The Democrat Party Hates America

[Belinda]

...I'm still just asking whether you understand that if a phenomenon isn't experienced, it isn't a phenomenon.

"Phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view." (Stanford) That's definitional. So what's does that have to do with non-physical realities, since you do experience them?

Yes you do. You also experience what appear to be physical realities. Ah, the discombobulating amphibolous 'appear'. I'll try again. We have experiences, some of which we generally attribute to objective causes, others which we take to be subjective. Some people, such as yourself, include among the objective, things like morality and justice, together with the less contentious 'physical realities'. Others think that things like morality and justice are subjective. Whichever is true, the experience is exactly the same. The same is true of 'physical realities'; whether they are real or ideal, the experience is exactly the same. You have to understand that or you are philosophically knackered.
So, back to:

Idealism does not explain material data; it dismisses all that by relegating it to the realm of "ideas." In that sense, like all mono-theories, it simply deals with data anomalies by denying they are real.

The data we, as humans, have to interpret are our experiences. Nobody denies that we have experiences*; as Descartes pointed out, you can't coherently do so. So no, idealism does not dismiss material data; it simply attributes them to a different source than materialists. As I said, this is philosophy 101, no one can even pretend to be a philosopher until they get their head around the basics.
*With the caveat that, as Cicero put it: "Nothing is so absurd that some philosopher hasn't already said it."

Immanuel would help his case if , instead of arguing about materialism and idealism, he simply explained whether he was talking about subjective phenomena or objective phenomena.

[Will Bouwman]

Immanuel would help his case if , instead of arguing about materialism and idealism, he simply explained whether he was talking about subjective phenomena or objective phenomena.

Wouldn't make a difference. The thing he can't get his head around is that both objective and subjective causes can, at least in theory, stimulate exactly the same experience.

[Belinda]

Immanuel would help his case if , instead of arguing about materialism and idealism, he simply explained whether he was talking about subjective phenomena or objective phenomena.

Wouldn't make a difference. The thing he can't get his head around is that both objective and subjective causes can, at least in theory, stimulate exactly the same experience.

Is that to say that it is a failing to make allowance for different tastes, backgrounds, and needs?

I think it is a failing to do so. However I feel I ought to draw a line somewhere between moral relativity and authority.

You say "at least in theory". But no scientist has ever managed to absolutely get rid of subjective bias, not so? Without decrying probability, isn't it the case that every theory, even Darwin's natural selection theory ,is a matter of probability ?

The difference between my stance and Immanuel 's is different paradigm.

[Immanuel Can]

...I'm still just asking whether you understand that if a phenomenon isn't experienced, it isn't a phenomenon.

"Phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view." (Stanford) That's definitional. So what's does that have to do with non-physical realities, since you do experience them?

Yes you do. You also experience what appear to be physical realities. Ah, the discombobulating amphibolous 'appear'. I'll try again. We have experiences, some of which we generally attribute to objective causes, others which we take to be subjective. Some people, such as yourself, include among the objective, things like morality and justice, together with the less contentious 'physical realities'. Others think that things like morality and justice are subjective. Whichever is true, the experience is exactly the same. The same is true of 'physical realities'; whether they are real or ideal, the experience is exactly the same. You have to understand that or you are philosophically knackered.

Heh. I always love it when people pat themselves on the back and assign themselves the "win." It almost invariably means they have a creeping suspicion (or even a covert realization) they really haven't got one, and remain vulnerable on some point; so they're keen to "close the deal" before their interlocutor realizes it. One always wonders why they didn't wait to receive the "win" by concession, if they actually got one.

But perhaps it's a little impolite to make too much of that rhetorical flourish. We should move on.

"The experience is exactly the same." Well, that phrase has implications: it would imply that, for example, the delusions of the LSD addict, which he "experiences" as real, are "exactly the same" as the situation of the man who has taken no LSD, and is not having delusions. For phenomenologically, we can study the nature of the man's delusions, alright: but, of course, not ontologically. So we find that there is all the difference in the world between the claim "this man is imagining/experiencing X," and "what he is imagining/experiencing is real."

Once again, we find that the Materialist is not explaining cognition, or rationality, or argumentation, or volition, or selfhood, even while he's relying on all of them: he's simply denying their real existence, and calling them "epiphenomena" (to use the current term) -- essentially, delusions. They're phenomena that inexplicably are supposed (by the Materialist, of course) to arise spontaneously when an organism has reached some unspecifiable level of complexity, and turn out, also inexplicably, to be of a completely different order from the complex entity from which they "emerged."

