compatibilism

[Atla]

I notice that your reply does not say how your behaviors would change or anyone else's behaviors, if you knew you had free-will or didn't have free-will.

Note to others:

Is he making an important point here that I keep missing? Because I'm always willing to acknowledge that, given just how mind-boggling [even surreal] the Big Questions...

Why is there something instead of nothing?
Why this something and not something else?
Where does the human condition fit into the whole understanding of this particular something itself?
What of solipsism, sim worlds, dream worlds, the Matrix?
What of the multiverse?
What of God?

...can often be, sure, I might be way off the mark. As with everyone else here. It's just that given the gap between what mere mortals here on planet Earth think they understand about the human brain here and now and all that there is to be known about it going back to a definitive understanding of existence itself...?

The point, some say, isn't what we would do so much as whether or not it can ever be demonstrated that we either have or do not have free will when we do do things.

The point is that for someone who wants to take philosophy out of the clouds, someone who wants to understand responsibility in compatibilism, someone who wants demonstrations ... you spend practically no time thinking and discussing the 'down to earth' behaviors.

But then -- click -- when I do bring all this down to Earth with Mary...

"The thing that puzzles me is how, in a determined world where Mary can never not abort Jane, she is still said to be morally responsible for it. After all, how many here would agree to being held morally responsible for something they were never able not to do?

The part whereby, if Mary had free will, her friend, given her own free will, might have convinced her not to abort Jane. Whereas without free will, Jane could never have not been obliterated.

The part where you explain to Jane how Mom having free will or not is not pertinent to her own existence at all?

The part, whereby, over and over again, I acknowledge/admit I am simply not understanding this correctly."

...it's wiggle, wiggle, wiggle. Though, sure, that reaction is in and of itself still no less than a subjective/subjunctive assessment rooted existentially in dasein. Then click, of course. Well, anyway, if "I" do say so myself.

Same with any attempt on my part to grasp how you intertwine philosophy and theology given the manner in which you connect the dots "here and now" between God, religion, souls, the human brain and human autonomy.  

Here you jump to the abstract "Big Questions".

What are the Big Questions other than those quandaries that involve understanding reality [human and otherwise] at its broadest? 

And what would be the difference between autonomous reasoning and autonomic reasoning?

It would seem to be the difference between voluntary and involuntary reasoning. It's like with AI. We click on one or another AI font and it gives us answers/reasons for whatever we ask of it. So, is this AI exercising free will? Or is it entirely programmed to reason given what is programmed into it by flesh and blood human beings? Then some extrapolate from that the belief that we are just nature's very own automatons/robots/androids.
Uh, dominoes? 

Though, again, I may well be unable here and now -- click -- to understand it correctly. 

Involuntary reasoning would seem to apply to issues like mental illness. But it quickly leads to dualism ... the idea that there is a 'real' person separate from the mental illness who does not want to think the thoughts that mental illness is 'making' him think.

This "real person"...that's not the equivalent of Maia's Intrinsic Self is it? They [as with many others embracing very different moral, political and religious fonts] are able to believe that deep down inside them is this Real Me enabling them to "just know" intuitively when something is good or bad, right or wrong, determined or free. And since no one else is them, no one else can possibly grasp this intrinsic reality as they do. And, perhaps,  the futility of explaining that part to them?

I would say that there is no involuntary thought or reasoning. You are what you think. And that may be broken, which is unfortunate. But it's the current you.

What on Earth do you call thinking and reasoning in dreams if not involuntary? 

I'm for keeping the two intertwined, myself.

Of course by keeping demonstrations and the determinism/free-will/compatibilism tied together, you don't reach any conclusion on anything. It's just a jumbled mess of constantly shifting focus.

In fact, it's those here who embrace an ontological/deontological "my way or else" frame of mind regarding the Big Questions [and most everything else] that enables me to appear all jumbled and losing focus in regard to the teleological nature of the universe. If there even is one.

So, philosophically, is the logic of free will, the logic of determinism, or the logic of compatibilism more reflective of human interactions? 

You make it sound as if determinism, compatibilism and free-will all use their own logic, three different logics. That intentional on your part, right? They all have their own 'truth' according to you.

