The Democrat Party Hates America

[Will Bouwman]

Oh. To paraphrase you, "people with a sense of humour" expect jokes to be amusing or witty, rather than merely gratutious.

Not everyone finds the same things amusing or witty, but I would expect someone with a sense of humour to recognise a joke, even one they don't find funny.

Would that reply be snarky or not?

Mr Can, if you set a trap, finish the job and add some camouflage.

So you don't assert that physics is going to be the answer to things like mind, morals, etc?

Finally!

Instead, you merely plead that you have no idea what physics can or cannot do eventually...

Also correct.

...and hence, that you have no stable concept in your mind of what "physics" even entails as a discipline?

That's a bit more complicated. I can run with your physics deals with the physical, I'm even prepared to accept it as definitional, but it has no content. You haven't defined what is physical and nobody, not even you, knows the metaphysical cause of physical phenomena. As I said, I understand that your view is essentially Cartesian dualism. Nothing wrong with that as an hypothesis, but that's what it is, and as I said, it is not the most parsimonious. Some version of idealism could be true, the problem being that the evidence can be accounted for equally well by many hypotheses; which is precisely why there are so many. It is the hard of thinking and the bonkers who believe only one hypothesis could be true. Now, I know perfectly well that you will insist that only one hypothesis is true, which I happen to believe. The trouble is, from a list of empirically adequate options, choosing one is a choice determined by your preferences; which is why I say it is fundamentally an aesthetic choice.

Feel free to correct the impression you're leaving.

It is only someone as tenacious as yourself who could maintain a false impression in the face of repeated denials as long as you have.

[Will Bouwman]

You will NOT want to miss it!

I already do.

[Immanuel Can]

Oh. To paraphrase you, "people with a sense of humour" expect jokes to be amusing or witty, rather than merely gratutious.

Not everyone finds the same things amusing or witty, but I would expect someone with a sense of humour to recognise a joke, even one they don't find funny.

Well, I guess that what you said was like a joke, only not as funny.

Would that reply be snarky or not?

Mr Can, if you set a trap, finish the job and add some camouflage.

Hey, they were your words. If you don't like the snark, don't use the words.

Instead, you merely plead that you have no idea what physics can or cannot do eventually...

Also correct.

...and hence, that you have no stable concept in your mind of what "physics" even entails as a discipline?

That's a bit more complicated. I can run with your physics deals with the physical, I'm even prepared to accept it as definitional, but it has no content. You haven't defined what is physical and nobody, not even you, knows the metaphysical cause of physical phenomena.

It has this content, for sure: that it points out the derivation of the term "physics." And while that should be screamingly obvious, perhaps it's not, to all people -- after all, there are those (like Emergentists and Eliminativists) who think it can explain metaphysics, even though it exhibits no ability at all to do so at present.

As I said, I understand that your view is essentially Cartesian dualism.

Then I'm sorry, but you don't understand it at all. Cartesian dualism is Gnostic, and explicitly so. I have no hint of the Gnostic in my beliefs.

Nothing wrong with that as an hypothesis, but that's what it is, and as I said, it is not the most parsimonious.

"Parsimony," while a virtue of some epistemics, is not a virtue of all, and demonstrably so. There was a time when it was thought that reality was composed of "matter." Parsimonious? Yes. It's far easier to believe in the simple solidity of "matter" than to explain vibrating energy fields or quarks. Materialism sure was parsimonious -- but also, as it turns out, reductional and untrue.

Now, I know perfectly well that you will insist that only one hypothesis is true, which I happen to believe. The trouble is, from a list of empirically adequate options, choosing one is a choice determined by your preferences; which is why I say it is fundamentally an aesthetic choice.

I don't think so. I don't think you will really think that either, once you consider it more carefully.

Does the presence of theories like Aristotelian "elements" or the old theory of "matter" make it merely a matter of aesthetic choice when one is believing in quarks? Of course not. One theory accords much better with the available date than the other two: in fact, the available data now renders the other two theories implausible and indeed, impossible. Once can remain Aristotelian or Materialist only by refusing the data...no other way. "Aesthetics" have nothing at all to offer that situation.

