forms only against the definitions that grant them a truth-value, such desigation of reality is shown problematic. The course, as for any faith, when a probelm arises that challenges the truth-value of the scheme by which the individual knows itself, is to default back into the system and assert its truth, instead of moving forth into the probelm. This is to say, that when a mythology is confronted with its 'fasilty', the mythology is re-asserted, or it is destroyed, is made impotent, it "dies".

Have you been reading too much ZIzek?
What's your point?
I do not accept the category aphilosphy, except as an absence of philosophy. It attends to no dialectic as it is contentless.


This is what you are doing; you are defending against the death of that which jusitifes you existence: reality. You are reiterating the truth value of the scheme that grants you your reality, which is substantiated by 'traditional' routes for making argument the
re-establish the truth-value of the scheme of symbols.

Don't pretend to tell me what I am doing. That's for me to pronounce on not you.
My relationship with my death is my own, and not yours to pontificate about.
It is a topic I have fairly recently had occasion to consider in stark focus; so much so that it is always near. One thing I have learned; living is not possible if everyday you know that you will die, living is the delusion of life.


The terms of the scheme are taken, in faith, as representing potential true objects, which are then argued along a scheme-reifyng-route in order that the potential for the true object might be found.

It is a faith based route for maintaining and justifying the individual in reality.

Maybe, maybe not. It depends.


In a way I guess it could be seen as post-moderist in the same way as say cars have changed style, or that every year there is new fashion. And in this way 'post-modernism' dies when it was coined. But this goes to the example of the symbol and the object. If one sees the symbol as directly and implicitly being the object, then we will have new and novel ways of knowing and representation that is moving toward a solution.
If the symbol is understood as indicating only itself, then the solution has already been found, the car is the car no matter what it looks like or what it is called, chothes are clothes.
One could see this as a religious move, but I deny this because of further proofs I have said elswhere.

But I will add, so much as you have put in "the devil is in the details", it is an orientation upon the details, as such details are in themselves symbols, that the religious may exist, and in fact being advocated by those who would see thier reality and expression thereof as not religious.

This is what I enjoy about yourself, you are vehemently object based. Your faith is what I call materialist-objectivist. I could not voice the arguments the way you do though i know what they may be because I understand the dialectic involved in the creation of reality. And I need such voiced polemic to be able to understand how to approach what I write so perhaps someone might hear.

You really do not understand me at all.
Objectivity is noting more than collective subjectivity, usually based around a hierarchical and dominant ideology. This is particularly banal when it comes to claims of moral authority, and just -so stories about natural rules of behaviour. We can trust basic science, but for peripheral claims giant paradigms stalk the land and demand that scientific narratives comply with historical norms. There are some staggeringly obtuse examples when we characterise disease and contraception in this respect. Then there is a range of pseudo-sciences from psychology and evolutionary spin-off disciplines, sociology etc. that impose restricting categories on our lives, that chain us to class narratives; enforce and naturalise with the reification of inequalities.
And all this is filtered through perceptual lenses that have been crafted through education and reinforced through experience so that we are bound to accept a range of categories which blind us the the social thing in itself.. We can only hope to challenge that lens and replace it with another that serves out class better.


Those would be spiritual-religious I see are often too 'soft', I guess, and too soon admit to thier religiousness or spirituality. But these are just the other side of the same coin. The religious who will not admit thier religiousness yet have a substance and intesity in thier not admitting are those with whom I like to engage.

It is probably just as difficult for you to understand what might be an 'aphilsophy' that I am talking about as it is for me to understand how you could not see what i am saying. This is why sometimes I think you are just being obstinate.

Yes, and perhaps to say "language determines reality' was a bit too hasty, I thought youd jump on that. the sentence does not express the meaning i intended.

the post-modern swamp. Hummmm. ho-humm. Ok Mr. Object (I object!)

Perhaps we might step over in the "what is history" thread. Im sure that would be entertaining.

[chaz wyman]

Perhaps this forum is too limited to present the proofs needed to appraoch this stalemate. To address each of the Big Name authors/philsophers and point out where perhaps you are asserting traditional 'object oriented' interpretations is much too large and tedious for this forum.

Sour Grapes, really means you can't piss high enough to reach them.
It's always someone else's fault and not the fault os a flabby and flaccid argument.


What I see in your responses, is exactly the example of what I am saying.

Gee I forgot through all the blancmange that there was any duck of an argument in there.
Remind me again what that was?

I suppose to say "does not exist" could be taken to mean "I disagree", but it seems you that your disagrement was about that there could be not philsophy as I have stated it, which is evidently untrue because I have an argument -- with which you disagree, i understand now.

I think I said exactly what I wanted to say. Your characterisation of what philosophy "does' or is designed to do is not recognisable. A point I think you have conceded.


the confusion of the subject and object stem from an associating the object "out there" with the symbols that we have for them. Such symbols do not present a True object - the meaning of the symbol grants us reality through the scheme of meaning that our particular "culture", and more particularly the individual, has developed. This scheme is faulty, except as much as one has faith that it is not. When an individual has faith in the truth of the scheme of symbols, then that reality given to that individual is True: it is an intrinsic mythology. It cannot be argued against to those faithful individuals. One can only use the scheme to attempt to argue true or false, but this always leads the one of faith to assert the truth of the scheme.

