#StrawGodFallacy - Rebuttal to #ProblemOfEvil criticism

[Oxpiu]

I use the term #StrawGodFallacy as rebuttal to the #TheProblemOfEvil debate

I see it as a very clean underused argument that deflects the criticism on God's character back to an oversimplification debate on the necessary diagnostics for God to exist. I feel that the problem of evil discussion is often too Westernised to an idealistic hyper grace focus identity of God where there is a large spectrum of narratives on God's character that are being ignored The #ProblemOfEvil debate is often treated as the #PowerHit approach to knock down christians who struggle with their vulnerabilities in dealing with trauma in their life and the world. This is why I like the #StrawGodFallacy approach as it cleanly takes the emotion out of the picture and allows a debater to approach this argument from a logical paradigm instead of an emotional paradigm. I came up with this rebuttal years ago and I haven't seen anyone else use it. I launch it today to see what others think of it.

[Gary Childress]

I use the term #StrawGodFallacy as rebuttal to the #TheProblemOfEvil debate

I see it as a very clean underused argument that deflects the criticism on God's character back to an oversimplification debate on the necessary diagnostics for God to exist. I feel that the problem of evil discussion is often too Westernised to an idealistic hyper grace focus identity of God where there is a large spectrum of narratives on God's character that are being ignored The #ProblemOfEvil debate is often treated as the #PowerHit approach to knock down christians who struggle with their vulnerabilities in dealing with trauma in their life and the world. This is why I like the #StrawGodFallacy approach as it cleanly takes the emotion out of the picture and allows a debater to approach this argument from a logical paradigm instead of an emotional paradigm. I came up with this rebuttal years ago and I haven't seen anyone else use it. I launch it today to see what others think of it.

Sure. What is the "straw god fallacy"? Can you elaborate on it?

[FlashDangerpants]

I launch it today to see what others think of it.

Where is it then?

[Oxpiu]

#StrawGodFallacy - #StrawManFallacy applied to a deity

Basic concept
- Define God in a narrow band of existence
- Show features that contradict the definition to apply
- Therefore version of God doesn't exist

The fallacy lies in the fact that God is defined in a broad of characterisation over multiple community groups and cultures. The straw god fallacy argument rebuts the oversimplified definition of God.

[FlashDangerpants]

test... cloudflare seems to be pissed at me ... they seem to hate #hastags

[phyllo]

#StrawGodFallacy - #StrawManFallacy applied to a deity

Basic concept
- Define God in a narrow band of existence
- Show features that contradict the definition to apply
- Therefore version of God doesn't exist

The fallacy lies in the fact that God is defined in a broad of characterisation over multiple community groups and cultures. The straw god fallacy argument rebuts the oversimplified definition of God.

Most of the time, the two opponents agree on the core definitions.

For example, "God is all loving" and "horrible things happen to people".

If they don't agree that "God is all loving" then there is no argument. They might argue about some other aspect of God.

[Immanuel Can]

#StrawGodFallacy - #StrawManFallacy applied to a deity

Basic concept
- Define God in a narrow band of existence
- Show features that contradict the definition to apply
- Therefore version of God doesn't exist

The fallacy lies in the fact that God is defined in a broad of characterisation over multiple community groups and cultures. The straw god fallacy argument rebuts the oversimplified definition of God.

Yes, that's a problem. "Straw-manning" God is pretty common.

Dawkins does it, when he claims that the unreality of Zeus, Odin and Allah would count as evidence against the existence of a genuine God. The fallacy is obvious: the fact that I'm not Oxpiu, and Tom is not Oxpiu, and others here are not Oxpiu does not even remotely imply there can be no Oxpiu. One wonders that men who call themselves "men of science" can make such transparent false steps as this, and do it in print, even. But they do, obviously.

So you have a good argument there. But where do you want to go from that?

[Immanuel Can]

#StrawGodFallacy - #StrawManFallacy applied to a deity

Basic concept
- Define God in a narrow band of existence
- Show features that contradict the definition to apply
- Therefore version of God doesn't exist

The fallacy lies in the fact that God is defined in a broad of characterisation over multiple community groups and cultures. The straw god fallacy argument rebuts the oversimplified definition of God.

Most of the time, the two opponents agree on the core definitions.

For example, "God is all loving" and "horrible things happen to people".

If they don't agree that "God is all loving" then there is no argument. They might argue about some other aspect of God.

But there are additional premises needed in that argument.

One would be "God is morally obligated to prevent all horrible things from happening to people," and another would be, "God could never have a sufficient reason for permitting some horrible things to happen to people." But both of those missing premises are highly disputed, and with good reason. So the case doesn't turn out to be as simple as skeptics might hope.

[phyllo]

The arguments end up in the details of what "all loving" means. And "all powerful".

