The Democrat Party Hates America

[BigMike]

But let’s step back for a moment. You’re not defending truth. You’re defending utility. You’ve given up on whether free will is real, and instead staked your position on the idea that it’s a helpful lie—like Santa Claus for grownups. That’s your hill. And I need you to recognize that. You’re not arguing it exists. You’re arguing it’s useful.

And you know what? Sometimes illusions do feel useful. Placebos relieve pain. National myths hold countries together. But here’s the question you keep dodging: At what cost?

I mean this is a philosophy debate and you are arguing about what is better for society so in a sense you are arguing for utility. You're not arguing for truth.

1. Belief in free will does not fuel cruelty.

2. Determinism destroys accountability because by definition no one chose to do what they did so they can't be blamed for it. Again accountability is incompatible with determinism, which is a point Sapolsky makes in his work (he even uses determinism to argue for no on deserving anything, that would include effort in things like sports or art). What you've described simply isn't true.

3. History and social structure is a story, it's the world of meaning we weave and inhabit. By determinism you cannot alter inputs, that implies agency that determinism says you don't have. Something either works or doesn't. That's not how change, parenting, or behavior science works. In fact if you knew anything about behavior science you'd know the story being told is important for animals like us. But again, under determinism people have no choice, meaning such interventions likely won't work if people don't believe in agency.

4. Stories are engines and maps. You keep talking about science and physics when all of that is maps too. All we have are maps, not reality itself. Revolution, pain, need, oppression, those are all stories being told by us. Read Buddhism to see how all that is a narrative built around a self, a self that does not exist under determinism.

5. I don't cite them out of context. I know he says free will doesn't exist (though his book and work don't necessarily prove that) but he acknowledges that society runs on that belief and so do our social interactions, entertainment, everything. That's why in the interview he said he didn't know how to implement a society without that. He assumes nothing would change when it clearly would.

My objection is to the science, because there is mixed results about free will. But more than that it's the social impact that's more important and one that I'd argue is the end point of science. Science is after all a human social endeavor to understand reality and we use that to guide us and society.

6. This:

Some might. At first. That’s why we reframe. Not with lies, but with new language. Instead of “you control everything,” we say, “Your choices are shaped by your past, but your future can still change—if we change what shapes it.” That’s still cause and effect. It’s still motivational. And it’s true.

Is literally false under determinism. You are still thinking with free will with "if we change what shapes it". You are telling people they are leaves on the wind subject to forces they don't control and at the mercy of things they don't understand. It's literally the death of motivation. No one is going to get out of bed in the morning if it feels like they aren't living their lives but just going through the motions. That nothing they do is in their hands and they have no choice about anything. Everything they love is because of outside forces, nothing about them. The people they cherish didn't chose them, it was just inevitable.

Really think hard about number 6 because I feel like you don't get it. It's that naivete that just assumes it will work out when all the evidence we have shows that removing the feeling of choice or agency leads to depression and suicide.

There is no point to living life if you control none of it.

https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2021/ ... l%20health.

You ask why I “want to take belief in free will away.” I don’t want to take anything. I want us to grow out of it. Like we outgrew geocentrism. Or bloodletting. Or divine kings. And yes, that kind of growth is scary. But clinging to a comforting falsehood because it “keeps people in line” is not noble—it’s cowardice.

You have fantasies that don't match reality. Not to mention your examples aren't nearly comparable. Geocentrism was valid from the observations at the time and useful until new data up turned it, but it's not like it harmed people by doing it. Blood letting and divine kinds were also harmful. But free will, the belief in choice and agency has real consequences for peoples lives, and taking away that would ruin society (again...evidence). You aren't talking about growth, it's just ego stroking. Assuming you know best when you clearly have no idea the damage it would do or how to fix it.

It doesn't "keep people in line" it's what drives everything we do. You have no plan for it's removal, just assurances nothing would change.

If determinism is true, then people are not evil—they’re injured. They’re not broken—they’re caused. And the moment we stop pretending they “could have done otherwise,” we start building systems that don’t just punish, but actually prevent.

That's the thing, we don't. You don't get it, under determinism there is no reason for someone who doesn't give a damn to do so, because they have no choice or say in how they feel. You really don't get how pervasive the belief in choice and agency impacts human psychology and society. Under determinism there aren't people, just machines.

It's LITERALLY just physics playing out.

And if you don’t like that idea—fine. But don’t pretend the data is on your side. And don’t confuse popularity with proof. Because truth doesn’t need applause. It just needs to be faced.

And that’s exactly what I’m doing.

You're kidding yourself if you think you're talking about truth. Your thinking on this is so narrow that it's hard to argue because you can't see. The data is on my side, as we have shown when people are robbed of choice or agency they get depressed. All you have is "just so" statements not rooted in reality.

Whether you admit it or not humans run on illusions, heck our own perception of the world is not reality. We already don't live in truth. You ignored the data I gave that supported that.

You're not serious about this, that much is clear, because your whole plan is just "trust me bro" followed by mere insistences.

Darkneos—

Let’s break this down one more time, clearly and calmly, because you’re throwing a lot, and underneath it all is a single, fatal confusion:

You keep saying determinism means “there’s no point,” “no one does anything,” “no one gets out of bed,” “there’s no you.” But that’s not an argument. That’s just despair dressed up as analysis. And it’s based on a mistaken view of motivation—a view that assumes people act because of abstract beliefs about “agency.”

They don’t.

People act because their needs aren’t met.

Let’s get real: motivation doesn’t come from metaphysics. It comes from lack. From pressure. From tension. From unmet needs.

Every act of courage, every protest, every invention, every reform, every relationship, every “why” you’ve ever cared about—it was driven not by belief in magical freedom, but by some form of unsatisfied Maslow-level need. Safety. Belonging. Esteem. Survival. Purpose.

You don’t get up in the morning because you believe in libertarian free will. You get up because you’re hungry. Because someone needs you. Because you fear poverty. Or loneliness. Or failure. Or you’re chasing meaning, love, security, identity. And all of those are caused.

So let’s drop the fantasy that people need to think they’re metaphysically “free” to act. They need to feel that something matters—and that they can affect it. Determinism doesn’t rob them of that. It explains how it happens.

---

You keep saying:

“Under determinism there are no people. Just machines.”

Okay. First: you’re a machine. And so am I. But that doesn’t mean you don’t think, feel, cry, laugh, hurt, hope. Those things are real. They’re just caused. You want a ghost in the machine because the machine feels too cold. But the ghost was always imaginary. And the machine? It’s us. Beautiful, flawed, patterned, and improvable.

You say:

“There’s no reason to do anything if I’m not free.”

That’s just false. Determinism doesn’t say “nothing matters.” It says everything that happens—including what matters to you—comes from somewhere. Your hunger matters. Your loss matters. Your history matters. And that drives your action. Not the illusion that you’re a little god floating above cause.

---

And here’s the thing about your insistence that belief in free will “works”:

Even if it motivates some people in some studies—it also justifies cruelty. It’s why we say poor people “deserve” to suffer. It’s why we imprison drug addicts. It’s why we shame trauma victims. Because we pretend they “could’ve chosen differently.”

That’s your “helpful” illusion. That’s the cost.

And sure, you can say Sapolsky doesn’t have a full blueprint for a deterministic society. Fine. Who does? But it doesn’t mean the alternative is right. Nobody knew how to build a post-monarchy world at first either. That’s how progress works—it starts with truth, not comfort.

You keep shouting, “But people get depressed if they don’t feel agency!”

Yes. That’s exactly why we need to reframe agency, not fake it. We teach people: “You are not your trauma. You are not broken. Your actions come from somewhere, and if we change those inputs, things can get better.” That’s not disempowering. That’s compassionate design.

