the limitations of language

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Rules, Language & Reality
George Wrisley considers how some of Wittgenstein’s later ideas on language relate to reality.

Two of the perennial questions in 20th century analytic philosophy have been “How we are able to say or mean anything with signs, symbols, and sounds?” and “What exactly is the meaning of those signs, symbols, and sounds?”

Well, it seems how we are able to do this revolves largely around the fact that biologically we come into the world able to do it. All the rest -- click -- would seem to pertain to the parts we still do not grasp regarding how matter itself [God or No God] was able to evolve over billions of years into living, biological, conscious and then self-conscious matter. 

As for what exactly the meaning of the words we use convey, that's not nearly as important [to me] as the extent to which we are either more or less able to demonstrate that all other men and women are obligated to share in that meaning. 

Existentially.

But why in the world would philosophers become so focused on language and meaning?

 

More to the point, it seems, why out in the world interacting with others socially, politically and economically, would philosophers not be focused on language and meaning? Note for example how often they are examined and explored here. In and out of the clouds.

One reason is that an enormous range of issues are touched by looking at language, and important philosophical insights can be won by doing this. Another reason is the immense influence a number of philosophers who were interested in language had on everyone else doing philosophy, especially in Britain and America.

Me, for instance. Here, however, what intrigues me most about language is how those who share the same language [in the same dictionaries] still manage to accumulate so many "failures to communicate". And, in particular, in regard to meaning, morality and metaphysics.

[popeye1945]

The limitations of language, the word is not the thing!

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Rules, Language & Reality
George Wrisley considers how some of Wittgenstein’s later ideas on language relate to reality.

The importance of Immanuel Kant for later philosophy can’t be over-emphasized. One of his legacies was philosophy’s focus on the relationship between the mind and the world; that is, the connection between subjective consciousness and the objective world outside of consciousness.

But is this or is not this done only in assuming it is being done [at least in part] by minds capable of thinking and feeling autonomously. Otherwise, the relationship between "in my head" and "out in the world" is just one more domino nature topples over on cue.

Only this assumption itself may well be just one more domino.

Kant ultimately explained the relation between the two in terms of the conceptual categories we must all possess in order to have any meaningful experience of the world. However, he didn’t think of these categories and concepts in linguistic terms – for Kant they certainly would have been prior to language.

I'm all for exploring this relationship myself. Click, of course. But I suggest there is a crucial distinction to be made here between "I" in the either/or world and "I" in the is/ought world. The laws of nature, mathematics, and the empirical world around us doesn't change just because we acquire language. There are things we invented words for and there is the extent to which these words either do or do not result in or precipitate failures to communicate.

But over time philosophers slowly shifted the emphasis from categories supplied by the mind to concepts supplied by language: philosophers began to look at the role of language in the connection between mind and world and language’s role in mediating our experience of the world.

How about this...

Given a particular historical and cultural context in today's world, one in which the relationship between words and worlds is often shifting as a result of any number of on-going social, political and economic changes, and given our own unique accumulation of personal experiences, how would we go about minimizing those failures to communicate?

Aside from Kant, a further driving force behind 20th century philosophy’s focus on language was the idea that if we can get clear about the logic of language, and if we can analyse our statements so that we aren’t misled by their ‘surface grammar’, then we will be able to answer all sorts of exciting philosophical questions, or (on another view) be able to show that they are pseudo-problems.

Has anyone here arrived at this conclusion? If so, what on Earth does it mean for all practical purposes, given a moral and political conflagration of particular interest to them?

[Fairy]

'If any one, really, wants to find out the actual Truth of things, then just ask clarifying questions',

Asking questions implies there is multiple sources of information.

In actual truth there’s only one source, namely, one with the knowing.

“ Knowing “ is this selfless lack of appearance, that constructs an appearance. But that appearance can disappear and reappear and we call that change, we call it time, we call it space, we call it distance, we call distinctness, we call it other. But notice...this appearance, is a Self. A Self is a construction.

So if you want to know the truth of the construction. Just deconstruct the construction. No point in playing these mind games. No point in creating needless complexity. The truth of what you are is a BLANK selfless awareness which means there is no other, and everything you have ever perceived was just an appearance,an illusion. Imagined.

[iambiguous]

Rules, Language & Reality
George Wrisley considers how some of Wittgenstein’s later ideas on language relate to reality.

As to the second reason for the focus on language: those giants who set the agenda for 20th Century analytic philosophy, for example Frege, Russell, Moore, and Wittgenstein, in one way or another all focused on some kind of philosophical analysis of our language.

The part where magazines like Philosophy Now provide forums in which to explore an assessment of human language analytically...didactically. But it's the part where they intertwine their philosophical assessment of words given specific social, political and economic interactions that is of most interest to me. Words that for all practical purposes either sustain confluence or conflict.

