Theories of Consciousness

[anonymous66]

I know this topic is old and sort of ran itself out after 3 weeks, but I just now see it and wasn't planning on reading it all.
I would call the 3 main options M, SD, and PD respectively, M for Monism since materialism is an unlikely subset of what I'll call scientific naturalism.

Anyone else enjoy exploring the different theories of Consciousness? I'd like to be able to understand as many of them as I can.

For the most part, they can be broken down into 3 main theories.

Materialism - the mind is the brain (or created by the brain). Brain states=mind states. It appears that for this to be the case, consciousness itself would have to be some kind of illusion. I've read some Daniel Dennett - including Bacteria to Bach.

How can anything not actually conscious experience an illusion? That seems self contradictory. I suspect you define the word differently than do I.
As an M person myself, I distinguish conscious process (the part you educate in a classroom) from subconscious process (the part you educate with practice). The latter is waaay more efficient and can to 6th order calculus problems in seconds that would take the inefficient conscious part probably half a day.

The illusion part comes up because materialism only admits physical properties. If mental properties aren't physical (do thoughts have a mass?), and yet we experience them, then following the logic, they must be illusory. Daniel Dennett actually referred to himself as an "illusionist". And of course there is Eliminative Materialism - it denies the existence of certain mental states - if those mental states don't actually exist, and yet we experience them, following the logic, they must be illusory. Doesn't it seem strange to deny the existence of something that so obviously exists? It appears to me that if I know anything, I know that mental properties exist.

It's kind of a problem for materialists / materialism, because if a materialist does actually admit that mental properties exist, then he is no longer a materialist, but rather some sort of dualist.

Galen Strawson suggests that we consider a new kind of monism - one that admits mental properties along with physical properties.

[anonymous66]

Substance dualism - there are 2 types of stuff - mind stuff (or soul stuff) and physical stuff. This appears to be the least popular right now - but there are a few reputable philosophers (i.e. Richard Swinburne) who defend the idea. This is the traditional idea that humans have an immortal soul.

Property dualism - I tend to lump this in with panpsychism. Panpsychism is the idea that everything has some kind of consciousness. Property dualism is the idea that in addition to the "regular" physical attributes like mass and size, there also exist mental properties. In reality, one could accept that property dualism is the case, but reject panpsychism... but I don't think that one could accept panpsychism and reject property dualism. I've read Thomas Nagel, David Chalmers, and Galen Strawson.

OK, I don't know enough about the dualism views to actually assert what they posit, but what they all have in common is a prediction of interaction between the substance or property, and normal physical effects. It can't work without that, so there has to be a structure somewhere sensitive to some cause that isn't a physical one. Sans finding such a thing, it all seem like bunk to me, but that's me. Every dualist I've seen (except Descartes) has hand waved it away, apparently letting it fall to 'magic'.

So anyway, for at least the substance dualists, or any one positing an afterlife, where does conscious thinking/pondering go on? In the physical part or the mental part? Same question with memory. Many people lose their memory near death, especially Alzheimer's victims. Does one get that back upon death, and if so, why isn't it accessible? What of all the other memories lost, including the bad ones, possibly suppressed?
When is the 'soul' assigned to a physical entity? Conception? What if said entity subsequently splits in two? That would mean that for identical twins, one of them is the original and the rest not. You say SD has low probability, but there's an awful lot of people who've bought into the afterlife story. Most of them don't actually attempt to rationalize the opinion, and I suppose we're confining the discussion to those that do.


For both PD and SD, are humans special in having access to this sort of thing? Regardless, do you deny evolution theory? If not, do all creatures have it, like say lichen or a virus? I suppose the panpsychists would say yes to that, but anybody that says not, there has to be a transition somewhere where a parent that operates in the physical way breeds a child that has access to the other way. For the SD case, this amounts to a sort of possession by a new thing with a will of its own, discarding everything evolution put there to have the being do the same task on its own. For the PD case I suppose it can be a gradual leverage of something that was always there but not used well or at all.


Anyway a66, if there are answers to any of this in the 10 pages, I didn't see them.

I guess I don't see the issue you do with evolution. It appears to me that whatever theory of consciousness a person subscribes to, that person could also say "I accept evolution" without holding any contradictory views.

Why would accepting both evolution and PD be a problem? Why would it be a problem to hold any theory of consciousness and also accept evolution?

I'm not sure what you mean by "special" either. I'm looking at this sentence "For both PD and SD, are humans special in having access to this sort of thing?" Can you elaborate?