---

So let’s land this:

• Motivation comes from need, not freedom.
• Meaning comes from connection, not magic.
• Progress comes from truth, not myth.
• And determinism, properly understood, is not fatalism. It’s a path to real responsibility, real change, real healing.

You don’t need to believe in Santa Claus to love your kids. And you don’t need to believe in metaphysical free will to act, grow, or care. You just need to understand what drives you—and build systems that support it.

That’s the work I’m doing. And that’s the future I’m fighting for.

[FlashDangerpants]

How free do you reckon you are? It must be agreed some people are more free of restrictions than others.

I am familiar with that move. So sure, I have freedoms that are not available to people with no imagination, but I lack freedoms that a billionaire with a private jet has to go to some places etc. Or if you want to go Berlin style, I have the negative freedom to leap leap tall buildings in a single bound - there is no act of man that can stop me, but I don't have the positive freedom to do so because I am no Superman.

That was fun, but it has nothing really to do with the metaphysics of free will, it's a bait and switch move.

I agree with all your examples.Simply that freedom of choice is relative to the life one leads. The life one leads is relative to other lives and to inanimate things and ideas.. Even if there were no such events as causes (or causal determinism) we pretty well know that experiences link up together and that some links are more probable than others. It's more probable that a man will feel sleepy in the morning if he is kept awake all night.
It is less probable that a man will steal if he and his dependants are not hungry.
I cannot see what actual 'work' this free will thing is logically supposed to be doing.

The point of an underdetermined situation is that nobody can see what extra work any of the options is doing. Our experience of our lives as we live them is perfectly compatible with the hard determinism, soft determinism, compatibilist, soft free will or hardcore free will metaphysical positions.

The role of constraints, habit, biologically informed preferences, missing organs and senses or whatnot don't change the metaphysics of the case, they just add an extra bit of talk that is still equally covered no matter what option is "the truth" that we cannot actually uncover.

There is no way to discover which is the case, all that can happen is that you can persuade yourself to believe one or another. This is harmless up until you convince yourself that people who believe one of the other options are stupid, or evil. It's bit like religion really.

[BigMike]

I am familiar with that move. So sure, I have freedoms that are not available to people with no imagination, but I lack freedoms that a billionaire with a private jet has to go to some places etc. Or if you want to go Berlin style, I have the negative freedom to leap leap tall buildings in a single bound - there is no act of man that can stop me, but I don't have the positive freedom to do so because I am no Superman.

That was fun, but it has nothing really to do with the metaphysics of free will, it's a bait and switch move.

I agree with all your examples.Simply that freedom of choice is relative to the life one leads. The life one leads is relative to other lives and to inanimate things and ideas.. Even if there were no such events as causes (or causal determinism) we pretty well know that experiences link up together and that some links are more probable than others. It's more probable that a man will feel sleepy in the morning if he is kept awake all night.
It is less probable that a man will steal if he and his dependants are not hungry.
I cannot see what actual 'work' this free will thing is logically supposed to be doing.

The point of an underdetermined situation is that nobody can see what extra work any of the options is doing. Our experience of our lives as we live them is perfectly compatible with the hard determinism, soft determinism, compatibilist, soft free will or hardcore free will metaphysical positions.

The role of constraints, habit, biologically informed preferences, missing organs and senses or whatnot don't change the metaphysics of the case, they just add an extra bit of talk that is still equally covered no matter what option is "the truth" that we cannot actually uncover.

There is no way to discover which is the case, all that can happen is that you can persuade yourself to believe one or another. This is harmless up until you convince yourself that people who believe one of the other options are stupid, or evil. It's bit like religion really.

Flash—

You say “our experience of our lives as we live them” is compatible with any metaphysical view—hard determinism, compatibilism, libertarianism. But here’s the problem with framing it that way: experience doesn’t determine what’s true. It just reflects how things feel from the inside. And yes, how things feel can be deceiving.

So let me flip the question:

Isn’t every conservation law of physics—energy, momentum, charge—not just some abstract equation, but a direct description of the structure behind our very experience? These aren’t metaphysical window dressing. They’re the mathematical scaffolding that holds up every interaction, from brain activity to bouncing a ball. If you're going to claim “any theory could be true,” you’re ignoring the fact that only one kind—the one with testable, causal structure—actually shows up in physics, in chemistry, in biology, and yes, in cognition.

Now let’s talk about interactions.

Every one of the four fundamental interactions—gravitational, electromagnetic, strong nuclear, weak nuclear—requires at least two things that can transfer energy, momentum, force. These interactions don’t act on nothing. They act on, and between, things that have properties.

So—if compatibilist free will is supposed to do anything in the world, then it must have physical properties. It must be able to initiate or modify interactions. But if that’s the case, then it’s subject to those very same conservation laws. It doesn’t float above physics. It is physics—or it’s fiction.

And if it’s subject to conservation and causality, then it is—by definition—not free in any metaphysical sense. Not in the sense people rely on when they talk about “could have done otherwise.” It’s just part of the chain. It’s not an unmoved mover. It’s a moved piece of the system.

So yes, you’re right—our “experience” might seem compatible with many stories. But if we’re serious about truth, not just comfort, only one of those stories aligns with the structure that governs every measurable thing in existence.

Free will can’t exist independently of that structure.

And if it doesn’t, then it isn’t free.

[FlashDangerpants]

I agree with all your examples.Simply that freedom of choice is relative to the life one leads. The life one leads is relative to other lives and to inanimate things and ideas.. Even if there were no such events as causes (or causal determinism) we pretty well know that experiences link up together and that some links are more probable than others. It's more probable that a man will feel sleepy in the morning if he is kept awake all night.
It is less probable that a man will steal if he and his dependants are not hungry.
I cannot see what actual 'work' this free will thing is logically supposed to be doing.

The point of an underdetermined situation is that nobody can see what extra work any of the options is doing. Our experience of our lives as we live them is perfectly compatible with the hard determinism, soft determinism, compatibilist, soft free will or hardcore free will metaphysical positions.

The role of constraints, habit, biologically informed preferences, missing organs and senses or whatnot don't change the metaphysics of the case, they just add an extra bit of talk that is still equally covered no matter what option is "the truth" that we cannot actually uncover.

There is no way to discover which is the case, all that can happen is that you can persuade yourself to believe one or another. This is harmless up until you convince yourself that people who believe one of the other options are stupid, or evil. It's bit like religion really.

Flash—

You say “our experience of our lives as we live them” is compatible with any metaphysical view—hard determinism, compatibilism, libertarianism. But here’s the problem with framing it that way: experience doesn’t determine what’s true. It just reflects how things feel from the inside. And yes, how things feel can be deceiving.

That they can be doesn't mean they are. I refer you to Descartes for a big discussion of other aspects of our experience which might equally be deceiving but that don't happen to suit your argument.

So let me flip the question:

What question are you flipping here? The idiom seems misplaced.

Isn’t every conservation law of physics—energy, momentum, charge—not just some abstract equation, but a direct description of the structure behind our very experience? These aren’t metaphysical window dressing. They’re the mathematical scaffolding that holds up every interaction, from brain activity to bouncing a ball. If you're going to claim “any theory could be true,” you’re ignoring the fact that only one kind—the one with testable, causal structure—actually shows up in physics, in chemistry, in biology, and yes, in cognition.

Now let’s talk about interactions.

Every one of the four fundamental interactions—gravitational, electromagnetic, strong nuclear, weak nuclear—requires at least two things that can transfer energy, momentum, force. These interactions don’t act on nothing. They act on, and between, things that have properties.