For some things it is necessary to engage with the historical contingencies, with others things are just always true. To over emphasise the former we have Popper's effective critique the "Poverty of Historicism"


It is the same, say, with born again Christians or fundamentalists. You cannot ague away that sheme of reality they have. Have you ever tried? it is useless, they will always refer to a truth a things that you are attempting to show incorrect. But they simpy do not see it.

Their problem is that their case is based on a false claim of absolute eternal truth, when they demonstrate historically contingent and varying belief systems throughout history which are not compatible with each other.


this is the case with any scheme of reality. And in this case, what I try to designate by the dialectical 'philsophy' and 'aphilosphy', while showing that both exist as valid forms only against the definitions that grant them a truth-value, such desigation of reality is shown problematic. The course, as for any faith, when a probelm arises that challenges the truth-value of the scheme by which the individual knows itself, is to default back into the system and assert its truth, instead of moving forth into the probelm. This is to say, that when a mythology is confronted with its 'fasilty', the mythology is re-asserted, or it is destroyed, is made impotent, it "dies".

Have you been reading too much ZIzek?
What's your point?
I do not accept the category aphilosphy, except as an absence of philosophy. It attends to no dialectic as it is contentless.


This is what you are doing; you are defending against the death of that which jusitifes you existence: reality. You are reiterating the truth value of the scheme that grants you your reality, which is substantiated by 'traditional' routes for making argument the
re-establish the truth-value of the scheme of symbols.

Don't pretend to tell me what I am doing. That's for me to pronounce on not you.
My relationship with my death is my own, and not yours to pontificate about.
It is a topic I have fairly recently had occasion to consider in stark focus; so much so that it is always near. One thing I have learned; living is not possible if everyday you know that you will die, living is the delusion of life.


The terms of the scheme are taken, in faith, as representing potential true objects, which are then argued along a scheme-reifyng-route in order that the potential for the true object might be found.

It is a faith based route for maintaining and justifying the individual in reality.

Maybe, maybe not. It depends.


In a way I guess it could be seen as post-moderist in the same way as say cars have changed style, or that every year there is new fashion. And in this way 'post-modernism' dies when it was coined. But this goes to the example of the symbol and the object. If one sees the symbol as directly and implicitly being the object, then we will have new and novel ways of knowing and representation that is moving toward a solution.
If the symbol is understood as indicating only itself, then the solution has already been found, the car is the car no matter what it looks like or what it is called, chothes are clothes.
One could see this as a religious move, but I deny this because of further proofs I have said elswhere.

But I will add, so much as you have put in "the devil is in the details", it is an orientation upon the details, as such details are in themselves symbols, that the religious may exist, and in fact being advocated by those who would see thier reality and expression thereof as not religious.

This is what I enjoy about yourself, you are vehemently object based. Your faith is what I call materialist-objectivist. I could not voice the arguments the way you do though i know what they may be because I understand the dialectic involved in the creation of reality. And I need such voiced polemic to be able to understand how to approach what I write so perhaps someone might hear.

You really do not understand me at all.
Objectivity is noting more than collective subjectivity, usually based around a hierarchical and dominant ideology. This is particularly banal when it comes to claims of moral authority, and just -so stories about natural rules of behaviour. We can trust basic science, but for peripheral claims giant paradigms stalk the land and demand that scientific narratives comply with historical norms. There are some staggeringly obtuse examples when we characterise disease and contraception in this respect. Then there is a range of pseudo-sciences from psychology and evolutionary spin-off disciplines, sociology etc. that impose restricting categories on our lives, that chain us to class narratives; enforce and naturalise with the reification of inequalities.
And all this is filtered through perceptual lenses that have been crafted through education and reinforced through experience so that we are bound to accept a range of categories which blind us the the social thing in itself.. We can only hope to challenge that lens and replace it with another that serves out class better.


Those would be spiritual-religious I see are often too 'soft', I guess, and too soon admit to thier religiousness or spirituality. But these are just the other side of the same coin. The religious who will not admit thier religiousness yet have a substance and intesity in thier not admitting are those with whom I like to engage.

It is probably just as difficult for you to understand what might be an 'aphilsophy' that I am talking about as it is for me to understand how you could not see what i am saying. This is why sometimes I think you are just being obstinate.

Yes, and perhaps to say "language determines reality' was a bit too hasty, I thought youd jump on that. the sentence does not express the meaning i intended.

the post-modern swamp. Hummmm. ho-humm. Ok Mr. Object (I object!)

Perhaps we might step over in the "what is history" thread. Im sure that would be entertaining.

[lancek4]

[/color]
What I see in your responses, is exactly the example of what I am saying.

Gee I forgot through all the blancmange that there was any duck of an argument in there.
Remind me again what that was?

Ahh yes, i diverged from the topic.
(see below)

[/color]I suppose to say "does not exist" could be taken to mean "I disagree", but it seems you that your disagrement was about that there could be not philsophy as I have stated it, which is evidently untrue because I have an argument -- with which you disagree, i understand now.