Likewise, as you say, no matter what one "aesthetically" believes, only one hypothesis will turn out to be true. Of course, if we don't have all the theories possible, then all the ones we have could be equally false -- a situation which, again, recourse to "aesthetics" will do nothing at all to cure.

Or to put it another way, and to quote the old aphorism, "Reality is what you run into when your beliefs are false." There will still only be one truth, whether or not at a given moment anybody knows what it is. But possibly, some do. And it's the question of which theory is most fitting to the data which is really the only interesting question -- aesthetics, that is, what people might prefer, has nothing at all to tell us. It's worse than useless.

[Will Bouwman]

Now, I know perfectly well that you will insist that only one hypothesis is true, which I happen to believe. The trouble is, from a list of empirically adequate options, choosing one is a choice determined by your preferences; which is why I say it is fundamentally an aesthetic choice.

I don't think so. I don't think you will really think that either, once you consider it more carefully.

Does the presence of theories like Aristotelian "elements" or the old theory of "matter" make it merely a matter of aesthetic choice when one is believing in quarks? Of course not. One theory accords much better with the available date than the other two...

You really should read with more care. My point is not that aesthetics has a direct impact in discovering truth; it is that if someone chooses from a list of empirically adequate options, in other words different hypotheses that account for the data equally well, there is no scientific reason to prefer any one of them. I think if you consider that more carefully, you will think so.

[Impenitent]

if aesthetic curves are indicators of truth, are 8's twice as true as 0's?

-Imp

[Immanuel Can]

Now, I know perfectly well that you will insist that only one hypothesis is true, which I happen to believe. The trouble is, from a list of empirically adequate options, choosing one is a choice determined by your preferences; which is why I say it is fundamentally an aesthetic choice.

I don't think so. I don't think you will really think that either, once you consider it more carefully.

Does the presence of theories like Aristotelian "elements" or the old theory of "matter" make it merely a matter of aesthetic choice when one is believing in quarks? Of course not. One theory accords much better with the available date than the other two...

You really should read with more care. My point is not that aesthetics has a direct impact in discovering truth; it is that if someone chooses from a list of empirically adequate options, in other words different hypotheses that account for the data equally well, there is no scientific reason to prefer any one of them. I think if you consider that more carefully, you will think so.

I think not. The options in question are never "empirically adequate" to the same degree, of course. One can imagine so, but only by refusing to consider the empirical and other data. And even in such cases as the observer is unable to discern, aesthetics will deliver no information at all that's useful in locating which one is closest to the one thing that matters: reality.

One will always find that reality is highly uncompromising on mere aesthetic preferences when the attempt is made to use them to select truth. What I would like to think and what is actually true are often not at all the same.

[Will Bouwman]

You really should read with more care. My point is not that aesthetics has a direct impact in discovering truth; it is that if someone chooses from a list of empirically adequate options, in other words different hypotheses that account for the data equally well, there is no scientific reason to prefer any one of them. I think if you consider that more carefully, you will think so.

I think not. The options in question are never "empirically adequate" to the same degree, of course.

There aren't degrees of empirical adequacy, an hypothesis either accounts for the data, or it doesn't.

One can imagine so, only by refusing to consider the empirical and other data.

If an hypothesis accounts for all the data, there aren't any more data.

And even in such cases as the observer is unable to discern, aesthetics will deliver no information at all that's useful in locating which one is closest to the one thing that matters: reality.

In human affairs, reality doesn't matter as much as what people believe. That includes science, in which what matters is whether a theory works. Obviously reality is what it is, but our window to it, primarily our senses, and then whatever technology we can devise to augment them, provide data which we then have to interpret. This is the important bit: there are always different ways to interpret whatever current set of data is at our disposal. Exactly the same data generate different hypotheses that explain exactly the same data. Since different hypotheses explain exactly the same data, there is no way to tell which, if any, is the one that corresponds to reality. We are therefore presented with a choice of hypotheses that science cannot tell apart. If we choose to believe one of them, it is not for scientific reasons. You might not like my use of aesthetic in this context, but that is my choice.