So—if compatibilist free will is supposed to do anything in the world, then it must have physical properties. It must be able to initiate or modify interactions. But if that’s the case, then it’s subject to those very same conservation laws. It doesn’t float above physics. It is physics—or it’s fiction.

And if it’s subject to conservation and causality, then it is—by definition—not free in any metaphysical sense. Not in the sense people rely on when they talk about “could have done otherwise.” It’s just part of the chain. It’s not an unmoved mover. It’s a moved piece of the system.

So yes, you’re right—our “experience” might seem compatible with many stories. But if we’re serious about truth, not just comfort, only one of those stories aligns with the structure that governs every measurable thing in existence.

Free will can’t exist independently of that structure.

And if it doesn’t, then it isn’t free.

Well. I don't really so how the question got flipped there. I can simply refer you to my own previous words: "There is no way to discover which is the case, all that can happen is that you can persuade yourself to believe one or another." All that stuff about conservation is just that.

[BigMike]

The point of an underdetermined situation is that nobody can see what extra work any of the options is doing. Our experience of our lives as we live them is perfectly compatible with the hard determinism, soft determinism, compatibilist, soft free will or hardcore free will metaphysical positions.

The role of constraints, habit, biologically informed preferences, missing organs and senses or whatnot don't change the metaphysics of the case, they just add an extra bit of talk that is still equally covered no matter what option is "the truth" that we cannot actually uncover.

There is no way to discover which is the case, all that can happen is that you can persuade yourself to believe one or another. This is harmless up until you convince yourself that people who believe one of the other options are stupid, or evil. It's bit like religion really.

Flash—

You say “our experience of our lives as we live them” is compatible with any metaphysical view—hard determinism, compatibilism, libertarianism. But here’s the problem with framing it that way: experience doesn’t determine what’s true. It just reflects how things feel from the inside. And yes, how things feel can be deceiving.

That they can be doesn't mean they are. I refer you to Descartes for a big discussion of other aspects of our experience which might equally be deceiving but that don't happen to suit your argument.

So let me flip the question:

What question are you flipping here? The idiom seems misplaced.

Isn’t every conservation law of physics—energy, momentum, charge—not just some abstract equation, but a direct description of the structure behind our very experience? These aren’t metaphysical window dressing. They’re the mathematical scaffolding that holds up every interaction, from brain activity to bouncing a ball. If you're going to claim “any theory could be true,” you’re ignoring the fact that only one kind—the one with testable, causal structure—actually shows up in physics, in chemistry, in biology, and yes, in cognition.

Now let’s talk about interactions.

Every one of the four fundamental interactions—gravitational, electromagnetic, strong nuclear, weak nuclear—requires at least two things that can transfer energy, momentum, force. These interactions don’t act on nothing. They act on, and between, things that have properties.

So—if compatibilist free will is supposed to do anything in the world, then it must have physical properties. It must be able to initiate or modify interactions. But if that’s the case, then it’s subject to those very same conservation laws. It doesn’t float above physics. It is physics—or it’s fiction.

And if it’s subject to conservation and causality, then it is—by definition—not free in any metaphysical sense. Not in the sense people rely on when they talk about “could have done otherwise.” It’s just part of the chain. It’s not an unmoved mover. It’s a moved piece of the system.

So yes, you’re right—our “experience” might seem compatible with many stories. But if we’re serious about truth, not just comfort, only one of those stories aligns with the structure that governs every measurable thing in existence.

Free will can’t exist independently of that structure.

And if it doesn’t, then it isn’t free.

Well. I don't really so how the question got flipped there. I can simply refer you to my own previous words: "There is no way to discover which is the case, all that can happen is that you can persuade yourself to believe one or another." All that stuff about conservation is just that.

Flash—

You say “all that stuff about conservation is just that,” as if it were just decorative physics talk—something fancy but ultimately irrelevant to the metaphysical question. But this isn’t wallpaper. Conservation laws, interaction forces—these aren’t just constraints on billiard balls. They’re what every single physical process in the universe is made of. Including the ones that constitute you, your brain, and your decisions.

You claim “there is no way to discover which is the case,” but that assumes this is a purely introspective or conceptual issue—like weighing different flavors of metaphysical ice cream. It’s not. This is about whether the model of free will—specifically, libertarian or metaphysically independent free will—fits into the causal structure of the universe. And if it doesn’t—if it’s incompatible with what we know about conservation and causation—then yes, we can rule it out. Just like we ruled out luminiferous aether. Just like we ruled out caloric fluid.

Let’s break it down.

• Every physical change requires interaction.
• Every interaction transfers conserved quantities: energy, momentum, angular momentum, etc.
• For something—like a choice—to cause a change in the world, it must participate in these transfers.
• That means the thing doing the causing (your “will”) must have physical properties.
• If it has physical properties, it is governed by physical laws.
• And if it’s governed by physical laws, it is not free in any absolute or metaphysical sense.

So if compatibilists want to keep using the word “free,” fine—but they’re using it the way we call a puppet “free” because it swings on a long string.

And when you say we’re just “persuading ourselves” into different views, as if there’s no way to test which one maps better to reality—that’s like saying heliocentrism and geocentrism are equally valid worldviews because both can be drawn. Sure. But only one matches the math. Only one orbits the truth.

So no, it’s not just preference. It’s physics. It’s structure. And unless you can point to some force or substance that escapes those structures—a fifth interaction, perhaps—then this isn’t about “what we believe.”

It’s about what can exist in a lawful universe.

[FlashDangerpants]

Flash—

You say “our experience of our lives as we live them” is compatible with any metaphysical view—hard determinism, compatibilism, libertarianism. But here’s the problem with framing it that way: experience doesn’t determine what’s true. It just reflects how things feel from the inside. And yes, how things feel can be deceiving.

That they can be doesn't mean they are. I refer you to Descartes for a big discussion of other aspects of our experience which might equally be deceiving but that don't happen to suit your argument.

So let me flip the question:

What question are you flipping here? The idiom seems misplaced.

Isn’t every conservation law of physics—energy, momentum, charge—not just some abstract equation, but a direct description of the structure behind our very experience? These aren’t metaphysical window dressing. They’re the mathematical scaffolding that holds up every interaction, from brain activity to bouncing a ball. If you're going to claim “any theory could be true,” you’re ignoring the fact that only one kind—the one with testable, causal structure—actually shows up in physics, in chemistry, in biology, and yes, in cognition.

Now let’s talk about interactions.

Every one of the four fundamental interactions—gravitational, electromagnetic, strong nuclear, weak nuclear—requires at least two things that can transfer energy, momentum, force. These interactions don’t act on nothing. They act on, and between, things that have properties.

So—if compatibilist free will is supposed to do anything in the world, then it must have physical properties. It must be able to initiate or modify interactions. But if that’s the case, then it’s subject to those very same conservation laws. It doesn’t float above physics. It is physics—or it’s fiction.

And if it’s subject to conservation and causality, then it is—by definition—not free in any metaphysical sense. Not in the sense people rely on when they talk about “could have done otherwise.” It’s just part of the chain. It’s not an unmoved mover. It’s a moved piece of the system.

So yes, you’re right—our “experience” might seem compatible with many stories. But if we’re serious about truth, not just comfort, only one of those stories aligns with the structure that governs every measurable thing in existence.

Free will can’t exist independently of that structure.

And if it doesn’t, then it isn’t free.

Well. I don't really so how the question got flipped there. I can simply refer you to my own previous words: "There is no way to discover which is the case, all that can happen is that you can persuade yourself to believe one or another." All that stuff about conservation is just that.

Flash—

You say “all that stuff about conservation is just that,” as if it were just decorative physics talk—something fancy but ultimately irrelevant to the metaphysical question. But this isn’t wallpaper. Conservation laws, interaction forces—these aren’t just constraints on billiard balls. They’re what every single physical process in the universe is made of. Including the ones that constitute you, your brain, and your decisions.