What are "sufficient reasons"? What is "horrible"? What is "moral"?

So I don't think it's a case of "StrawGod". Rather it's a case of having different ideas how these concepts work in practice.

[Immanuel Can]

The arguments end up in the details of what "all loving" means. And "all powerful".

What are "sufficient reasons"? What is "horrible"? What is "moral"?

Hardly details, of course. These are rather the key pillars of both arguments -- the argument for, and the argument against the existence of God. We can't simply bounce over them, leaving them vague, and say that we have mounted any kind of reasonable argument. So both sides have important stakes in specifying what is meant by these terms.

Let's take the skeptic's view, for example. How can he accuse God, or the universe, of anything, since by definition, he does not believe in objective good and evil, and thus not in objective rightness or objective "horribleness" at all? But it seems too weak for him to say that all he means by "horrible" is, "things we don't happen to like." He must mean more than that, and something objective, durable in meaning, and universally-clear as well: for otherwise, he'd have no justification for complaining about any state of affairs at all. Nothing can be "horrible" in an objective way, in his world; so how can he accuse God of allowing "horribleness" he doesn't even believe can possibly be objectively "horrible"?

That's a huge problem for the skeptical side. But likewise, to defend the goodness or "all lovingness" of God, the Theist is going to have to define what "good" or "love" are, and that, too, objectively.

These are not small tasks, of course; but without them, no such arguments make any coherent sense.

[phyllo]

Hardly details, of course. These are rather the key pillars of both arguments -- the argument for, and the argument against the existence of God. We can't simply bounce over them, leaving them vague, and say that we have mounted any kind of reasonable argument. So both sides have important stakes in specifying what is meant by these terms.

In the context of the OP, neither side is setting up an easy target to knock down.

Let's take the skeptic's view, for example. How can he accuse God, or the universe, of anything, since by definition, he does not believe in objective good and evil, and thus not in objective rightness or objective "horribleness" at all? But it seems too weak for him to say that all he means by "horrible" is, "things we don't happen to like." He must mean more than that, and something objective, durable in meaning, and universally-clear as well: for otherwise, he'd have no justification for complaining about any state of affairs at all. Nothing can be "horrible" in an objective way, in his world; so how can he accuse God of allowing "horribleness" he doesn't even believe can possibly be objectively "horrible"?

I don't think the skeptic has much of a problem.

He can refer to a consensus of what people consider "horrible".

He can refer to God's "commandments" and make the argument that these are "horrible" things when someone other than God is doing it.

[Immanuel Can]

Hardly details, of course. These are rather the key pillars of both arguments -- the argument for, and the argument against the existence of God. We can't simply bounce over them, leaving them vague, and say that we have mounted any kind of reasonable argument. So both sides have important stakes in specifying what is meant by these terms.

In the context of the OP, neither side is setting up an easy target to knock down.

Actually, I think the battle's far from equal.

After all, at least we can say this about the Theist set: they're being consistent. That is, IF (hypothetically) what they believe, namely that a good God exists, is true, then the existence of morality would follow logically. There's no inconsistency in a Theist asking, "Why has God allowed X to happen?" because God is supposed to be objectively good and kind.

However, how can we make sense of the skeptic's view? IF (hypothetically) what he believes were true, namely that there's no God, and the universe is merely the product of random forces, then from where does the skeptic get the rationale for asking about God being good or evil? He doesn't believe in God, but more importantly, doesn't believe that good and evil have any objective reality. So we cannot even make sense of the skeptic's question, even if we grant him all his suppositions. Now, that's what we call a rational contradiction, for sure.

Let's take the skeptic's view, for example. How can he accuse God, or the universe, of anything, since by definition, he does not believe in objective good and evil, and thus not in objective rightness or objective "horribleness" at all? But it seems too weak for him to say that all he means by "horrible" is, "things we don't happen to like." He must mean more than that, and something objective, durable in meaning, and universally-clear as well: for otherwise, he'd have no justification for complaining about any state of affairs at all. Nothing can be "horrible" in an objective way, in his world; so how can he accuse God of allowing "horribleness" he doesn't even believe can possibly be objectively "horrible"?

I don't think the skeptic has much of a problem.

He can refer to a consensus of what people consider "horrible".

But then he needs to prove that "consensus" determines what is true, and that some kind of objective "horribleness" objectively exists -- and he's going to have to do both, while still insisting that the universe is merely a random product of non-moral events.

How's he going to do that?

He can refer to God's "commandments"

He doesn't believe in God or in commandments.

[phyllo]

Actually, I think the battle's far from equal.

After all, at least we can say this about the Theist set: they're being consistent. That is, IF (hypothetically) what they believe, namely that a good God exists, is true, then the existence of morality would follow logically. There's no inconsistency in a Theist asking, "Why has God allowed X to happen?" because God is supposed to be objectively good and kind.

