Prove me wrong: there is no God

[Fanman]

For the neutral reader and my forum record, to ensure that there is an equivalent AI account of my argument, I assessed my argument using ChatGPT (GPT-5.6 Luna) based on the forum user's (FlashDangerPants) critique. It concluded that the core of my argument survives, but that the implications should remain provisional. I do not necessarily agree with ChatGPT's conclusion, but provisionally, I will accept it. Upon deeper analysis with ChatGPT, it concluded that the user's arguments did not provide any substantive defeaters to my argument.

[Immanuel Can]

That's a no then. Good; so we agree that any argument which includes a premise that assumes a particular uncaused cause is unsound.

So...you didn't read what I said. Okay. You don't have to.

Mr Can, if the likelihood of a quantum fluctuation being the cause of the universe is anything but nil, any argument that concludes anything other than a quantum fluctuation being the cause of the universe is unsound.

I'm astounded that anybody can think something so obviously wrong. But let me see if I can explain.

The likelihood that alien Amazons from some other galaxy seeded Earth with life is not nil. But it is so unlikely as to be astronomically unlikely, given the dimensions of the universe and the proximity of any potentially habitable planet, and our complete lack of any evidence for any such planet. Still, it's not "nil." It's just nearly nil.

According to your argument, then, Amazons from another galaxy seeded Earth: and to think anything else is "unsound."

So now, who didn't understand logic?

[FlashDangerpants]

For the neutral reader and my forum record, to ensure that there is an equivalent AI account of my argument, I assessed my argument using ChatGPT (GPT-5.6 Luna) based on the forum user's (FlashDangerPants) critique. It concluded that the core of my argument survives, but that the implications should remain provisional. I do not necessarily agree with ChatGPT's conclusion, but provisionally, I will accept it. Upon deeper analysis with ChatGPT, it concluded that the user's arguments did not provide any substantive defeaters to my argument.

And yet you get grumpy when people suggest you seem a bit autistic.

[Will Bouwman]

I'm astounded that anybody can think something so obviously wrong. But let me see if I can explain.

No need, I accept that I put that clumsily. This is less misleading:
Mr Can, if the likelihood of a quantum fluctuation being the cause of the universe is anything but nil, any argument that concludes any particular cause of the universe is unsound.
I'm sure you agree with that.

[Immanuel Can]

I'm astounded that anybody can think something so obviously wrong. But let me see if I can explain.

No need, I accept that I put that clumsily. This is less misleading:

That's fine. Let's see if we can get your point, together.

Mr Can, if the likelihood of a quantum fluctuation being the cause of the universe is anything but nil, any argument that concludes any particular cause of the universe is unsound.

Oh. Is what you mean, "If there are other alternatives that are not nil in probability, then we can't say exactly what is, for certain, the cause of the universe"? (Is that what you're meaning by your use of "unsound" -- not 100% certain)?

If you mean something different, of course you're free to correct my supposition on that. However, let me respond, on the assumption that I've understood the point you're aiming to make.

Not a problem.

I've said this before, but let's apply it here. All human knowing is probabilistic, not absolute. EVERYTHING we know, we know only in terms of higher or lower probabilities. But higher probabilities are much better and more certain than lower probabilities; and exceedingly high probabilities, when counterpoised to extremely low (but non-nil) probabilities, are the best source of knowledge human beings can have.

So we arrive at this: is the existence of God higher in probability than the postulate of creation by random quantum "fluctuations"? (Of course, there are problems with this second option, including such things as "what is 'fluctuating'?", which implies the pre-existence of something to "fluctuate," and thus doesn't actually meet the challenge of addressing ultimate origins at all. But let's suspend that concern, rather than addressing it here.) The relative probabilities are the only way to settle the matter, at least to the satisfaction of human knowledge.

How do we estimate the relative probabilities of each hypothesis? Maybe that's the next question. Let me try.

Well, one conforms to mathematics, to logic, and to empirical observations, including causality, irreducible complexity, and so on...at least, we must concede, in some significant ways. It has, we would have to admit, at least some reasonable explanatory efficacy for the things we observe. It might still be wrong, let us say, because like all human knowing, it can never deliver 100% certainty to us. But it has a relatively substantial chance of being a correct supposition, because it does satisfy some issues -- even if we're not settled yet on all of the issues. However, the other hypothesis does not conform to anything, including science itself, since it would make causal analysis impossible. So one is more probable than the other, and explains more of what we know and experience than does the other.

