Christianity

[Alexiev]

No, it's what is called a "synonym." I can see you're irritated, but I think that's because you sense we're on the verge of a truthful realization here. But let me explain.

We can play with nomenclature; we can call it "subjective opinion," or "taste," or "preference," or "gut feeling," or "momentary disposition," but what "prejudice" captures much better is the element of taking received moral precepts that are (according to subjectivism) merely subjective, and treating them as if they had some sort of objective force. It's passing a "judgment" before one has any grounds to justify that judgment. And if that doesn't amount to "prejudice," then I'd say probably nothing can.

Morality is not like taste in movies -- mine, yours, or the critics'. If it is not grounded in some reality, then it has no authority, no power, no obligatory force...it can, and should be, simply disregarded.

Nietzsche got that.

You are simply making this up. I wrote (in clear, simple English) some of the grounds on which a reasonable secular morality is based -- cultural norms, accepted principles, etc. It has the same "reality" as laws -- which, in Western society, are also secular.

A "prejudice" is a preconceived opinion not based on evidence or reason.

Yes. So what "evidence" or "reason" can you produce for even one moral precept? Just one. Any one. You can pick it. But show why anybody at all is obligated to agree with it.

I explained that in my post (which you ignored) and explained it again above. You probably read your anti-secular-morality screed somewhere. Maybe the original writer can defend it better than you can. You appear unable to defend it at all.

Are you suggesting that a literary critic who prefers Jane Austen to Georgette Heyer is merely "prejudiced"?

No. I'm suggesting he's dealing with mere matters of taste, not matters of morality at all. Taste can neither be right nor wrong...but morality always requires both.

Why? Why can't morality be a matter of taste? It certainly has been through the ages. Moral principles and practices have changed with changing cultures and changing tastes.

Torquemada thought Christianity not only justified but demanded the torture and burning of heretics.

No, I don't think he did. I think he just wanted to do it, and found it convenient to invent a pseudo-religious rationale to do it. But you won't find he had any basis in Scripture. He was just making stuff up.

Of course, you might be referring to Torquemada in the hopes of invoking a case we'll all agree that he did something wrong. But if his opinion on the subject was subjective, and yours is subjective, then is torturing "heretics" actually right or wrong? What's your "reason" and "evidence" that you're right, and he wasn't?

What's the "reason" and "evidence" you use to inform yourself that "kindness" and "charity" are good, and Torquemada was bad?

You see, even subjectivists can't help trying to smuggle back into the discussion value judgments for which they can explain no warrant. Alexiev does not like torture. Torquemada did. What is the arbitrating authority that ought to compel us to agree with Alexiev and not with Torquemada?

The certainty with which Torquemada approached his faith -- feeling his beliefs were "objective -- justified his actions.

You're guessing. Neither you nor I knows his motive. If his faith was really focused on objective realities, he surely should have compared his own actions to Scripture and discovered he was not "loving his enemies" or "praying for them" by torturing them.

Did he know about the Biblical view? Probably. We might guess he did. Maybe he didn't. But he certainly didn't care, if he knew; and he wasn't looking to it for any instruction about what he was doing. His actions prove that.

But given that Atheists have killed far, far more people than all the religious in the world combine, throughout the entirety of human history, what's your assurance that they are in a more "moral" position?

Torquemada's faith clearly justified his actions. If heretics can guide themselves and others to the pits of hell. and if hell is eternal torture, surely preventing even one person from suffering eternal torture justifies subjecting several to temporary torture. Makes sense to me.

The reason kindness and charity are good is that they conduce human happiness (which, in my subjective opinion is also good). Arguing that there is no "evidence" that happiness is good is silly. It's good in my subjective opinion. I need no confirmation from you, Jesus, or the Bible. Why would I?

Doubt -- I'd suggest --is the beginning of wisdom.

I agree. Doubt is very good, so long as it does not merely decay into brainless cynicism, but rather provokes proper questioning.

"And now I give you these three, hope, faith, and love. But the greatest of these is love." Both secular and Christian moral philosophers can (subjectively) agree.

But again, why do you believe they should agree? And if they don't, what makes one of them bad?

Because, in my subjective opinion, love conduces human happiness -- mine and others' -- and faith and hope often do not. Although the postulates in both secular and religious morality are subjective, the conclusions are derived via reason.

[Immanuel Can]

No, it's what is called a "synonym." I can see you're irritated, but I think that's because you sense we're on the verge of a truthful realization here. But let me explain.