I think I said exactly what I wanted to say. Your characterisation of what philosophy "does' or is designed to do is not recognisable. A point I think you have conceded.

I dont know if I have conceeded. i am stating a definition which I use to make a point about definitions: philsophy and what may be aphilosophy. Def: 'typically-known' philsophy is methodological; it is designed to support a particular way of approaching living. thus what i might be talking about is 'aphilsophy'. But in that what i might be talking about may be philsophy, because thats what I consider it in definition, as a polemical potential, then methodological philsophy is actually 'aphilosophy'. And I suggest this argument because of 'methodological' philosphy is incapable of justifying what may be said to be traditional philsophy under one rubric. Methodological traditional philosohy creates an enigmatic category of commonality through the faith in the symbol-as-object progression, which sees reality as progressing in knowledge. this is why I say the argument that I can make that brings all (or most) philsophy under one rubric is too large for this thread.
We could start with Leviathan if you want, on another thread. Perhaps I could learn something.

the confusion of the subject and object stem from an associating the object "out there" with the symbols that we have for them. Such symbols do not present a True object - the meaning of the symbol grants us reality through the scheme of meaning that our particular "culture", and more particularly the individual, has developed. This scheme is faulty, except as much as one has faith that it is not. When an individual has faith in the truth of the scheme of symbols, then that reality given to that individual is True: it is an intrinsic mythology. It cannot be argued against to those faithful individuals. One can only use the scheme to attempt to argue true or false, but this always leads the one of faith to assert the truth of the scheme.

For some things it is necessary to engage with the historical contingencies, with others things are just always true. To over emphasise the former we have Popper's effective critique the "Poverty of Historicism"

i admit my ignorance of Popper. But it seems it might have something similar to do with Kierkegaard's "contemporary", and his discussion of history in Philosophical Crumbs. But either you are expressing something here that is beyond me at this time, or you do not understnd me. Are you saying: historical contigencies are 'anachronistic' symbols that are retained though they are 'invalid', and then there are 'valid' symbols that are validly operative in the 'ever-present', or that do not become anachronistic?

It is the same, say, with born again Christians or fundamentalists. You cannot ague away that sheme of reality they have. Have you ever tried? it is useless, they will always refer to a truth a things that you are attempting to show incorrect. But they simpy do not see it.

Their problem is that their case is based on a false claim of absolute eternal truth, when they demonstrate historically contingent and varying belief systems throughout history which are not compatible with each other.

No, i disagree. what is their false claim? How is it false? Is it not only false against the scheme of truth that you assert as true? what is your criteria for truth? I agree that there is no absolute eternal truth in knowledge but that does not mean that they are essentially false, because then i could make the same arguement against me having an absolute referent. If i cannot convince them, they cannot convince me, who is to say what is false? (And this is not an arguement for a futility of reality.) I know what you are saying here, but i feel the statement is too 'distant' from the issue im presenting.

this is the case with any scheme of reality. And in this case, what I try to designate by the dialectical 'philsophy' and 'aphilosphy', while showing that both exist as valid forms only against the definitions that grant them a truth-value, such desigation of reality is shown problematic. The course, as for any faith, when a probelm arises that challenges the truth-value of the scheme by which the individual knows itself, is to default back into the system and assert its truth, instead of moving forth into the probelm. This is to say, that when a mythology is confronted with its 'fasilty', the mythology is re-asserted, or it is destroyed, is made impotent, it "dies".

Have you been reading too much ZIzek?
What's your point?
I do not accept the category aphilosphy, except as an absence of philosophy. It attends to no dialectic as it is contentless.

I find Zizek interesting but he merely echos what I have come upon; he is like an echo, a reverberation of his own meaning (I have written an essay about his inconstentcies.)
and - you are using the same strategy here as you do in arguing that 'atheism' is not a belief. We end in a stalemate there.

This is what you are doing; you are defending against the death of that which jusitifes you existence: reality. You are reiterating the truth value of the scheme that grants you your reality, which is substantiated by 'traditional' routes for making argument the re-establish the truth-value of the scheme of symbols.



Don't pretend to tell me what I am doing. That's for me to pronounce on not you.
My relationship with my death is my own, and not yours to pontificate about.
It is a topic I have fairly recently had occasion to consider in stark focus; so much so that it is always near. One thing I have learned; living is not possible if everyday you know that you will die, living is the delusion of life.

Perhaps I am too detached from the reality of death. I do not intend to pontificate about such 'personal' realities. But this does go exactly to my point: I am not speaking of how one might approach life in the face of death. In fact I am not saying anything about how life reality should exist for anyone; this is what I propose we avoid. Perhaps, I am talking about how one might approach death in the face of life.

I am not pretending. the postulate I am putting forward is that when one has come to terms with what existence is, then that one becomes, for lack of a better term, "rational" about living, not that they 'should' or 'can', but this is what logically happens given the condition of our knowledge. Where when one is concerned with how to respond to life's vicicitudes rationally, it is because the moment of decision rests in a reflection of the certainty of death, and it is usually done so against another. Maybe this is a very-short version of a sub-argument. Also; when the scheme of knowledge (that which supplies truth-value) is confronted, it is defended as if the threat against it is life-threatening.