So it's obvious, I would say, which we must prefer. The "quantum fluctuations" explanation is so complicated, so incomplete, so counter-intuitive, and so problematic to things like causality and science and technology, and renders human knowledge itself impossible, so that while it may not be "nil" in probability, it surely has to be regarded as astronomically unlikely. I think we're safest not to embrace something so close to "nil" in explanatory efficacy.

So I suggest you make your own calculation of probability, and decide which hypothesis you will go with. You have my view, but it's not binding on you.

[Immanuel Can]

I'm sure you agree with that.

Here's something quite different. It deals with God, and with quantum theory, among other things. So it does address our topic.

It's not advocating my view.

It's not advocating your view.

It's advocating its own view.

Nevertheless, why don't we consider what it offers, as an additional perspective?

Here it is: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tmEvJaqg1Ow

[Fanman]

So, if we accept that the universe is progressing, though not necessarily in an actual direction, for those who find it difficult to conceptualise progression without direction, imagine that you were at the geometrical centre of the universe and began walking. Which direction would you be moving in, relative to reality? Perhaps none, phenomenologically, in any universal sense; you would simply be making progress through successive positions.

Phenomenologically, we reason in terms of direction, but our experience may not reflect the actuality—that is a real possibility.

At the same time, states within existence would be changing. My argument, therefore, is that at a fundamental level, this may be what is occurring, conceptually: causality and randomness are ways we describe relationships between changing states within a progression that does not necessarily have an actual direction.

It helps to think in terms of a chain or non-chain because humans are very pattern-sensitive. But scaling that disposition up from a terrestrial scale to an ontological scale is a leap that I do not believe we have a valid reason to justify.

[Will Bouwman]

I've said this before, but let's apply it here. All human knowing is probabilistic, not absolute. EVERYTHING we know, we know only in terms of higher or lower probabilities.

One thing we know as certain is that different people interpret the same information in different ways. You, for instance, believe that 'irreducible complexity' reduces the probability of evolution. By contrast, I think evolution reduces the probability of irreducible complexity. These are not equivalent though; the difference is irreducible complexity is just a belief that without every component, an organ is useless. Well, I don't imagine he would get ethical clearance, but if Michael Behe for example, wished to demonstrate irreducible complexity, he might propose to remove the lenses from Alice's eyes. This would certainly put her at a disadvantage to Bob with his fully functional eyes. Poor old Charlie though, has both eyes removed which, if the premise of irreducible complexity is correct, would make his disadvantage the same as Alice's. Believe that if you will, but I can anticipate some simple experiments to show that Alice is much better off than Charlie. On the other hand, evolution is supported by the creatures alive today which display various stages in the evolution of the eye.
As Aristotle pointed out, we are swayed by ethos and pathos as well as logos. In some people, most I suspect, ethos and pathos are decisive and logos gets to work justifying what is, as I keep saying, essentially an aesthetic choice. Long story short: as you agree, Kalam and any dependent arguments are unsound; how anyone determines probability is greatly influenced by what they wish to believe. You say:

The "quantum fluctuations" explanation is...so counter-intuitive...

What you mean is that it is counter to your intuition.

[Fanman]

NB: The following is not an absolute claim; it is a coherent (IMO), philosophical argument.

I believe that asking what caused existence (the universe) results in a profound logical irony. To cause anything requires power, potential, and/or agency—all of which require the prerequisite of being. Therefore, any proposed “cause” of existence must, by definition, be something that exists.

Causality, as a concept, cannot bridge a transition from non-existence to existence because the causal mechanism itself requires existence to operate. The Kalam's demand for an external origin therefore collapses into a self-defeating loop: “what caused existence?”—something that exists. In this model, existence is not a secondary effect brought about by a prior trigger; it is the irreducible, inescapable baseline. You cannot precede the ground of being without inadvertently relying upon it.

Existing state-change within a progressive field does not encounter these issues.

Critical addition to my post: I have distilled an axiom from my work on this subject. The inverted commas around “Progressive” are intentional—for falsifiability purposes. The approximation sign means that the model is not being treated as a proof.

The axiom: “Progressive” ≈ continuous state-change in existence.