Moral status: robots, foetuses, and healthy patients
Moral status: robots, foetuses, and healthy patients
Suppose we build a Mark 1 robot that is conscious but not sentient, i.e. cannot feel pleasure or pain. Because he does not feel pleasure or pain, it cannot matter to him what we do to him, and since it cannot matter to him, it need not matter to us, either. This robot therefore has no moral status.
Now suppose we build a Mark 2 robot. Unlike the Mark 1, this robot can feel pleasure and pain. Because he can feel pleasure and pain, what we do to him matters to him. If we saw the Mark 1 robot's leg off, he has no reason to mind, because it doesn't hurt. If we saw the Mark 2 robot's leg off, he does have a reason to mind: it hurts, so he would rather we didn't. Because what happens to him matters to him, the Mark 2 robot has moral status.
Now suppose we have a kit that will enable us to upgrade the Mark 1 robot to Mark 2. Once we have upgraded the robot, he will have moral status. Does he have moral status already, on the grounds that he can be upgraded? I think not. It's the other way round: the robot will acquire moral status if we upgrade him, but if we don't upgrade him, he will continue to have no moral status.
There is a parallel here with foetuses, human or otherwise. Once a foetus becomes sentient, can feel pleasure or pain, it matters to it what happens to it, so it has moral status. Before it becomes sentient, it feels no pleasure or pain, so it does not matter to it what happens to it, and it therefore has no moral status. Pro-lifers are therefore correct if they say that it is wrong to abort a sentient foetus, but they are incorrect if they say that it is wrong to abort a pre-sentient foetus. The pre-sentient foetus is like the Mark 1 robot awaiting an upgrade to Mark 2; if it gets upgraded, i.e. develops sentience, it will acquire moral status, but if we abort it before that happens, it never acquires moral status, so there is nothing wrong with aborting it at that early stage.
It is a mistake to treat a being with no moral status as if it had moral status. No being is directly wronged by this, but it could indirectly cause harm, e.g. by diverting resources that could have helped some other being or beings.
It is a mistake to treat a being with moral status as if it had no moral status, and in this case, the being so treated is directly wronged. In the surgeon problem, the healthy patient has moral status but is merely used as a source of spare organs, i.e. treated as if he had no moral status, and is therefore wronged. Utilitarians would claim that the good done to the unhealthy patients outweighs the evil done to the healthy patient, but this does not alter the fact that the healthy patient has been wronged.
What determines a being’s moral status? Being a hedonist, I think this must be based somehow on pleasure and pain. An easy case is where an old person and a young person are in a burning building, and only one can be rescued. The young person, we assume, has more net pleasure ahead of them than the old person, and therefore more reason to mind being burned to death. So the young person has higher moral status than the old person.
However, moral status is not just about who has more net pleasure ahead of them; it is essentially about who stands to gain more from an action. Suppose sentient being A is starving, while sentient being B is well-fed. Feeding B will make little improvement to B’s net pleasure, whereas feeding A will make a great improvement to A's net pleasure; so on this issue at this time, A has higher moral status than B.
How much of this is objective? I am satisfied that pleasure is objectively good and pain is objectively bad, and I am satisfied that treating a being in a way that does not conform to their moral status is incorrect and may be wrong. But what if good and right point in different directions? What if the healthy patient is Adolf Hitler at the age of, say, 20? We wrong Hitler if we take his organs, but we do a huge amount of good by killing him before he gets the chance to kill 6 million Jews. Should we avoid wronging Hitler by letting him live, thus allowing a huge evil to occur? Or should we prevent the evil, but wrong Hitler in the process? There seems to be no common currency between good and evil on the one hand, and right and wrong on the other, and so at the present time I see no objective way of deciding this kind of case. It appears to me at present that the choice can only be subjective. But I am still thinking about it.
P.S. I apologise in advance if I am slow to reply to comments. My life continues to be extremely busy. If people prefer not to comment on the grounds that they may not get a quick reply, I quite understand.