The terms of the scheme are taken, in faith, as representing potential true objects, which are then argued along a scheme-reifyng-route in order that the potential for the true object might be found.

It is a faith based route for maintaining and justifying the individual in reality.

Maybe, maybe not. It depends.

It does not depend. Or tell me how it depends.

You really do not understand me at all.
Objectivity is noting more than collective subjectivity, usually based around a hierarchical and dominant ideology. This is particularly banal when it comes to claims of moral authority, and just -so stories about natural rules of behaviour. We can trust basic science, but for peripheral claims giant paradigms stalk the land and demand that scientific narratives comply with historical norms. There are some staggeringly obtuse examples when we characterise disease and contraception in this respect. Then there is a range of pseudo-sciences from psychology and evolutionary spin-off disciplines, sociology etc. that impose restricting categories on our lives, that chain us to class narratives; enforce and naturalise with the reification of inequalities.
And all this is filtered through perceptual lenses that have been crafted through education and reinforced through experience so that we are bound to accept a range of categories which blind us the the social thing in itself.. We can only hope to challenge that lens and replace it with another that serves out class better.

Perhaps this is where we differ. I agree with your synopsis above, but I am skeptical that we can challenge that lens and replace it with something better. In fact, in my essay I say just that: methodological proposes to loosen definitional reality and to replace the definition with a new one. This is exactly where I gain the opinion that you are proving the point of the essay, and its argument.

Your last comment there reflects what I call 'objectivist-materialist'. I know that traditionally such terms have already been defined and resevred for meaning, this is why I am telling you here my definition, because I have not come up with a more fitting term for what i mean. In short (it seems) you are invested in the social as if human beings have a 'special' perspective on the world that can gain us a 'better' or 'progressed' state of affairs. Indeed this may be true, that we do have such a potential (I take This issue up in another essay also) but I do not find 'philsophy' there. I do not assert that I have a philsophy that attends how I behave in the world, or if I do, then I do not call it philsophy, except as a colloquialism. And, if I have a philsophy for how I might proceed in the world, I cannot express it directly, in fact I cannot be but silent about it because it then proposes in its positing everything that logically is untrue. And this is contradictory to communication and discourse: thus it cannot be spoken about -- which, coincidentally, is what Wittgestien offers us in 'tractatus'.

[evangelicalhumanist]

Perhaps, I am talking about how one might approach death in the face of life.

By noting, first, that death is inevitable. In the face of that truth, write a decent will and power of attorney, then forget about death and get on with life -- as joyfully as you can. It's infinitely more rewarding than worrying about approaching death.

[chaz wyman]

[/color]
What I see in your responses, is exactly the example of what I am saying.

Gee I forgot through all the blancmange that there was any duck of an argument in there.
Remind me again what that was?

Ahh yes, i diverged from the topic.
(see below)

[/color]I suppose to say "does not exist" could be taken to mean "I disagree", but it seems you that your disagrement was about that there could be not philsophy as I have stated it, which is evidently untrue because I have an argument -- with which you disagree, i understand now.

I think I said exactly what I wanted to say. Your characterisation of what philosophy "does' or is designed to do is not recognisable. A point I think you have conceded.

I dont know if I have conceeded. i am stating a definition which I use to make a point about definitions: philsophy and what may be aphilosophy. Def: 'typically-known' philsophy is methodological; it is designed to support a particular way of approaching living. thus what i might be talking about is 'aphilsophy'. But in that what i might be talking about may be philsophy, because thats what I consider it in definition, as a polemical potential, then methodological philsophy is actually 'aphilosophy'. And I suggest this argument because of 'methodological' philosphy is incapable of justifying what may be said to be traditional philsophy under one rubric. Methodological traditional philosohy creates an enigmatic category of commonality through the faith in the symbol-as-object progression, which sees reality as progressing in knowledge. this is why I say the argument that I can make that brings all (or most) philsophy under one rubric is too large for this thread.
We could start with Leviathan if you want, on another thread. Perhaps I could learn something.

the confusion of the subject and object stem from an associating the object "out there" with the symbols that we have for them. Such symbols do not present a True object - the meaning of the symbol grants us reality through the scheme of meaning that our particular "culture", and more particularly the individual, has developed. This scheme is faulty, except as much as one has faith that it is not. When an individual has faith in the truth of the scheme of symbols, then that reality given to that individual is True: it is an intrinsic mythology. It cannot be argued against to those faithful individuals. One can only use the scheme to attempt to argue true or false, but this always leads the one of faith to assert the truth of the scheme.

For some things it is necessary to engage with the historical contingencies, with others things are just always true. To over emphasise the former we have Popper's effective critique the "Poverty of Historicism"

i admit my ignorance of Popper. But it seems it might have something similar to do with Kierkegaard's "contemporary", and his discussion of history in Philosophical Crumbs. But either you are expressing something here that is beyond me at this time, or you do not understnd me. Are you saying: historical contigencies are 'anachronistic' symbols that are retained though they are 'invalid', and then there are 'valid' symbols that are validly operative in the 'ever-present', or that do not become anachronistic?