Again, logic revolves around the biological/evolutionary relationship between words and worlds. Only the world here revolves in turn around The Gap, Rummy's Rule and the Benjamin Button Syndrome. All those things we don't even know [yet] that we don't even know about the universe.

After all, it's not for nothing that every week there seems to be one or another "new discovery" by the Hubble/Webb telescopes that bring into question the profoundly problematic mystery embedded in existence itself. What, the human condition is the exception to the rule?

"Logic of determinism" simple means logic applied to the subject of determinism. One logic to bind them all.

In other words, the logic that you and flannel jesus and flashdangerpants express here on this thread is inherently/necessarily more rational than my own jumbled logic? And this is true because philosophically you believe that it is true of your own free will. That's what makes it true. Either in being compelled to behave as you do given the only possible reality, or in being compelled to explore the science enabling you to actually demonstrate how and why your own assessment of compatibilism is the optimal assessment given the inherent relationship here between words and worlds. 

And, as long as particular determinists provide us with arguments alone, they are no less anchoring their own assumptions and conclusions in a "world of words".

Arguments are anchored in observations of the world. They always have been.

Same thing in my view. What particular arguments relating to what particular observations relating to what particular historical and cultural contexts? And pertaining to what particular accumulation of personal experiences? 

What would you consider as "ample empirical, experiential evidence"? What would that look like? What are the requirements that need to be met?

How about enough of it that philosophers and scientists are able to come together someday in order to inform the world [one way or the other] what the "real deal" is here.

That's so vague and general that it doesn't say anything of interest.

You're asking for  "ample empirical, experiential evidence" so you ought to state what posters should provide for you? That way, they won't waste their time and yours, posting 'evidence' which you will reject as inadequate.

Come on, give us a clue as to what you want.

This reminds me of IC demanding to know what proof might convince me that the Christian God does in fact exist. Yet nothing that I or others suggest here is really proof at all. Not until we pat him on the back and congratulate him for providing us with all the proof we'll ever need in order to accept Jesus Christ as our personal savior.

How about you? What's your own take on Jesus? 

Can someone point to anything definitive that was said in this long comment?

[phyllo]

But then -- click -- when I do bring all this down to Earth with Mary...

"The thing that puzzles me is how, in a determined world where Mary can never not abort Jane, she is still said to be morally responsible for it. After all, how many here would agree to being held morally responsible for something they were never able not to do?

The part whereby, if Mary had free will, her friend, given her own free will, might have convinced her not to abort Jane. Whereas without free will, Jane could never have not been obliterated.

The part where you explain to Jane how Mom having free will or not is not pertinent to her own existence at all?

The part, whereby, over and over again, I acknowledge/admit I am simply not understanding this correctly."

You write two different sets of events for determinism and free-will and that's it. You do no reasoning, no exploring, no analysis.

Let's say that Mary's friend tries to talk Mary out of the abortion in a free-will world but not in the determined world. Why did that happen? What motivated her to act in that way in a free-will world but not in a determined world? What are her reasons and why does she not have those reasons in the determined world?

When I ask free-willers, I generally get no reasons. It just happens that way.

Or let's say that Mary's friend talks to Mary in both the free-will world and the determined world and Mary is convinced in the free-will world but not convinced in the determined world.

Again why does this happen? Why does Mary change her mind if she has free-will?

What on Earth do you call thinking and reasoning in dreams if not involuntary?

Does your brain want to have other dreams or no dreams at all but something is forcing your brain to dream this stuff?

Dreaming seems voluntary to me.

In fact, it's those here who embrace an ontological/deontological "my way or else" frame of mind regarding the Big Questions [and most everything else] that enables me to appear all jumbled and losing focus in regard to the teleological nature of the universe. If there even is one.

Talk about 'in the clouds'.

Again, logic revolves around the biological/evolutionary relationship between words and worlds.

Sounds like BS to me.

In other words, the logic that you and flannel jesus and flashdangerpants express here on this thread is inherently/necessarily more rational than my own jumbled logic? And this is true because philosophically you believe that it is true of your own free will. That's what makes it true. Either in being compelled to behave as you do given the only possible reality, or in being compelled to explore the science enabling you to actually demonstrate how and why your own assessment of compatibilism is the optimal assessment given the inherent relationship here between words and worlds.