Now suppose we build a Mark 2 robot. Unlike the Mark 1, this robot can feel pleasure and pain. Because he can feel pleasure and pain, what we do to him matters to him. If we saw the Mark 1 robot's leg off, he has no reason to mind, because it doesn't hurt. If we saw the Mark 2 robot's leg off, he does have a reason to mind: it hurts, so he would rather we didn't. Because what happens to him matters to him, the Mark 2 robot has moral status.
Now suppose we have a kit that will enable us to upgrade the Mark 1 robot to Mark 2. Once we have upgraded the robot, he will have moral status. Does he have moral status already, on the grounds that he can be upgraded? I think not. It's the other way round: the robot will acquire moral status if we upgrade him, but if we don't upgrade him, he will continue to have no moral status.
There is a parallel here with foetuses, human or otherwise. Once a foetus becomes sentient, can feel pleasure or pain, it matters to it what happens to it, so it has moral status. Before it becomes sentient, it feels no pleasure or pain, so it does not matter to it what happens to it, and it therefore has no moral status. Pro-lifers are therefore correct if they say that it is wrong to abort a sentient foetus, but they are incorrect if they say that it is wrong to abort a pre-sentient foetus. The pre-sentient foetus is like the Mark 1 robot awaiting an upgrade to Mark 2; if it gets upgraded, i.e. develops sentience, it will acquire moral status, but if we abort it before that happens, it never acquires moral status, so there is nothing wrong with aborting it at that early stage.
It is a mistake to treat a being with no moral status as if it had moral status. No being is directly wronged by this, but it could indirectly cause harm, e.g. by diverting resources that could have helped some other being or beings.
It is a mistake to treat a being with moral status as if it had no moral status, and in this case, the being so treated is directly wronged. In the surgeon problem, the healthy patient has moral status but is merely used as a source of spare organs, i.e. treated as if he had no moral status, and is therefore wronged. Utilitarians would claim that the good done to the unhealthy patients outweighs the evil done to the healthy patient, but this does not alter the fact that the healthy patient has been wronged.
What determines a being’s moral status? Being a hedonist, I think this must be based somehow on pleasure and pain. An easy case is where an old person and a young person are in a burning building, and only one can be rescued. The young person, we assume, has more net pleasure ahead of them than the old person, and therefore more reason to mind being burned to death. So the young person has higher moral status than the old person.
However, moral status is not just about who has more net pleasure ahead of them; it is essentially about who stands to gain more from an action. Suppose sentient being A is starving, while sentient being B is well-fed. Feeding B will make little improvement to B’s net pleasure, whereas feeding A will make a great improvement to A's net pleasure; so on this issue at this time, A has higher moral status than B.
How much of this is objective? I am satisfied that pleasure is objectively good and pain is objectively bad, and I am satisfied that treating a being in a way that does not conform to their moral status is incorrect and may be wrong. But what if good and right point in different directions? What if the healthy patient is Adolf Hitler at the age of, say, 20? We wrong Hitler if we take his organs, but we do a huge amount of good by killing him before he gets the chance to kill 6 million Jews. Should we avoid wronging Hitler by letting him live, thus allowing a huge evil to occur? Or should we prevent the evil, but wrong Hitler in the process? There seems to be no common currency between good and evil on the one hand, and right and wrong on the other, and so at the present time I see no objective way of deciding this kind of case. It appears to me at present that the choice can only be subjective. But I am still thinking about it.
P.S. I apologise in advance if I am slow to reply to comments. My life continues to be extremely busy. If people prefer not to comment on the grounds that they may not get a quick reply, I quite understand.
- henry quirk
- Posts: 16379
- Joined: Fri May 09, 2008 8:07 pm
- Location: 🔥AMERICA🔥
- Contact:
Re: Moral status: robots, foetuses, and healthy patients
Let's go with this...
If the capacity to feel pain is a marker of moral status, then someone with congenital analgesia (the inability to feel pain) has a lower moral status than someone without congenital analgesia, yes?