You claim “there is no way to discover which is the case,” but that assumes this is a purely introspective or conceptual issue—like weighing different flavors of metaphysical ice cream. It’s not. This is about whether the model of free will—specifically, libertarian or metaphysically independent free will—fits into the causal structure of the universe. And if it doesn’t—if it’s incompatible with what we know about conservation and causation—then yes, we can rule it out. Just like we ruled out luminiferous aether. Just like we ruled out caloric fluid.

Let’s break it down.

• Every physical change requires interaction.
• Every interaction transfers conserved quantities: energy, momentum, angular momentum, etc.
• For something—like a choice—to cause a change in the world, it must participate in these transfers.
• That means the thing doing the causing (your “will”) must have physical properties.
• If it has physical properties, it is governed by physical laws.
• And if it’s governed by physical laws, it is not free in any absolute or metaphysical sense.

So if compatibilists want to keep using the word “free,” fine—but they’re using it the way we call a puppet “free” because it swings on a long string.

And when you say we’re just “persuading ourselves” into different views, as if there’s no way to test which one maps better to reality—that’s like saying heliocentrism and geocentrism are equally valid worldviews because both can be drawn. Sure. But only one matches the math. Only one orbits the truth.

So no, it’s not just preference. It’s physics. It’s structure. And unless you can point to some force or substance that escapes those structures—a fifth interaction, perhaps—then this isn’t about “what we believe.”

It’s about what can exist in a lawful universe.

That is just a description of how some laws can be taken to apply to everything you can currently account for via physics. Free will is not something you can account for via physics, but determinsm isn't something you can actually discover to be true by your methodology either. That is why you are resorting to trying to persuade.

Tell us all about it when you have devised an actual experiment that demonstrates your case directly rather than having to tell us how unwise it is to believe in anything that isn't gifted to us by you.

[BigMike]

That they can be doesn't mean they are. I refer you to Descartes for a big discussion of other aspects of our experience which might equally be deceiving but that don't happen to suit your argument.


What question are you flipping here? The idiom seems misplaced.



Well. I don't really so how the question got flipped there. I can simply refer you to my own previous words: "There is no way to discover which is the case, all that can happen is that you can persuade yourself to believe one or another." All that stuff about conservation is just that.

Flash—

You say “all that stuff about conservation is just that,” as if it were just decorative physics talk—something fancy but ultimately irrelevant to the metaphysical question. But this isn’t wallpaper. Conservation laws, interaction forces—these aren’t just constraints on billiard balls. They’re what every single physical process in the universe is made of. Including the ones that constitute you, your brain, and your decisions.

You claim “there is no way to discover which is the case,” but that assumes this is a purely introspective or conceptual issue—like weighing different flavors of metaphysical ice cream. It’s not. This is about whether the model of free will—specifically, libertarian or metaphysically independent free will—fits into the causal structure of the universe. And if it doesn’t—if it’s incompatible with what we know about conservation and causation—then yes, we can rule it out. Just like we ruled out luminiferous aether. Just like we ruled out caloric fluid.

Let’s break it down.

• Every physical change requires interaction.
• Every interaction transfers conserved quantities: energy, momentum, angular momentum, etc.
• For something—like a choice—to cause a change in the world, it must participate in these transfers.
• That means the thing doing the causing (your “will”) must have physical properties.
• If it has physical properties, it is governed by physical laws.
• And if it’s governed by physical laws, it is not free in any absolute or metaphysical sense.

So if compatibilists want to keep using the word “free,” fine—but they’re using it the way we call a puppet “free” because it swings on a long string.

And when you say we’re just “persuading ourselves” into different views, as if there’s no way to test which one maps better to reality—that’s like saying heliocentrism and geocentrism are equally valid worldviews because both can be drawn. Sure. But only one matches the math. Only one orbits the truth.

So no, it’s not just preference. It’s physics. It’s structure. And unless you can point to some force or substance that escapes those structures—a fifth interaction, perhaps—then this isn’t about “what we believe.”

It’s about what can exist in a lawful universe.

That is just a description of how some laws can be taken to apply to everything you can currently account for via physics. Free will is not something you can account for via physics, but determinsm isn't something you can actually discover to be true by your methodology either. That is why you are resorting to trying to persuade.

Tell us all about it when you have devised an actual experiment that demonstrates your case directly rather than having to tell us how unwise it is to believe in anything that isn't gifted to us by you.

Flash—

When you say “free will is not something you can account for via physics,” that’s not a defense of free will—it’s an admission that it doesn’t fit into the causal structure of reality. You're essentially saying, “This thing I want to be real doesn’t obey the rules that govern everything else we can actually measure or test.” That’s not a metaphysical position. That’s magical thinking.

Now, I’m not claiming physics explains everything. But it does define the boundaries of what can be part of the world. It tells us that every change—whether a falling apple, a firing neuron, or a spoken word—must involve an interaction: a transfer of energy, momentum, or force between things with properties. That’s not decorative detail. That’s the ground floor of reality.

And here’s where the whole “free will” story collapses.

If your will causes anything—if it moves your body, changes your thoughts, initiates action—then it must have causal power. And anything with causal power must participate in physical interactions. That means it must obey conservation laws. It must carry or transfer some quantity—energy, charge, mass, momentum—between objects. If it didn’t, it wouldn’t be causing anything. It would be noise.

And this is true even if tomorrow we discover some fifth fundamental interaction. If it transfers force, if it mediates between entities, if it causes change—it will still obey conservation. It will still be rule-bound. It will still make predictions. And therefore, it will still not be free in the metaphysical sense. Because “free” in that sense means uncaused, unbound, not determined by anything prior. The moment it interacts, the illusion dies.

So no—you don’t get to carve out a pocket of exception from physics and call it “will.” If it’s real, it plays by the rules. And if it doesn’t play by the rules, it doesn’t cause anything. It’s irrelevant.

As for determinism, you say we haven’t “discovered it to be true.” But this isn’t about proving determinism in a vacuum. It’s about observing that every working model of the world, from gravity to cognition, behaves as if determinism (or at least lawful causality) holds. Every scientific advance—every drug, every circuit, every satellite—assumes lawful interactions, not metaphysical exemptions.

That’s not philosophy class. That’s how your phone works.

So yes, I’m trying to persuade. But not because the evidence is weak—because belief in free will lingers in spite of the evidence, not because of it. And unless someone can show how “will” fits into the physical structure of the universe—how it transfers conserved quantities, obeys interaction rules, leaves measurable footprints—then it’s not part of reality.

It’s not free.

It’s fiction.

[FlashDangerpants]

Flash—

You say “all that stuff about conservation is just that,” as if it were just decorative physics talk—something fancy but ultimately irrelevant to the metaphysical question. But this isn’t wallpaper. Conservation laws, interaction forces—these aren’t just constraints on billiard balls. They’re what every single physical process in the universe is made of. Including the ones that constitute you, your brain, and your decisions.

You claim “there is no way to discover which is the case,” but that assumes this is a purely introspective or conceptual issue—like weighing different flavors of metaphysical ice cream. It’s not. This is about whether the model of free will—specifically, libertarian or metaphysically independent free will—fits into the causal structure of the universe. And if it doesn’t—if it’s incompatible with what we know about conservation and causation—then yes, we can rule it out. Just like we ruled out luminiferous aether. Just like we ruled out caloric fluid.

Let’s break it down.