Then show the flaws in the logical reasoning that FJ, FDP and I are using. Show why your reasoning is correct.

Instead of posting these childish accusations targeting people rather than arguments.

Same thing in my view. What particular arguments relating to what particular observations relating to what particular historical and cultural contexts? And pertaining to what particular accumulation of personal experiences?

The observations and context are given when the arguments are made.

This reminds me of IC demanding to know what proof might convince me that the Christian God does in fact exist. Yet nothing that I or others suggest here is really proof at all. Not until we pat him on the back and congratulate him for providing us with all the proof we'll ever need in order to accept Jesus Christ as our personal savior.

You don't propose a reasonable proof.

Your proof that God exists, is that God produces a miracle. And we witness the miracle.

That's not something that we can discover, reason out or calculate. It's completely out of our control. It depends entire on God doing something for us.

A reasonable proof is something that we can do here and now or potentially in the future.

It's something humans do.

[iambiguous]

Free Will: Now You Have It, Now You Don’t
By Dennis Overbye at the New York Times

The German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer said, as Einstein paraphrased it, that “a human can very well do what he wants, but cannot will what he wants.”

So, is there a way for philosophers to pin down what "for all practical purposes" this actually means given the behaviors that they themselves embody?

How about you?

Again, let's focus the beam on posting here. You post willfully but you were never able to will otherwise, given how the brain is just more matter entirely in sync with the laws of matter.

Or does it convey another frame of mind altogether?

Just out of curiosity, for those here who believe that they understand his point, what do you imagine Schopenhauer would say to Mary were she to ask him if she was morally responsible for an abortion she was never able not to have?

Einstein, among others, found that a comforting idea. “This knowledge of the non-freedom of the will protects me from losing my good humor and taking much too seriously myself and my fellow humans as acting and judging individuals,” he said.

Then this part: that, in fact, everything he finds comforting or discomforting, he was never able not to find any other way. In other words, what does it mean to feel comforted by something you were never able not to feel comforted by?

How comforted or depressed this makes you might depend on what you mean by free will. The traditional definition is called “libertarian” or “deep” free will. It holds that humans are free moral agents whose actions are not predetermined. This school of thought says in effect that the whole chain of cause and effect in the history of the universe stops dead in its tracks as you ponder the dessert menu.

Does this or does this not assume that in defining the meaning of free will you were never really able to define it otherwise?

This thing regarding how we define words is something that many will -- click -- fall back on to "prove" they are right and others who define it differently are wrong.

[iambiguous]

But then -- click -- when I do bring all this down to Earth with Mary...

"The thing that puzzles me is how, in a determined world where Mary can never not abort Jane, she is still said to be morally responsible for it. After all, how many here would agree to being held morally responsible for something they were never able not to do?

The part whereby, if Mary had free will, her friend, given her own free will, might have convinced her not to abort Jane. Whereas without free will, Jane could never have not been obliterated.

The part where you explain to Jane how Mom having free will or not is not pertinent to her own existence at all?

The part, whereby, over and over again, I acknowledge/admit I am simply not understanding this correctly."

You write two different sets of events for determinism and free-will and that's it. You do no reasoning, no exploring, no analysis.

Allow me [once again] to offer others the manner in which I translate this:

"When I attempt to reason and explore and analyze determinism, free will and compatibilism, I come to completely different conclusions. Therefore you clearly do none of them correctly. Otherwise you'd be here thinking about them exactly as I do."

Let's say that Mary's friend tries to talk Mary out of the abortion in a free-will world but not in the determined world. Why did that happen? What motivated her to act in that way in a free-will world but not in a determined world? What are her reasons and why does she not have those reasons in the determined world?

Of course, this is the part where I suggest that, given free will, human motivation revolves largely around dasein out in the is/ought world. So, even in accepting some measure of autonomy, there does not appear [to me] to be a font able to provide us with objective morality given a No God world.

When I ask free-willers, I generally get no reasons. It just happens that way.

