IC please clarify for us

[MikeNovack]

So he ought not to have any expectation that science is even doable.

This is tiresome. Not relevant what you as a believer in some deity believe the materialist SHOULD believe. It is your religion suggesting that a non-believer would be lost. What is relevant is what the materialist believes. I have never encountered a materialist who felt themselves lost in the sense you believe they should feel.

[Immanuel Can]

I don't think that's at all true, either. There are many reasons people choose to believe what they believe, and often these reasons are not rational. However, lots of people here do not believe mere Materialism. And I might add, without giving away too much, that unbeknownst to you, I have been told by others that they have been persuaded by the argument, as well: so how many of these there are, neither you nor I can say, but we can certainly say your claim that Materialism is overwhelmingly persuasive isn't true. For those who pay attention and think, it seems that Materialism is not such an amazing option after all.

Perhaps you perceive that I am defending a strict materialist orientation,

Well, Materialism isn't the kind of thing you can partly practice. This is because Materialism's whole supposition is the non-existence of anything not made of materials. If one says "I believe materials exist," then you're saying nothing that is not believed by both the Materialist and the metaphysician. However, if you say, "I believe materials exist, but also that immaterial things can exist," then you're not be a Materialist at all; you're a metaphysician, because in addition to their metaphysical convictions, most of them also believe that materials exist.

you are avoiding responding to the most relevant part of the argument

No, I'm just ignoring the off-topic. We were dealing with the question of how to understand moral properties, such as "evil."

The purpose I established was to attempt to get clear(er) about what “evil” actually is, and how the notion of it can be explained through metaphysics, since it is a meaningless term within Nature.

I don't think we have reason to think that's true, at all. The Materialist may think that; but you now claim not to be a Materialist. And it's certainly not a given.

I do not think you can recognize the degree to which I ally with significant portions of your metaphysics

Well, I have no idea why you brought up Materialism, and seemed to want to say it was impressive, and "powerful," and "etc.", which isn't really true: it's narrow, reductional and unsatisfying as an explanation of reality, I would say. It deals with all metaphysical properties by simply pretending they don't exist. That's not a terribly smart strategy, of course.

But now you say you believe that certain metaphysical properties do exist. Well, let's hear about that. What metaphysical properties do you think are real, and what makes you believe they're real?

[Immanuel Can]

So he ought not to have any expectation that science is even doable.

This is tiresome. Not relevant what you as a believer in some deity believe the materialist SHOULD believe.

Well, I'm only talking about somebody who was rational and consistent, and said he was beginning from Materialist assumptions. There are plenty of Materialists who are rather inconsistent; but it's not possible to discuss what irrational things they may try to add to their Materialism, because there's no end of such things. I think we can only discuss what the philosophy itself rationalizes; not what inconsistent or irrational people do.

I have never encountered a materialist who felt themselves lost in the sense you believe they should feel.

I have.

[phyllo]

Naturally, that response doesn't address the trustworthiness of the metaphysicist's brain at all

Actually, it does.

The metaphysicist may have reason to trust his brain. For example, he may consider that he's in a universe that runs by rational rules and logical relations, or that his brain is deliberately designed to be interested in truth, or that the Creator made this world in order for us to discover it, and our brains in order that we could. That won't mean the human brain is infallible, but it would certainly make science a rational exercise.

However, the Materialist's worldview denies him any such reason to trust his own brain. He thinks it's a product of randomness, chance, time plus mutation, or some other such haphazard process, and has no intended purpose at all. Likewise, he believes that the universe is here by pure chance, and there's no reason to expect law-governed behaviour from its elements, nor any reason for him to think there's any truth-relation between his brain and the external world. So he ought not to have any expectation that science is even doable.

The materialist finds a structured universe which follows physicals laws. These are not expectations, but rather observations. He/she doesn't not think the brain is somehow exempt from following the laws.

A metaphysicist may think that the laws of the universe change at the whim of a god or demon. (Depending on his/her specific beliefs, of course.)

[Immanuel Can]

Naturally, that response doesn't address the trustworthiness of the metaphysicist's brain at all

Actually, it does.

The metaphysicist may have reason to trust his brain. For example, he may consider that he's in a universe that runs by rational rules and logical relations, or that his brain is deliberately designed to be interested in truth, or that the Creator made this world in order for us to discover it, and our brains in order that we could. That won't mean the human brain is infallible, but it would certainly make science a rational exercise.