• Every physical change requires interaction.
• Every interaction transfers conserved quantities: energy, momentum, angular momentum, etc.
• For something—like a choice—to cause a change in the world, it must participate in these transfers.
• That means the thing doing the causing (your “will”) must have physical properties.
• If it has physical properties, it is governed by physical laws.
• And if it’s governed by physical laws, it is not free in any absolute or metaphysical sense.

So if compatibilists want to keep using the word “free,” fine—but they’re using it the way we call a puppet “free” because it swings on a long string.

And when you say we’re just “persuading ourselves” into different views, as if there’s no way to test which one maps better to reality—that’s like saying heliocentrism and geocentrism are equally valid worldviews because both can be drawn. Sure. But only one matches the math. Only one orbits the truth.

So no, it’s not just preference. It’s physics. It’s structure. And unless you can point to some force or substance that escapes those structures—a fifth interaction, perhaps—then this isn’t about “what we believe.”

It’s about what can exist in a lawful universe.

That is just a description of how some laws can be taken to apply to everything you can currently account for via physics. Free will is not something you can account for via physics, but determinsm isn't something you can actually discover to be true by your methodology either. That is why you are resorting to trying to persuade.

Tell us all about it when you have devised an actual experiment that demonstrates your case directly rather than having to tell us how unwise it is to believe in anything that isn't gifted to us by you.

Flash—

When you say “free will is not something you can account for via physics,” that’s not a defense of free will—it’s an admission that it doesn’t fit into the causal structure of reality. You're essentially saying, “This thing I want to be real doesn’t obey the rules that govern everything else we can actually measure or test.” That’s not a metaphysical position. That’s magical thinking.

Now, I’m not claiming physics explains everything. But it does define the boundaries of what can be part of the world. It tells us that every change—whether a falling apple, a firing neuron, or a spoken word—must involve an interaction: a transfer of energy, momentum, or force between things with properties. That’s not decorative detail. That’s the ground floor of reality.

And here’s where the whole “free will” story collapses.

If your will causes anything—if it moves your body, changes your thoughts, initiates action—then it must have causal power. And anything with causal power must participate in physical interactions. That means it must obey conservation laws. It must carry or transfer some quantity—energy, charge, mass, momentum—between objects. If it didn’t, it wouldn’t be causing anything. It would be noise.

And this is true even if tomorrow we discover some fifth fundamental interaction. If it transfers force, if it mediates between entities, if it causes change—it will still obey conservation. It will still be rule-bound. It will still make predictions. And therefore, it will still not be free in the metaphysical sense. Because “free” in that sense means uncaused, unbound, not determined by anything prior. The moment it interacts, the illusion dies.

So no—you don’t get to carve out a pocket of exception from physics and call it “will.” If it’s real, it plays by the rules. And if it doesn’t play by the rules, it doesn’t cause anything. It’s irrelevant.

As for determinism, you say we haven’t “discovered it to be true.” But this isn’t about proving determinism in a vacuum. It’s about observing that every working model of the world, from gravity to cognition, behaves as if determinism (or at least lawful causality) holds. Every scientific advance—every drug, every circuit, every satellite—assumes lawful interactions, not metaphysical exemptions.

That’s not philosophy class. That’s how your phone works.

So yes, I’m trying to persuade. But not because the evidence is weak—because belief in free will lingers in spite of the evidence, not because of it. And unless someone can show how “will” fits into the physical structure of the universe—how it transfers conserved quantities, obeys interaction rules, leaves measurable footprints—then it’s not part of reality.

It’s not free.

It’s fiction.

None of that argues against the actual case I am making.

You assume that you will not need any new paradigm to account to anything, but you can't demonstrate that you won't need any new paradigm to account for human agency. You are arguing beyond what your evidentiary basis actually supports on grounds of faith that if we knew certain unknowable things, they would support your extra-evidentiary case.

You don't know that your current understanding of causality is sophisticated enough for this investigation, you just assume that it is, because it seems good enough to explain previous investigations into other phenomena. You have no evidence that you are not, and indeed you may very well be in a position similar to that of Newtonian physicists in the years before Einsten's theory of relativity arrived. The people who believe in free will seem to think that in itself is evidence that you are in fact in this sort of situation.

You cannot, in principle, actually know that the "laws" of which you speak actually do apply in all places and at all times for all interactions, you infer that they do based on not having noticed any where they don't. However the people who believe in free will all agree with each other that you are overlooking a clear and obvious example, and that human choice is at least sometimes an uncaused cause.

You are a prisoner of your own set of what Jacobi very very very incorrectly calls "existential predicates". You are tuned to view the world according to a collection of paradigms you have come to accept as the truth of the matter. Your problem is that you cannot discern between that which has explanatory force within the story you are telling and that which has logical force beyond the story.

[BigMike]

That is just a description of how some laws can be taken to apply to everything you can currently account for via physics. Free will is not something you can account for via physics, but determinsm isn't something you can actually discover to be true by your methodology either. That is why you are resorting to trying to persuade.

Tell us all about it when you have devised an actual experiment that demonstrates your case directly rather than having to tell us how unwise it is to believe in anything that isn't gifted to us by you.

Flash—

When you say “free will is not something you can account for via physics,” that’s not a defense of free will—it’s an admission that it doesn’t fit into the causal structure of reality. You're essentially saying, “This thing I want to be real doesn’t obey the rules that govern everything else we can actually measure or test.” That’s not a metaphysical position. That’s magical thinking.

Now, I’m not claiming physics explains everything. But it does define the boundaries of what can be part of the world. It tells us that every change—whether a falling apple, a firing neuron, or a spoken word—must involve an interaction: a transfer of energy, momentum, or force between things with properties. That’s not decorative detail. That’s the ground floor of reality.

And here’s where the whole “free will” story collapses.

If your will causes anything—if it moves your body, changes your thoughts, initiates action—then it must have causal power. And anything with causal power must participate in physical interactions. That means it must obey conservation laws. It must carry or transfer some quantity—energy, charge, mass, momentum—between objects. If it didn’t, it wouldn’t be causing anything. It would be noise.

And this is true even if tomorrow we discover some fifth fundamental interaction. If it transfers force, if it mediates between entities, if it causes change—it will still obey conservation. It will still be rule-bound. It will still make predictions. And therefore, it will still not be free in the metaphysical sense. Because “free” in that sense means uncaused, unbound, not determined by anything prior. The moment it interacts, the illusion dies.

So no—you don’t get to carve out a pocket of exception from physics and call it “will.” If it’s real, it plays by the rules. And if it doesn’t play by the rules, it doesn’t cause anything. It’s irrelevant.

As for determinism, you say we haven’t “discovered it to be true.” But this isn’t about proving determinism in a vacuum. It’s about observing that every working model of the world, from gravity to cognition, behaves as if determinism (or at least lawful causality) holds. Every scientific advance—every drug, every circuit, every satellite—assumes lawful interactions, not metaphysical exemptions.

That’s not philosophy class. That’s how your phone works.

So yes, I’m trying to persuade. But not because the evidence is weak—because belief in free will lingers in spite of the evidence, not because of it. And unless someone can show how “will” fits into the physical structure of the universe—how it transfers conserved quantities, obeys interaction rules, leaves measurable footprints—then it’s not part of reality.

It’s not free.

It’s fiction.

None of that argues against the actual case I am making.

You assume that you will not need any new paradigm to account to anything, but you can't demonstrate that you won't need any new paradigm to account for human agency. You are arguing beyond what your evidentiary basis actually supports on grounds of faith that if we knew certain unknowable things, they would support your extra-evidentiary case.

You don't know that your current understanding of causality is sophisticated enough for this investigation, you just assume that is because it seems good enough to explain previous investigations into other phenomena. You have no evidence thatyou are not, and indeed you may very well be in a position similar to that of Newtonian physicists in the years before Einsten's theory of relativity arrived - you absolutely do not have any evidence that you are not in this situation. The people who believe in free will seem to think that itself is evidence that you are in fact in this sort of situation.