What, they tell you that they believe in free will? Okay, next time ask some them to provide you with all the evidence they have accumulated such that in utilizing the scientific method they are able to explain step by step how and why their own brain is able to function autonomously.

Or let's say that Mary's friend talks to Mary in both the free-will world and the determined world and Mary is convinced in the free-will world but not convinced in the determined world.

Again why does this happen? Why does Mary change her mind if she has free-will?

More to the point [at least for some of us], if Mary had no free will and nature autonomically "selected" Jane to be aborted, Jane is then never able to be around for you and those of your ilk here to discuss this with her. It's only in a world where human beings did "somehow" acquire free will that Jane has any chance at all of being among us "here and now".

Or, yeah, I'm [still] unable to either grasp your point here or the optimal understanding of compatibilism.   

What on Earth do you call thinking and reasoning in dreams if not involuntary?

   Does your brain want to have other dreams or no dreams at all but something is forcing your brain to dream this stuff?
Dreaming seems voluntary to me.

So, when you don't want to dream, what do you actually do in order to bring this about? And given your dreams [if you have them] are you in command of them?

How about others here? Anyone else dream only if and when they want to? And only what they see fit to dream?

In fact, it's those here who embrace an ontological/deontological "my way or else" frame of mind regarding the Big Questions [and most everything else] that enables me to appear all jumbled and losing focus in regard to the teleological nature of the universe. If there even is one.

 Talk about 'in the clouds'.

Well, when discussing the ontological and teleological nature of existence itself, the clouds are a good place to start. It's just that in regard to "meaning morality and metaphysics" my own main interest revolves around connecting the dots between words and worlds. 

In other words, the logic that you and flannel jesus and flashdangerpants express here on this thread is inherently/necessarily more rational than my own jumbled logic? And this is true because philosophically you believe that it is true of your own free will. That's what makes it true. Either in being compelled to behave as you do given the only possible reality, or in being compelled to explore the science enabling you to actually demonstrate how and why your own assessment of compatibilism is the optimal assessment given the inherent relationship here between words and worlds.

Then show the flaws in the logical reasoning that FJ, FDP and I are using. Show why your reasoning is correct.

I can't even demonstrate how and why my own reasoning is autonomous let alone that given free will my own assessment here comes closest to being the correct one. 

Instead of posting these childish accusations targeting people rather than arguments.

I'll encourage others here to decide for themselves -- click -- who seems more intent on targeting others rather than the arguments they make. Childishly or otherwise.

Arguments are anchored in observations of the world. They always have been.

Same thing in my view. What particular arguments relating to what particular observations relating to what particular historical and cultural contexts? And pertaining to what particular accumulation of personal experiences?

The observations and context are given when the arguments are made.[/b]

Or not, of course.

This reminds me of IC demanding to know what proof might convince me that the Christian God does in fact exist. Yet nothing that I or others suggest here is really proof at all. Not until we pat him on the back and congratulate him for providing us with all the proof we'll ever need in order to accept Jesus Christ as our personal savior.

You
don't propose a reasonable proof.

That's because in regard to the Big Questions, proofs are said to be reasonable by some that others scoff at. And then the part where any proposed truths here are deftly intertwined in a consensus derived from both philosophers and scientists. 

Your proof that God exists, is that God produces a miracle. And we witness the miracle.

That's not something that we can discover, reason out or calculate. It's completely out of our control. It depends entire on God doing something for us.

A reasonable proof is something that we can do here and now or potentially in the future.

It's something humans do.

That basically brings me back around to this:

Same with any attempt on my part to grasp how you intertwine philosophy and theology given the manner in which you connect the dots "here and now" between God, religion, souls, the human brain and human autonomy.

I have no capacity myself to demonstrate that God or free Will or objective morality actually do, in fact, exist. Or do, in fact, not exist. I just make it clear that in noting this I am not suggesting that they don't exist. I merely request that those who do believe they exist make attempts to demonstrate it beyond a world of words.

[phyllo]

You write two different sets of events for determinism and free-will and that's it. You do no reasoning, no exploring, no analysis.

