The Democrat Party Hates America

[Gary Childress]

It's very simple: the experience is real.

No, the experience is a perception of what may be real or what may be unreal.

What sort of unreal thing can stimulate a perception?

Standing in a desert, the deformation of the air caused by hot air rising from the ground can make a distant area of sand look like it's a pond or body of water to human perception. However, the heat waves in the air rising from the ground, themselves, are what is causing the perception, and they seem to be a 'real' thing. Are you suggesting that a perception cannot be caused by "nothing"? Or that a perception cannot be uncaused?

[Immanuel Can]

No, the experience is a perception of what may be real or what may be unreal.

What sort of unreal thing can stimulate a perception?

Standing in a desert, the deformation of the air caused by hot air rising from the ground can make a distant area of sand look like it's a pond or body of water to human perception. However, the heat waves in the air rising from the ground, themselves, are what is causing the perception, and they seem to be a 'real' thing. Are you suggesting that a perception cannot be caused by "nothing"? Or that a perception cannot be uncaused?

I'm suggesting that what the perceiver is perceiving is NOT REAL. If it were, he could slake his thirst on sand. The hot air is real. But he's not seeing it for what it is.

This is too obvious. What's the point here?

[Gary Childress]

What sort of unreal thing can stimulate a perception?

Standing in a desert, the deformation of the air caused by hot air rising from the ground can make a distant area of sand look like it's a pond or body of water to human perception. However, the heat waves in the air rising from the ground, themselves, are what is causing the perception, and they seem to be a 'real' thing. Are you suggesting that a perception cannot be caused by "nothing"? Or that a perception cannot be uncaused?

I'm suggesting that what the perceiver is perceiving is NOT REAL. If it were, he could slake his thirst on sand. The hot air is real. But he's not seeing it for what it is.

This is too obvious. What's the point here?

I don't know. That's what I'm trying to figure out.

[Impenitent]

It's very simple: the experience is real.

No, the experience is a perception of what may be real or what may be unreal.

What sort of unreal thing can stimulate a perception?

wishful thinking...

-Imp

[Gary Childress]

No, the experience is a perception of what may be real or what may be unreal.

What sort of unreal thing can stimulate a perception?

wishful thinking...

-Imp

Well played. Kudos.

[Belinda]

Standing in a desert, the deformation of the air caused by hot air rising from the ground can make a distant area of sand look like it's a pond or body of water to human perception. However, the heat waves in the air rising from the ground, themselves, are what is causing the perception, and they seem to be a 'real' thing. Are you suggesting that a perception cannot be caused by "nothing"? Or that a perception cannot be uncaused?

I'm suggesting that what the perceiver is perceiving is NOT REAL. If it were, he could slake his thirst on sand. The hot air is real. But he's not seeing it for what it is.

This is too obvious. What's the point here?

I don't know. That's what I'm trying to figure out.

Your experience is real. Your experience includes your interpretation and your evaluation of the phenomenon.

Some people believe there is a supernatural Experiencer who knows all experiences, even the experience of a sparrow as it falls in death.

[Gary Childress]

I'm suggesting that what the perceiver is perceiving is NOT REAL. If it were, he could slake his thirst on sand. The hot air is real. But he's not seeing it for what it is.

This is too obvious. What's the point here?

I don't know. That's what I'm trying to figure out.

Your experience is real. Your experience includes your interpretation and your evaluation of the phenomenon.

Some people believe there is a supernatural Experiencer who knows all experiences, even the experience of a sparrow as it falls in death.

And some people don't. As I understand it, IC believes in a supernatural experiencer. Does Will? Or what is the argument over? It sounds like we aren't getting to the kernel at the core of the disagreement, maybe? Or perhaps the existence or not of a "supernatural experiencer" is the kernel?

[Belinda]

I don't know. That's what I'm trying to figure out.

Your experience is real. Your experience includes your interpretation and your evaluation of the phenomenon.

Some people believe there is a supernatural Experiencer who knows all experiences, even the experience of a sparrow as it falls in death.

And some people don't. As I understand it, IC believes in a supernatural experiencer. Does Will? Or what is the argument over? It sounds like we aren't getting to the kernel at the core of the disagreement, maybe? Or perhaps the existence or not of a "supernatural experiencer" is the kernel?

I think the argument is because Will thinks as a modern post-scientific enlightenment man thinks; whereas Immanuel has the unthinking faith of a medieval man, but simultaneously tries to be scientifically enlightened.

[Belinda]

I don't know. That's what I'm trying to figure out.

Your experience is real. Your experience includes your interpretation and your evaluation of the phenomenon.

Some people believe there is a supernatural Experiencer who knows all experiences, even the experience of a sparrow as it falls in death.

And some people don't. As I understand it, IC believes in a supernatural experiencer. Does Will? Or what is the argument over? It sounds like we aren't getting to the kernel at the core of the disagreement, maybe? Or perhaps the existence or not of a "supernatural experiencer" is the kernel?