We can play with nomenclature; we can call it "subjective opinion," or "taste," or "preference," or "gut feeling," or "momentary disposition," but what "prejudice" captures much better is the element of taking received moral precepts that are (according to subjectivism) merely subjective, and treating them as if they had some sort of objective force. It's passing a "judgment" before one has any grounds to justify that judgment. And if that doesn't amount to "prejudice," then I'd say probably nothing can.

Morality is not like taste in movies -- mine, yours, or the critics'. If it is not grounded in some reality, then it has no authority, no power, no obligatory force...it can, and should be, simply disregarded.

Nietzsche got that.

You are simply making this up. I wrote (in clear, simple English) some of the grounds on which a reasonable secular morality is based -- cultural norms, accepted principles, etc. It has the same "reality" as laws -- which, in Western society, are also secular.

That won't work. Where is it written that having people agree with one makes one right? You use the word "reasonable" but have no content for it. What's "reasonable" about making up a precept, and then expecting everybody to follow it, when there's no sufficient reason for them to prefer your precept over anybody else's?

Cultural relativism fails the same way solipsistic relativism fails: both fail because nobody needs to believe them. There's nothing behing their claims to "rightness."

A "prejudice" is a preconceived opinion not based on evidence or reason.

No, it's just a "judging" before (i.e. "pre") the having of good reasons. And so far, there's no reason been suggested why any particular morality is right or wrong. How could there be, if they're all "subjective"?

Yes. So what "evidence" or "reason" can you produce for even one moral precept? Just one. Any one. You can pick it. But show why anybody at all is obligated to agree with it.

I explained that in my post

No, that you did not. You've not suggested even one moral precept, nor the reasons why anybody is obligated rationally to believe it.

Are you suggesting that a literary critic who prefers Jane Austen to Georgette Heyer is merely "prejudiced"?

No. I'm suggesting he's dealing with mere matters of taste, not matters of morality at all. Taste can neither be right nor wrong...but morality always requires both.

Why?

Because that's what "morality" means. That's what makes it different from "taste."

Torquemada's faith clearly justified his actions.

Then there would have been nothing "Christian" about his actions. And I can understand how a Christian can criticize him for what he did, then, because they can draw on the criteria of Scripture. But I still can't see what a subjectivist has that allows him to deplore Torquemada while insisting that what Torquemada did was merely a matter of subjective taste.

The reason kindness and charity are good is that they conduce human happiness (which, in my subjective opinion is also good).

In what secular authority do you find that we are supposed to make other people happy?

Doubt -- I'd suggest --is the beginning of wisdom.

I agree. Doubt is very good, so long as it does not merely decay into brainless cynicism, but rather provokes proper questioning.

"And now I give you these three, hope, faith, and love. But the greatest of these is love." Both secular and Christian moral philosophers can (subjectively) agree.

But again, why do you believe they should agree? And if they don't, what makes one of them bad?

Because, in my subjective opinion, love conduces human happiness -- mine and others' -- and faith and hope often do not.

Nice opinion. But why should anybody agree?

Although the postulates in both secular and religious morality are subjective, the conclusions are derived via reason.

That's what I'm asking you. What are those "reasons" that compel us to make people happy, or to be kind or charitable? We need to know, because if they're not very durable, then neither is any purported duty to care about them durable. But if they're strong, then the duty attached to making people happy in those ways would be strong too.

So? What's the strength of your argument on that? What are those "reasons"?

[Alexiev]

No, it's what is called a "synonym." I can see you're irritated, but I think that's because you sense we're on the verge of a truthful realization here. But let me explain.

We can play with nomenclature; we can call it "subjective opinion," or "taste," or "preference," or "gut feeling," or "momentary disposition," but what "prejudice" captures much better is the element of taking received moral precepts that are (according to subjectivism) merely subjective, and treating them as if they had some sort of objective force. It's passing a "judgment" before one has any grounds to justify that judgment. And if that doesn't amount to "prejudice," then I'd say probably nothing can.

Morality is not like taste in movies -- mine, yours, or the critics'. If it is not grounded in some reality, then it has no authority, no power, no obligatory force...it can, and should be, simply disregarded.

Nietzsche got that.

You are simply making this up. I wrote (in clear, simple English) some of the grounds on which a reasonable secular morality is based -- cultural norms, accepted principles, etc. It has the same "reality" as laws -- which, in Western society, are also secular.