Allow me [once again] to offer others the manner in which I translate this:

"When I attempt to reason and explore and analyze determinism, free will and compatibilism, I come to completely different conclusions. Therefore you clearly do none of them correctly. Otherwise you'd be here thinking about them exactly as I do."

You don't show any of your reasoning so how can anyone judge it to be correct or incorrect?

Let's say that Mary's friend tries to talk Mary out of the abortion in a free-will world but not in the determined world. Why did that happen? What motivated her to act in that way in a free-will world but not in a determined world? What are her reasons and why does she not have those reasons in the determined world?

Of course, this is the part where I suggest that, given free will, human motivation revolves largely around dasein out in the is/ought world. So, even in accepting some measure of autonomy, there does not appear [to me] to be a font able to provide us with objective morality given a No God world.

It would revolve around dasein in both a free-will and a determined world. So that is not a fundamental difference.

Who said anything about "objective morality"? Not me.

When I ask free-willers, I generally get no reasons. It just happens that way.

What, they tell you that they believe in free will? Okay, next time ask some them to provide you with all the evidence they have accumulated such that in utilizing the scientific method they are able to explain step by step how and why their own brain is able to function autonomously.

I don't ask them for evidence or for them to utilize the "scientific method".

All I ask is for them to show their reasoning.

Or let's say that Mary's friend talks to Mary in both the free-will world and the determined world and Mary is convinced in the free-will world but not convinced in the determined world.

Again why does this happen? Why does Mary change her mind if she has free-will?

More to the point [at least for some of us], if Mary had no free will and nature autonomically "selected" Jane to be aborted, Jane is then never able to be around for you and those of your ilk here to discuss this with her. It's only in a world where human beings did "somehow" acquire free will that Jane has any chance at all of being among us "here and now".

Again, you can't provide any reasons why she would change her mind in a free-will world but not a determined world.

Does your brain want to have other dreams or no dreams at all but something is forcing your brain to dream this stuff?
Dreaming seems voluntary to me.

So, when you don't want to dream, what do you actually do in order to bring this about? And given your dreams [if you have them] are you in command of them?

How about others here? Anyone else dream only if and when they want to? And only what they see fit to dream?

Once more this sounds like I'm separate from my brain. Like I have one set of wants and my brain has a separate set of wants and we're fighting over who gets to do what.

But isn't it really one set of wants? ... I want what my brain wants.

Then show the flaws in the logical reasoning that FJ, FDP and I are using. Show why your reasoning is correct.

I can't even demonstrate how and why my own reasoning is autonomous let alone that given free will my own assessment here comes closest to being the correct one.

So, you admit that you are unable to reason and to use logic.

Okay, let's leave it at that.

[Atla]

More to the point [at least for some of us], if Mary had no free will and nature autonomically "selected" Jane to be aborted, Jane is then never able to be around for you and those of your ilk here to discuss this with her. It's only in a world where human beings did "somehow" acquire free will that Jane has any chance at all of being among us "here and now".

Note to others:

I've seen him make this "point" like 150 times now, he keeps returning to it and repeating it like the good autistic boy he is.

Can anyone tell me what his point is? I don't see it. If Mary is determined to want the abortion or be talked into abortion then Jane is aborted, if Mary is determined to not want the abortion or not be talked into abortion then Jane lives.

Yes that's what determinism means. What was the point, and why does he always only mention the outcome where Jane is aborted?

[Belinda]

I notice that your reply does not say how your behaviors would change or anyone else's behaviors, if you knew you had free-will or didn't have free-will.

Note to others:

Is he making an important point here that I keep missing? Because I'm always willing to acknowledge that, given just how mind-boggling [even surreal] the Big Questions...

Why is there something instead of nothing?
Why this something and not something else?
Where does the human condition fit into the whole understanding of this particular something itself?
What of solipsism, sim worlds, dream worlds, the Matrix?
What of the multiverse?
What of God?

...can often be, sure, I might be way off the mark. As with everyone else here. It's just that given the gap between what mere mortals here on planet Earth think they understand about the human brain here and now and all that there is to be known about it going back to a definitive understanding of existence itself...?

The point, some say, isn't what we would do so much as whether or not it can ever be demonstrated that we either have or do not have free will when we do do things.

