The first valid evidence that god does NOT exist

[Will Bouwman]

I am unaware of any reputable source that would suggest that not being able to know anything is a prerequisite of doing philosophy.

It isn't, nor did I say it was.

It seems you did.

If "nobody is supposed to deduce anything," then there is no such thing as knowledge --

Well, when it comes to philosophical questions, that is true; that is what makes them philosophical.

Well no. As I have said several times, philosophy is essentially story telling. More formally, there is evidence, the stuff that we know, and arguments, the hypotheses we generate from our knowledge to explain or contextualise it. People can deduce all sorts of different things from the same evidence/knowledge, make a case to support their deduction, and we are free to be persuaded, or make up our own interpretation. That is true with historical and scientific knowledge, but especially so of philosophical knowledge, which, again as I have mentioned, is extremely limited.
Here's a list of philosophical problems. Good luck answering any one of them definitively.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_p ... l_problems

[Immanuel Can]

It isn't, nor did I say it was.

It seems you did.

Well, when it comes to philosophical questions, that is true; that is what makes them philosophical.

Well no. As I have said several times, philosophy is essentially story telling.

Seriously, dude. You're going to buy into the "narrative" thing?

People can deduce all sorts of different things from the same evidence/knowledge,

I pointed out that this is only true in a very limited and superficial sense. It can only happen if the evidence is sketchy and limited, non-specifid to any hypothesis. The more evidence one finds, the less possible it becomes to hold onto certain hypotheses. That's how science works: it accumulates evidence and eliminates weak hypotheses.

If science can't do that, then there's no science. And there's also no such thing as "learning," because the accumulation of data would not improve knowledge or confirm any hypotheses in particular. You would be arguing that everything is just speculation, with no relevant data.

I can't believe nobody's explained that to you. That's what it's been about all along.

That is true with historical and scientific knowledge, but especially so of philosophical knowledge, which, again as I have mentioned, is extremely limited.

The three are acutally quite distinct, and no, it's not true of all three, and not true of philosophy, in particular. If you'll forgive me for saying so, I think there's something for you to discover here.

Philosophy, when you understand it, is a meta-discipline. That is why there is a "philosophy of history," and a "philosophy of science," and a "philosophy of medicine," and a "philosophical ethics," and "philosophy of mind," and "philosophy of art and aesthetics," and "philosophy of education," among other "philosophies"; and there is a meta-meta-discipline of formal logic that underwrites all of them.

In general, philosophy is a method, a means of approach, not a particular body of facts or data. To know the "philosophy of" something is to engage it on the deepest conceptual level with the tools of logical analysis and rational discourse. In fact, has it not struck you that the highest degree in ANY subjects is the "PhD"? And what does it mean? "Doctor of the Philosophy of...." There's a reason that a grasp of the "philosophy" is the end of the line in all our disciplines: it's the deep root. Or why do you think that here, on this site, we can attack any subject matter from a "philosophical" perspective? It's because philosophy is the handle that fits all pots.

Check it out. You'll find that's right.

[Will Bouwman]

As I have said several times, philosophy is essentially story telling.

Seriously, dude. You're going to buy into the "narrative" thing?

Yes.

People can deduce all sorts of different things from the same evidence/knowledge,

I pointed out that this is only true in a very limited and superficial sense.

No, you just showed your ignorance.

It can only happen if the evidence is sketchy and limited, non-specifid to any hypothesis. The more evidence one finds, the less possible it becomes to hold onto certain hypotheses. That's how science works: it accumulates evidence and eliminates weak hypotheses.

But it can't stop hypotheses proliferating.

If science can't do that, then there's no science.

Tell that to Isaac Newton. Second edition of the Principia Mathematica, General Scolium and hypotheses non fingo in particular. You don't know what you are talking about.

[Immanuel Can]

As I have said several times, philosophy is essentially story telling.

Seriously, dude. You're going to buy into the "narrative" thing?

Yes.

Don't. It's yet another of the wild excesses of Postmodernism. It's not true that everything is "narrative," or that there's no difference between theories. Nothing they say justifies the conclusions they demand. They're drunk on their own kool-aid.

I pointed out that this is only true in a very limited and superficial sense.

No, you just showed your ignorance.