...to start.What determines a being’s moral status? Being a hedonist, I think this must be based somehow on pleasure and pain.
If the capacity to feel pain is a marker of moral status, then someone with congenital analgesia (the inability to feel pain) has a lower moral status than someone without congenital analgesia, yes?
Re: Moral status: robots, foetuses, and healthy patients
I think so, yes.
- henry quirk
- Posts: 16379
- Joined: Fri May 09, 2008 8:07 pm
- Location: 🔥AMERICA🔥
- Contact:
Re: Moral status: robots, foetuses, and healthy patients
So if I had congenital analgesia I ought not mind if my hand were cut off or my leg crushed? I believe I would. My hand, my leg, these are parts of me. I value me. Moreover, as a person, I believe I have a value, a worth, independent of what I might think of myself. My moral status, then rests on my personhood, not sensory capability.
Re: Moral status: robots, foetuses, and healthy patients
Well, first let me clarify my last answer. 'Pain', as usual in philosophy, does not just mean physical pain, it also covers emotional pain: so although someone with congenital analgesia has lower moral status, other things being equal, than someone who can feel physical pain, they may still be able to feel emotional pain, and so they would still have moral status by virtue of that, albeit probably lower moral status in total than most people. If you 'mind' having your hand or leg cut off, presumably that 'minding' is in fact emotional pain, so it qualifies you for moral status. On the other hand, if you merely have a belief that your arm or leg was valuable but you have no emotional or physical pain from losing it, that belief does not in itself involve any kind of pain, and therefore does not qualify you for moral status.henry quirk wrote: ↑Wed May 07, 2025 11:49 pmSo if I had congenital analgesia I ought not mind if my hand were cut off or my leg crushed? I believe I would. My hand, my leg, these are parts of me. I value me. Moreover, as a person, I believe I have a value, a worth, independent of what I might think of myself. My moral status, then rests on my personhood, not sensory capability.
As for your belief that your value rests on your personhood and not your sensory capability, I would say that that belief is simply mistaken. That belief requires support in the form of evidence and/or argument. Without that support, there is no reason to think the belief is true.
- henry quirk
- Posts: 16379
- Joined: Fri May 09, 2008 8:07 pm
- Location: 🔥AMERICA🔥
- Contact:
Re: Moral status: robots, foetuses, and healthy patients
There's no person, any-where or -when, who would willingly allow a limb to be lopped off. Even the one with congenital analgesia will object. In fact, the only folks who'd submit to such a thing are those convinced amputation would save their lives. Even crazy folk, those who want a limb removed, feel like there's a benefit for them in losing a limb and won't agree to such a thing without that perceived benefit (we, of course, have no obligation to assist a crazy person in mutilating himself...in fact, we may have an obligation not to).I would say that that belief is simply mistaken. That belief requires support in the form of evidence and/or argument. Without that support, there is no reason to think the belief is true.
More generally, there's no person, any-where or -when, who accepts it is their lot to be murdered, slaved, raped, robbed, or defrauded. Even the murderer, slaver, raper, robber, and fraud-meister takes a dim view of being used in such a way.
Everyone has an intuitive understanding of his own self-possesesion, his Ownness. And therein lies moral status.
A person, any person, any-where or -when, may do with his own (and no one else's) life as he sees fit. He has an absolute claim on himself and no one else. He has a right to defend his life against those who'd take it or use it or abuse it. It's immoral to assess him as more or less and assign him a value like a commodity. He's a person, his moral status is the same as any other person and we owe him recognition and respect as a person.
Question: if you contracted congenital analgesia would you accept being treated as less?
Re: Moral status: robots, foetuses, and healthy patients
Haven't read OP yet:henry quirk wrote: ↑Wed May 07, 2025 11:34 pm If the capacity to feel pain is a marker of moral status, then someone with congenital analgesia (the inability to feel pain) has a lower moral status than someone without congenital analgesia, yes?
but that condition causes the inability to feel physical pain, I assume -
it does not restrict one's capacity to feel psychological pain.