The point is that for someone who wants to take philosophy out of the clouds, someone who wants to understand responsibility in compatibilism, someone who wants demonstrations ... you spend practically no time thinking and discussing the 'down to earth' behaviors.

But then -- click -- when I do bring all this down to Earth with Mary...

"The thing that puzzles me is how, in a determined world where Mary can never not abort Jane, she is still said to be morally responsible for it. After all, how many here would agree to being held morally responsible for something they were never able not to do?

The part whereby, if Mary had free will, her friend, given her own free will, might have convinced her not to abort Jane. Whereas without free will, Jane could never have not been obliterated.

The part where you explain to Jane how Mom having free will or not is not pertinent to her own existence at all?

The part, whereby, over and over again, I acknowledge/admit I am simply not understanding this correctly."

...it's wiggle, wiggle, wiggle. Though, sure, that reaction is in and of itself still no less than a subjective/subjunctive assessment rooted existentially in dasein. Then click, of course. Well, anyway, if "I" do say so myself.

Same with any attempt on my part to grasp how you intertwine philosophy and theology given the manner in which you connect the dots "here and now" between God, religion, souls, the human brain and human autonomy.  

Here you jump to the abstract "Big Questions".

What are the Big Questions other than those quandaries that involve understanding reality [human and otherwise] at its broadest? 

And what would be the difference between autonomous reasoning and autonomic reasoning?

It would seem to be the difference between voluntary and involuntary reasoning. It's like with AI. We click on one or another AI font and it gives us answers/reasons for whatever we ask of it. So, is this AI exercising free will? Or is it entirely programmed to reason given what is programmed into it by flesh and blood human beings? Then some extrapolate from that the belief that we are just nature's very own automatons/robots/androids.
Uh, dominoes? 

Though, again, I may well be unable here and now -- click -- to understand it correctly. 

Involuntary reasoning would seem to apply to issues like mental illness. But it quickly leads to dualism ... the idea that there is a 'real' person separate from the mental illness who does not want to think the thoughts that mental illness is 'making' him think.

This "real person"...that's not the equivalent of Maia's Intrinsic Self is it? They [as with many others embracing very different moral, political and religious fonts] are able to believe that deep down inside them is this Real Me enabling them to "just know" intuitively when something is good or bad, right or wrong, determined or free. And since no one else is them, no one else can possibly grasp this intrinsic reality as they do. And, perhaps,  the futility of explaining that part to them?

I would say that there is no involuntary thought or reasoning. You are what you think. And that may be broken, which is unfortunate. But it's the current you.

What on Earth do you call thinking and reasoning in dreams if not involuntary? 

I'm for keeping the two intertwined, myself.

Of course by keeping demonstrations and the determinism/free-will/compatibilism tied together, you don't reach any conclusion on anything. It's just a jumbled mess of constantly shifting focus.

In fact, it's those here who embrace an ontological/deontological "my way or else" frame of mind regarding the Big Questions [and most everything else] that enables me to appear all jumbled and losing focus in regard to the teleological nature of the universe. If there even is one.

So, philosophically, is the logic of free will, the logic of determinism, or the logic of compatibilism more reflective of human interactions? 

You make it sound as if determinism, compatibilism and free-will all use their own logic, three different logics. That intentional on your part, right? They all have their own 'truth' according to you.

Again, logic revolves around the biological/evolutionary relationship between words and worlds. Only the world here revolves in turn around The Gap, Rummy's Rule and the Benjamin Button Syndrome. All those things we don't even know [yet] that we don't even know about the universe.

After all, it's not for nothing that every week there seems to be one or another "new discovery" by the Hubble/Webb telescopes that bring into question the profoundly problematic mystery embedded in existence itself. What, the human condition is the exception to the rule?

"Logic of determinism" simple means logic applied to the subject of determinism. One logic to bind them all.

In other words, the logic that you and flannel jesus and flashdangerpants express here on this thread is inherently/necessarily more rational than my own jumbled logic? And this is true because philosophically you believe that it is true of your own free will. That's what makes it true. Either in being compelled to behave as you do given the only possible reality, or in being compelled to explore the science enabling you to actually demonstrate how and why your own assessment of compatibilism is the optimal assessment given the inherent relationship here between words and worlds. 