It is the same, say, with born again Christians or fundamentalists. You cannot ague away that sheme of reality they have. Have you ever tried? it is useless, they will always refer to a truth a things that you are attempting to show incorrect. But they simpy do not see it.

Their problem is that their case is based on a false claim of absolute eternal truth, when they demonstrate historically contingent and varying belief systems throughout history which are not compatible with each other.

No, i disagree. what is their false claim? How is it false? Is it not only false against the scheme of truth that you assert as true? what is your criteria for truth? I agree that there is no absolute eternal truth in knowledge but that does not mean that they are essentially false, because then i could make the same arguement against me having an absolute referent. If i cannot convince them, they cannot convince me, who is to say what is false? (And this is not an arguement for a futility of reality.) I know what you are saying here, but i feel the statement is too 'distant' from the issue im presenting.

this is the case with any scheme of reality. And in this case, what I try to designate by the dialectical 'philsophy' and 'aphilosphy', while showing that both exist as valid forms only against the definitions that grant them a truth-value, such desigation of reality is shown problematic. The course, as for any faith, when a probelm arises that challenges the truth-value of the scheme by which the individual knows itself, is to default back into the system and assert its truth, instead of moving forth into the probelm. This is to say, that when a mythology is confronted with its 'fasilty', the mythology is re-asserted, or it is destroyed, is made impotent, it "dies".

Have you been reading too much ZIzek?
What's your point?
I do not accept the category aphilosphy, except as an absence of philosophy. It attends to no dialectic as it is contentless.

I find Zizek interesting but he merely echos what I have come upon; he is like an echo, a reverberation of his own meaning (I have written an essay about his inconstentcies.)
and - you are using the same strategy here as you do in arguing that 'atheism' is not a belief. We end in a stalemate there.

This is what you are doing; you are defending against the death of that which jusitifes you existence: reality. You are reiterating the truth value of the scheme that grants you your reality, which is substantiated by 'traditional' routes for making argument the re-establish the truth-value of the scheme of symbols.



Don't pretend to tell me what I am doing. That's for me to pronounce on not you.
My relationship with my death is my own, and not yours to pontificate about.
It is a topic I have fairly recently had occasion to consider in stark focus; so much so that it is always near. One thing I have learned; living is not possible if everyday you know that you will die, living is the delusion of life.

Perhaps I am too detached from the reality of death. I do not intend to pontificate about such 'personal' realities. But this does go exactly to my point: I am not speaking of how one might approach life in the face of death. In fact I am not saying anything about how life reality should exist for anyone; this is what I propose we avoid. Perhaps, I am talking about how one might approach death in the face of life.

I am not pretending. the postulate I am putting forward is that when one has come to terms with what existence is, then that one becomes, for lack of a better term, "rational" about living, not that they 'should' or 'can', but this is what logically happens given the condition of our knowledge. Where when one is concerned with how to respond to life's vicicitudes rationally, it is because the moment of decision rests in a reflection of the certainty of death, and it is usually done so against another. Maybe this is a very-short version of a sub-argument. Also; when the scheme of knowledge (that which supplies truth-value) is confronted, it is defended as if the threat against it is life-threatening.

The terms of the scheme are taken, in faith, as representing potential true objects, which are then argued along a scheme-reifyng-route in order that the potential for the true object might be found.

It is a faith based route for maintaining and justifying the individual in reality.

Maybe, maybe not. It depends.

It does not depend. Or tell me how it depends.

You really do not understand me at all.
Objectivity is noting more than collective subjectivity, usually based around a hierarchical and dominant ideology. This is particularly banal when it comes to claims of moral authority, and just -so stories about natural rules of behaviour. We can trust basic science, but for peripheral claims giant paradigms stalk the land and demand that scientific narratives comply with historical norms. There are some staggeringly obtuse examples when we characterise disease and contraception in this respect. Then there is a range of pseudo-sciences from psychology and evolutionary spin-off disciplines, sociology etc. that impose restricting categories on our lives, that chain us to class narratives; enforce and naturalise with the reification of inequalities.
And all this is filtered through perceptual lenses that have been crafted through education and reinforced through experience so that we are bound to accept a range of categories which blind us the the social thing in itself.. We can only hope to challenge that lens and replace it with another that serves out class better.

Perhaps this is where we differ. I agree with your synopsis above, but I am skeptical that we can challenge that lens and replace it with something better. In fact, in my essay I say just that: methodological proposes to loosen definitional reality and to replace the definition with a new one. This is exactly where I gain the opinion that you are proving the point of the essay, and its argument.

Your last comment there reflects what I call 'objectivist-materialist'. I know that traditionally such terms have already been defined and resevred for meaning, this is why I am telling you here my definition, because I have not come up with a more fitting term for what i mean. In short (it seems) you are invested in the social as if human beings have a 'special' perspective on the world that can gain us a 'better' or 'progressed' state of affairs. Indeed this may be true, that we do have such a potential (I take This issue up in another essay also) but I do not find 'philsophy' there. I do not assert that I have a philsophy that attends how I behave in the world, or if I do, then I do not call it philsophy, except as a colloquialism. And, if I have a philsophy for how I might proceed in the world, I cannot express it directly, in fact I cannot be but silent about it because it then proposes in its positing everything that logically is untrue. And this is contradictory to communication and discourse: thus it cannot be spoken about -- which, coincidentally, is what Wittgestien offers us in 'tractatus'.

