The Democrat Party Hates America

[Belinda]

How free is your free will? Can you quantify your free will? Is your free will maybe like a grain of salt that not merely mixes with water but is dissolved in a given volume of water?

I'm not the person to ask. My expertise is in easy stuff, like quantum mechanics and relativity. I quite like Roger Penrose's take, or at least the bit I understand, which in a nutshell, is that consciousness is not computable, which I presume means it couldn't be the product of purely mechanical processes. As I said though, I'm a bit out of my depth when it comes to philosophy of mind.

Fair enough, Will—and honestly, if you’re already comfortable swimming in quantum mechanics and relativity, you’re doing just fine. Don't sell yourself short. And yeah, Penrose’s view is certainly a bold one. His Orch-OR theory, developed with anesthesiologist Stuart Hameroff, proposes that consciousness arises from quantum processes in microtubules within neurons—an attempt to step beyond what he sees as the limits of algorithmic computation.

Penrose argues that consciousness is non-computable—that no Turing machine, no matter how complex, could fully replicate it. It’s an intriguing proposal, one that draws from Gödel’s incompleteness theorems and quantum indeterminacy to suggest that human understanding and insight must involve something more than classical computation.

That said, the theory’s been met with a lot of skepticism in the neuroscience and physics communities. A major hurdle is the so-called “warm, wet brain” problem. Quantum coherence is notoriously fragile—it tends to collapse quickly in environments like the human brain, which is noisy, warm, and biologically active. Many argue it’s just not plausible for delicate quantum states to persist long enough inside neurons to play the kind of role Orch-OR suggests.

Still, Penrose’s challenge to mainstream materialist views of consciousness has been valuable in pushing the conversation forward. Even critics concede: at least he’s asking hard questions with intellectual rigor, which is more than can be said for most pop-theories of mind.

It seems that what Penrose calls "consciousness" is more explicitly waking awareness. I wonder what audience Penrose was aiming for.

[Belinda]

I'm not the person to ask. My expertise is in easy stuff, like quantum mechanics and relativity. I quite like Roger Penrose's take, or at least the bit I understand, which in a nutshell, is that consciousness is not computable, which I presume means it couldn't be the product of purely mechanical processes. As I said though, I'm a bit out of my depth when it comes to philosophy of mind.

Fair enough, Will—and honestly, if you’re already comfortable swimming in quantum mechanics and relativity, you’re doing just fine. Don't sell yourself short. And yeah, Penrose’s view is certainly a bold one. His Orch-OR theory, developed with anesthesiologist Stuart Hameroff, proposes that consciousness arises from quantum processes in microtubules within neurons—an attempt to step beyond what he sees as the limits of algorithmic computation.

Penrose argues that consciousness is non-computable—that no Turing machine, no matter how complex, could fully replicate it. It’s an intriguing proposal, one that draws from Gödel’s incompleteness theorems and quantum indeterminacy to suggest that human understanding and insight must involve something more than classical computation.

That said, the theory’s been met with a lot of skepticism in the neuroscience and physics communities. A major hurdle is the so-called “warm, wet brain” problem. Quantum coherence is notoriously fragile—it tends to collapse quickly in environments like the human brain, which is noisy, warm, and biologically active. Many argue it’s just not plausible for delicate quantum states to persist long enough inside neurons to play the kind of role Orch-OR suggests.

Still, Penrose’s challenge to mainstream materialist views of consciousness has been valuable in pushing the conversation forward. Even critics concede: at least he’s asking hard questions with intellectual rigor, which is more than can be said for most pop-theories of mind.

It seems that what Penrose calls "consciousness" is more explicitly waking awareness.( I wonder what audience Penrose was aiming for.) If free will correlates with waking awareness then free will is not constantly present in the same individual but is either polarised present or polarised not present in the same individual.

If I felt I wanted a spooky substance like free will to be true, I'd at least make a decent stab at reading some neuroscience.

[Alexis Jacobi]

Well again, you should know by now that I am acutely aware that, with two exceptions, all propositions are theory laden. I am not a determinist. Unlike you, I understand that determinism accounts for the phenomena just as well as free will, and that my preference for free will is a choice. Or maybe just my nature.

The position you have could be seen as putting the entire conversation on the shelf since, as you say, it cannot actually be settled. In a sense then the “war of opinions” that goes on with such furor is less a war on the basis of tangible facts, so called, but rather on tendencies of personality.