Needless to say, an insult isn't an answer. You can see that what I'm saying is exactly right -- or should be able to see it, if you don't.

It can only happen if the evidence is sketchy and limited, non-specifid to any hypothesis. The more evidence one finds, the less possible it becomes to hold onto certain hypotheses. That's how science works: it accumulates evidence and eliminates weak hypotheses.

But it can't stop hypotheses proliferating.

It doesn't try, and it doesn't matter. Wilder hypotheses can be dismissed, and better ones -- ones that better account for the accumulating data -- can be preferred. That's called "growing in knowledge," or "learning stuff."

And we all do it.

Except for those who deny the possibility of knowledge, of course. Not surprisingly, they have none.

[Will Bouwman]

Seriously, dude. You're going to buy into the "narrative" thing?

Yes.

Don't. It's yet another of the wild excesses of Postmodernism.

That isn't my reference. Again:

I think somebody's poisoned your view of philosophy. I don't know who would possibly agree with your claim.

I don't imagine you are drawing from a particularly deep well. The fact that you misrepresent what I wrote notwithstanding, you clearly haven't heard of Socrates.

It's not true that everything is "narrative," or that there's no difference between theories.

That's not a claim I have made. The point is that given a number of different theories that account for the evidence, there is no way to tell which, if any, is true.

Nothing they say justifies the conclusions they demand. They're drunk on their own kool-aid.

Well, if one of they turns up, you can tell them that. Meanwhile, perhaps you might make some effort to address what I actually say.

[Immanuel Can]

The point is that given a number of different theories that account for the evidence, there is no way to tell which, if any, is true.

Well, you may not know that that is Postmodern orthodoxy (i.e. crappola) but it is. If you don't know where you got it from, that doesn't make it any different from what it is.

Epistemic Relativism can't even possibly be true. And that's because Epistemic Relativism ITSELF claims to be the metanarrative that explains all lesser narratives. So if ER is true, then it becomes false -- that is, there IS a dominant metanarrative, and it's that of ER. If it's false, then it's also false. So ER believers can never win. And that's just basic logic, and what justifies the term "crappola."

[Age]

The point is that given a number of different theories that account for the evidence, there is no way to tell which, if any, is true.

Well, you may not know that that is Postmodern orthodoxy (i.e. crappola) but it is. If you don't know where you got it from, that doesn't make it any different from what it is.

But, no one said, nor even implied, that they do not know where they got it from.

Why do you keep 'seeing', or 'believing', things that are just not here?

Epistemic Relativism can't even possibly be true. And that's because Epistemic Relativism ITSELF claims to be the metanarrative that explains all lesser narratives. So if ER is true, then it becomes false -- that is, there IS a dominant metanarrative, and it's that of ER. If it's false, then it's also false. So ER believers can never win. And that's just basic logic, and what justifies the term "crappola."

Once again, you are not replying to what was said, nor written.

you are only replying to your own imaginations, views, and beliefs, only.

[Will Bouwman]

The point is that given a number of different theories that account for the evidence, there is no way to tell which, if any, is true.

Well, you may not know that that is Postmodern orthodoxy (i.e. crappola) but it is. If you don't know where you got it from, that doesn't make it any different from what it is.

Well, again, I have to correct you; underdetermination is not post modernism. The former has been a feature of western thought, probably forever, but demonstrably since pre Socratic philosophy when the likes of Thales, Anaximenes, Heraclitus and Xenophanes all agreed with the basic hypothesis of the transmutation of elements but, with the same evidence available to each, they argued that the primordial substance was water, air, fire and earth respectively.
When Andreas Osiander was given responsibility for the publication of Copernicus's book On the Revolutions of the Celestial Spheres, he added a preface in which he argued that different hypotheses can be supported by the same evidence. It doesn’t matter to the calculations whether people choose the hypothesis they find most plausible or the one they find most useful to work with. As Osiander said, “If they provide a calculus consistent with the observations, that alone is enough.”
That sentiment was echoed by Isaac Newton in the General Scholium he added to the second edition of his Principia Mathematica, in which he wrote:
"hitherto I have not been able to discover the cause of those properties of gravity from phenomena, and I make no hypotheses. For whatever is not deduced from the phenomena, is to be called an hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, whether of occult qualities or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy.”
He understood that the phenomena, the evidence, the stuff we actually know, can be interpreted in different ways, but that none of the hypotheses people cooked up would make any difference to the facts.
Fundamentally that is what Kant was getting at with his separation of phenomena and noumena: there are empirical facts which, as Descartes pointed out is undeniable, and you can say what you like about the noumenal, the phenomenal facts remain the phenomenal facts.
We have discussed all of the above and much more, generally with you trying to show that I don't understand any of it, when it is quite clear from the number of times I have to correct you, that you do not understand much of what I say. None of the people mentioned above could be described as post modernists; it is simply a fact that the same evidence can support wildly different hypotheses.
Richard Feynman put it like this:

"we must keep all theories in our head, and every theoretical physicist that's any good knows six or seven theoretical representations for exactly the same physics." It's at 1:45 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NM-zWTU7X-k

Epistemic Relativism can't even possibly be true.

That is one more claim I haven't made. So no, you are wrong again; I didn't get it from post modernism.
You could make a case for epistemic relativism also having its roots in ancient Greece, Protagoras's dictum "Man is the measure of all things" in particular. In its current form it can be summed up in Paul Feyerabend's "Anything goes." The idea being that for practical purposes, if a belief works in a particular context, it is as good as any other, which post modernism gets from underdetermination. Where some post modernists go too far, in my view, is by insisting that there are no objective criteria by which beliefs can be judged. I think I can end on a point of agreement, since we both think there are.

[Age]

The point is that given a number of different theories that account for the evidence, there is no way to tell which, if any, is true.

Well, you may not know that that is Postmodern orthodoxy (i.e. crappola) but it is. If you don't know where you got it from, that doesn't make it any different from what it is.

Well, again, I have to correct you; underdetermination is not post modernism. The former has been a feature of western thought, probably forever, but demonstrably since pre Socratic philosophy when the likes of Thales, Anaximenes, Heraclitus and Xenophanes all agreed with the basic hypothesis of the transmutation of elements but, with the same evidence available to each, they argued that the primordial substance was water, air, fire and earth respectively.
When Andreas Osiander was given responsibility for the publication of Copernicus's book On the Revolutions of the Celestial Spheres, he added a preface in which he argued that different hypotheses can be supported by the same evidence. It doesn’t matter to the calculations whether people choose the hypothesis they find most plausible or the one they find most useful to work with. As Osiander said, “If they provide a calculus consistent with the observations, that alone is enough.”
That sentiment was echoed by Isaac Newton in the General Scholium he added to the second edition of his Principia Mathematica, in which he wrote:
"hitherto I have not been able to discover the cause of those properties of gravity from phenomena, and I make no hypotheses. For whatever is not deduced from the phenomena, is to be called an hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, whether of occult qualities or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy.”

And, a great example of this phenomena is people using the data within redshift, in forming theories that the Universe, Itself, is expanding, and then extrapolating backwards that the Universe must of begun. Which some then concluded, and then believed, absolutely, that the Universe begun, and is expanding.

While others know, and irrefutably so, that redshift, or what is called evidence for the beginning and expanding hypotheses, is actually just further irrefutable proof for the Fact that the Universe is actually infinite and eternal.

Now, see how the 'evidence', here, called 'redshift', is actually 'evidence for' two competing and opposing hypotheses "immanuel can"? Or, are you, still, too closed and too blind to see?

He understood that the phenomena, the evidence, the stuff we actually know, can be interpreted in different ways, but that none of the hypotheses people cooked up would make any difference to the facts.
Fundamentally that is what Kant was getting at with his separation of phenomena and noumena: there are empirical facts which, as Descartes pointed out is undeniable, and you can say what you like about the noumenal, the phenomenal facts remain the phenomenal facts.

We have discussed all of the above and much more, generally with you trying to show that I don't understand any of it, when it is quite clear from the number of times I have to correct you, that you do not understand much of what I say. None of the people mentioned above could be described as post modernists; it is simply a fact that the same evidence can support wildly different hypotheses.
Richard Feynman put it like this:

"we must keep all theories in our head, and every theoretical physicist that's any good knows six or seven theoretical representations for exactly the same physics." It's at 1:45 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NM-zWTU7X-k

Epistemic Relativism can't even possibly be true.