None of us is a supernatural experiencer for sure. After one of us dies he or she will no longer exist as an ego. However what he or she experienced in life continues to exist as time -consciousness does not an encumber any more. Any way that is what I believe for what it's worth.

[Immanuel Can]

I don't know. That's what I'm trying to figure out.

Your experience is real. Your experience includes your interpretation and your evaluation of the phenomenon.

Some people believe there is a supernatural Experiencer who knows all experiences, even the experience of a sparrow as it falls in death.

And some people don't. As I understand it, IC believes in a supernatural experiencer. Does Will? Or what is the argument over?

It has nothing at all to do with the supernatural, at the moment, Gary. It has to do with natural, non-physical phenomena, like consciousness, selfhood, morality, rationality, and so on.

Will and I are debating the nature of these natural but non-physical phenomena -- a task which, ironically, Will could not even execute if such things did not exist.

[Impenitent]

Holy napping synapses Batman

-Imp

[Gary Childress]

Your experience is real. Your experience includes your interpretation and your evaluation of the phenomenon.

Some people believe there is a supernatural Experiencer who knows all experiences, even the experience of a sparrow as it falls in death.

And some people don't. As I understand it, IC believes in a supernatural experiencer. Does Will? Or what is the argument over?

It has nothing at all to do with the supernatural, at the moment, Gary. It has to do with natural, non-physical phenomena, like consciousness, selfhood, morality, rationality, and so on.

Will and I are debating the nature of these natural but non-physical phenomena -- a task which, ironically, Will could not even execute if such things did not exist.

When I look at you and Will arguing, I don't see any conflicting statements, just each of you insisting that you are right about something that doesn't appear to conflict with the statement you each insist is true. I mean, there are hallucinations, there are sensations, there are perceptions, there are physical entities. That all seems obvious to me. I'm more interested in what you are trying to get agreement on? Or what does Will have wrong in his statements?

[FlashDangerpants]

I think the argument is because Will thinks as a modern post-scientific enlightenment man thinks; whereas Immanuel has the unthinking faith of a medieval man, but simultaneously tries to be scientifically enlightened.

I don't know. That's what I'm trying to figure out.

Your experience is real. Your experience includes your interpretation and your evaluation of the phenomenon.

Some people believe there is a supernatural Experiencer who knows all experiences, even the experience of a sparrow as it falls in death.

And some people don't. As I understand it, IC believes in a supernatural experiencer. Does Will? Or what is the argument over? It sounds like we aren't getting to the kernel at the core of the disagreement, maybe? Or perhaps the existence or not of a "supernatural experiencer" is the kernel?

The issue is twofold and very simple.

First issue - You and Belinda have both dealt with Immanuel Can over many years now, why are you two taking his words at face value still? He is invariably misrepresenting something at all times, you both know this already, but you treat him as a reliable narrator like you wake up and every day you have no history or memory.

Second issue: The origin of the debate you are confused about lay with a discussion over science and how it should be understood. Willy B made a point that anybody passingly familiar with 20th C phil of sci would be tempted to attribute to Thomas Kuhn. Namely that all observed data about the world around us can be supported by innumerable mutually contradictory theories that NEVERTHELESS ALL FIT THE AVAILABLE EVIDENCE.

So for this purpose - being for me to inform you rather than for me to report exactly what has been written already - Let us say there are three theories in play for why the apple in your hand looks red to you. Theory one is that there is a real apple, in your real hand and it really looks red. Theory two is that God imagines the universe and then we exist as imagined beings within it, and God chooses for the vision of the imagined apple to appear to you as a red object. And theory three is that the universe is being simulated beings of the 83rd dimension in a sort of computer, you happen to exist in a simulation run where it just so happens redness is being presented for apple type objects, but tomorrow (their tomorrow) there will be a power cut and when the universe is rebooted, due to a buffer overflow, apples will be tartan and will always have been tartan and the phrase "5 red apples" will not refer to any object in the universe.

You don't need to try and outwit any of that, you only need to be smart enough to comprehend it. All three theories are compatible with all the evidence that is to hand. Every observation ever made by any scientist is compatible with them all and with many others that equally are incompatible. The thing I just described is what Kuhn calls "underdetermination" and it is basically solid grounds for continuing uncertainty. It's not a complicated distinction unless you are a gaslighting loon like Can. Like all abusive relationships, what Can wants is to have perfect certainty for himself, and for you to be cast into such doubt that you rely on his judgment, thus he cannot be open to organised uncertainty.

Anyway, at some point in that underdetermination story, Willy B holds that whether you choose to see the apple as being an actual red object versus an immaterial phantasm in the mind of God is not determined by reliance on evidence so much as an act of faith, or as he describes it, the aesthetic preference for the explanation that you find most pleasing. For that purpose, epistemological informalities such as a preference for parsimony & elegance, or a great respect for the authority of ip-dip-dog-shit, are just aesthetic preferences.

Everything else that follows from there, has just been Can trying to gaslight Will about that sort of thing. Although what preceded it was also Can gaslighting. He does that every day, he does viable philosophical argument far less often, arguably never.