You cannot, in principle, actually know that the "laws" of which you speak actually do apply in all places and at all times for all interactions, you infer that they do based on not having noticed any where they don't. However the people who believe in free will all agree with each other that you are overlooking a clear and obvious example, and that human choice is at least sometimes an uncaused cause.

You are a prisoner of your own set of what Jacobi very very very incorrectly calls "existential predicates". You are tuned to view the world according to a collection of paradigms you have come to accept as the truth of the matter. Your problem is that you cannot discern between that which has explanatory force within the story you are telling and that which has logical force beyond the story.

Flash—

You’re making a fair point that we should be humble about our models and open to future paradigm shifts. But let’s be precise about what that actually allows us to say—and what it doesn’t.

You’re right that no one can prove today’s models are final. That’s the nature of science—it’s provisional, testable, falsifiable. But that cuts both ways. You can't use “we might be wrong” as a blank check to smuggle in a metaphysical exception without evidence, simply because it feels intuitively right.

You say I can’t know the conservation laws apply everywhere. Sure. But here's the issue: when we discover new phenomena—say, quantum entanglement, dark matter, or even relativity—we don’t toss causality. We update the model while preserving the deep structure: measurable interactions, energy balance, conserved properties. That’s not an arbitrary bias. That’s the most successful explanatory framework we have. It’s not just a story—it’s a story that predicts.

And let’s say we do discover a new paradigm. You mention “human choice” as a candidate for such a paradigm-breaker. But here’s the catch: if human choice truly causes things to happen, then it is an interaction—and any interaction, no matter how exotic, must transfer something between entities. Energy. Momentum. Information. Whatever it is, it must be conserved and detectable. Otherwise, it’s indistinguishable from magic.

Even a hypothetical fifth interaction would still be an interaction—governed by its own conservation constraints. You can’t cause change in a physical system without exchanging something. If free will can’t be measured, doesn’t transfer a quantity, and doesn’t leave a footprint, then by definition, it does no work. It’s not uncaused—it’s non-existent.

Now, on your broader critique: you accuse me of being “a prisoner” to my own explanatory framework. But frameworks aren’t prisons. They’re provisional tools, constantly tested against the world. You say I confuse explanatory force with logical force. But logical force means nothing without an anchor in observed structure. You’re suggesting the logical possibility of free will justifies its belief. But logic can build coherent castles in the air. Physics demands a foundation.

And here's the real tension: you're not saying free will is evident in the data. You’re saying it’s evident in our intuition. But intuition gave us geocentrism. Intuition told us the earth was flat, that heavier objects fall faster, and that space couldn’t bend. Intuition is a relic of evolution, not a beacon of truth.

So no—I can’t claim certainty. But the people claiming free will are claiming certainty. They’re declaring, without evidence, that human choice floats above cause and effect. And that, Flash, is not just bad science—it’s bad metaphysics.

Because any real explanation of agency must fit inside the lawful structure of reality. Otherwise, it’s not agency. It’s fantasy.

[Belinda]

I agree with all your examples.Simply that freedom of choice is relative to the life one leads. The life one leads is relative to other lives and to inanimate things and ideas.. Even if there were no such events as causes (or causal determinism) we pretty well know that experiences link up together and that some links are more probable than others. It's more probable that a man will feel sleepy in the morning if he is kept awake all night.
It is less probable that a man will steal if he and his dependants are not hungry.
I cannot see what actual 'work' this free will thing is logically supposed to be doing.

The point of an underdetermined situation is that nobody can see what extra work any of the options is doing. Our experience of our lives as we live them is perfectly compatible with the hard determinism, soft determinism, compatibilist, soft free will or hardcore free will metaphysical positions.

The role of constraints, habit, biologically informed preferences, missing organs and senses or whatnot don't change the metaphysics of the case, they just add an extra bit of talk that is still equally covered no matter what option is "the truth" that we cannot actually uncover.

There is no way to discover which is the case, all that can happen is that you can persuade yourself to believe one or another. This is harmless up until you convince yourself that people who believe one of the other options are stupid, or evil. It's bit like religion really.

Flash—

You say “our experience of our lives as we live them” is compatible with any metaphysical view—hard determinism, compatibilism, libertarianism. But here’s the problem with framing it that way: experience doesn’t determine what’s true. It just reflects how things feel from the inside. And yes, how things feel can be deceiving.

So let me flip the question:

Isn’t every conservation law of physics—energy, momentum, charge—not just some abstract equation, but a direct description of the structure behind our very experience? These aren’t metaphysical window dressing. They’re the mathematical scaffolding that holds up every interaction, from brain activity to bouncing a ball. If you're going to claim “any theory could be true,” you’re ignoring the fact that only one kind—the one with testable, causal structure—actually shows up in physics, in chemistry, in biology, and yes, in cognition.

Now let’s talk about interactions.

Every one of the four fundamental interactions—gravitational, electromagnetic, strong nuclear, weak nuclear—requires at least two things that can transfer energy, momentum, force. These interactions don’t act on nothing. They act on, and between, things that have properties.

So—if compatibilist free will is supposed to do anything in the world, then it must have physical properties. It must be able to initiate or modify interactions. But if that’s the case, then it’s subject to those very same conservation laws. It doesn’t float above physics. It is physics—or it’s fiction.

And if it’s subject to conservation and causality, then it is—by definition—not free in any metaphysical sense. Not in the sense people rely on when they talk about “could have done otherwise.” It’s just part of the chain. It’s not an unmoved mover. It’s a moved piece of the system.

So yes, you’re right—our “experience” might seem compatible with many stories. But if we’re serious about truth, not just comfort, only one of those stories aligns with the structure that governs every measurable thing in existence.

Free will can’t exist independently of that structure.

And if it doesn’t, then it isn’t free.

Free will does exist independently of that structure which scientists discover in bits and pieces. Let's contrast human will with artificial intelligence. If I 'm not mistaken artificial intelligence can't err except for deterministic electronic glitches.But humans can and do err, perform irregularly and stupidly, and make a lot of errors. Even scientists err: the problem of induction.

I submit that free will is the ability to err. No other animal is free to err to anything approaching the degree to which humans err. If we humans could not err then we would be non-human intelligences.

[BigMike]

The point of an underdetermined situation is that nobody can see what extra work any of the options is doing. Our experience of our lives as we live them is perfectly compatible with the hard determinism, soft determinism, compatibilist, soft free will or hardcore free will metaphysical positions.

The role of constraints, habit, biologically informed preferences, missing organs and senses or whatnot don't change the metaphysics of the case, they just add an extra bit of talk that is still equally covered no matter what option is "the truth" that we cannot actually uncover.

There is no way to discover which is the case, all that can happen is that you can persuade yourself to believe one or another. This is harmless up until you convince yourself that people who believe one of the other options are stupid, or evil. It's bit like religion really.

Flash—

You say “our experience of our lives as we live them” is compatible with any metaphysical view—hard determinism, compatibilism, libertarianism. But here’s the problem with framing it that way: experience doesn’t determine what’s true. It just reflects how things feel from the inside. And yes, how things feel can be deceiving.

So let me flip the question:

Isn’t every conservation law of physics—energy, momentum, charge—not just some abstract equation, but a direct description of the structure behind our very experience? These aren’t metaphysical window dressing. They’re the mathematical scaffolding that holds up every interaction, from brain activity to bouncing a ball. If you're going to claim “any theory could be true,” you’re ignoring the fact that only one kind—the one with testable, causal structure—actually shows up in physics, in chemistry, in biology, and yes, in cognition.