That won't work. Where is it written that having people agree with one makes one right? You use the word "reasonable" but have no content for it. What's "reasonable" about making up a precept, and then expecting everybody to follow it, when there's no sufficient reason for them to prefer your precept over anybody else's?

Cultural relativism fails the same way solipsistic relativism fails: both fail because nobody needs to believe them. There's nothing behing their claims to "rightness."

A "prejudice" is a preconceived opinion not based on evidence or reason.

No, it's just a "judging" before (i.e. "pre") the having of good reasons. And so far, there's no reason been suggested why any particular morality is right or wrong. How could there be, if they're all "subjective"?

Yes. So what "evidence" or "reason" can you produce for even one moral precept? Just one. Any one. You can pick it. But show why anybody at all is obligated to agree with it.

I explained that in my post

No, that you did not. You've not suggested even one moral precept, nor the reasons why anybody is obligated rationally to believe it.

No. I'm suggesting he's dealing with mere matters of taste, not matters of morality at all. Taste can neither be right nor wrong...but morality always requires both.

Why?

Because that's what "morality" means. That's what makes it different from "taste."

Torquemada's faith clearly justified his actions.

Then there would have been nothing "Christian" about his actions. And I can understand how a Christian can criticize him for what he did, then, because they can draw on the criteria of Scripture. But I still can't see what a subjectivist has that allows him to deplore Torquemada while insisting that what Torquemada did was merely a matter of subjective taste.

The reason kindness and charity are good is that they conduce human happiness (which, in my subjective opinion is also good).

In what secular authority do you find that we are supposed to make other people happy?

I agree. Doubt is very good, so long as it does not merely decay into brainless cynicism, but rather provokes proper questioning.
But again, why do you believe they should agree? And if they don't, what makes one of them bad?

Because, in my subjective opinion, love conduces human happiness -- mine and others' -- and faith and hope often do not.

Nice opinion. But why should anybody agree?

Although the postulates in both secular and religious morality are subjective, the conclusions are derived via reason.

That's what I'm asking you. What are those "reasons" that compel us to make people happy, or to be kind or charitable? We need to know, because if they're not very durable, then neither is any purported duty to care about them durable. But if they're strong, then the duty attached to making people happy in those ways would be strong too.

So? What's the strength of your argument on that? What are those "reasons"?

Nobody needs to believe Christianity, either. Both secular morality and Christian morality are equally unsupported by moral principles that are derived from credible evidence. Nonetheless, we must muddle through as best we can. Principles derived from time-tested ethical systems supported by cultural (or religious) mores have, at least, some credibility.

For that matter, why accept moral principles pronounced by God? If God is good, on what basis can one so proclaim? If God is good because he is the ruler and the creator, then moral principles become mere sycophancy. If God is good because he is loving, or charitable, or forgiving, on what basis do we find love, charity or forgiveness good? The religious and the secular alike must have subjective reasons for supporting certain moral principles.

[Immanuel Can]

You are simply making this up. I wrote (in clear, simple English) some of the grounds on which a reasonable secular morality is based -- cultural norms, accepted principles, etc. It has the same "reality" as laws -- which, in Western society, are also secular.

That won't work. Where is it written that having people agree with one makes one right? You use the word "reasonable" but have no content for it. What's "reasonable" about making up a precept, and then expecting everybody to follow it, when there's no sufficient reason for them to prefer your precept over anybody else's?

Cultural relativism fails the same way solipsistic relativism fails: both fail because nobody needs to believe them. There's nothing behing their claims to "rightness."

A "prejudice" is a preconceived opinion not based on evidence or reason.

No, it's just a "judging" before (i.e. "pre") the having of good reasons. And so far, there's no reason been suggested why any particular morality is right or wrong. How could there be, if they're all "subjective"?

I explained that in my post

No, that you did not. You've not suggested even one moral precept, nor the reasons why anybody is obligated rationally to believe it.

Why?

Because that's what "morality" means. That's what makes it different from "taste."

Torquemada's faith clearly justified his actions.

Then there would have been nothing "Christian" about his actions. And I can understand how a Christian can criticize him for what he did, then, because they can draw on the criteria of Scripture. But I still can't see what a subjectivist has that allows him to deplore Torquemada while insisting that what Torquemada did was merely a matter of subjective taste.

The reason kindness and charity are good is that they conduce human happiness (which, in my subjective opinion is also good).

In what secular authority do you find that we are supposed to make other people happy?

Because, in my subjective opinion, love conduces human happiness -- mine and others' -- and faith and hope often do not.