However, Mr Determinism does propose a remodel of the education system to accommodate his settled theory — no longer theory but political and social doctrine. Though you may sit on the proverbial fence, one cannot but note this militant aspect of the ideological stance. All sorts of ramifications and consequences lurk there, many quite monstrous.

Also, it might be a claim worthy of further thought: free-will, if indeed it exhibits the quality of “choice in the matter” cannot be compared with “no choice in the matter” (Mr Determinism’s hard determinism stance).

The evidence of free decision is in the witnessed outcomes. To deny these (it seems to me) one resorts to elaborated sophistries and linguistically constructed defenses (tightly bound up, one might say, with those subjective personality traits always so predominant in all PN participants).

Odd it seems to me that your argument is not an argument, but simply a statement of preference. I think I understand what you are saying though. Or perhaps why you say it.

Have you ever thought much on what what the actual ramifications would/will be if the militant ideology of a Mr Determinism were to gain substantial purchase? It does not seem to me that you have.

[Belinda]

Well again, you should know by now that I am acutely aware that, with two exceptions, all propositions are theory laden. I am not a determinist. Unlike you, I understand that determinism accounts for the phenomena just as well as free will, and that my preference for free will is a choice. Or maybe just my nature.

The position you have could be seen as putting the entire conversation on the shelf since, as you say, it cannot actually be settled. In a sense then the “war of opinions” that goes on with such furor is less a war on the basis of tangible facts, so called, but rather on tendencies of personality.

However, Mr Determinism does propose a remodel of the education system to accommodate his settled theory — no longer theory but political and social doctrine. Though you may sit on the proverbial fence, one cannot but note this militant aspect of the ideological stance. All sorts of ramifications and consequences lurk there, many quite monstrous.

Also, it might be a claim worthy of further thought: free-will, if indeed it exhibits the quality of “choice in the matter” cannot be compared with “no choice in the matter” (Mr Determinism’s hard determinism stance).

The evidence of free decision is in the witnessed outcomes. To deny these (it seems to me) one resorts to elaborated sophistries and linguistically constructed defenses (tightly bound up, one might say, with those subjective personality traits always so predominant in all PN participants).

Odd it seems to me that your argument is not an argument, but simply a statement of preference. I think I understand what you are saying though. Or perhaps why you say it.

Have you ever thought much on what what the actual ramifications would/will be if the militant ideology of a Mr Determinism were to gain substantial purchase? It does not seem to me that you have.

Apart from a small number of suspect religious schools, in the UK all schools educate from Enlightenment principles, and the Socratic method is endorsed by colleges of education.

[BigMike]

Fair enough, Will—and honestly, if you’re already comfortable swimming in quantum mechanics and relativity, you’re doing just fine. Don't sell yourself short. And yeah, Penrose’s view is certainly a bold one. His Orch-OR theory, developed with anesthesiologist Stuart Hameroff, proposes that consciousness arises from quantum processes in microtubules within neurons—an attempt to step beyond what he sees as the limits of algorithmic computation.

Penrose argues that consciousness is non-computable—that no Turing machine, no matter how complex, could fully replicate it. It’s an intriguing proposal, one that draws from Gödel’s incompleteness theorems and quantum indeterminacy to suggest that human understanding and insight must involve something more than classical computation.

That said, the theory’s been met with a lot of skepticism in the neuroscience and physics communities. A major hurdle is the so-called “warm, wet brain” problem. Quantum coherence is notoriously fragile—it tends to collapse quickly in environments like the human brain, which is noisy, warm, and biologically active. Many argue it’s just not plausible for delicate quantum states to persist long enough inside neurons to play the kind of role Orch-OR suggests.

Still, Penrose’s challenge to mainstream materialist views of consciousness has been valuable in pushing the conversation forward. Even critics concede: at least he’s asking hard questions with intellectual rigor, which is more than can be said for most pop-theories of mind.

It seems that what Penrose calls "consciousness" is more explicitly waking awareness.( I wonder what audience Penrose was aiming for.) If free will correlates with waking awareness then free will is not constantly present in the same individual but is either polarised present or polarised not present in the same individual.

If I felt I wanted a spooky substance like free will to be true, I'd at least make a decent stab at reading some neuroscience.