One will always find that reality is highly uncompromising on mere aesthetic preferences when the attempt is made to use them to select truth. What I would like to think and what is actually true are often not at all the same.

Yes, I know. This is not about what is actually true. It is about what people choose to believe.

[Immanuel Can]

You really should read with more care. My point is not that aesthetics has a direct impact in discovering truth; it is that if someone chooses from a list of empirically adequate options, in other words different hypotheses that account for the data equally well, there is no scientific reason to prefer any one of them. I think if you consider that more carefully, you will think so.

I think not. The options in question are never "empirically adequate" to the same degree, of course.

There aren't degrees of empirical adequacy, an hypothesis either accounts for the data, or it doesn't.

That's only true when one is considering all the data. Even a bad theory accounts for some data. If it didn't it wouldn't be a theory about that phenomenon.

And even in such cases as the observer is unable to discern, aesthetics will deliver no information at all that's useful in locating which one is closest to the one thing that matters: reality.

In human affairs, reality doesn't matter as much as what people believe.

That's not close to true: falsehoods are always worse than reality. Consider engineering: does it matter whether or not the bridge can hold your weight, or only whether or not you think it can?

You might not like my use of aesthetic in this context, but that is my choice.

My objection is not aesthetic. It's about the fact your claim is not true.

One will always find that reality is highly uncompromising on mere aesthetic preferences when the attempt is made to use them to select truth. What I would like to think and what is actually true are often not at all the same.

Yes, I know. This is not about what is actually true. It is about what people choose to believe.

Perhaps that's what you're thinking. It's not what I'm saying.

[Will Bouwman]

You might not like my use of aesthetic in this context, but that is my choice.

My objection is not aesthetic. It's about the fact your claim is not true.

Here we go. Tell me, what is my claim?

[Immanuel Can]

You might not like my use of aesthetic in this context, but that is my choice.

My objection is not aesthetic. It's about the fact your claim is not true.

Here we go. Tell me, what is my claim?

"If we choose to believe one of them, it is not for scientific reasons."

No, it's for reasons of truthfulness: because two different theories NEVER align with exactly the same data. Such a thing simply never happens at all.

If they did, they would not be "different" at all. It is for scientific reasons we should evaluate theories, not mere aesthetic ones. Aesthetic reasons have no utility in the matter of discerning objective truth. In fact, there, aesthetic reasoning is nothing but an impediment.

[Alexis Jacobi]

In human affairs, reality doesn't matter as much as what people believe.

Yes, I know. This is not about what is actually true. It is about what people choose to believe.

Obviously what you note is true: many people believe things by choice, and especially in the domain of extremely subjective and personal topics. One could add that people hold to their beliefs by necessity as well. Take as an example the belief that “prayer works”. Hardly commensurate with the scientific interpretive system.

The Seventeenth century impetus in declaring that there are genuine solidities about reality that one can count on, and ranges of “beliefs” that are questionable (and by implication likely false), is what I understand you to be referring to. The effect on mythic belief and poetic description was — still is — devastating.

I also assume you are making reference to the tendency in people to believe really outrageous and unverifiable things — wild theories such as there are extraterrestrials who live in the center of the earth and enter and exit by way of openings at the poles. Where elaborate fantasies are blended with semi-scientific possibilities in a form of interpretive pastiche.

In all these areas I can understand why you refer to aesthetics as determining what people decide to believe.

But I wonder if you can provide example of things believed in by serious scientists about the nature of reality that are “aesthetic” in a similar sense?

Also, it seems that the word aesthetic is a bit insufficient since to believe in truly outrageous things that are mythically-based is likely more psychologically-driven than an issue of the “prettiness” of a given theory.

[Will Bouwman]

My objection is not aesthetic. It's about the fact your claim is not true.

Here we go. Tell me, what is my claim?

"If we choose to believe one of them, it is not for scientific reasons."