Nice opinion. But why should anybody agree?

Although the postulates in both secular and religious morality are subjective, the conclusions are derived via reason.

That's what I'm asking you. What are those "reasons" that compel us to make people happy, or to be kind or charitable? We need to know, because if they're not very durable, then neither is any purported duty to care about them durable. But if they're strong, then the duty attached to making people happy in those ways would be strong too.

So? What's the strength of your argument on that? What are those "reasons"?

Nobody needs to believe Christianity, either.

Et tu quoque?

That won't help secularism. All you'll be arguing is that morality is never anything more than subjective...which means, it's delusory, unfounded, imaginary, and ultimately refers to nothing beyond the temporary feeling of some person or group...and hence, is not morally obligatory to anybody.

Nonetheless, we must muddle through as best we can.

Nietzsche didn't think so. He thought that what "we" had to do is to realize there's no such thing as morality, and get past it all. He thought that's what real courage was: to face the amorality of the universe, and to seize the opportunity to live accordingly.

Somebody should have asked him a further question, though: like how he knew courage was "good."

For that matter, why accept moral principles pronounced by God?

Well, that's easy: because God is the ultimate grounds of all being.

If God is good, on what basis can one so proclaim?

On the basis that it's true, of course, that it's a fair description of God's character.

Maybe you meant something more than that? I'll wait for you to fill out that question, if you wish.

[Alexiev]

That won't help secularism. All you'll be arguing is that morality is never anything more than subjective...which means, it's delusory, unfounded, imaginary, and ultimately refers to nothing beyond the temporary feeling of some person or group...and hence, is not morally obligatory to anybody.

As I tried to explain, but you failed to understand, "subjective": does not mean "delusory, unfounded, imaginary... (or) temporary...." Why would it? Why can't a critic "found" his tastes on solid principles (or on weak principles). Those tastes, however, are not "unfounded". NOr are they delusory or imaginary. Why would they be. Canonical tastes in music or literature are hardly "temporary" (except in that life and the universe are "temporary:). So your claims are clearly ridiculous. Of course morality is not "obligatory". That's why that lovely Hell exists. So what?

For that matter, why accept moral principles pronounced by God?

Well, that's easy: because God is the ultimate grounds of all being.

If God is good, on what basis can one so proclaim?

On the basis that it's true, of course, that it's a fair description of God's character.

Maybe you meant something more than that? I'll wait for you to fill out that question, if you wish.

[/quote]
How is "God is good" a fair description of God's character if there is no criteria for "good" outside of God? You might as well say, "God is God." Truye, but meaningless.

I have no idea what "the ultimate grounds of all being" means. OK, God created the universe. It is correct that the kid who builds a sand castle is entitled to kick it down, while others are not. An author can kill off Captain Ahab without being accused of murder. But an author is "good" if his books are entertaining, or enlightening, or emotionally resonant. If it is in that manner that you claim God is good, I agree. Where was I, after all when He hung the stars in the sky, and all the angels sang with joy. But if by "good" we mean "morally sound", then unless we have a definition of "morally sound" other than "what God does" the statement is circular and meaningless.

[Immanuel Can]

That won't help secularism. All you'll be arguing is that morality is never anything more than subjective...which means, it's delusory, unfounded, imaginary, and ultimately refers to nothing beyond the temporary feeling of some person or group...and hence, is not morally obligatory to anybody.

As I tried to explain, but you failed to understand, "subjective": does not mean "delusory, unfounded, imaginary... (or) temporary...." Why would it?

It means all of those things. If you say, "I have a subjective preference that you should not steal," it does not mean, "It's wrong for you to steal." It really doesn't imply I have any particular duty to do or not do anything. And the same is true for everybody else...including yourself. If tomorrow, you discover you have a subjective liking for theft, you can do it with a clear conscience; because your subjective preference of yesterday actually signalled nothing at all about the moral status of the act.

Why can't a critic "found" his tastes on solid principles (or on weak principles).

Morality is not a "taste." It implies a duty, an obligation on everybody's part to "do the right thing" or "not do the wrong thing". Choosing movies and books, or flavours of ice cream, never does. And if morality does not implicate a duty, it implicates nothing at all.

For that matter, why accept moral principles pronounced by God?

Well, that's easy: because God is the ultimate grounds of all being.

If God is good, on what basis can one so proclaim?

On the basis that it's true, of course, that it's a fair description of God's character.