Exactly—and that’s a sharp observation, Belinda. Penrose doesn’t always make a clear distinction between consciousness broadly and what we’d call waking awareness—the directed, reportable kind of experience we typically think of when we say “I’m conscious right now.” That ambiguity muddies the waters, especially in debates about free will.

And you’re spot on about the intermittent nature of awareness. Neuroscience shows us that what we call consciousness is more like a flickering spotlight than a steady beam. Most of what we do—decisions, reactions, even speech—is processed unconsciously before we ever get the memo. Free will, if it existed, would have to ride atop a sea of automatic, involuntary processes that operate far beneath waking awareness.

Penrose was aiming for a pretty broad but intellectually ambitious audience—folks with the stamina for both math and metaphysics—but his take still ends up sounding like a Hail Mary pass at rescuing some glimmer of free will from physics. And yes, the irony is thick: the very same rigorous, reductionist science that many cling to for certainty ends up undermining their intuitions about selfhood and freedom.

So if someone wants to keep believing in a spooky metaphysical force called “free will,” they should probably crack open some neuroscience first—and prepare for a bumpy ride.

[FlashDangerpants]

Well again, you should know by now that I am acutely aware that, with two exceptions, all propositions are theory laden. I am not a determinist. Unlike you, I understand that determinism accounts for the phenomena just as well as free will, and that my preference for free will is a choice. Or maybe just my nature.

The position you have could be seen as putting the entire conversation on the shelf since, as you say, it cannot actually be settled. In a sense then the “war of opinions” that goes on with such furor is less a war on the basis of tangible facts, so called, but rather on tendencies of personality.

However, Mr Determinism does propose a remodel of the education system to accommodate his settled theory — no longer theory but political and social doctrine. Though you may sit on the proverbial fence, one cannot but note this militant aspect of the ideological stance. All sorts of ramifications and consequences lurk there, many quite monstrous.

Also, it might be a claim worthy of further thought: free-will, if indeed it exhibits the quality of “choice in the matter” cannot be compared with “no choice in the matter” (Mr Determinism’s hard determinism stance).

The evidence of free decision is in the witnessed outcomes. To deny these (it seems to me) one resorts to elaborated sophistries and linguistically constructed defenses (tightly bound up, one might say, with those subjective personality traits always so predominant in all PN participants).

Odd it seems to me that your argument is not an argument, but simply a statement of preference. I think I understand what you are saying though. Or perhaps why you say it.

Have you ever thought much on what what the actual ramifications would/will be if the militant ideology of a Mr Determinism were to gain substantial purchase? It does not seem to me that you have.

The people who misunderstand the debate about free will are the ones who think that it has some important outcome. You, IC, Henry, that Darkneos guy, and above all BigMike all don't get it. You all think that if free will is an illusion then the world would be different to the way it is, or in Mike's case, should be different.

Willy B laid it out for IC in that passage you quoted, and you don't seem to have understood him either. When he tells you that " determinism accounts for the phenomena just as well as free will" he means it. It's moot as a question that needs to be answered, and it's equally moot as a question that can really be answered, because properly understood, determinism is just an alternative way of describing the world exactly as it is, not some other world.

Elsewhere in the free will debate, FJ is having a similar problem trying to explain to Darkneos what the limits of physicalist reductions and its implications are, which falls under the same category of conversation and largely it is the same set of people who can't grasp the lack of importance there either. Again, all data about the real world are accounted for equally either way and that limits the importance of the matter.

I mention that second thing partly to see if I can have fun at Mannie's expense. I am fairly sure he is going to tell Willy that he doesn't know what he's talking about because materialism entails determinism on the basis that all matter behaves entirely probabilistically and thus the reduction of the person to atoms and quarks or whatnot must eliminate all articles of folk psychology including choice. Basically there is a core of the bad argument about free will that is shared by Mike, Mannie and the Darkneos guy even if they aren't on the same side of the debate. Technically they share it with Peter Strawson, or perhaps even indirectly inherit it from him, so I should probably give them a break, but I am not a nice man, so I shan't.

Willy B is more into philosophy of science than I am, and so he presents this free will thing above as a case of underdetermination which is a concept he has been heroically attempting to teach to mister Can for a long time. In his accounting there, it is simply the case that the available evidence for determinism and that for free will are basically the same, there is no evidence available in the world that would help you choose between them because both explain the world as it is. Not being a philosopher of science (and really having very little skill in that area), I tend to describe it as either a full on pseudo-problem - or just a a nothing burger if I am dialling it down.