That is one more claim I haven't made. So no, you are wrong again; I didn't get it from post modernism.
You could make a case for epistemic relativism also having its roots in ancient Greece, Protagoras's dictum "Man is the measure of all things" in particular. In its current form it can be summed up in Paul Feyerabend's "Anything goes." The idea being that for practical purposes, if a belief works in a particular context, it is as good as any other, which post modernism gets from underdetermination. Where some post modernists go too far, in my view, is by insisting that there are no objective criteria by which beliefs can be judged. I think I can end on a point of agreement, since we both think there are.

[Immanuel Can]

The point is that given a number of different theories that account for the evidence, there is no way to tell which, if any, is true.

Well, you may not know that that is Postmodern orthodoxy (i.e. crappola) but it is. If you don't know where you got it from, that doesn't make it any different from what it is.

Well, again, I have to correct you; underdetermination is not post modernism.

"Underdetermination," when applied to all hypotheses, as you are doing, is just the marketing word for "epistemic relativism," and while it may be common today, it's also absurd.

Fundamentally that is what Kant was getting at with his separation of phenomena and noumena:

No, I would say that's actually incorrect. If you understand Kant, "phenomena" are about epistemology, and "noumena" are, so to speak, the "things-in-themselves," meaning ontologically-real entities. Kant points out that human beings know the noumena through their phenomenological perspective -- meaning that they can be wrong about what they see or imagine. But Kant never suggests that noumena are illusions, or that phenomena are all that is real.

So our phenomenal apprehensions can be closer or farther from the reality of the noumenal. And even if none of us is able to perceive the noumenal perfectly, it's certain that some of us perceive it worse or in more of a distorted way than others do. And it is this that makes some hypotheses better than others. So epistemic relativism is not supported by pointing out that the phenomenal is not the noumenal.

Epistemic Relativism can't even possibly be true.

You could make a case for epistemic relativism also having its roots in ancient Greece, Protagoras's dictum "Man is the measure of all things" in particular.

It's a terribly silly quotation, isn't it? That one would suppose a contingent, dying entity like man could be the measure of all things? One would have to mean "measure" in some very etiolated and vague sense, to say the least. Man is neither the grounds of existence, nor its creator, nor its sustainer. And every man passes off the scene, leaving "all things" intact behind him.

Where some post modernists go too far, in my view, is by insisting that there are no objective criteria by which beliefs can be judged. I think I can end on a point of agreement, since we both think there are.

Well, that's what I was asking you: what are the objective criteria by which you suppose Idealism to be a compelling hypothesis? Since we agree such criteria permitting judgment do exist, why can't I ask you to specify them?

[Will Bouwman]

...underdetermination is not post modernism.

"Underdetermination," when applied to all hypotheses, as you are doing, is just the marketing word for "epistemic relativism," and while it may be common today, it's also absurd.

I am not applying underdetermination to all hypotheses, only to certain scientific and philosophical questions. Post modernism goes much further, too far in my opinion, by applying it to things like astrology, witchcraft and religion.

Fundamentally that is what Kant was getting at with his separation of phenomena and noumena:

No, I would say that's actually incorrect. If you understand Kant, "phenomena" are about epistemology, and "noumena" are, so to speak, the "things-in-themselves," meaning ontologically-real entities.

Indeed; do you not see that I said as much here:

...there are empirical facts which, as Descartes pointed out is undeniable, and you can say what you like about the noumenal, the phenomenal facts remain the phenomenal facts.

Kant points out that human beings know the noumena through their phenomenological perspective -- meaning that they can be wrong about what they see or imagine.

We can't be wrong about what we experience, again that's Descartes; we have the experiences we experience. We can however, be wrong about what we attribute our experiences to.

But Kant never suggests that noumena are illusions, or that phenomena are all that is real. So our phenomenal apprehensions can be closer or farther from the reality of the noumenal.

Our phenomenal apprehensions are what they are. What we attribute them to can be closer or farther from the reality of the noumenal.

And even if none of us is able to perceive the noumenal perfectly, it's certain that some of us perceive it worse or in more of a distorted way than others do.

We don't perceive the noumenal, we perceive the phenomenal and make noumenal hypotheses.

And it is this that makes some hypotheses better than others. So epistemic relativism is not supported by pointing out that the phenomenal is not the noumenal.