Most of the above is basically contentless.
But I will comment on your last paragraph because you are making a claim about me which is incorrect. I did not say; replace it with something "better", I said 'replace it with another that serves out class better.' A thing which better serves our class is not "BETTER" per se. You are letting your guard down by claiming that such a thing as a better object is part of the dialectic. Changing the filter to look at the social system, for example with Marxist eyes, provides an alternative - it does not provide a thing that can be universally better, but one which might promote sectional interests above those of the elites. I am talking about the political sphere but it work in a wider context too. It's just a question of having the ability to change your lenses to have a 'thicker' understanding. You claim that you are saying the same thing is possibly true. I quote above"In fact, in my essay I say just that: "methodological proposes to loosen definitional reality and to replace the definition with a new one." it's just that I say it more grammatically. Did you mean "methodology proposes"?; "methodological" is adjectival.
And if you think this is "objectivist-materialist" you really need to go and see a doctor. The rest of your paragraph is complete bullshit. You really do not know me, and yet you persist in caricaturing me in a way that pleases you to criticise.

[chaz wyman]

Perhaps, I am talking about how one might approach death in the face of life.

By noting, first, that death is inevitable. In the face of that truth, write a decent will and power of attorney, then forget about death and get on with life -- as joyfully as you can. It's infinitely more rewarding than worrying about approaching death.

As a person who was told that without treatment I had a year to live, I know that this method worked for me.
Living your life within view of your death constantly is no life at all.
Knowing that ultimately your actions will result in the same end, can be invigorating and empowering, though.

[lancek4]

By noting, first, that death is inevitable. In the face of that truth, write a decent will and power of attorney, then forget about death and get on with life -- as joyfully as you can. It's infinitely more rewarding than worrying about approaching death

You obviously have not read the essay EV. Check out the first paragraph then we can file your comment here as "given" and then maybe discuss something pertinent to the argument of the essay. There is a link a few pages back in this thread if you are interested.

[lancek4]

Most of the above is basically contentless.

In a very dry and unthoughtful manner, yes, the essay's contentlessness would then amount to 'aphilsophy'. Very astute.
But it is only contentless in relation to a specfic scheme by which truth is granted. i am saying

something

- am I not? Something is there. Your responses show the validity of what the essay is suggesting. I am not using a bunch of nice sounding words to say "contentless". you are 'caught' in ap articular type of reality that is oriented upon the object in a particular manner of truth. i would think i would not have to get Socratic on you, I would think you would see how terms never find a final rediuction. I am saying that you see the terms as 'terminating' somewhere, and, as all the individual terms hypothetically 'terminate' (find essential truth) as they do, together form a scheme of truth.

But I will comment on your last paragraph because you are making a claim about me which is incorrect. I did not say; replace it with something "better", I said 'replace it with another that serves out class better.' A thing which better serves our class is not "BETTER" per se. You are letting your guard down by claiming that such a thing as a better object is part of the dialectic.

Yes, ok, I did notice that. thank you.

Changing the filter to look at the social system, for example with Marxist eyes, provides an alternative - it does not provide a thing that can be universally better, but one which might promote sectional interests above those of the elites. I am talking about the political sphere but it work in a wider context too. It's just a question of having the ability to change your lenses to have a 'thicker' understanding. You claim that you are saying the same thing is possibly true. I quote above"In fact, in my essay I say just that: "methodological proposes to loosen definitional reality and to replace the definition with a new one." it's just that I say it more grammatically. Did you mean "methodology proposes"?; "methodological" is adjectival.
And if you think this is "objectivist-materialist" you really need to go and see a doctor. The rest of your paragraph is complete bullshit. You really do not know me, and yet you persist in caricaturing me in a way that pleases you to criticise.

I see there is a 'disconnect' between our understandings of things. this is what I attempt to describe: thus I say "you".
what you say in the last paragraph, yes, I agree. and yess I meant 'methodology' or 'the' methodological (philsophy)...'
And yes I am saying something very similar; I suppose I am taking a much larger spoonful than you are.
"Our class" suggests to me a particular ethics -no? So, yes I have to agree with you so far as to say that this 'philsophical meathod' has gotten us to our current social system that is much better for humanity as a whole, considering the barbarisms of the past -- and in fact it is the freedom that our system has granted us which allows for me to sit here and have such philosohical arguments, indeed, to have this particular arguement as in the essay.
I suppose that such freedom finds its limits, and then seeing that freedom is actually a condition of being bound, then bounces back into 'plausibly denied' bounds of the ethical, and finds in this blissful ignorance that choice is freedom.
thus I propose that philsophy does not advocate an ethics, and, 'aphilsophy' does, or philsophy does and aphilsophy does not, depending upon one's orientation upon reality. The essay argues that what might be a 'true' philsophy does not offer an ethics.
In that I am suggesting that what to you is 'contentless' (aphilsophy), does in fact have content, I am asserting that what you might think is 'aphilsophy', having no content, actually has content, and I am thus proposing 'philsophy' is concerned with this content, which you come unto as 'no content'. Thus, what you might be proposing as 'philsophy', I am proposing as "aphilsophy", because the ethical gets nowhere but itself. Sartre offers us the 'gateway' into how to speak of this content, because, if i were to speak of this 'aphilsophical' content i would have to use terms that inevitably find 'philsophical-ethical' meaning. That is unless, as I suggest, the individual has come to terms with existence and is no longer oriented upon the truth of the object, the mistaken identity that is the true symbol-object, that allows for a methodological philsophy and ethical promotion.

