phyllo wrote: ↑Thu Feb 19, 2026 1:25 pm
And if you think he can do that, then let's outline the particular sins or infractions that you think should be in that category. That way, we'll establish our "should have" point for the criticism of God's actions.
I don't want the topic to be changed from the 'problem of evil' to 'my personal evaluation of the seriousness of sins'.
It's not being. All I'm doing is asking
what the question itself requires of us...what it requires us to know or assume. And that's what we do in philosophy, as you know: we look into the reasons we think the things we think.
Why not just tackle some things that the majority would consider evil?
Simple: because that asks us to believe that whatever "the majority" (however defined) thinks
must be true. And we know that isn't always the case: the historical precedents are simply too many. So it would be asking us to accept an absurd premise, one that we recognize is simply false or unwarranted. Rationally speaking, we can't do that.
For example, in the case of 'natural evil', why does God allow a toddler to get cancer and die painfully.
Okay, now we have a specific example. But we must pause: do we already know that that is "evil"? Maybe we
feel we don't like it, but how do we know it's actually evil, and how do we know it's "God's fault," so to speak?
If we go to the skeptic's position, the position of the one posing the "problem of evil," then the truth is that we DON'T know. In fact, the Atheistic position would require of us to believe that it's NOT evil. It's just how things happen, and there's no good or bad about it. The Theist can ask the question, of course, because he believes that something can be objectively wrong, or objectively evil, and has a basis for doing so. But will Atheism help us with the problem of evil, here? Will it provide us any light at all? And if we think as Atheists, will we even be allowed to think our own question is cogent?
At the same time, don't you and I feel that the Atheist's answer is wrong? Doesn't our instinctive sense rebel against that sort of shallow dismissal of the suffering of an innocent? I think it does. And I think we sense something is unfair there, even if Atheism would demand of us to interpret that as nothing more than a delusion. The moral intuition, in such a case, is too strong to resist, is it not?
Something, therefore, seems very wrong with the Atheist's position, does it not? It won't allow us to believe in the evil of things that intuitively revolt us in the extreme. And I submit to you that if evil actually is an objective reality, and our intuitions are telling us the truth, then the inability of Atheism to inform us about evil identifies a very important fault in Atheism itself. We're not going to get any moral light from Atheism.
In the case of 'human evil', why does God allow the kidnapping, rape and murder with a hammer of an 8 year old girl.
Well, that one changes the problem somewhat, obviously: because in that case, the evil is clearly coming from an evil human being. And that should cause the Atheist to wonder how it is that human beings, whom Humanists and others assure us are essentially good or neutral (
"tabula rasa," perhaps) can be capable of such a thing.
And again, this signals a problem with Atheism: it can't explain why human beings do things we intuitively feel are evil. It can't even allow us to know that they ARE evil, or that "evil" is a word that refers to any objective reality at all. And again, Atheism stymies us, when it comes to the question of human evils, just as much as it fails us when we try to think about natural evils. For no evil exists -- that's what it requires us to assume, in both cases.
So now we have two cases, one
natural evils, and the other
human evils. However, I think we'll give too easy an out if we try to blend those two cases. We'll maybe start to blame things on humans which are genuine "natural evils," or blame on God things that are clearly "human evils." The two cases have distinct answers -- and though those answers may eventually coordinate (I think they do), at least at the beginning, I think we should accept the distinction proposed by philosophers like Susan Neiman, and treat the two as importantly separable.
So let's start with the second case first: human evils. The question becomes something like, "Why does God allow human beings to do the evils they do?" Of course, again, the Atheist's supposition is going to have to be "He doesn't": there's no God, and there's no objective reality to evil. But I think you and I agree that the Atheist's supposition is too cruel and intuitively offensive, do we not? Or would you accept the Atheist's logic, and simply dismiss that case outright?
But, of course, if we do the latter, then the question of the existence of evil is simply not askable, since no evil exists. And I do think you want to pose the question. Do you mind, therefore, if I simply set aside the Atheistic perspective, and speak in terms of how Theists understand the answer?
Human evils are attributable to free will. That God has endowed human beings with such things as individual identity, volition, moral choice, will, soul, self, personhood and freedom entails that human beings can always go one of two ways: to do the good, or to do evil. It's our choice. And sadly, we don't always choose well. Moreover, evil is not squeamish about taking victims -- it's just
that evil. So when an 8-year-old girl is assaulted, it is the bad consequence of a good thing: volition, identity, choice...in a word, humanity.
Do we want a world in which God has eliminated choice, identity, volition, morality, will, soul, personhood...and consumately, freedom and our own unique selves? Would we be content instead with a world in which all evils -- from the great to the small -- were eliminated from possibility, so that we never had even the slightest choice to do anything but the very best? Or would we have to ponder, instead, what the right balance between allowing the freedom to choose good or evil might be, if we want there still to be such things as individuality, choice, personhood, etc. in the universe?
What would your answer be? Would you select the world of perfect moral robots with no volition of their own, or would you permit some measure of freedom of moral choice to remain in the world -- even if it entailed that some evil things would still happen to some people?
I'll await your decision on that. When we've solved human evils, I think we can go on to natural ones. But we definitely need to solve this quandary first.