However, the Materialist's worldview denies him any such reason to trust his own brain. He thinks it's a product of randomness, chance, time plus mutation, or some other such haphazard process, and has no intended purpose at all. Likewise, he believes that the universe is here by pure chance, and there's no reason to expect law-governed behaviour from its elements, nor any reason for him to think there's any truth-relation between his brain and the external world. So he ought not to have any expectation that science is even doable.

The materialist finds a structured universe which follows physicals laws.

He doesn't know if that is what he "finds." By his own account, he's using a random, accidental, survival-focused brain to make that assessment. He can't know whether or not it's true, and has no reason to think it is.

We can say that he thinks he finds that. But he shouldn't expect to, and he cannot know whether that's what he's found, or whether that's just another lie his brain is feeding him.

[Alexis Jacobi]

For example, he may consider that he's in a universe that runs by rational rules and logical relations, or that his brain is deliberately designed to be interested in truth, or that the Creator made this world in order for us to discover it, and our brains in order that we could. That won't mean the human brain is infallible, but it would certainly make science a rational exercise.

What interests me here is what you are doing. You make a series of propositions that are convulsive: That the Universe is rational; that our brain is designed for truth-discovery; and also something quite relevant: that not only is our world to be discovered (i.e. the material truths about chemicals, biology, physics and all the rest) but (at least this is my reading) that the reasons why we are here, let’s say on a spiritual level, are discoverable.

There is no way that you will be able to convince the ‘materialist’ whose position is now a pole in the conversation, that the material and biological brain as they describe it is incapable of all the delicate and complex analysis that you say necessitates a divine imbuer, i.e. a soul (or more accurately a ‘ghost in the machine’).

We were dealing with the question of how to understand moral properties, such as "evil."

Certainly the definition of evil in our human world is crucial, and it is a question you are always called to respond to, but by no means is it the only focus of the metaphysician. In the largest framing, the metaphysician is interested in the fact that we are here and the reason why we are here. And in relation to that issue, where we came from and of course where we are going.

The way those questions are answered involves entire sets of definitions about “World”. And just so I am clear, my view is that your literalist Christian Evangelical position is limited and incomplete. Therefore, your metaphysics are insufficient and, also in my view, require expansion and renovation.

[Alexis Jacobi]

I don't think we have reason to think that's true, at all. [That within Nature ‘evil’ is a non-existent category]. The Materialist may think that; but you now claim not to be a Materialist. And it's certainly not a given.

It really is ‘a given’. It is really more than just a “materialist” (which word implies an ideology) who understands that “evil” pertains to solely human concerns, not to any event or issue that you could name in Nature. If you think differently, please be so kind as to name an event or act in Nature that is ‘evil’. A biologist and a zoologist — an ecologist — does not describe evil in the natural world. Full stop.

Your shark-kills-seal is a good example. No ‘evil’ is involved. Bad luck for the seal, I suppose, but in the order of ecology it was all to the good.

And the connected fact is that if it was your granny or your child that got attacked and eaten, ‘evil’ still cannot be ascribed to the shark.

[Immanuel Can]

I don't think we have reason to think that's true, at all. [That within Nature ‘evil’ is a non-existent category]. The Materialist may think that; but you now claim not to be a Materialist. And it's certainly not a given.

It really is ‘a given’.

No, it's really not.

It is really more than just a “materialist”

If you believe in something metaphysical, then you're not a Materialist at all.

...please be so kind as to name an event or act in Nature that is ‘evil’.

That's the matter of hot debate: can we make out that an "evil" has been visited upon people, when, say an earthquake destroys their village? Can we say an "evil" is cancer? Plenty of people think we can, and lots of people speak that way casually. But so do philosophers. Susan Nieman, for example, in her book Evil in Modern Thought, identifies two types of evil: what she calls "human evils," and what she calls "natural evils."

Now, you may not agree with her, but you certainly can't say that people don't talk about natural evils. They do. And often they start with words like, "Why would God allow..." So you can't say that it's a "given." Lots of people are simply not prepared to "give" it to you. They still want to consider things like earthquakes, plagues and hurricanes as forms of "natural evils."

[phyllo]

Naturally, that response doesn't address the trustworthiness of the metaphysicist's brain at all

I think you mean in fact the untrustworthiness of that brain.

Six of one, half dozen of the other.

It doesn't matter because he will either ignore the issue or make some insane unsupported assertions that metaphysicists have trustworthy brains and materialists don't.

Brains come from the same source, which is independent of a person's beliefs about metaphysics. The mechanics are the same for both metaphysicists and materialists. So it comes down to who does a better job of critical thinking, analysis and investigation.