How can this be? Because I am not arguing an ethics. i am arguing a necessary condition of knowledge: philsophy is an investigation into this 'contentlessness', to use you designation.
We cannot say 'religious' nor 'spirituality' because of the limitation that Rudolf Otto describes of such experiences. We cannot designate this 'contentlessness' to the religious, because then we are reifying the methodological-ethical philsophy that you are describing above, that I agree with.

[lancek4]

BTW - I am not concerning myself with death. I am living. But maybe i have come to terms with what death means given our current state of knowledge, the state of affairs of our knowledge, our condition of knowledge.
---- but maybe not

[chaz wyman]

Most of the above is basically contentless.

In a very dry and unthoughtful manner, yes, the essay's contentlessness would then amount to 'aphilsophy'. Very astute.
Cheeky bugger ain't ya? No, nothing amounts to aphilosophy.
But it is only contentless in relation to a specfic scheme by which truth is granted. i am saying

something

- am I not? Something is there. Your responses show the validity of what the essay is suggesting. I am not using a bunch of nice sounding words to say "contentless". you are 'caught' in ap articular type of reality that is oriented upon the object in a particular manner of truth. i would think i would not have to get Socratic on you, I would think you would see how terms never find a final rediuction. I am saying that you see the terms as 'terminating' somewhere, and, as all the individual terms hypothetically 'terminate' (find essential truth) as they do, together form a scheme of truth.

But I will comment on your last paragraph because you are making a claim about me which is incorrect. I did not say; replace it with something "better", I said 'replace it with another that serves out class better.' A thing which better serves our class is not "BETTER" per se. You are letting your guard down by claiming that such a thing as a better object is part of the dialectic.

Yes, ok, I did notice that. thank you.

Changing the filter to look at the social system, for example with Marxist eyes, provides an alternative - it does not provide a thing that can be universally better, but one which might promote sectional interests above those of the elites. I am talking about the political sphere but it work in a wider context too. It's just a question of having the ability to change your lenses to have a 'thicker' understanding. You claim that you are saying the same thing is possibly true. I quote above"In fact, in my essay I say just that: "methodological proposes to loosen definitional reality and to replace the definition with a new one." it's just that I say it more grammatically. Did you mean "methodology proposes"?; "methodological" is adjectival.
And if you think this is "objectivist-materialist" you really need to go and see a doctor. The rest of your paragraph is complete bullshit. You really do not know me, and yet you persist in caricaturing me in a way that pleases you to criticise.

I see there is a 'disconnect' between our understandings of things. this is what I attempt to describe: thus I say "you".
what you say in the last paragraph, yes, I agree. and yess I meant 'methodology' or 'the' methodological (philsophy)...'
And yes I am saying something very similar; I suppose I am taking a much larger spoonful than you are.
"Our class" suggests to me a particular ethics -no? So, yes I have to agree with you so far as to say that this 'philsophical meathod' has gotten us to our current social system that is much better for humanity as a whole, considering the barbarisms of the past -- and in fact it is the freedom that our system has granted us which allows for me to sit here and have such philosohical arguments, indeed, to have this particular arguement as in the essay.
I suppose that such freedom finds its limits, and then seeing that freedom is actually a condition of being bound, then bounces back into 'plausibly denied' bounds of the ethical, and finds in this blissful ignorance that choice is freedom.
thus I propose that philsophy does not advocate an ethics, and, 'aphilsophy' does, or philsophy does and aphilsophy does not, depending upon one's orientation upon reality.

Philosophy in general terms is not situated to advocate anything in particular, except examination. The methodologies can put us on the same page so that certain claims can be re-examined by others. None of this stops philosophy from suggesting and employing a range of different methodologies for comparison. Obviously particular philosophers, after due consideration, recommend and advocate their pet theories: Aristotle's deontology, Kant's categorical imperative, Bentham's Utilitarianism spring to mind this morning. The rational methodology can be employed to examine all 3 to suggest the consequences and implications of such schemes, were they to be adopted.
But what I find most useful about philosophical method is it ability to uncover and expose certain assumptions, often unseen, that lie behind a text- such as the utilitarian one you employ above. (re:"is much better for humanity as a whole") , which I'm not sure I accept - it being a rather occidental point of view.

The essay argues that what might be a 'true' philsophy does not offer an ethics.
In that I am suggesting that what to you is 'contentless' (aphilsophy), does in fact have content, I am asserting that what you might think is 'aphilsophy', having no content, actually has content, and I am thus proposing 'philsophy' is concerned with this content, which you come unto as 'no content'.

Maybe you misunderstand what I meant by contentless?