[BigMike]

Well again, you should know by now that I am acutely aware that, with two exceptions, all propositions are theory laden. I am not a determinist. Unlike you, I understand that determinism accounts for the phenomena just as well as free will, and that my preference for free will is a choice. Or maybe just my nature.

The position you have could be seen as putting the entire conversation on the shelf since, as you say, it cannot actually be settled. In a sense then the “war of opinions” that goes on with such furor is less a war on the basis of tangible facts, so called, but rather on tendencies of personality.

However, Mr Determinism does propose a remodel of the education system to accommodate his settled theory — no longer theory but political and social doctrine. Though you may sit on the proverbial fence, one cannot but note this militant aspect of the ideological stance. All sorts of ramifications and consequences lurk there, many quite monstrous.

Also, it might be a claim worthy of further thought: free-will, if indeed it exhibits the quality of “choice in the matter” cannot be compared with “no choice in the matter” (Mr Determinism’s hard determinism stance).

The evidence of free decision is in the witnessed outcomes. To deny these (it seems to me) one resorts to elaborated sophistries and linguistically constructed defenses (tightly bound up, one might say, with those subjective personality traits always so predominant in all PN participants).

Odd it seems to me that your argument is not an argument, but simply a statement of preference. I think I understand what you are saying though. Or perhaps why you say it.

Have you ever thought much on what what the actual ramifications would/will be if the militant ideology of a Mr Determinism were to gain substantial purchase? It does not seem to me that you have.

The people who misunderstand the debate about free will are the ones who think that it has some important outcome. You, IC, Henry, that Darkneos guy, and above all BigMike all don't get it. You all think that if free will is an illusion then the world would be different to the way it is, or in Mike's case, should be different.

Willy B laid it out for IC in that passage you quoted, and you don't seem to have understood him either. When he tells you that " determinism accounts for the phenomena just as well as free will" he means it. It's moot as a question that needs to be answered, and it's equally moot as a question that can really be answered, because properly understood, determinism is just an alternative way of describing the world exactly as it is, not some other world.

Elsewhere in the free will debate, FJ is having a similar problem trying to explain to Darkneos what the limits of physicalist reductions and its implications are, which falls under the same category of conversation and largely it is the same set of people who can't grasp the lack of importance there either. Again, all data about the real world are accounted for equally either way and that limits the importance of the matter.

I mention that second thing partly to see if I can have fun at Mannie's expense. I am fairly sure he is going to tell Willy that he doesn't know what he's talking about because materialism entails determinism on the basis that all matter behaves entirely probabilistically and thus the reduction of the person to atoms and quarks or whatnot must eliminate all articles of folk psychology including choice. Basically there is a core of the bad argument about free will that is shared by Mike, Mannie and the Darkneos guy even if they aren't on the same side of the debate. Technically they share it with Peter Strawson, or perhaps even indirectly inherit it from him, so I should probably give them a break, but I am not a nice man, so I shan't.

Willy B is more into philosophy of science than I am, and so he presents this free will thing above as a case of underdetermination which is a concept he has been heroically attempting to teach to mister Can for a long time. In his accounting there, it is simply the case that the available evidence for determinism and that for free will are basically the same, there is no evidence available in the world that would help you choose between them because both explain the world as it is. Not being a philosopher of science (and really having very little skill in that area), I tend to describe it as either a full on pseudo-problem - or just a a nothing burger if I am dialling it down.

Flash, you keep describing this debate like it’s a harmless parlor game—two equally valid ways of “describing” the same world. But if you truly believe that, then you’ve misunderstood the stakes entirely. No, this isn’t a coin flip between “free will” and “determinism” as interchangeable narrative filters. That’s the kind of academic aloofness that mistakes intellectual detachment for clarity.

Hard determinism doesn’t just describe the world differently—it fundamentally rejects the assumptions baked into how society functions: criminal punishment based on moral culpability, education systems rooted in “personal responsibility,” media that glorifies “choice” as the pinnacle of character. If determinism is true—and the evidence overwhelmingly favors it—then these institutions are built on sand. And replacing them isn’t optional. It’s ethically required.