Because of their influence the next generation of philosophers, such as Quine, Putnam, and Davidson, also spent a great deal of time and effort investigating various aspects of language and issues concerning meaning and reference.

Same thing, in my view. Down through the ages. Investigating language analytically but then taking whatever conclusions you come to scholastically and investigating further how your own understanding of particular words put in particular orders is either accepted or rejected by others.

Language plays an enormously important role in our interaction with other people and with the world. We employ various words and concepts to talk about objects (tables and flowers), properties (colors and shapes), and relations (the flower is on the table, the pain is in my arm). We express feelings, ask questions, give commands, tell jokes, tell stories, sing songs, and so on.

See what I mean? Here there are words and concepts that either encompass reality objectively for all of us in the either/or world -- tables, flowers, pain -- or precipitate endless failures to communicate when the tables, flowers and pain are embedded in one or another assessment of conflicting goods.

As for expressing feelings, asking questions, giving commands, telling jokes, telling stories, singing songs, etc., it's not like there aren't any number of contexts in which fierce conflicts might unfold over which feelings, questions, command, jokes, stories and songs are or are not appropriate within any actual community. Conflicts both within communities and between communities.

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Rules, Language & Reality
George Wrisley considers how some of Wittgenstein’s later ideas on language relate to reality.

So let’s return to our initial questions: How we’re able to do all of these things with language? How is it that certain signs, symbols, and sounds are meaningful, and what exactly is their meaning?

For me "here and now", it's not what each of us as individuals think we can do with language so much as the extent to which we can demonstrate that what we do think here about it, others are obligated to think as well.

Signs, symbols and sounds are everywhere. And if all of us concurred regarding what they mean, failures to communicate would plummet. Yet here we are many, many centuries after the invention of philosophy and the limitations of language basically remain the same. Some things we can all agree on while other things are ever and always embedded in conflicting goods derived from any number of equally conflicting moral philosophies.

Is the word ‘cat’ meaningful because of what it refers to – namely, those furry, meowing fleabags many of us have as pets? Is the meaning of ‘cat’ just those animals themselves? Further, does the world determine what our concepts are to be? That is, with language do we simply try to mirror the various kinds of objects, properties, and relations that exist, or is the world ‘open’ to different ways of conceptualizing it?

Really, how many of us get into arguments regarding what it means to have a pet cat? Sure,  some will insist certain breeds of cats make the best pets...or they'll debate how best to feed them or breed them. While others insist it's not for nothing that dogs are often referred to as our "best friends". 

Then the part where particular countries in Asia and Africa and South America consume cats for dinner.  

Such questions as these vexed Wittgenstein. He tried to answer them in his first work, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. He later came to see a number of shortcomings in that work’s answers. He expressed his changing ideas in a variety of notebooks and unfinished manuscripts which were eventually published in the decades after his death.

Just out of curiosity, in regard to conflicting value judgments, how might his early work be more or less applicable than his later works?

What particular shortcomings pertaining to what particular human interactions? And how do his later works encompass human relationships more...realistically?

[iambiguous]

Rules, Language & Reality
George Wrisley considers how some of Wittgenstein’s later ideas on language relate to reality.

Linguistic meaning is in an important sense normative. That is, there are right and wrong ways to use words. If we use words in the wrong way we may fail to say anything meaningful. For example, if I say, “The window was dog,” then I’m misusing either ‘window’ or ‘dog’ in such a way that I’m talking nonsense. Normativity plays an important role for Wittgenstein’s later views on language.

Words and worlds. We use particular words in order to both grasp the world around us and to convey what we conclude from that to others.

First, of course, the language used must be one that is communicated to all those who speak it in turn. Travel to countries that speak entirely different languages and you can find yourself struggling to comprehend what is going on. On the other hand, you can learn to speak that language. And, at the very least, you have access to translators and translations.  

Instead, my focus here revolves around normative language. Why my rules of behavior and not yours. Why ours and not theirs? 

Wittgenstein in his later writings notoriously related the notion of linguistic meaning to the notion of our use of language. The exact nature of the relationship he saw between meaning and use is hotly debated, but I will try to steer around the need to decide such exegetical matters. 

That's the part [if I grasp it correctly] where my own understanding of language becomes intertwined in the manner in which I understand the meaning of dasein given human interactions that revolve around conflicting value judgments and [especially] conflicting goods.

As for "exegetical matters", how does this not revolve around the fact that out in the is/ought world interpretation is often everything. One person's explanation regarding the morality of abortion may be another person's bullshit. Or another person's gibberish.

At the very least, we can say that for Wittgenstein there is an important connection between our use of language – what we do with it, when and where we say what we say – and the meaning of the sounds that we make and the symbols that we write.

Now all we need is a context in which to explore this more substantively. 