[anonymous66]

None of this stuff is addressable by science because consciousness on Nagel's use and on Chalmers' use of that term is entirely non-empirical. There is an epistemic constraint here in that nothing arising within consciousness that can "get outside" of consciousness to find out what, if anything, is "really out there." The best we can do is construct metaphysical hypotheses and check for logical consistency. The upshot is that all logically consistent hypotheses must remain in play... the prejudicial elimination of any one of them is no better than religious dogma. I make one concession to prejudice and it is that ontological solipsism is sterile so, unable to take this any further, I pay no further heed to it. The remaining metaphysical hypotheses each lead in turn to a serious problem. Materialism (physicalism) leads to what Chalmers calls the "Hard Problem of Consciousness." Cartesian dualism leads to the "Interaction Problem." And Idealism leads to the "Combination Problem" (first identified by William James who referred to it as the "Mind Dust Problem"). The challenge, then, is to find a way past one or more of these problems. All else is hubris.

I think you meant to say "panspsychism" , not idealism. I believe your sentence should read, And panpsychism leads to the "Combination Problem" - assuming you take panpsychism to be synonymous with property dualism. The question being, how is it that many simple conscious parts can combine to form one complex conscious being?

I haven't put much thought into whether idealism could be an explanation for consciousness.

[Noax]

I know this topic is old and sort of ran itself out after 3 weeks ...

Couple months this time. I guess I don't check back on this site very often, partly due to the site logging me out 6 times during composing of this post, but mostly due to the absence of moderation. So apologies for the delay.

How can anything not actually conscious experience an illusion?

The illusion part comes up because materialism only admits physical properties. If mental properties aren't physical (do thoughts have a mass?), and yet we experience them, then following the logic, they must be illusory.

That's like saying that a physical rock cannot fall off a cliff because 'falling' has no mass even though the rock (and the physical apparatus doing the mental processes) both do have mass. So are you saying that at least materialism must deny all physical processes? I don't think you'll get a lot of agreement there

Daniel Dennett actually referred to himself as an "illusionist". And of course there is Eliminative Materialism - it denies the existence of certain mental states

Materialism doesn't necessitate these stances.

Doesn't it seem strange to deny the existence of something that so obviously exists?

Not being a realist, I don't think anything 'obviously' exists. I put incredibly little stock into that word, as well as into 'intuitive'. Work out the reasons why you think this thing obviously exists and you might see some assumptions that are not so obvious.

It's kind of a problem for materialists / materialism, because if a materialist does actually admit that mental properties exist, then he is no longer a materialist, but rather some sort of dualist.

Nonsense. A typical materialist would suggest that mental processes are material processes, that is, interactions between material components.

I guess I don't see the issue you do with evolution.

My only issue is that people tend to agree with it, but turn away from the details. I noticed you didn't answer my questions (nor any about a potential identity or afterlife), so I cannot identify where the sticking point is for you. To repeat:
Do all things have consciousness, like say lichen, virus, amphiphiles, RNA molecules, rocks?

I'm looking at this sentence "For both PD and SD, are humans special in having access to this sort of thing?" Can you elaborate?

I asked about a list of things above. Some posit that only humans have this dualistic mind, making them preferred (special) entities in the universe. Many religions suggest exactly this. Only humans are eligible for going to heaven or whatever.

[Eodnhoj7]

Anyone else enjoy exploring the different theories of Consciousness? I'd like to be able to understand as many of them as I can.

For the most part, they can be broken down into 3 main theories.

Materialism - the mind is the brain (or created by the brain). Brain states=mind states. It appears that for this to be the case, consciousness itself would have to be some kind of illusion. I've read some Daniel Dennett - including Bacteria to Bach.

Substance dualism - there are 2 types of stuff - mind stuff (or soul stuff) and physical stuff. This appears to be the least popular right now - but there are a few reputable philosophers (i.e. Richard Swinburne) who defend the idea. This is the traditional idea that humans have an immortal soul.

Property dualism - I tend to lump this in with panpsychism. Panpsychism is the idea that everything has some kind of consciousness. Property dualism is the idea that in addition to the "regular" physical attributes like mass and size, there also exist mental properties. In reality, one could accept that property dualism is the case, but reject panpsychism... but I don't think that one could accept panpsychism and reject property dualism. I've read Thomas Nagel, David Chalmers, and Galen Strawson.

I've read a few articles about Integrated Information Theory - and I'm aware of the idea of Neutral Monism - they both appear to be either very similar to or are a form of panpsychism.

Consciousness is inseperable from distinction for consciousness is a distinction by nature of consciousness making it a distinction.