That's polysyllabic, but ultimately empty of content. He's talking about a kind of magic, really. And consequently, he's offering no account, and certainly not any explanation of HOW the physical gives rise to the non-physical: all he's offering is a dismissal. He's denying the reality of the very properties upon which the potential of his own argument absolutely depends. He's again caught in a self-contradiction...all the more inconvenient for him, since he also has to remain convinced there's no "self."

So, back to:

Idealism does not explain material data; it dismisses all that by relegating it to the realm of "ideas." In that sense, like all mono-theories, it simply deals with data anomalies by denying they are real.

The data we, as humans, have to interpret are our experiences. Nobody denies that we have experiences*;

But that's not the issue. The issue is whether or not those "experiences" are indicative of something real, or are merely delusions. So in saying "we have experiences" we've said no more than "we have something that may be real or may not be," since perceptions, subjective experiences, can be generated by something real, or produced without reference to reality.

We don't just perceive; sometimes, we dream. The problem is to account for how this phenomenon fits into reality.

[FlashDangerpants]

There used to be a time where I thought IC put in a bit more effort to behave himself when he argued with uwot, sometimes staying close to the topic at hand and the argument raised. But since that name change I think he's stopped bothering even with Willy.

[FlashDangerpants]

Immanuel would help his case if , instead of arguing about materialism and idealism, he simply explained whether he was talking about subjective phenomena or objective phenomena.

Wouldn't make a difference. The thing he can't get his head around is that both objective and subjective causes can, at least in theory, stimulate exactly the same experience.

Is that to say that it is a failing to make allowance for different tastes, backgrounds, and needs?

I think it is a failing to do so. However I feel I ought to draw a line somewhere between moral relativity and authority.

You say "at least in theory". But no scientist has ever managed to absolutely get rid of subjective bias, not so? Without decrying probability, isn't it the case that every theory, even Darwin's natural selection theory ,is a matter of probability ?

The difference between my stance and Immanuel 's is different paradigm.

I think he means something much more literal than that, he tends to point to the whole Descartes thing about not being able to tell by inspection of the experience itself whether the source is a real world, or a dream or a naughty demon. We have no way of knowing we're not living in a simulation, so why not buy a pair of Chinese Ray-Bans? That sort of thing. Not normally controversial or difficult to get.

[Will Bouwman]

...both objective and subjective causes can, at least in theory, stimulate exactly the same experience.

Is that to say that it is a failing to make allowance for different tastes, backgrounds, and needs?

Not directly. It is just a common or garden philosophical fact that the universe might be the processes of an almighty mind, for example. Or it might be a simulation, as Flash points out. It is just a fact that there are many possibilities that could produce the exact same experiences that any one of us encounter. The different tastes, backgrounds and needs make no difference to what is the case, but heavily influence what we choose to believe.

[Will Bouwman]

"The experience is exactly the same." Well, that phrase has implications: it would imply that, for example, the delusions of the LSD addict, which he "experiences" as real, are "exactly the same" as the situation of the man who has taken no LSD, and is not having delusions.

Clearly you haven't taken LSD, which incidentally, isn't addictive. Anyway, assuming there were an addictive drug that could induce delusions of mundane events, do you understand that, regardless of the situation, the experience of the event would be exactly the same whether induced by events outside your brain or the drug you ingested?

[Immanuel Can]

"The experience is exactly the same." Well, that phrase has implications: it would imply that, for example, the delusions of the LSD addict, which he "experiences" as real, are "exactly the same" as the situation of the man who has taken no LSD, and is not having delusions.

Clearly you haven't taken LSD, which incidentally, isn't addictive.

This is beside the point. You certainly see what I'm pointing to. I could have said "heroin," or "crack," or "fentanyl." The point is simple, in all cases: the "experience" isn't real. The fact that the "experiencer" can't tell is moot. The difference remains, and is vitally important. This is why somebody high on hallucinogens -- of which, you will know, LSD is one -- might jump off a building, imagining he can fly. Reality will then intervene, and very shortly give him a new experience of his being wrong.

...do you understand that, regardless of the situation, the experience of the event would be exactly the same whether induced by events outside your brain or the drug you ingested?

Here we have the ambiguity problem again.

You write "the experience" and "would be exactly the same." But it wouldn't. Not at all, in final consequence.