Now let’s talk about interactions.

Every one of the four fundamental interactions—gravitational, electromagnetic, strong nuclear, weak nuclear—requires at least two things that can transfer energy, momentum, force. These interactions don’t act on nothing. They act on, and between, things that have properties.

So—if compatibilist free will is supposed to do anything in the world, then it must have physical properties. It must be able to initiate or modify interactions. But if that’s the case, then it’s subject to those very same conservation laws. It doesn’t float above physics. It is physics—or it’s fiction.

And if it’s subject to conservation and causality, then it is—by definition—not free in any metaphysical sense. Not in the sense people rely on when they talk about “could have done otherwise.” It’s just part of the chain. It’s not an unmoved mover. It’s a moved piece of the system.

So yes, you’re right—our “experience” might seem compatible with many stories. But if we’re serious about truth, not just comfort, only one of those stories aligns with the structure that governs every measurable thing in existence.

Free will can’t exist independently of that structure.

And if it doesn’t, then it isn’t free.

Free will does exist independently of that structure which scientists discover in bits and pieces. Let's contrast human will with artificial intelligence. If I 'm not mistaken artificial intelligence can't err except for deterministic electronic glitches.But humans can and do err, perform irregularly and stupidly, and make a lot of errors. Even scientists err: the problem of induction.

I submit that free will is the ability to err. No other animal is free to err to anything approaching the degree to which humans err. If we humans could not err then we would be non-human intelligences.

Belinda—

That’s a fascinating angle: defining free will as the “ability to err.” But I think we need to zoom in and ask—what does it mean to err? What is an “error,” and where does it come from?

If you slip on a wet floor, that’s not free will—it’s physics. If you miscalculate a math problem, that’s not metaphysical liberty—it’s faulty perception, flawed memory, or noise in a neural signal. And if you believe something false, it’s usually because your brain, shaped by evolution, priors, and culture, used a shortcut that failed in this context. But in all these cases, the error has causes. It's not a mystery. It's just a malfunction—or a mismatch—within a causal system.

Error doesn’t require freedom in the metaphysical sense. It requires complexity. And humans are complex systems—rich enough to generate internal conflict, competing priorities, limited information processing, and emotional override. But none of that breaks causality. It’s still biology in motion.

Artificial intelligence can and does err too, by the way—not just from glitches, but from training bias, incomplete datasets, or misalignment between goals and environment. And every one of those errors is traceable. Just like with us.

Now, the idea that “humans can err more than other animals” is probably true—but that’s not evidence for free will. It’s evidence for more variables, more layers, more feedback loops. More room for contradiction. But none of that implies metaphysical exception. It implies we’re high-dimensional meat computers with a lot of moving parts—not unmoved movers with magical choice powers.

So while “error” might feel like proof of free will, it’s really just a mirror showing how tangled and fragile our machinery is.

In short: error isn’t freedom. It’s just caused unpredictability. And that still lives well inside the walls of determinism.

[Belinda]

Flash—

You say “our experience of our lives as we live them” is compatible with any metaphysical view—hard determinism, compatibilism, libertarianism. But here’s the problem with framing it that way: experience doesn’t determine what’s true. It just reflects how things feel from the inside. And yes, how things feel can be deceiving.

So let me flip the question:

Isn’t every conservation law of physics—energy, momentum, charge—not just some abstract equation, but a direct description of the structure behind our very experience? These aren’t metaphysical window dressing. They’re the mathematical scaffolding that holds up every interaction, from brain activity to bouncing a ball. If you're going to claim “any theory could be true,” you’re ignoring the fact that only one kind—the one with testable, causal structure—actually shows up in physics, in chemistry, in biology, and yes, in cognition.

Now let’s talk about interactions.

Every one of the four fundamental interactions—gravitational, electromagnetic, strong nuclear, weak nuclear—requires at least two things that can transfer energy, momentum, force. These interactions don’t act on nothing. They act on, and between, things that have properties.

So—if compatibilist free will is supposed to do anything in the world, then it must have physical properties. It must be able to initiate or modify interactions. But if that’s the case, then it’s subject to those very same conservation laws. It doesn’t float above physics. It is physics—or it’s fiction.

And if it’s subject to conservation and causality, then it is—by definition—not free in any metaphysical sense. Not in the sense people rely on when they talk about “could have done otherwise.” It’s just part of the chain. It’s not an unmoved mover. It’s a moved piece of the system.

So yes, you’re right—our “experience” might seem compatible with many stories. But if we’re serious about truth, not just comfort, only one of those stories aligns with the structure that governs every measurable thing in existence.

Free will can’t exist independently of that structure.

And if it doesn’t, then it isn’t free.

Free will does exist independently of that structure which scientists discover in bits and pieces. Let's contrast human will with artificial intelligence. If I 'm not mistaken artificial intelligence can't err except for deterministic electronic glitches.But humans can and do err, perform irregularly and stupidly, and make a lot of errors. Even scientists err: the problem of induction.

I submit that free will is the ability to err. No other animal is free to err to anything approaching the degree to which humans err. If we humans could not err then we would be non-human intelligences.

Belinda—

That’s a fascinating angle: defining free will as the “ability to err.” But I think we need to zoom in and ask—what does it mean to err? What is an “error,” and where does it come from?

If you slip on a wet floor, that’s not free will—it’s physics. If you miscalculate a math problem, that’s not metaphysical liberty—it’s faulty perception, flawed memory, or noise in a neural signal. And if you believe something false, it’s usually because your brain, shaped by evolution, priors, and culture, used a shortcut that failed in this context. But in all these cases, the error has causes. It's not a mystery. It's just a malfunction—or a mismatch—within a causal system.

Error doesn’t require freedom in the metaphysical sense. It requires complexity. And humans are complex systems—rich enough to generate internal conflict, competing priorities, limited information processing, and emotional override. But none of that breaks causality. It’s still biology in motion.

Artificial intelligence can and does err too, by the way—not just from glitches, but from training bias, incomplete datasets, or misalignment between goals and environment. And every one of those errors is traceable. Just like with us.

Now, the idea that “humans can err more than other animals” is probably true—but that’s not evidence for free will. It’s evidence for more variables, more layers, more feedback loops. More room for contradiction. But none of that implies metaphysical exception. It implies we’re high-dimensional meat computers with a lot of moving parts—not unmoved movers with magical choice powers.

So while “error” might feel like proof of free will, it’s really just a mirror showing how tangled and fragile our machinery is.

In short: error isn’t freedom. It’s just caused unpredictability. And that still lives well inside the walls of determinism.

I did not say “humans can err more than other animals” is evidence of so -called free will , but that humans' ability to err is the same as so-called "free will".

The present problem with advanced AI is that machines can now err, and it's the type of errors they do that catch them out.

Unpredictability remains our protection against the rise and rise of AI.
There's nothing magical about unpredictability, or the stupidity of failing to wear non-slip footwear. We are all stupid to some degree, stupidity defines our human nature. Other animals are not stupid but are instinctive.

[FlashDangerpants]

Flash—

When you say “free will is not something you can account for via physics,” that’s not a defense of free will—it’s an admission that it doesn’t fit into the causal structure of reality. You're essentially saying, “This thing I want to be real doesn’t obey the rules that govern everything else we can actually measure or test.” That’s not a metaphysical position. That’s magical thinking.

Now, I’m not claiming physics explains everything. But it does define the boundaries of what can be part of the world. It tells us that every change—whether a falling apple, a firing neuron, or a spoken word—must involve an interaction: a transfer of energy, momentum, or force between things with properties. That’s not decorative detail. That’s the ground floor of reality.

And here’s where the whole “free will” story collapses.