No, it's for reasons of truthfulness: because two different theories NEVER align with exactly the same data. Such a thing simply never happens at all.

That is wrong. Can you think of one piece of empirical evidence that could possibly differentiate between dualism and idealism?
If that isn't sciency enough for you, this article includes a table of gravitational theories, four of which are listed as viable:
https://ned.ipac.caltech.edu/level5/ESS ... stein.html
Newtonian gravity isn't one of them, but it is very much a part of science because it works extremely well in almost all cases. Hypotheses do not have to be true to be useful.

[Immanuel Can]

Here we go. Tell me, what is my claim?

"If we choose to believe one of them, it is not for scientific reasons."

No, it's for reasons of truthfulness: because two different theories NEVER align with exactly the same data. Such a thing simply never happens at all.

That is wrong. Can you think of one piece of empirical evidence that could possibly differentiate between dualism and idealism?

If they're the same theory, how come even you have two different names for the same theory? If you don't recognize them as different, you're not asking a coherent question: if your question is coherent, then even YOU know they're different.

So how do you want to play it? That the theories are effectively the same, or that they're meaningfully different?

But as it is, the matter's not hard. Idealism does not explain material data; it dismisses all that by relegating it to the realm of "ideas." In that sense, like all mono-theories, it simply deals with data anomalies by denying they are real.

Hypotheses do not have to be true to be useful.

"Useful" is not a great criterion, because things get "used" for bad and dishonest purposes. For instance, no doubt Marxism is "useful" for increasing social control; many autocrats have found it is. That doesn't make it a good or true theory. It just makes it "useful" to villains.

However, in regard to scientific theories, the more true they are, the more genuinely useful they are. Reality's like that: it always provides better confirmation for the better hypothesis.

[Alexis Jacobi]

That's not close to true: falsehoods are always worse than reality. Consider engineering: does it matter whether or not the bridge can hold your weight, or only whether or not you think it can?

If I understand Will correctly I do not think he refers to the type knowledge that determines what is true and accurate in engineering as being aesthetically subjective. It is in that realm where basic, verifiable and completely trustworthy grasp of reality apply.

I was seeking an example to illustrate subjective beliefs that are speculative, and yet resonate with men because, somehow and on some level they illustrate truths.

Take for example Macbeth’s encounter with the Weird Sisters on the heath. The story illustrates an imagined event, and yet Macbeth’s fate — being driven by powers that seem to operate in our shared world and the terrible outcomes that resulted from his “choices” — reveals to a discerning man something about “reality” that is extra-scientific.

The “fact” of enticing and seductive powers that can seduce and capture men and lead them into extreme levels of crime and “sin” is not a science-verifiable realm.

And the deep ancestral guilt associated with cold-blooded murder of a benevolent kinsman and king — it can hardly be understood in science-terms.

If one “believed-in” such supernatural Fates in our science-interpretive dominated present, one would be considered a lunatic. But you as a Christian do surely believe-in the powers of temptation orchestrated by a demonic, anti-god power …

If I am not mistaken Will says that he cannot verify whether or not these “supernatural” forces exist or not. And in his view belief in them is ultimately determined by aesthetics.

[Will Bouwman]

Where elaborate fantasies are blended with semi-scientific possibilities in a form of interpretive pastiche.

In all these areas I can understand why you refer to aesthetics as determining what people decide to believe.

But I wonder if you can provide example of things believed in by serious scientists about the nature of reality that are “aesthetic” in a similar sense?

If you Google 'theories of the universe', Gus, you will be presented with a list of things like Braneworld, multiverse, simulation, holographic and more. These maybe elaborate fantasies, but they are taken seriously by serious scientists.
That different scientists choose to explore different hypotheses is down to their particular idiosyncrasies. They choose them for fundamentally the same character of reasoning that one chooses what music to listen to.
You might find it more plausible coming from a NobelPrize winner. As the late, great Richard Feynman noted: "Every theoretical physicist who's any good, knows 5 or 6 theories for exactly the same physics."
https://youtu.be/NM-zWTU7X-k?si=-3GT3Ya951GUcseI