[Gary Childress]

I think the argument is because Will thinks as a modern post-scientific enlightenment man thinks; whereas Immanuel has the unthinking faith of a medieval man, but simultaneously tries to be scientifically enlightened.

Your experience is real. Your experience includes your interpretation and your evaluation of the phenomenon.

Some people believe there is a supernatural Experiencer who knows all experiences, even the experience of a sparrow as it falls in death.

And some people don't. As I understand it, IC believes in a supernatural experiencer. Does Will? Or what is the argument over? It sounds like we aren't getting to the kernel at the core of the disagreement, maybe? Or perhaps the existence or not of a "supernatural experiencer" is the kernel?

The issue is twofold and very simple.

First issue - You and Belinda have both dealt with Immanuel Can over many years now, why are you two taking his words at face value still? He is invariably misrepresenting something at all times, you both know this already, but you treat him as a reliable narrator like you wake up and every day you have no history or memory.

Second issue: The origin of the debate you are confused about lay with a discussion over science and how it should be understood. Willy B made a point that anybody passingly familiar with 20th C phil of sci would be tempted to attribute to Thomas Kuhn. Namely that all observed data about the world around us can be supported by innumerable mutually contradictory theories that NEVERTHELESS ALL FIT THE AVAILABLE EVIDENCE.

So for this purpose - being for me to inform you rather than for me to report exactly what has been written already - Let us say there are three theories in play for why the apple in your hand looks red to you. Theory one is that there is a real apple, in your real hand and it really looks red. Theory two is that God imagines the universe and then we exist as imagined beings within it, and God chooses for the vision of the imagined apple to appear to you as a red object. And theory three is that the universe is being simulated beings of the 83rd dimension in a sort of computer, you happen to exist in a simulation run where it just so happens redness is being presented for apple type objects, but tomorrow (their tomorrow) there will be a power cut and when the universe is rebooted, due to a buffer overflow, apples will be tartan and will always have been tartan and the phrase "5 red apples" will not refer to any object in the universe.

You don't need to try and outwit any of that, you only need to be smart enough to comprehend it. All three theories are compatible with all the evidence that is to hand. Every observation ever made by any scientist is compatible with them all and with many others that equally are incompatible. The thing I just described is what Kuhn calls "underdetermination" and it is basically solid grounds for continuing uncertainty. It's not a complicated distinction unless you are a gaslighting loon like Can. Like all abusive relationships, what Can wants is to have perfect certainty for himself, and for you to be cast into such doubt that you rely on his judgment, thus he cannot be open to organised uncertainty.

Anyway, at some point in that underdetermination story, Willy B holds that whether you choose to see the apple as being an actual red object versus an immaterial phantasm in the mind of God is not determined by reliance on evidence so much as an act of faith, or as he describes it, the aesthetic preference for the explanation that you find most pleasing. For that purpose, epistemological informalities such as a preference for parsimony & elegance, or a great respect for the authority of ip-dip-dog-shit, are just aesthetic preferences.

Everything else that follows from there, has just been Can trying to gaslight Will about that sort of thing. Although what preceded it was also Can gaslighting. He does that every day, he does viable philosophical argument far less often, arguably never.

That's kind of what I expected to be the case. I know that IC is devout to the Bible. Therefore, I assume he is looking for ways to validate the Bible with modern science. At this point, I'm not sure what counts as a refutation of the Bible. When biblical stories are clearly scientifically inaccurate or seem preposterous, the Bible becomes "allegorical" and when they are scientifically accurate, they are proof that the Bible is a reliable resource for life. I mean, we're all going to argue until we're blue in the face about things. That's why I see agnosticism as the most rational conclusion regarding things that we cannot reliably know the truth of. Of course, that has its limits also. Assumptions have their place also. and I guess we would all like to know who has it right or whose assumptions are accurate. When I'm paranoid and delusional, I hope my assumptions are not right. So far, so good, I usually wake up the next day to a refreshed view of things. But paranoia seems to creep in over time inevitably.

[Immanuel Can]

And some people don't. As I understand it, IC believes in a supernatural experiencer. Does Will? Or what is the argument over?

It has nothing at all to do with the supernatural, at the moment, Gary. It has to do with natural, non-physical phenomena, like consciousness, selfhood, morality, rationality, and so on.

Will and I are debating the nature of these natural but non-physical phenomena -- a task which, ironically, Will could not even execute if such things did not exist.

When I look at you and Will arguing, I don't see any conflicting statements, just each of you insisting that you are right about something that doesn't appear to conflict with the statement you each insist is true. I mean, there are hallucinations, there are sensations, there are perceptions, there are physical entities. That all seems obvious to me. I'm more interested in what you are trying to get agreement on? Or what does Will have wrong in his statements?

Will seems to be trying to argue something, but not doing it very well. If I took it literally, he would be arguing that anything one "experiences" as an illusion is "exactly the same" as if one experienced it in reality. But since that's obviously not the case, I'm waiting for some clarity from his argument, just as you are.