Thus, what you might be proposing as 'philsophy', I am proposing as "aphilsophy", because the ethical gets nowhere but itself. Sartre offers us the 'gateway' into how to speak of this content, because, if i were to speak of this 'aphilsophical' content i would have to use terms that inevitably find 'philsophical-ethical' meaning. That is unless, as I suggest, the individual has come to terms with existence and is no longer oriented upon the truth of the object, the mistaken identity that is the true symbol-object, that allows for a methodological philsophy and ethical promotion.

Are you suggesting that Sartre used the term aphilosophy?
The way you want to use the term seems to affront my grammatical and etymological sense.
You seem to want to have aphilosophy as an alternative, but in doing so wanting it to have some content, and relevance to philosophy. Apolitical suggests no role in politics. The use of the "a-" is not symmetrical. I think you might be describing ectophilosphy, maybe dysphilopshy, juxtaphilosphy, because what you describe seems to be generated by , and assumes philosophy in a way that atheism does not assume god.

How can this be? Because I am not arguing an ethics. i am arguing a necessary condition of knowledge: philsophy is an investigation into this 'contentlessness', to use you designation.
We cannot say 'religious' nor 'spirituality' because of the limitation that Rudolf Otto describes of such experiences.

I don't know what he said. I never use those words to describe any activity I would ever engage in.

We cannot designate this 'contentlessness' to the religious, because then we are reifying the methodological-ethical philsophy that you are describing above, that I agree with.

But does this not simply demonstrate my problem with philosophy?

[lancek4]

Are you suggesting that Sartre used the term aphilosophy?

No I am not.

The way you want to use the term seems to affront my grammatical and etymological sense.
You seem to want to have aphilosophy as an alternative, but in doing so wanting it to have some content, and relevance to philosophy. Apolitical suggests no role in politics. The use of the "a-" is not symmetrical. I think you might be describing ectophilosphy, maybe dysphilopshy, juxtaphilosphy, because what you describe seems to be generated by , and assumes philosophy in a way that atheism does not assume god.

Point taken. Yes, perhaps the terms I use are problematic. this is why I need to enage more dialugue with thoughtful individuals, to figure more appropriate or understandable terms.
Yet, I am suggesting something by using what would otherwise be asymmetrical in an implication of symmetry.

How can this be? Because I am not arguing an ethics. i am arguing a necessary condition of knowledge: philsophy is an investigation into this 'contentlessness', to use you designation.
We cannot say 'religious' nor 'spirituality' because of the limitation that Rudolf Otto describes of such experiences.

I don't know what he said. I never use those words to describe any activity I would ever engage in.

We cannot designate this 'contentlessness' to the religious, because then we are reifying the methodological-ethical philsophy that you are describing above, that I agree with.[/quote]
Otto, in his "Idea of the Holy", proposes (at least to my reading of him), among other things, that, what he terms, a 'numinous' experience (spiritual experience and the like; a experience from which the idea "holy" comes from) has no content in itself, but is made sence of before and after such experience. I call this by which we make sence: discourse.

Thus our (mine and yours) disagreement. As to 'atheism', I understand your designation of 'a' terms. In fact, this is youre position (I believe), that where theism proposes a "god" of some sort, atheism does not propose its counterpart, as symmetrical, but rather negates the potential, possibility and actuality of there being a god, and asserts "there is no God". i fully understand the argument.

But this is exactly the problem. And this is the problem that Witt noticed, Sartre, Kirkegaard, and others noticed: everything is determined, defined, indeed Exists in that we speak of it. Tell me of something that exists without using discourse to speak to me about it. ?.?.?

So the probelm is discourse. If someone (such as Typist) were to indicate something that may be 'beyond' discourse, such as 'thought', the force of gravity, or whatever, it has been negated (symmetrically) by the mere positing of it in discourse. But obviously, to me anyway, there is something that such discourse about what may be beyond discourse is attempting to indicate.

Thus I i indicate this potential, this problem, by situating creatively 'philsophy' and 'aphilsophy'.
and thus I define the position that you are asserting when you say that atheism or aphilsophy indicates an absolute negation of the idea, of the reality, because you are making an assumption, or are asserting your orientation upon reality where there is a 'positive' reality of say 'things', and these things may be designated in a sure way by discourse, our scheme of symbols, such that there may be a 'negative' that which is infinitely reduces upon itself and becomes contentless.

I am working from the proposition that this dscribed scheme, of the positive and negative (above), constitues a type of 'positive' situating of reality, and that actually what is understood in this scheme as 'negative', is actually a redundancy, in that there cannot be an absolute negation except in the former scheme: the position or orientation upon reality that upholds within itself a potential for total relation with the universe or reality, I call a faith, because it is but one particular way of coming upon a true reality.
Hegel was short in his portrayal of a complete system: he missed this third relation which does not infinitely reduce; this was Kierkegaard's step.
This is the Big Scoop of faith, saying that faith is that which informs ones ability for truth. Belief is the expression or negotiation of this faith in definition.

The problem is discourse, not merely the defintions by which we come upon a reality, but the orientation by which we come upon the definitions. the problem is how we speak of what may be true.