And, as long as particular determinists provide us with arguments alone, they are no less anchoring their own assumptions and conclusions in a "world of words".

Arguments are anchored in observations of the world. They always have been.

Same thing in my view. What particular arguments relating to what particular observations relating to what particular historical and cultural contexts? And pertaining to what particular accumulation of personal experiences? 

What would you consider as "ample empirical, experiential evidence"? What would that look like? What are the requirements that need to be met?

How about enough of it that philosophers and scientists are able to come together someday in order to inform the world [one way or the other] what the "real deal" is here.

That's so vague and general that it doesn't say anything of interest.

You're asking for  "ample empirical, experiential evidence" so you ought to state what posters should provide for you? That way, they won't waste their time and yours, posting 'evidence' which you will reject as inadequate.

Come on, give us a clue as to what you want.

This reminds me of IC demanding to know what proof might convince me that the Christian God does in fact exist. Yet nothing that I or others suggest here is really proof at all. Not until we pat him on the back and congratulate him for providing us with all the proof we'll ever need in order to accept Jesus Christ as our personal savior.

How about you? What's your own take on Jesus? 

Can someone point to anything definitive that was said in this long comment?

Artificial intelligence is precisely for that sort of donkey work.

[phyllo]

Artificial intelligence is precisely for that sort of donkey work.

Are you going to feed Iambiguous' posts into AI and extract the essential truth?

[Atla]

Hm you think that'll work?

Do the following comments (written by the same person) say anything definitive on the free will versus determinism issue, or are they just waffle? Summary only. Here are the comments:

1. comment: But then -- click -- when I do bring all this down to Earth with Mary...

"The thing that puzzles me is how, in a determined world where Mary can never not abort Jane, she is still said to be morally responsible for it. After all, how many here would agree to being held morally responsible for something they were never able not to do?

The part whereby, if Mary had free will, her friend, given her own free will, might have convinced her not to abort Jane. Whereas without free will, Jane could never have not been obliterated.

The part where you explain to Jane how Mom having free will or not is not pertinent to her own existence at all?

The part, whereby, over and over again, I acknowledge/admit I am simply not understanding this correctly."

...it's wiggle, wiggle, wiggle. Though, sure, that reaction is in and of itself still no less than a subjective/subjunctive assessment rooted existentially in dasein. Then click, of course. Well, anyway, if "I" do say so myself.

Same with any attempt on my part to grasp how you intertwine philosophy and theology given the manner in which you connect the dots "here and now" between God, religion, souls, the human brain and human autonomy."

2. comment: What are the Big Questions other than those quandaries that involve understanding reality [human and otherwise] at its broadest?

3. comment: This "real person"...that's not the equivalent of Susan's Intrinsic Self is it? They [as with many others embracing very different moral, political and religious fonts] are able to believe that deep down inside them is this Real Me enabling them to "just know" intuitively when something is good or bad, right or wrong, determined or free. And since no one else is them, no one else can possibly grasp this intrinsic reality as they do. And, perhaps, the futility of explaining that part to them?

4. comment: What on Earth do you call thinking and reasoning in dreams if not involuntary?

5. comment: In fact, it's those here who embrace an ontological/deontological "my way or else" frame of mind regarding the Big Questions [and most everything else] that enables me to appear all jumbled and losing focus in regard to the teleological nature of the universe. If there even is one.

6. comment: Again, logic revolves around the biological/evolutionary relationship between words and worlds. Only the world here revolves in turn around The Gap, Rummy's Rule and the Benjamin Button Syndrome. All those things we don't even know [yet] that we don't even know about the universe.

After all, it's not for nothing that every week there seems to be one or another "new discovery" by the Hubble/Webb telescopes that bring into question the profoundly problematic mystery embedded in existence itself. What, the human condition is the exception to the rule?

7. comment: In other words, the logic that you and Joe and Jim express here on this thread is inherently/necessarily more rational than my own jumbled logic? And this is true because philosophically you believe that it is true of your own free will. That's what makes it true. Either in being compelled to behave as you do given the only possible reality, or in being compelled to explore the science enabling you to actually demonstrate how and why your own assessment of compatibilism is the optimal assessment given the inherent relationship here between words and worlds.

