Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Tue May 27, 2025 9:27 pm
That's a thoroughly unhelpful "definition." If fails to specify what those "reasons" would be, what the "anti-response" would entail, and what would justify calling "reasons" "sufficient." In other words, it says absolutely nothing specific.
Then it also makes unclear what the real connection between "unpleasant" and "bad" would be. Many things that are "unpleasant" are good...like cough medicine. And things which some people find "pleasant," like theft or adultery, could be "bad."
So you've given nothing that informs us of anything.
Only if "unpleasant" and "bad" turn out to be the same, which even you now admit they are not...though even your claim that "unpleasantness" is involved with "badness" remains unclear.
That's just circular. Being "unpleasant" simply means being "disliked." The "avoidably" is also gratuitous: what would "avoidance" have to do with either?
Wait.
If "unpleasantness" "intrinsically provides sufficient reason" for an "anti-response," and that is also your definition of "bad" (see above), then you are saying homosexuality is bad, and "intrinsically" so. And the basis for that would be no more than that some people "unavoidably" feel an "unpleasantness" about it.
Which is not informative of anything, since all of the terms you use remain undefined. You've said nothing, essentially. We're no closer to knowing what you mean by "bad" than before, since we can't know what "provides sufficient reason" or "anti-reaction" or "unpleasantness" entail.
It looks like you're plugging for a very weak form of Emotivism, in which your own personal emotions determine whether things are "good" or "bad," and your own sense of "sufficient reasons" is all that's available for us to use in moral reflection: and that's just not good enough for anybody else, is it?
No. I'm saying the opposite. I'm saying that that is what YOU might need in order to make your case, but you can't have it. Pain is an
effect, but it doesn't tell us the moral quality of the thing with which it comes packaged. Some painful things are good, and some painless things are bad. Pain actually has no ability to tell us anything about the moral situation, or goodness or badness, or justification.
No, I am definitely doing no such thing.
I'm pointing out, rather, that the presence of pain tells us nothing, morally speaking. And that in ethics, we aren't at all concerned with whether or not people happen to like or feel pleasantness about what they're doing; we're only concerned with whether or not what we're asking them to do is RIGHT, even if it causes them pain, or even if it offers any pleasure.
The same critiques still work. You can see that.
Are you asking a question? It needs a question mark, then.
I'd be interested in how you think your moral theory would answer this. That's why I asked.
So you haven't done anything to resolve the conflict between the theories that hold that "good" means "good intentions," as in Kant, and "good" means "pleasant outcomes or consequences," as per Mill et al. So we can't know whether or not dosing somebody with fentanyl is good or bad. This is what I mean about your theory being totally morally uninformative: we're no more clear on the situation than we were at the start, and your theory has added no useful information to our moral judgment at all.
Then it would mean you can't tell anything about goodness or badness until after all the participants are dead. And yes, that would be a very serious -- even terminal -- fault in any such theory. It literally could not inform any living person about the moral status of his/her situation. And it sure won't inform the dead.
Then you need to read Hume. He did. And I linked you an article that quoted not only him but a bunch of other authors reacting to Hume.

Are you not even aware that the word "ought" is essential to moral thinking? Ethics is not about what you
feel you want to do, or what
you can be able to do, or what you
find convenient to do. You can know all three without knowing anything about morals or ethics at all...just by consulting your gut or your momentary disposition. But if ethics/morals are real things, then they have to do with what one
should or
ought to do, regardless of one's feelings in the moment.
If we say "It is moral to die for one's family," we are not asking, "Do you want to die?" We aren't asking, "Would you find it pleasant?" We aren't even asking, "Do you want to?" We're saying, instead, that it would be good/noble/courageous/admirable and right to do it, especially if you find it something you'd rather not do, and will be painful and hard, and you wouldn't otherwise do. In other words, something you "ought" to do, not something you feel like doing.
In that, all philosophers of ethics agree. It's you that has no ally on that. "Ought" is the essential term of all ethical/moral reflection...as also suggested by the OP here.
Did you even read the article?
I did them all. And you ignored all I did. If that's what you do, I can't stop you.
No. I'm pointing out that you can't even use "pleasant" as a mere
indicator of goodness. The two are utterly unrelated, and only ever occur in each other's company by accident. That's what I'm pointing out.
Justify that claim. why is he "doing evil"? He likes it. He wants it. He can do it. And he finds it pleasant.
But he knows exactly what he's doing. And he finds it fun. How do you convince him he
ought not to do it?
Are you actually suggesting that when an Atheist says, "That was a good meal," he means it was
morally good?

I'll bet he doesn't. He means by "good" something like "tasty" or "gustatorially fulfilling," or "aesthetically pleasing." He doesn't mean anything moral at all. So there's no such conflict. It's not a morality-implicating situation. The Atheist can have his "good meal" without even involving himself in ethics.
this is answered simply by the fact that God
does not change His nature. You needed an "if" to get your argument off the ground; but it was an "if" even less possible than, "If I could flap my arms hard enough, I could fly." It's outright impossible. So no, it's not a live criticism. It's not even one that the imagination can fabricate without misunderstanding what the word "God" (in reference to the only God that actually exists) means.
Oh, that's easy to answer. Because the ultimate good of man is fellowship with God. It's both the thing
best for man, and t
he thing for which he was designed. It's good in every possible way, in fact. So you should seek what is consistent with the nature of God so as to be a fit companion for God. And if you seek anything else, you'll only be seeking that which is evil -- that which is all three of, hurtful to you, damaging to your relationship with your Creator, and ultimately defeating of your own whole reason for being in existence.