And the degree to which one could feel psychological pain,
is worthy of a great respect,
even relative to a less complex animal's capacity to feel physical pain.
And furthermore,
whether physical pain or psychological pain is worse,
is a can of worms in itself.
Potentially all pain boils down to psychological pain -
as what is physical pain,
if not a type of pain one recognizes through their awareness / cognition?
EDIT:
Read CIN2's followup posts to discover this note was irrelevant.
Re: Moral status: robots, foetuses, and healthy patients
A potential is being extinguished, but is not direct harm to the fetus -CIN2 wrote:but they are incorrect if they say that it is wrong to abort a pre-sentient foetus.
as at this stage, it is believed to be completely indifferent to any outcome.
At all stages of pregnancy, the carrier of the fetus is expected to be sentient and will have moral value.
So when it's between an indifferent fetus, and a very much sentient parent -
by the standards you've assumed in regards to morality,
the one who's wellbeing comes out ahead,
fairly reasonably looks like the parent.
Furthermore, a utilitarian could consider the ramifications to society if we set the precedent that any time you go a hospital, the doctors may intentionally harvest your organs against your will.CIN2 wrote:In the surgeon problem, the healthy patient has moral status but is merely used as a source of spare organs, i.e. treated as if he had no moral status, and is therefore wronged.
And if that precedent was set, there'd likely be many more precedents of like kind followed.
This is turn would discourage people from wanting to obey this moral system, because as you rightly point out - an injustice is being done upon them.
Morality in practice is more like an agreement.CIN2 wrote:It appears to me at present that the choice can only be subjective. But I am still thinking about it.
Each has their own vision of what is good and bad,
but in regards to others,
we find common ground to agree on -
that each party hopes to be to their benefit.
You'll follow your will / preferences -
and it's only an issue,
when they lead in conflict with others.
Then it's about navigating the dilemma of alternate preferences.
Widely adopted moral systems try to lay out which metric supersedes another outcome -
i.e. what's better, what's worse. If it's A or B, which should we choose and why?
-
Impenitent
- Posts: 5774
- Joined: Wed Feb 10, 2010 2:04 pm
Re: Moral status: robots, foetuses, and healthy patients
if it is not human- kill it
if it shows sentience- don't kill it
does sentience include the "correct" response to human speech?
my dog is sentient
-Imp
if it shows sentience- don't kill it
does sentience include the "correct" response to human speech?
my dog is sentient
-Imp
Re: Moral status: robots, foetuses, and healthy patients
Yes, because he feels emotional pain at the prospect. I covered this in my previous comment.henry quirk wrote: ↑Thu May 08, 2025 12:51 amThere's no person, any-where or -when, who would willingly allow a limb to be lopped off. Even the one with congenital analgesia will object.I would say that that belief is simply mistaken. That belief requires support in the form of evidence and/or argument. Without that support, there is no reason to think the belief is true.
You are not refuting my contention, which is that only where cutting off a limb causes physical or emotional pain is there a moral status reason to object to it.
Here you assert an ethical position, but you do not support it with evidence or argument.henry quirk wrote: ↑Thu May 08, 2025 12:51 am Everyone has an intuitive understanding of his own self-possesesion, his Ownness. And therein lies moral status.
Unsupported assertion.henry quirk wrote: ↑Thu May 08, 2025 12:51 am A person, any person, any-where or -when, may do with his own (and no one else's) life as he sees fit.
Unsupported assertion.
Unsupported assertion.henry quirk wrote: ↑Thu May 08, 2025 12:51 am He has a right to defend his life against those who'd take it or use it or abuse it.
Unsupported assertion.henry quirk wrote: ↑Thu May 08, 2025 12:51 am It's immoral to assess him as more or less and assign him a value like a commodity.