If your will causes anything—if it moves your body, changes your thoughts, initiates action—then it must have causal power. And anything with causal power must participate in physical interactions. That means it must obey conservation laws. It must carry or transfer some quantity—energy, charge, mass, momentum—between objects. If it didn’t, it wouldn’t be causing anything. It would be noise.

And this is true even if tomorrow we discover some fifth fundamental interaction. If it transfers force, if it mediates between entities, if it causes change—it will still obey conservation. It will still be rule-bound. It will still make predictions. And therefore, it will still not be free in the metaphysical sense. Because “free” in that sense means uncaused, unbound, not determined by anything prior. The moment it interacts, the illusion dies.

So no—you don’t get to carve out a pocket of exception from physics and call it “will.” If it’s real, it plays by the rules. And if it doesn’t play by the rules, it doesn’t cause anything. It’s irrelevant.

As for determinism, you say we haven’t “discovered it to be true.” But this isn’t about proving determinism in a vacuum. It’s about observing that every working model of the world, from gravity to cognition, behaves as if determinism (or at least lawful causality) holds. Every scientific advance—every drug, every circuit, every satellite—assumes lawful interactions, not metaphysical exemptions.

That’s not philosophy class. That’s how your phone works.

So yes, I’m trying to persuade. But not because the evidence is weak—because belief in free will lingers in spite of the evidence, not because of it. And unless someone can show how “will” fits into the physical structure of the universe—how it transfers conserved quantities, obeys interaction rules, leaves measurable footprints—then it’s not part of reality.

It’s not free.

It’s fiction.

None of that argues against the actual case I am making.

You assume that you will not need any new paradigm to account to anything, but you can't demonstrate that you won't need any new paradigm to account for human agency. You are arguing beyond what your evidentiary basis actually supports on grounds of faith that if we knew certain unknowable things, they would support your extra-evidentiary case.

You don't know that your current understanding of causality is sophisticated enough for this investigation, you just assume that is because it seems good enough to explain previous investigations into other phenomena. You have no evidence thatyou are not, and indeed you may very well be in a position similar to that of Newtonian physicists in the years before Einsten's theory of relativity arrived - you absolutely do not have any evidence that you are not in this situation. The people who believe in free will seem to think that itself is evidence that you are in fact in this sort of situation.

You cannot, in principle, actually know that the "laws" of which you speak actually do apply in all places and at all times for all interactions, you infer that they do based on not having noticed any where they don't. However the people who believe in free will all agree with each other that you are overlooking a clear and obvious example, and that human choice is at least sometimes an uncaused cause.

You are a prisoner of your own set of what Jacobi very very very incorrectly calls "existential predicates". You are tuned to view the world according to a collection of paradigms you have come to accept as the truth of the matter. Your problem is that you cannot discern between that which has explanatory force within the story you are telling and that which has logical force beyond the story.

Flash—

You’re making a fair point that we should be humble about our models and open to future paradigm shifts. But let’s be precise about what that actually allows us to say—and what it doesn’t.

You’re right that no one can prove today’s models are final. That’s the nature of science—it’s provisional, testable, falsifiable. But that cuts both ways. You can't use “we might be wrong” as a blank check to smuggle in a metaphysical exception without evidence, simply because it feels intuitively right.

You say I can’t know the conservation laws apply everywhere. Sure. But here's the issue: when we discover new phenomena—say, quantum entanglement, dark matter, or even relativity—we don’t toss causality. We update the model while preserving the deep structure: measurable interactions, energy balance, conserved properties. That’s not an arbitrary bias. That’s the most successful explanatory framework we have. It’s not just a story—it’s a story that predicts.

And let’s say we do discover a new paradigm. You mention “human choice” as a candidate for such a paradigm-breaker. But here’s the catch: if human choice truly causes things to happen, then it is an interaction—and any interaction, no matter how exotic, must transfer something between entities. Energy. Momentum. Information. Whatever it is, it must be conserved and detectable. Otherwise, it’s indistinguishable from magic.

Even a hypothetical fifth interaction would still be an interaction—governed by its own conservation constraints. You can’t cause change in a physical system without exchanging something. If free will can’t be measured, doesn’t transfer a quantity, and doesn’t leave a footprint, then by definition, it does no work. It’s not uncaused—it’s non-existent.

Now, on your broader critique: you accuse me of being “a prisoner” to my own explanatory framework. But frameworks aren’t prisons. They’re provisional tools, constantly tested against the world. You say I confuse explanatory force with logical force. But logical force means nothing without an anchor in observed structure. You’re suggesting the logical possibility of free will justifies its belief. But logic can build coherent castles in the air. Physics demands a foundation.

And here's the real tension: you're not saying free will is evident in the data. You’re saying it’s evident in our intuition. But intuition gave us geocentrism. Intuition told us the earth was flat, that heavier objects fall faster, and that space couldn’t bend. Intuition is a relic of evolution, not a beacon of truth.

So no—I can’t claim certainty. But the people claiming free will are claiming certainty. They’re declaring, without evidence, that human choice floats above cause and effect. And that, Flash, is not just bad science—it’s bad metaphysics.

Because any real explanation of agency must fit inside the lawful structure of reality. Otherwise, it’s not agency. It’s fantasy.

You started by sort of acknowledging some of what I wrote. But then in the middle you just ignored it. "Maybe there's a paradigm shift we aren't prepared for - oh there can't be, my paradigms don't permit it."

Your frameworks aren't provisional if you are not prepared to extend them. And you aren't, so be honest, you are clearly asserting that your position about causation is final, not provisional. Anybody who honestly held that your position regarding conservation laws and causation was actually provisional would be open to the problem that human agency might require an adjustment from your side to fully explain.

I don't think you are in much of a position to tell me about "bad metaphysics", but either way I have no interest in the metaphysical claim that "human choice floats above cause and effect", I am simply inviting you to come to terms with the limits on what you are able to provide valid and sound argument for. I don't argue on behalf of your opposition, I consider the debate quite bogus.

[FlashDangerpants]

Free will does exist independently of that structure which scientists discover in bits and pieces. Let's contrast human will with artificial intelligence. If I 'm not mistaken artificial intelligence can't err except for deterministic electronic glitches.But humans can and do err, perform irregularly and stupidly, and make a lot of errors. Even scientists err: the problem of induction.

I submit that free will is the ability to err. No other animal is free to err to anything approaching the degree to which humans err. If we humans could not err then we would be non-human intelligences.

Why compare human will to artificial intelligence? Wouldn't the apples vs apples comparison be against human intelligence? I thought humans had cognitive conative and affective dimension, while that what makes artificial intelligence so eerie is the reliance entirely on the cognitive aspect with the absence of both others.

We can compare human free will with computer free will when computers have conative and affective capabilities, until then, I see no reason to climb aboard this one.

[Belinda]

Free will does exist independently of that structure which scientists discover in bits and pieces. Let's contrast human will with artificial intelligence. If I 'm not mistaken artificial intelligence can't err except for deterministic electronic glitches.But humans can and do err, perform irregularly and stupidly, and make a lot of errors. Even scientists err: the problem of induction.

I submit that free will is the ability to err. No other animal is free to err to anything approaching the degree to which humans err. If we humans could not err then we would be non-human intelligences.

Why compare human will to artificial intelligence? Wouldn't the apples vs apples comparison be against human intelligence? I thought humans had cognitive conative and affective dimension, while that what makes artificial intelligence so eerie is the reliance entirely on the cognitive aspect with the absence of both others.

We can compare human free will with computer free will when computers have conative and affective capabilities, until then, I see no reason to climb aboard this one.

Why not put that AI programme thing, ChatGPT,to the test and ask it a question like what it feels like to be in love?