Maybe you meant something more than that? I'll wait for you to fill out that question, if you wish.

How is "God is good" a fair description of God's character if there is no criteria for "good" outside of God?

I don't think that's hard to see. We know what good is. And we know who God is. Nothing in that predication is unfamiliar to us.

If I say, "This screen is white," does it make my utterance less meaningful if it's true that I've never seen ultimate, Platonic "whiteness"? What if I've seen a sheep, a piece of clean paper, a square of bleached fabric and snow on a winter morning: if that's my conception of white, am I unable to say coherently, "My screen is white"? Of course not.

We all know many good things. In fact, are not you and I right now discussing goodness? But as a secularist, one who does not believe in the reality of such things, how are you able to do that? And yet, you are. Is that not because we all have, built into our created nature, an awareness of goodness? Even if such a thing is completely unexpectable and inexplicable in secular terms, you are doing it, and doing it right now. How is that possible, if the secular worldview is true? How should we be able to talk about thing that find no corresponding part at all in the universe, if that's how it really is?

But it's not. Secularism is wrong. And our moral awareness, so easy to both of us, reminds us of that fact every day.

I have no idea what "the ultimate grounds of all being" means. OK, God created the universe.

Then you do know what it means.

Where was I, after all when He hung the stars in the sky, and all the angels sang with joy.

You're quoting Job. Well done. I'm impressed again.

Do you know what God's answer really means? It doesn't mean, as some have thought, "Shut up, Job." And it doesn't mean, "Who are you to ask me questions?" What it means is, "If I were to try to tell you, the answer you seek would involve things which your fallible human mind cannot even fathom. You ask me to give you the ocean, but you come with a paper cup. At the end of the day, therefore, you will have to trust Me; for you cannot know all the reasons for all the things I do in the universe." That's what it means.

And Job realizes it. This is why his response is, "I have spoken of things too wonderful for me." In other words, "I've been asking for things I simply do not have the capacity to receive." He's right about that.

God's not reluctant to have conversations with man over difficult matters. That does not mean that mere mortals such as we are equipped to understand all the answers.

[Belinda]

People have believed in religious moral codes for centuries or millennia. Secular morality is therefore based upon religious moral codes. Nothing new under the sun.

[popeye1945]

People have believed in religious moral codes for centuries or millennia. Secular morality is therefore based upon religious moral codes. Nothing new under the sun.

These religious moral codes are conditioned by the cultures in which they arise; the code sometimes determines the continuing development of the culture, and they become one, as with Islam. Secular morality needs its moral foundation to be humanity's commonality, one species, one code. Science could do a much better job of sorting out what supports our common biology, its survival, and its general welfare. It's time humanity ceased being guided by the ignorance of its past. " IF WE ARE TO SURVIVE AS A SPECIES, WE MUST OVERCOME FAITH." CARL SAGAN

[Belinda]

That won't help secularism. All you'll be arguing is that morality is never anything more than subjective...which means, it's delusory, unfounded, imaginary, and ultimately refers to nothing beyond the temporary feeling of some person or group...and hence, is not morally obligatory to anybody.

As I tried to explain, but you failed to understand, "subjective": does not mean "delusory, unfounded, imaginary... (or) temporary...." Why would it? Why can't a critic "found" his tastes on solid principles (or on weak principles). Those tastes, however, are not "unfounded". NOr are they delusory or imaginary. Why would they be. Canonical tastes in music or literature are hardly "temporary" (except in that life and the universe are "temporary:). So your claims are clearly ridiculous. Of course morality is not "obligatory". That's why that lovely Hell exists. So what?

For that matter, why accept moral principles pronounced by God?

Well, that's easy: because God is the ultimate grounds of all being.

If God is good, on what basis can one so proclaim?

On the basis that it's true, of course, that it's a fair description of God's character.

Maybe you meant something more than that? I'll wait for you to fill out that question, if you wish.

How is "God is good" a fair description of God's character if there is no criteria for "good" outside of God? You might as well say, "God is God." Truye, but meaningless.

I have no idea what "the ultimate grounds of all being" means. OK, God created the universe. It is correct that the kid who builds a sand castle is entitled to kick it down, while others are not. An author can kill off Captain Ahab without being accused of murder. But an author is "good" if his books are entertaining, or enlightening, or emotionally resonant. If it is in that manner that you claim God is good, I agree. Where was I, after all when He hung the stars in the sky, and all the angels sang with joy. But if by "good" we mean "morally sound", then unless we have a definition of "morally sound" other than "what God does" the statement is circular and meaningless.
[/quote]


Good is not one attribute among other attributes of God. When Christians say "God is good" they mean that God is another name for transcendent essence of good.