You say, “The world wouldn't be different if free will were an illusion.” That’s either a deeply naïve statement or an attempt to dodge the implications. The world already is what determinism describes—it’s just that most people don’t know it yet. But when they do? That changes everything. Justice becomes restorative, not retributive. Education becomes intervention, not blame. Policy becomes design, not punishment. And yes, the meaning we assign to human behavior will shift—but toward truth, not fantasy.

You and Will want to sit comfortably in the “both sides explain it” zone. That’s fine if your aim is to avoid philosophical discomfort. But don’t pretend that denying free will has no real-world consequence. It’s the difference between a society rooted in illusion and one willing to grow up.

So no, it’s not “moot.” It’s the most important philosophical correction of our time.

[Alexis Jacobi]

The following has relevancy to the never-ending debate on the theme:

The following from Philosophy and Religion: The Logic of Religious Belief, by John Wilson 1961

The second type of support which the religious feeling gives to morality also assists morality to retain its non-scientific character. Religious feeling resists the tendency to regard men as logically similar to things: a tendency which grows as science (particularly psychological science) advances further. Briefly, there are a number of concepts peculiar and essential to morality, which clash (or appear to clash) with the notion that men, like things, work by cause and effect, are capable of scientific investigation, and are ultimately to be studied by the same methods as those which we use to study things, though no doubt with more difficulty.

If men's actions are all ultimately explicable in a normal manner, and in principle at least capable of prediction, doubt is cast on these moral concepts. Among those which become dubious are the notions of guilt, responsibility, blame, praise, punishment — and ultimately, justice.

The religious and moral concept of 'free will’ also appears to be challenged. For, in fact, we do still regard men in a very different logical light from that in which we regard things. We do not praise a man's moral actions in the same psychological way as that in which we praise the smooth running of a machine. To our minds, a man is 'responsible' for a murder in a different sense from that in which a bullet is 'responsible': the man is 'guilty', whereas the bullet can only be called 'guilty' by a metaphor.

We might say, perhaps, though this is crude, that orthodox morality depends on a picture of a sort of inner man or self, who is essentially mysterious and unpredictable: the person's ‘soul', or his 'will'. This inner man is inviolable, and not acted upon by causes: it is not just another part of the machine. It is a kind of incarnate will, that can do right or wrong, rather than merely go right or wrong. Hence we can blame, praise and punish it (or him) according to its merits or deserts, according to justice. All this, of course, is immensely helped by religious belief: the belief that men are basically mysterious, have (or are) souls, and so on; and this is why religious believers tend to be horrified by the scientific approach to the human personality.

[Atla]

I can't even beat sense into VA using my supposed free will. Nor can I will a chocolate bar into existence. That's because determinism correctly describes the world, while free will absolutely doesn't.

[Alexis Jacobi]

Willy B laid it out for IC in that passage you quoted, and you don't seem to have understood him either. When he tells you that "determinism accounts for the phenomena just as well as free will" he means it. It's moot as a question that needs to be answered, and it's equally moot as a question that can really be answered, because properly understood, determinism is just an alternative way of describing the world exactly as it is, not some other world.

It does not surprise me that you’d come up with such a formulation.

It is clearly not “moot” as a question, and it more than certainly is a question that requires an answer. And the question can be answered. Indeed must be answered by an individual who desires to hold to his self and his moral agency.

Determinism, you buffoon, as defined by Mr Determinism, is a radical expression of a new anthropology with vast moral implications.

Do you actually have a mouth or, as it seems, do you literally talk out of your asshole?!?

[Atla]

Free will believers should will themselves 80 more IQ points, that's inside your own mind right, so you can't come up with more excuses.

[Alexis Jacobi]

I can't even beat sense into VA using my supposed free will.

Then get your hands on an actual free will.

If you wish I can set VA on a healing path, but you tight-fisted English jerk-offs* are going to have to make a contribution to the cause. I’ll ask for at least a grand.

*Yes, yes, I know you Atla are some weird Greekish mutt from only God knows where …

[Atla]

I can't even beat sense into VA using my supposed free will.

Then get your hands on an actual free will.

If you wish I can set VA on a healing path, but you tight-fisted English jerk-offs* are going to have to make a contribution to the cause. I’ll ask for at least a grand.