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Rules, Language & RealityGeorge Wrisley considers how some of Wittgenstein’s later ideas on language relate to reality.

For Wittgenstein our use of language is constrained in a way analogous to the way the movements of a game piece are constrained by the game’s rules, for example, for the king in chess.

This comparison makes sense given the fact that within any given community rules of behavior abound. They are everywhere. And they generally revolve around one or another combination of might makes right, right makes might or moderation, negotiation and compromise

On the other hand, for some, it all starts to crumble in acknowledging there are only 32 total pieces in a chess game while the "game of life" for human beings involves countless variables...variables that we may well never be fully aware of. Let alone fully control. After all where is the equivalent of the Benjamin Button Syndrome in a chess match?

So in his later philosophy he appeals to the notion of a linguistic rule, or what he (somewhat confusingly) calls a rule of grammar. ‘Grammatical rules’ are the standards by which we evaluate whether someone has spoken meaningfully. Their evaluation, however, need not be explicit.

Well, from the perspective of those of my ilk, grammatical rules are among the least of all the culprits precipitating "failures to communicate". And the most effective linguistic rules are those in which the words we choose to describe or encompass the world around us are then able to be backed up with solid evidence.

Insofar as you and I have learned the same language and belong to the same community of speakers, I ‘evaluate’ your use of language by either understanding or failing to understand what you say. If you move the rook in chess in accordance with the rules we make nothing of it: I understand your move.

Same thing, in my view. It is often pointed out that in chess the Shannon number --  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shannon_number  -- is simply mind boggling:

"...there are a staggering number of possible moves and games in chess, far exceeding millions. The number is so vast that it is nearly impossible to calculate precisely. The possibilities grow exponentially with each turn, leading to an astronomical number of potential positions and game variations."

On the other hand, try even to imagine what the Shannon number would be in regard to human interactions! 

Nevertheless, the rules are there, in the background. If you were to move your rook diagonally, the rules would be brought forward and explicitly cited. Similarly, if you were to misspeak, I might either correct you, or ask you what you mean, and your answer might entail explicitly bringing forward the rules of grammar.

So, in the background, the rules we embody in sustaining our own interactions with others revolve around what seems to be, well, you tell me. The rules of grammar pertaining to what particular set of circumstances? The part where we can all concur regarding any number of objective truths, and the parts where communication has never stopped going bust in regard to conflicting value judgments. 

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Rules, Language & Reality
George Wrisley considers how some of Wittgenstein’s later ideas on language relate to reality.

Wittgenstein maintained that he was using the term ‘grammar’ in its ordinary sense.

"Philosophy has defined grammar by examining its role as the foundation for meaning and thought, as seen in the work of Aristotle and Wittgenstein, or as an innate, universal human faculty, according to Chomsky's universal grammar. Philosophers have analyzed grammar not just as rules for correct usage, but as the very conditions for constructing sensible statements about the world, distinguishing meaningful discourse from nonsense." AI

Is this ordinary enough for you?

Or go to the dictionary and "look up" the meaning: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/grammar

On the other hand...

However his examples of rules of grammar certainly aren’t ones to be found in your usual grammar book. Some of his examples of rules of grammar are “4 meters is a length,” “A sofa is longer than a chair,” “This is red (said while pointing at something red),” and “Believing is not thinking.” Part of the idea here is that rules of grammar are the kinds of things we tell others when explaining the meaning of a word or an expression to them.

In other words, words and worlds. Here, however, there's a world that seems to revolve almost entirely around either/or interactions. The laws of nature, mathematics, the material world around us. These objective truths are applicable to all of us. Pieces of furniture, measurements...descriptions that will spark virtually no contention.

On the other hand, to note that "believing is not thinking", is, from my own frame of mind, considerably more ambiguous. Believing what? And how much actual thinking went into what someone does believe?

If we’re talking to a child and we tell her that something is 4 meters, and she asks whether 4 meters is heavy, we might very well say “4 meters is a length.”

Exactly. Meter is a word invented by human beings in order to convey a measurement of length. Or width. Or height.

Or if we are trying to get clear on what exactly we mean by ‘believing’ something, we might note that there is a difference of use between ‘believing’ and ‘thinking’ and so indeed there is a difference between believing and thinking: one can believe something while not thinking about it and one can think about something without believing it.

From my frame of mind "here and now" it's not so much a matter of what we think or believe, but the extent to which we can demonstrate that what we do think and believe is that which all rational men and women are obligated to think and to believe in turn.

For Wittgenstein the rules of grammar normatively constrain what we mean by words and expressions. They’re the conditions of linguistic meaning.

Okay, so long as a distinction is made between all the things we can agree on and all the things that, instead, precipitate conflicting goods, precipitating in turn all manner of moral, political and spiritual conflagrations.