If the hallucinator only imagines he's jumping off a building, he does not at all get the same "experience" as the one who actually jumps off a building, even if their perceptions of the event, at the precise moment of their leap, were identical.

[Will Bouwman]

You certainly see what I'm pointing to. I could have said "heroin," or "crack," or "fentanyl." The point is simple, in all cases: the "experience" isn't real.

It's very simple: the experience is real. The perception, feeling, sensation, call it what you will, is real. The experiences you are having right now, all the sights, sounds, emotions; the entire contents of your mind, are real. An experience is a fact, an event, a datum, you really experience them. What is less certain is what causes your experiences.

You write "the experience" and "would be exactly the same." But it wouldn't. Not at all, in final consequence.

Well, yes, future data might compel us to revise our hypotheses. That is generally true of hypotheses, which is one reason they are nearly all underdetermined.

[Belinda]

I am as puzzled as Immanuel. I'd have thought that the same dose of a psychoactive substance would have different experiential effects on different persons at different times, And I'd have thought that mood and other psychophysical states have different experiential effects on different persons at different times.
For instance teachers of young children say they can't learn when they are hungry.

I do of course recognise that experiences are real. I claim that experiences are the only reality .Whether experiences are caused by a naughty demon, by God, by psychoactive substance, or by hunger it's experiences that are real.

[Will Bouwman]

I am as puzzled as Immanuel. I'd have thought that the same dose of a psychoactive substance would have different experiential effects on different persons at different times...

It does. I don't think Mr Can is confused by that, after all, he postulates two hallucinators, one whose experience of jumping off a building is induced by drugs, the other whose experience is induced by jumping off a building. What have I said that makes you believe I think otherwise?
Incidentally, this idea that LSD can make you believe you can fly is almost certainly a myth. It really came to prominence when pushed by President Nixon's drug policy advisor, whose daughter fell to her death. Her autopsy found no trace of LSD. She was bipolar and probably took her own life in a fit of despair. I can only imagine her father's grief and it is possible he had to blame something other than his daughter's tragic affliction. LSD makes see things spectacularly differently, it doesn't make you stupid.

I do of course recognise that experiences are real. I claim that experiences are the only reality .

You might be right, so good for you.

[Immanuel Can]

You certainly see what I'm pointing to. I could have said "heroin," or "crack," or "fentanyl." The point is simple, in all cases: the "experience" isn't real.

It's very simple: the experience is real.

No, the experience is a perception of what may be real or what may be unreal. Delusions, confusions and dreams are phenomena: people have them. Anybody who doesn't know that, is one of them, obviously.

The perception, feeling, sensation, call it what you will, is real. The experiences you are having right now, all the sights, sounds, emotions; the entire contents of your mind, are real.

Amphiboly, again.

You're confusing two claims: "I really have a perception that..." and "The thing I'm perceiving is real." THAT one has perceptions is a fact; that these perceptions are all necessarily of what is REAL is false.

You write "the experience" and "would be exactly the same." But it wouldn't. Not at all, in final consequence.

Well, yes, future data might compel us to revise our hypotheses.

If you jump off a building, you're not "revising." You're corrected in the most absolute way. And the result is no longer a "hypothesis." It's a reality.

[Immanuel Can]

I am as puzzled as Immanuel. I'd have thought that the same dose of a psychoactive substance would have different experiential effects on different persons at different times, And I'd have thought that mood and other psychophysical states have different experiential effects on different persons at different times.

Of course they do. And this is further evidence that what is being perceived, in both cases, is not real. They're delusions.

One of the features of reality is that, whatever it is, it imposes itself on us, and all of us in the same sort of way. I perceive there to be a chair; you perceive the chair from a different side, or with a slightly different colour or shade -- but you don't perceive a goat, an aqualung or a pear tree. We are forced to perceive something in common.

That's how reality works. It's not how delusions work.

For instance teachers of young children say they can't learn when they are hungry.

They can. They just don't learn as well or as quickly.

I claim that experiences are the only reality .

We have to nuance that claim carefully, B. Yes, we are always perceiving, not in touch with the thing-in-itself. But if we are in touch with reality, what we are perceiving will be, so to speak, forced upon us, regardless of our preferences. Reality will compel us to see, essentially, the same object.

So experiences are not themselves reality. Reality, by contrast, is what constrains the sorts of experiences a normal mind has, in the presence of the similar conditions to other minds.

[Will Bouwman]

It's very simple: the experience is real.

No, the experience is a perception of what may be real or what may be unreal.

What sort of unreal thing can stimulate a perception?