Well, if you can find someone prepared to support epistemic relativism, by all means have a pop at them.

Where some post modernists go too far, in my view, is by insisting that there are no objective criteria by which beliefs can be judged. I think I can end on a point of agreement, since we both think there are.

Well, that's what I was asking you: what are the objective criteria by which you suppose idealism to be a compelling hypothesis?

You clearly still do not understand that I don't claim that idealism is compelling. All I have argued is that it and realism are underdetermined noumenal, ontological hypotheses.

Since we agree such criteria permitting judgment do exist, why can't I ask you to specify them?

Empiricism, mathematics and logic. Observation, calculation and reason. You believe all three can uncover facts about the universe. That may be true, but again I defer to Richard Feynman:
"It doesn't matter how beautiful your theory is, it doesn't matter how smart you are. If it doesn't agree with experiment, it's wrong."
So while we can know with some certainty that mathematical and logical reasoning is valid, we cannot know what applies to the universe without looking.

[Immanuel Can]

...underdetermination is not post modernism.

"Underdetermination," when applied to all hypotheses, as you are doing, is just the marketing word for "epistemic relativism," and while it may be common today, it's also absurd.

I am not applying underdetermination to all hypotheses, only to certain scientific and philosophical questions. Post modernism goes much further, too far in my opinion, by applying it to things like astrology, witchcraft and religion.

Yes, those are some of the additional excesses of postmodernism, for sure. But their attack on science is a very serious problem. For since the 17th Century, science has been the primary driver of progress in the technological and civilizational arenas. When they deny the efficacy -- and even the possibility -- of real science, they're not just chipping away at some superstition; they're undermining the very possibility of progress of any kind, or of knowledge, even in material reality.

Fundamentally that is what Kant was getting at with his separation of phenomena and noumena:

No, I would say that's actually incorrect. If you understand Kant, "phenomena" are about epistemology, and "noumena" are, so to speak, the "things-in-themselves," meaning ontologically-real entities.

Indeed; do you not see that I said as much here:

...there are empirical facts which, as Descartes pointed out is undeniable, and you can say what you like about the noumenal, the phenomenal facts remain the phenomenal facts.

I saw that. I didn't think it was correct, and didn't want to haggle about Descartes any further, because I think the misunderstanding that he's arguing for "underdeterminsm" has been sufficiently debunked. It seemed like a useless rabbit-hole, to me.

Kant points out that human beings know the noumena through their phenomenological perspective -- meaning that they can be wrong about what they see or imagine.

We can't be wrong about what we experience, again that's Descartes; we have the experiences we experience.

But that response begs the question. Yes, we do really experience what we experience; but that admission does not imply we don't experience what is also real. It only says we're less than absolutely certain we do.

We can however, be wrong about what we attribute our experiences to.

Yes, of course. But that does not mean we ARE wrong, or that we ARE ALWAYS wrong, or that all our judgments are simply untrustworthy. Those are the sorts of non-sequiturs to which Postmondernism rushes, but we should be able to see through their fallacy about that, I think.

But Kant never suggests that noumena are illusions, or that phenomena are all that is real. So our phenomenal apprehensions can be closer or farther from the reality of the noumenal.

Our phenomenal apprehensions are what they are. What we attribute them to can be closer or farther from the reality of the noumenal.

The first claim is correct. The second is not.

The noumenal is also only what it is. It is not altered by the phenomenological. We can be wrong, or we can be more right, but reality, the noumenal, is always "right," in that sense. And phenomenological apprehension can be closer or farther from the reality of the noumenal. So when we see somebody who is, for example, hallucinating, we don't say, "He's in another noumenal realm." We say, "He's lost contact with the noumenal altogether, and has become deluded by the phenomenological in his head." And his phenomena are not as good or as noumenally-relevant as our phenomenal-apprehensions are. He's lost it; we haven't.

And even if none of us is able to perceive the noumenal perfectly, it's certain that some of us perceive it worse or in more of a distorted way than others do.

We don't perceive the noumenal, we perceive the phenomenal and make noumenal hypotheses.