[iambiguous]

Rules, Language & Reality
George Wrisley considers how some of Wittgenstein’s later ideas on language relate to reality.

Another aspect of grammar connected to its importance for meaning is the way it sets up the conditions of speaking sensibly about the world. To use one of Wittgenstein’s later metaphors, grammatical rules function as channels for our talk about the world in the way that a river bank channels water

Then [for those of my ilk] the assumption that here we have to make the crucial distinction between the use of language in the either/or world and its use in the is/ought world. It's one thing, say, to speak of pinning down the "objective truth" in regard to the laws of nature or mathematics or the empirical world around us. And another thing altogether to pin down how mere mortals in a No God world would/should go about inventing or discovering the objective truth regarding how rational/virtuous human beings ought to behave in this world morally, politically and/or spiritually.

Thus, it is one thing to discuss the channels used to successfully land astronauts on the Moon, and another thing altogether to discuss the channels that will then allow us to pin down whether or not this reflects the optimal use of government resources? Why should billions of dollars be spent sending people to Mars when there are so many problems right here on Earth that need to be addressed:

https://theperennial.org/2763/opinion/s ... ploration/

As he remarks in the Philosophical Grammar (written in 1930-33), part of the idea here is that grammatical rules do not determine the truth or falsity of our statements about the world. The role of grammar is instead to provide the conditions for comparing our empirical propositions with reality in order to determine whether they are true or false.

Then back to the part whereby, existentially, each of us will react to this differently. And then, in turn, the part where, in my view "here and now", the confrontations that beset us will revolve almost entirely around conflicting moral and political and religious assumptions.

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Rules, Language & Reality
George Wrisley considers how some of Wittgenstein’s later ideas on language relate to reality.

The Arbitrariness of Grammar and the Role of Reality

Wittgenstein’s tying of meaning to use here has a number of important consequences.

And, from my own frame of mind, the most important consequence still revolves around distinctions made between language used in the either/or world in order to describe an objective reality said to be applicable to all of us and language used instead in the is/ought world...words more intent on prescribing and prescribing how mere mortals ought to behave -- must behave? -- in order to sustain one or another God or No God rendition of Good and Evil.

And then, historically, more or less "or else".

The difference between language used to basically describe human interactions as they do in fact unfold and language used to pass judgments on those behaviors.

Earlier I posed the question as to whether the word ‘cat’ gets its meaning in virtue of referring to the familiar creatures many of us love.

On the other hand, there are those who do not love cats at all. Some hate them. So, is there an argument [philosophical or otherwise] able to establish whether it is more or less reasonable to love rather than hate them?

It’s tempting to think that since language is representational – it is about things – then it is the things that language is about (cats, tables, thoughts, feelings) that make language meaningful. Wittgenstein rejects this view of language.

Okay, but the language we use from day to day can also revolve around fiercely conflicted reactions to the relationships between these things. Describing behaviors is one thing, embracing or rejecting them as good or bad, another thing altogether.

Thus...

We do talk about and refer to a whole host of things, but language is not meaningful because of the things themselves. Language is meaningful because of how we use words in particular contexts and because there are right and wrong ways of using words and expressions: again, language use is normatively constrained by the rules of grammar. This use is socially upheld, like the rules of a game.

On the other hand, there are hard and fast rules in regard to games like bowling or chess or dominoes or baseball. Something is either permitted or prohibited. Whereas in regard to moral, political and religious interactions the language games we play can precipitate all manner of communication breakdowns.

[iambiguous]

Rules, Language & Reality
George Wrisley considers how some of Wittgenstein’s later ideas on language relate to reality.

A number of interesting insights come out of this way of looking at language and meaning. One result is Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the public nature of language. A good deal of the normativity that provides for meaning comes from the admonishments, requests for clarification and corrections of others when we speak, especially when we are learning a language. A further aspect of this is that much of our language is meaningful only as a result of its public context.

Take kids for example. They come into this world and the "normativity that provides for their own meaning" is deeply rooted in particular historical and cultural contexts. And over and again down through the centuries what some children will be admonished to avoid, others will be encouraged to embrace.

As for clarifications and corrections, it's basically the same thing. In other words, the assumption being that both will revolve around what those in particular communities deem clearly to be the correct behaviors. The "public nature of language" in my view is then rooted in the manner in which "here and now" I construe the meaning of dasein and the Benjamin Button Syndrome.

A related question is whether a private language is possible; this involves thinking about what we mean when we talk about sensations we experience. The point I want to focus on however, is the idea that the rules of grammar aren’t answerable to any objective reality. In Wittgenstein’s words, grammar is arbitrary and language is autonomous.

Here though I find myself once again making that crucial distinction between language/grammar used in the either/or world and language/grammar used in the is/ought world. After all, the fact is that in regard to human interactions there are words used to describe them that are applicable to everyone and words used that are anything but applicable to everyone.