8. comment: Same thing in my view. What particular arguments relating to what particular observations relating to what particular historical and cultural contexts? And pertaining to what particular accumulation of personal experiences?

9. comment: This reminds me of Tim demanding to know what proof might convince me that the Christian God does in fact exist. Yet nothing that I or others suggest here is really proof at all. Not until we pat him on the back and congratulate him for providing us with all the proof we'll ever need in order to accept Jesus Christ as our personal savior.

How about you? What's your own take on Jesus?

Summary:

The comments do not offer a clear or definitive stance on the free will vs. determinism issue. Instead, they mostly reflect confusion, ambivalence, and a kind of philosophical wandering or musing. The person raises questions about moral responsibility in a deterministic world, acknowledges their own lack of understanding, critiques others' certainty, and makes abstract references to related issues (like theology, dreams, and logic), but never settles on a clear position.

In short: The comments are mostly philosophical "waffling"—they express uncertainty and provoke thought, but do not take a firm stand on whether free will or determinism is true.

Did those comments establish any fact at all? Summary only.

Summary:

The comments do not establish any definitive facts. They consist mainly of speculative, subjective, and rhetorical reflections. While they touch on themes like moral responsibility, logic, and belief, they present no clear claims backed by evidence or logical demonstration. At most, they reveal the speaker’s personal confusion and philosophical skepticism, not objective facts.

Sorry but the AI isn't advanced enough yet to pierce the depths of Iambig's writing.

[Flannel Jesus]

Sorry but the AI isn't advanced enough yet to pierce the depths of Iambig's writing.

I'm gonna disagree with you there. I think the AI absolutely fucking nailed it.

[Atla]

Sorry but the AI isn't advanced enough yet to pierce the depths of Iambig's writing.

I'm gonna disagree with you there. I think the AI absolutely fucking nailed it.

That's what I meant too

[Flannel Jesus]

Sorry but the AI isn't advanced enough yet to pierce the depths of Iambig's writing.

I'm gonna disagree with you there. I think the AI absolutely fucking nailed it.

That's what I meant too

Yeah I know, we all know - me you and the ai - that biggy spends a lot of energy going nowhere.

[Atla]

AI is also a Stooge now. Absolutely shameless, if I may say so myself.

[Flannel Jesus]

AI is also a Stooge now. Absolutely shameless, if I may say so myself.

Click

[iambiguous]

Free Will: Now You Have It, Now You Don’t
By Dennis Overbye at the New York Times

In the 1970s, Benjamin Libet, a physiologist at the University of California, San Francisco, wired up the brains of volunteers to an electroencephalogram and told the volunteers to make random motions, like pressing a button or flicking a finger, while he noted the time on a clock.

Dr. Libet found that brain signals associated with these actions occurred half a second before the subject was conscious of deciding to make them.

The order of brain activities seemed to be perception of motion, and then decision, rather than the other way around.

I'm sure no doubt there are any number of folks [scientists, philosophers or otherwise] who can poke holes in this assessment by noting any number of particular variables that [they insist] are subject to being challenged: https://www.google.com/search?q=benjami ... s-wiz-serp

Otherwise, if there was absolutely no doubt that he was correct in regard to how the brain functions here, there would be little or no controversy left at all. Free will? Forget about it?

In short, the conscious brain was only playing catch-up to what the unconscious brain was already doing. The decision to act was an illusion, the monkey making up a story about what the tiger had already done.

Of course, there is a rather significant gap between monkey brains and tiger brains. Though nowhere near as large perhaps as the gap between monkey brains and human brains. With monkeys and tigers and all other living creatures, behaviors revolve almost entirely around instinct. No debates among them regarding free will, right?

With human brains on the other hand, the fact is scientists have been grappling to understand both its capacities and its limitations for decades now. And it is simply the case that they are not yet able to establish one way or the other whether human beings do in fact have free will.

Or, perhaps, someone here can link us all to that definitive assessment. Other than in a world of words.