However, how can we make sense of the skeptic's view? IF (hypothetically) what he believes were true, namely that there's no God, and the universe is merely the product of random forces, then from where does the skeptic get the rationale for asking about God being good or evil? He doesn't believe in God, but more importantly, doesn't believe that good and evil have any objective reality. So we cannot even make sense of the skeptic's question, even if we grant him all his suppositions. Now, that's what we call a rational contradiction, for sure.

What if the skeptic/atheist is simply pointing out to the theist that his ideas about God are inconsistent? The kind of God that the theist is describing does not or can not exist.

The skeptic is assuming a God exists and shows that there is a contradiction.

The skeptic's own views on good and evil don't enter into the argument.

But then he needs to prove that "consensus" determines what is true, and that some kind of objective "horribleness" objectively exists -- and he's going to have to do both, while still insisting that the universe is merely a random product of non-moral events.

No, he would only need to show that it's a reasonable consensus. It could be a subjective/intersubjective one.

[Immanuel Can]

Actually, I think the battle's far from equal.

After all, at least we can say this about the Theist set: they're being consistent. That is, IF (hypothetically) what they believe, namely that a good God exists, is true, then the existence of morality would follow logically. There's no inconsistency in a Theist asking, "Why has God allowed X to happen?" because God is supposed to be objectively good and kind.

However, how can we make sense of the skeptic's view? IF (hypothetically) what he believes were true, namely that there's no God, and the universe is merely the product of random forces, then from where does the skeptic get the rationale for asking about God being good or evil? He doesn't believe in God, but more importantly, doesn't believe that good and evil have any objective reality. So we cannot even make sense of the skeptic's question, even if we grant him all his suppositions. Now, that's what we call a rational contradiction, for sure.

What if the skeptic/atheist is simply pointing out to the theist that his ideas about God are inconsistent?

But they aren't. There's no reason for the skeptic to insist that God can have no sufficient reason for allowing the existence of some things the skeptic doesn't like. And that he, personally, doesn't like them, is all the skeptic can say about them: he can't say they're objectively "horrible," or that the Theist owes it to him to believe they are. After all, the skeptic doesn't even believe in "horribleness" as an objective quality.

What he would need to do is prove to the Theist that God can have no sufficient reason for allowing of some things the skeptic doesn't like. And that's impossible, of course.

The skeptic's own views on good and evil don't enter into the argument.

So he's asking a question in which he, himself, simply does not believe. But in the back of his mind, he already has his answer: there's no such thing as "horribleness." There never was a problem in the first place.

It is what I was suggesting, I submit to you. Only if there is an objective, universally-true kind of "horribleness" can the skeptic legitimately ask the Theist why God is allowing "horribleness." The skeptic's own view makes the claim that the Theist doesn't have to consider it "horrible"; and if he doesn't, he can't be (in the skeptic's view) a bad person, or deluded, or evasive, or in denial, or any other negative thing. The skeptic would have to concede that in deciding not to consider X "horrible," the Theist was behaving in no way less admirably than the skeptic himself is. There is no real "horribleness" to be explained.

But is that what skeptics hope to say? I suggest not. I suggest they want "horribleness" to be objectively compelling to the Theist, but to be able to back away from justifying their own employment of the term.

So we need to decide: is "horribleness" a real thing, the kind of thing both skeptics and Theists ought to recognize, and what are the criteria for it? If not, there's no "problem of evil" to be answered anyway.

But then he needs to prove that "consensus" determines what is true, and that some kind of objective "horribleness" objectively exists -- and he's going to have to do both, while still insisting that the universe is merely a random product of non-moral events.

No, he would only need to show that it's a reasonable consensus. It could be a subjective/intersubjective one.

How will he demonstrate that it's "reasonable"?

The mere existence of a "consensus" won't do it. We would have to have proved, beforehand, that "consensus" determines truth. And that's obviously not the case, since so many "consensuses" have been wrong, historically speaking.

If it's merely "subjective" or "intersubjective," then there's no duty for anybody to share that opinion. It means that he has a particular feeling, perhaps; but it doesn't imply anybody else has to share that feeling, or that if some do, that others less inclined to it are obligated to share it.

So he needs to riff off the word "reasonable." It's all he can do. But "reasonable" things can be explained in terms of reasons. And what reasons will the skeptic produce to show that the "consensus" about "horribleness" is a "reasonable" one, and hence obligatory to the Theist?

[phyllo]

Imagine that nothing is known about the personal beliefs of the people having the discussion.

They don't need to show or prove anything about their own beliefs.

The discussion is entirely about the logical consistency in the Problem of Evil.