Some people believe that all that exists is a theophany. Christians, Jews, and Muslims add moral codes to the theophany. Nobody can possibly know the essence of God.

[Alexiev]

How is "God is good" a fair description of God's character if there is no criteria for "good" outside of God?

I don't think that's hard to see. We know what good is. And we know who God is. Nothing in that predication is unfamiliar to

If we know what good is, we can create a secular morality based on that knowledge. This is obvious.

[Alexiev]

[
Good is not one attribute among other attributes of God. When Christians say "God is good" they mean that God is another name for transcendent essence of good.

Some people believe that all that exists is a theophany. Christians, Jews, and Muslims add moral codes to the theophany. Nobody can possibly know the essence of God.

If we can't know what "good" is (outside if God), how can we think about its "transcendent essence"?

[Immanuel Can]

How is "God is good" a fair description of God's character if there is no criteria for "good" outside of God?

I don't think that's hard to see. We know what good is. And we know who God is. Nothing in that predication is unfamiliar to

If we know what good is, we can create a secular morality based on that knowledge. This is obvious.

Quite the opposite. The way we know what good is, is because we are created by God to know what good is. That is, we have a conscience, and an awareness that this universe has both a purpose and a moral orientation. Without Him, we'd know nothing at all about good or evil. And that's precisely why secularism knows nothing about good or evil -- that it assumes there's no ultimate reason for, or moral orientation in, the universe. All "moralizing" is unreal, dishonest and deceptive. Nietzsche understood this, and explained it.

Now, can you "create a secular morality based on that knowledge"? No, of course...secularism will teach you there's no reality underlying all that. But what do secularists do instead? They often steal concepts from Theism, and pretend they're secular, so that secular morality will have a grounding. But you can catch that trick, merely by asking them, "On what secular basis am I morally duty-bound to agree with you?"

They can never tell you. And that's because morality does not come from secularism. It cannot.

But you and I know morality is real. I even dare to say that we both know it's objective -- at least, some precepts in it, we're going to agree on. I suspect you quietly believe that things like slavery, genocide, rape, theft, slander and perjury are really, objectively bad; and that all we're really discussing is the basis on which we can explain the aversion to these things we both share.

I say that we find them morally bad because they are contrary to the nature and will of God, and we have a conscience put in us by God that reminds us of that fact; but what will secularism say?

[Immanuel Can]

Good is not one attribute among other attributes of God. When Christians say "God is good" they mean that God is another name for transcendent essence of good.

Some people believe that all that exists is a theophany. Christians, Jews, and Muslims add moral codes to the theophany. Nobody can possibly know the essence of God.

If we can't know what "good" is (outside if God), how can we think about its "transcendent essence"?

She forgot a word. "Christians, Jews and Muslims add different codes." But that just means some codes are wrong, some are closer to the truth, and plausibly, one or another is true. So it's not much of a realization, really.

[Immanuel Can]

Secular morality is therefore based upon religious moral codes.

Well, then secularism has a huge problem: it doesn't believe in any religious moral codes. So it can't, in all honesty, base anything upon them. It can only do so by hiding its own most fundamental commitment -- namely, to the belief that all that is illusory.

[Immanuel Can]

How is "God is good" a fair description of God's character if there is no criteria for "good" outside of God? You might as well say, "God is God." Truye, but meaningless.

I think I already explained that.

We all know what "good" is, but we know it derivatively. That is, none of us experiences some Platonic "goodness" in its pure form, unattached to particular actions and mind states. We experience it through the natural world -- the way we experience "whiteness," for example.

But having experienced good, even derivatively, we're in a good position to associate those admirable and valuable qualities we discern in the experiential world with our conception of God. So to say "God is good" is not circular: it's derivative, but warranted.

Good is not one attribute among other attributes of God.

Yes, actually, it is. Admittedly, it's a comprehensive attribute -- all God does and is are "good." But that does not mean God does not have other qualities. For example, He's just. He's powerful. He's holy. He's eternal. And so on.

When Christians say "God is good" they mean that God is another name for transcendent essence of good.

No, it's actually not what we mean at all. We mean a personal God.

Nobody can possibly know the essence of God.

Nobody can know the Pacific Ocean or the whole universe, either. That says nothing to suggest they don't exist.