*Yes, yes, I know you Atla are some weird Greekish mutt from only God knows where …

Not even Atla the Atlantean philosopher-king and the Hyperboring Appallon together could set VA on a healing path. That dude is literally incorrigible. Another point for determinism. (the score is about 4238568723:0)

[henry quirk]

You...think...if free will is an illusion then the world would be different to the way it is

I never posted such a thing. My two nits -- I picked them over and over -- are these:

1-All of Mike's fine notions about justice, morality, social reform, education, compassion, meaning, value, what's good, what's evil, etc. aren't worth crap if this...

Here’s the brutal truth: your brain is a deterministic machine, operating under the same unyielding physical laws as a rock rolling downhill. You don’t control your thoughts, your desires, or your decisions. You are driven by a cascade of external inputs, biological processes, and environmental stimuli—all of which you neither initiated nor directed.

...is true.

2-If free wills are taught they are meat machines, atrocity will ensure.

As for free will as an illusion: it might well be (I've said so before). If so, I'll continue to go where the blind, amoral, deterministic forces direct. In context: I'll continue to blindly, amorally, advocate for man as a libertarian free will, self-directing, -reliant, and -responsible. And I'll continue to advocate for the Creator, the first free will. I mean, if I'm a meat machine, then that's kind of meat machine I am, right?

[BigMike]

The following has relevancy to the never-ending debate on the theme:

The following from Philosophy and Religion: The Logic of Religious Belief, by John Wilson 1961

The second type of support which the religious feeling gives to morality also assists morality to retain its non-scientific character. Religious feeling resists the tendency to regard men as logically similar to things: a tendency which grows as science (particularly psychological science) advances further. Briefly, there are a number of concepts peculiar and essential to morality, which clash (or appear to clash) with the notion that men, like things, work by cause and effect, are capable of scientific investigation, and are ultimately to be studied by the same methods as those which we use to study things, though no doubt with more difficulty.

If men's actions are all ultimately explicable in a normal manner, and in principle at least capable of prediction, doubt is cast on these moral concepts. Among those which become dubious are the notions of guilt, responsibility, blame, praise, punishment — and ultimately, justice.

The religious and moral concept of 'free will’ also appears to be challenged. For, in fact, we do still regard men in a very different logical light from that in which we regard things. We do not praise a man's moral actions in the same psychological way as that in which we praise the smooth running of a machine. To our minds, a man is 'responsible' for a murder in a different sense from that in which a bullet is 'responsible': the man is 'guilty', whereas the bullet can only be called 'guilty' by a metaphor.

We might say, perhaps, though this is crude, that orthodox morality depends on a picture of a sort of inner man or self, who is essentially mysterious and unpredictable: the person's ‘soul', or his 'will'. This inner man is inviolable, and not acted upon by causes: it is not just another part of the machine. It is a kind of incarnate will, that can do right or wrong, rather than merely go right or wrong. Hence we can blame, praise and punish it (or him) according to its merits or deserts, according to justice. All this, of course, is immensely helped by religious belief: the belief that men are basically mysterious, have (or are) souls, and so on; and this is why religious believers tend to be horrified by the scientific approach to the human personality.

Alexis,

What that passage lays bare is not the strength of religious morality—it’s its dependency on illusion. The whole house of cards—praise, blame, guilt, responsibility—requires you to believe in a “mysterious and unpredictable” soul exempt from causality. A ghost in the machine. Without it, your concepts of justice and morality dissolve. And that, right there, is the problem.

You quote this as though it’s a defense, but it’s a confession. It admits that if human behavior is governed by cause and effect—like everything else in nature—then yes, the old framework collapses. And it should. Because it’s not built on truth. It’s built on a mythic view of “will” that science has been steadily eroding for centuries.

The fact that religion “assists morality to retain its non-scientific character” is precisely why it has to go. If your moral system only works when we pretend people are outside the laws of nature, then you don’t have a moral system—you have a fable. A comforting one, sure, but still a fable.

We don’t need to fear the loss of blame or guilt. What we need is a better, more honest structure—one rooted in how people actually function, not in how ancient doctrines wished they would. Responsibility doesn’t vanish under determinism—it evolves. Into understanding, into systems of cause-based intervention, into justice that heals instead of punishes.

So thank you, sincerely, for the quote. It’s a perfect snapshot of the ideological bridge we need to burn.