Unsupported assertion.henry quirk wrote: ↑Thu May 08, 2025 12:51 am He's a person, his moral status is the same as any other person and we owe him recognition and respect as a person.
You're merely asserting your views, not supporting them with either evidence or argument.
I hope so. Suppose I and another person were trapped under a building, and there was only time to save one of us with his legs intact — the other would have to have his legs cut off. If one of us has congenital analgesia, the logical solution is that that person should be the one to have his legs cut off, because he will feel no pain. If I'm the one with congenital analgesia, it would therefore be wrong of me to argue that I had as much right to keep my legs as the other guy. I hope I would have the common decency to accept that.henry quirk wrote: ↑Thu May 08, 2025 12:51 am Question: if you contracted congenital analgesia would you accept being treated as less?
Re: Moral status: robots, foetuses, and healthy patients
Except for the fact that if the hand and/or leg of 'that body' are parts of 'you', 'a person', then if that hand were cut off or that leg crushed, then 'you', literally, would be less of 'a person'.henry quirk wrote: ↑Wed May 07, 2025 11:49 pmSo if I had congenital analgesia I ought not mind if my hand were cut off or my leg crushed? I believe I would. My hand, my leg, these are parts of me. I value me. Moreover, as a person, I believe I have a value, a worth, independent of what I might think of myself. My moral status, then rests on my personhood, not sensory capability.
So, how does this being 'less of a person' affect your so-called 'moral status' 'now', exactly?
Re: Moral status: robots, foetuses, and healthy patients
Why do you say, 'someone with congenital analgesia may still be able to feel emotional pain'?CIN2 wrote: ↑Thu May 08, 2025 12:08 amWell, first let me clarify my last answer. 'Pain', as usual in philosophy, does not just mean physical pain, it also covers emotional pain: so although someone with congenital analgesia has lower moral status, other things being equal, than someone who can feel physical pain, they may still be able to feel emotional pain, and so they would still have moral status by virtue of that, albeit probably lower moral status in total than most people.henry quirk wrote: ↑Wed May 07, 2025 11:49 pmSo if I had congenital analgesia I ought not mind if my hand were cut off or my leg crushed? I believe I would. My hand, my leg, these are parts of me. I value me. Moreover, as a person, I believe I have a value, a worth, independent of what I might think of myself. My moral status, then rests on my personhood, not sensory capability.
one can always feel emotional pain, except by choice alone.
But one might 'mind' having a leg or hand cut off not for any pain related issue but just for the simple fact of how those two things, literally, can come in 'handy'.
What do you even mean by, 'moral status', exactly?
If one does have so-called 'moral status', then what does 'this status' allow and/or provide 'that one', exactly?
CIN2 wrote: ↑Thu May 08, 2025 12:08 am As for your belief that your value rests on your personhood and not your sensory capability, I would say that that belief is simply mistaken. That belief requires support in the form of evidence and/or argument. Without that support, there is no reason to think the belief is true.
Re: Moral status: robots, foetuses, and healthy patients
I know of people would would willingly allow a limb to be so-called 'lopped off'. So, why do you believe, absolutely, that there is no person who would?henry quirk wrote: ↑Thu May 08, 2025 12:51 amThere's no person, any-where or -when, who would willingly allow a limb to be lopped off.I would say that that belief is simply mistaken. That belief requires support in the form of evidence and/or argument. Without that support, there is no reason to think the belief is true.
Do you believe that 'you' know every person, personally?
So, in one sentence you say, write, and claim that there is no person who would willingly allow a limb to be 'lopped off', but in your very next sentence you admit that there are people who would willingly allow a limb to be 'lopped off'.henry quirk wrote: ↑Thu May 08, 2025 12:51 am Even the one with congenital analgesia will object. In fact, the only folks who'd submit to such a thing are those convinced amputation would save their lives.
Are you aware of what you say and write, here, and just how confused 'you' come across sometimes?