Yes, we do perceive FROM the noumenal. That is the difference between a perception and a hallucination. The noumenal generates the possibility of the phenomenal, in that phenomena that appear unanchored to noumenal reality are mere hallucinations; and the noumenal is the ultimate criterion for the value of the phenomenological perception under consideration in a given case.

And it is this that makes some hypotheses better than others. So epistemic relativism is not supported by pointing out that the phenomenal is not the noumenal.

Well, if you can find someone prepared to support epistemic relativism, by all means have a pop at them.

If somebody says, "By 'underdetermined,' what I mean is that though we cannot have absolute knowledge of the noumenal," then I have no quarrel with them. But their observation is also trivial, and makes no real difference to anything at all. However, when somebody says, "By 'underdetermined,' I mean that we cannot have knowledge worth having," or "By 'underdetermined,' I mean that all hypotheses are equal, or relate to the same evidence," I recognize their position as excessive and ill-considered. And then it does argue for epistemic relativism, and epistemic relativism is absurd.

If you think I'm misunderstanding your position, you can place your position on the map above. I'll concede trivial "underdeterminism," the first one; but it would be crazy to concede to it anything more.

Where some post modernists go too far, in my view, is by insisting that there are no objective criteria by which beliefs can be judged. I think I can end on a point of agreement, since we both think there are.

Well, that's what I was asking you: what are the objective criteria by which you suppose idealism to be a compelling hypothesis?

You clearly still do not understand that I don't claim that idealism is compelling.

Then I'm at a loss to imagine why you even mentioned it, except as a complete red herring.

In any case, as I pointed out, it has nothing to do with the infinite regress problem, even were it somehow capable of being argued.

I defer to Richard Feynman:
"It doesn't matter how beautiful your theory is, it doesn't matter how smart you are. If it doesn't agree with experiment, it's wrong."

Well, what he says there is true: it doesn't matter what phenomenological experience you're having, either; if it does not conform itself to the noumenal reality, it's tripe.

So while we can know with some certainty that mathematical and logical reasoning is valid, we cannot know what applies to the universe without looking.

That's not the case, and not what his quotation would incline us to believe, either. When a man knows he has ten sheep, he doesn't need to know their particular names, or even to see them again, to realize that one is missing if he is told he has only nine. All he needs is mathematics. And mathematics will confirm to him what he has not yet seen.

In fact, much of our knowledge of the larger universe is entirely mathematical. We have never sent any spaceships or telescopes even to the further ranges of our Local Group. So no human being has ever visisted, even visually, the far limits of the universe. Yet much we can calculate is confirmed to us by mathematics, and as our experience expands, turns out to be right.

But again, this has nothing to do with the infinite regress problem, since that particular problem is already confirmable BOTH by mathematics AND by empirical means. We can be as sure of it as we can of anything, really.

[Will Bouwman]

I am not applying underdetermination to all hypotheses, only to certain scientific and philosophical questions. Post modernism goes much further, too far in my opinion, by applying it to things like astrology, witchcraft and religion.

Yes, those are some of the additional excesses of postmodernism, for sure. But their attack on science is a very serious problem.

It's not that big a deal, but before I bother to respond to the rest of your post, can we first agree that I am not defending post modernism?

[Immanuel Can]

I am not applying underdetermination to all hypotheses, only to certain scientific and philosophical questions. Post modernism goes much further, too far in my opinion, by applying it to things like astrology, witchcraft and religion.

Yes, those are some of the additional excesses of postmodernism, for sure. But their attack on science is a very serious problem.

It's not that big a deal, but before I bother to respond to the rest of your post, can we first agree that I am not defending post modernism?

I didn't think you were. But if you're defending epistemic relativism or the view that underdetermination implies we can't have criteria for scientific hypotheses, then I'd say you were certainly making common cause with the Postmodernists, and most likely, drinking their kool-aid without knowing you were.

[Will Bouwman]

... before I bother to respond to the rest of your post, can we first agree that I am not defending post modernism?

I didn't think you were. But if you're defending epistemic relativism...

I have told you that I'm not.

...or the view that underdetermination implies we can't have criteria for scientific hypotheses...

Again, I'm not.

...then I'd say you were certainly making common cause with the Postmodernists, and most likely, drinking their kool-aid without knowing you were.

And for the third time: I'm not. I'm not compelled to defend positions I don't hold any more than you have to explain why you stopped beating your wife.