Reference

[Ollie.ha]

One sec…

[Ollie.ha]

What is the relationship between something and its context?

If the context of something is that it is true, but the thought is that it is either true or false, what is the relationship between the two?

[Martin Peter Clarke]

Total taboo with the “not such that” but I think you get the picture.

(x ¬ | ∃x) = ∅ ⊕ {∅}) ⊕ ∅

Translates: ((the reference x, is not, the reason for, the existence, of x) that being, false, or, true) or all that being false

Is this unsolvable?

I mean what happens if you prove x ¬ | ∃x?

Not even contingent then?

That helps a lot!!!!

Sorry, I was being lazy. It was late as I said. That wasn't in answer to the question, but my response to the translation. I've edited anadromously.

[Martin Peter Clarke]

What is the relationship between something and its context?

If the context of something is that it is true, but the thought is that it is either true or false, what is the relationship between the two?

A contingency within a certainty?

[Ollie.ha]

See? Yes this is the type of thing I’m looking for!

[Ollie.ha]

Ok so instead of contingency let’s say uncertainty, and leave the certainty that is about that…

If you were to include the definition of uncertainty in the definition of certainty, wouldn’t that make a certain understanding?

[Ollie.ha]

lol “if I say “not black” is “blue” that’s not the opposite which is “white”!!!”

Certainty definitely means not uncertainty, but not uncertainty, does not necessarily mean certainty

Not certainty doesn’t necessarily mean uncertainty, but not not certainty definitely means certainty…

So the definition of the opposite isn’t included in a double negative

We need a new way of defining “certainty” including “uncertainty”

[Ollie.ha]

If we define uncertainty in the definition of certainty, the lack of knowledge will not contradict the notion of certainty because it is included in the definition

[Trajk Logik]

So - I have come to the conclusion that the word “ truth” could be better understood by calling it a “reference that is the same as itself”.

If we dissect reference itself we find that it has two components, the referenced, and the referencing. The relationship between those two is only the same if both are true, different if what is said or done is false (one but not both)

What is the nature of reference? How does it function? It’s questions like these that make for, what I consider, good rationalism.

Looks like a misuse of language to me. Truth is simply a type of relationship between the referrer and the the referenced. Falsehood is another type of relationship between the referrer and the referenced. Which relation is the case depends on how much the referrer represents the referenced.

In epistemology, philosophers are typically skeptical about how much of the world we know via our sensory representations. While our sensory representations might refer to some properties of some external thing, it does not exhaust what it means to be that thing. So are the representations of the world we experience true or false, or somewhere in between?

[Ollie.ha]

So - I have come to the conclusion that the word “ truth” could be better understood by calling it a “reference that is the same as itself”.

If we dissect reference itself we find that it has two components, the referenced, and the referencing. The relationship between those two is only the same if both are true, different if what is said or done is false (one but not both)

What is the nature of reference? How does it function? It’s questions like these that make for, what I consider, good rationalism.

Looks like a misuse of language to me. Truth is simply a type of relationship between the referrer and the the referenced. Falsehood is another type of relationship between the referrer and the referenced. Which relation is the case depends on how much the referrer represents the referenced.

In epistemology, philosophers are typically skeptical about how much of the world we know via our sensory representations. While our sensory representations might refer to some properties of some external thing, it does not exhaust what it means to be that thing. So are the representations of the world we experience true or false, or somewhere in between?

I learned that the relationship between the referrer and the referenced is that if the thing you’re thinking exists, then the referrer “does not create” the referenced