But, even 'you' freeing choose to be 'slaved', and 'to slave' others. Although you obviously can not yet recognize and see 'this fact', and as such believe absolutely otherwise.henry quirk wrote: ↑Thu May 08, 2025 12:51 am Even crazy folk, those who want a limb removed, feel like there's a benefit for them in losing a limb and won't agree to such a thing without that perceived benefit (we, of course, have no obligation to assist a crazy person in mutilating himself...in fact, we may have an obligation not to).
More generally, there's no person, any-where or -when, who accepts it is their lot to be murdered, slaved, raped, robbed, or defrauded. Even the murderer, slaver, raper, robber, and fraud-meister takes a dim view of being used in such a way.
But having a so-called 'intuitive understanding' never necessarily means that one's own personal so-called 'intuitive understanding' 'fits in with' what is actually True and Right, in Life. Take for example your own personal 'intuitive understanding' that 'that body' is 'you', 'the person'. Now, if 'you' really want to claim that 'this intuitive understanding' is true and right, then 'you' will have to admit and accept that if a hand or a leg is removed from 'that body', then 'you', instantly, become 'less of a person'.henry quirk wrote: ↑Thu May 08, 2025 12:51 am Everyone has an intuitive understanding of his own self-possesesion, his Ownness. And therein lies moral status.
Except "henry quirk", "itself", believes, absolutely, that it has some sort of 'right' that it can tell 'another' what they can, and/or can not, do 'with their own life'. And, if 'another' does not do what "henry quirk" tells them to do, or not do, then "henry quirk" believes, again absolutely, that it has some sort of 'right' to take over 'another's life', and/or to even remove 'that life', completely.henry quirk wrote: ↑Thu May 08, 2025 12:51 am A person, any person, any-where or -when, may do with his own (and no one else's) life as he sees fit.
Again, except for in cases above where "henry quirk" believes that is has some sort of 'claim' over anyone else's life, under "henry quirk's" own personal choices, of course.
Except, of course, when "henry quirk" chooses to end 'another's life', then 'the other' has absolutely no 'right' at all to defend 'their life'. And this is just because "henry quirk" has chosen that you do not have 'this right', 'now'.henry quirk wrote: ↑Thu May 08, 2025 12:51 am He has a right to defend his life against those who'd take it or use it or abuse it.
Yet, here, is "henry quirk" claiming that it and other people are 'human bodies', which obviously means that if 'some body' is smaller than, shorter than, weighing less than, or has less limbs that 'somebody else', then that so-called 'person' is less than other 'people' are.henry quirk wrote: ↑Thu May 08, 2025 12:51 am It's immoral to assess him as more or less and assign him a value like a commodity.
What do you mean by, 'moral status', exactly?henry quirk wrote: ↑Thu May 08, 2025 12:51 am He's a person, his moral status is the same as any other person and we owe him recognition and respect as a person.
Why did you write the word, 'Question', when you put a question mark at the end, anyway?henry quirk wrote: ↑Thu May 08, 2025 12:51 am Question: if you contracted congenital analgesia would you accept being treated as less?
If 'you', 'a person', is 'the body', then if a hand was cut off or a leg is crushed, for example, then 'that one' has to be 'less of a person', correct?
If this is not Correct, then will you explain why not, exactly?
If no, then why not?
Re: Moral status: robots, foetuses, and healthy patients
So, if you had the beginnings of a new being growing inside of you -- do you have a right to defend your life against that one who'd take it from you?henry quirk wrote: ↑Thu May 08, 2025 12:51 am A person, any person, any-where or -when, may do with his own (and no one else's) life as he sees fit. He has an absolute claim on himself and no one else. He has a right to defend his life against those who'd take it or use it or abuse it. It's immoral to assess him as more or less and assign him a value like a commodity. He's a person, his moral status is the same as any other person and we owe him recognition and respect as a person.
Re: Moral status: robots, foetuses, and healthy patients
Fretting over the details of one being's rights (while making no mention of the second being) in a two being situation, is somewhere between ignorant and disingenuous.