Haven’t those who reject morality just because of its religious roots ended up constructing another belief system

[Skepdick]

Secularism cannot validate anything on the basis of its own worlview. My point is not merely that secularism fails this test because it's untrue (I've already pointed out that untrue worldview can pass the test); my point is that secularism cannot structure in a valid way any moral claim at all...even if secularism were true!

That's simply not true.

Sure it is. That is precisely why you've provided no such moral claim. You can't. QED.

You are going to lie about all three of the moral claims I validated?
You are going to lie about the fact that the identity axiom validates any claim. Moral or otherwise?

Wow... What an immoral twat.

[Immanuel Can]

However, most of us can generally know the difference between being moral toward someone versus being immoral toward them--even secularists can know that.

Not on the basis of their secularism, however. They can "know" it by upbringing, by habit, by aculturation into a different worldview, by universal conscience, perhaps...but the minute they try to explain WHY thing X or Y is "moral," they can't. Nothing moral issues from secularism.

They know the world's a moral place. They just can't figure out how they know that.

Can you explain to me how you know that the world is a moral place?

Let's start with the obvious: you know there's such a thing as "morality." You're a morally-conscious being. How has that happened, given that secularism says you're being aware of a "nothing"?

I mean, Yaweh doesn't seem like a particularly moral God to me.

Well, you don't really know Him, so it's pretty hard to say, isn't it? What you can say is that IF He's a moral being, this world doesn't seem to be running by the sorts of rules that fit with it. And that's fair: it's not running by His rules, at least at present.

But consider this: if secularism were true, then there would be no way to have that sense of "not particularly moral." Secularism would dictate to you that you're sensing a "nothing" and should simply "get over" your ill-ease at the way the world is: there's nothing to be regretting. Whatever is, simply is. The world is not interested in your feelings about fairness, or kindness or justice or morality...it just continues grinding on in its own way, indifferent to us all. That's the secular viewpoint.

But I don't think that's the case. I think that your sense of the unfairness and anti-moral order of the world is a sound intuition. It may not make any sense from a secular perspective, but I think that's because secularism isn't the worldview capable of accounting for your feeling. And, of course, I think secularism also isn't realistic.

So that's the starting point: not only you, but all of us, we all have a sense of the moral order that should pervade the universe and yet does not. If that sense is grounded in any reality, then secularism's a dead end. But that intuition is one of our more powerful ones, and more pervasive ones, and more co-ordinated human experiences...so some better account of that existential data needs to be made. And when an intuition like that comes along, we're foolish to simply dismiss it. It's part of the psychological and sociological furniture of human experience, and a hint at the possibility of a more coherent reality. We should explore that, rather than simply shutting it down with secularist pat answers.

[Pistolero]

Morals are the encoding of behaviors that facilitate cooperative survival and reproductive strategies.
They require no god.
They are naturally selected and become innate to all social organisms, because they offer an advantage.

We witness moral acts among many species.
They have no Commandments on Stone, but an innate impulse to sacrifice themselves, or to be tolerant and kind, because it benefits them, in the long run.
Selfish genes.

Men add to these behaviors their own amendments, such as those that go against human nature, so as to facilitate the development of more complex systems.
For example, rules against adultery, are meant to repress natural mating impulses, so as to integrate as many males and females into society.

God is invented to then impose fear, as a way of regulating these amendments.

[Gary Childress]

Not on the basis of their secularism, however. They can "know" it by upbringing, by habit, by aculturation into a different worldview, by universal conscience, perhaps...but the minute they try to explain WHY thing X or Y is "moral," they can't. Nothing moral issues from secularism.

They know the world's a moral place. They just can't figure out how they know that.

Can you explain to me how you know that the world is a moral place?

Let's start with the obvious: you know there's such a thing as "morality." You're a morally-conscious being. How has that happened, given that secularism says you're being aware of a "nothing"?

So, are you saying that we know there is such a thing as morality because we are conscious of morality? If that is the case, then how does that exclude secularists?

[Immanuel Can]

Can you explain to me how you know that the world is a moral place?

Let's start with the obvious: you know there's such a thing as "morality." You're a morally-conscious being. How has that happened, given that secularism says you're being aware of a "nothing"?

So, are you saying that we know there is such a thing as morality because we are conscious of morality?

No, I'm saying that there is such a thing as morality AND we are conscious of morality. It's not a "because."

It's like the difference between saying, "The Eagles won the Superbowl, and I'm an Eagles fan," (I'm not, by the way) and saying, "The Eagles won the Superbowl because I'm an Eagles fan." The two are in no way equivalent, and the first clause is independent of the second.

If that is the case, then how does that exclude secularists?

It doesn't, because secularism isn't reality. So even secularists have this same conscience that others do: their own consciences are constantly telling them they're wrong, actually.

But what they lack are two things...one is a justification for why they believe in it, as secularism offers them no reason to think morality can even exist, and the second is a conviction that they would have to obey their moral awareness, since secularism tells them it's an illusion that they have any objective moral duties at all.

Fortunately, most secularists still pay attention to their innate moral awareness, even though secularism itself denies them any grounds for believing they need to do so. In their case, the hypocrisy of them not following the logic of their own declared beliefs turns out to be a benefit to us all. The concerning thing is just how long they're going to keep doing it, after they realize that secularism gives them no justification to think they have to.

[Gary Childress]

Let's start with the obvious: you know there's such a thing as "morality." You're a morally-conscious being. How has that happened, given that secularism says you're being aware of a "nothing"?

So, are you saying that we know there is such a thing as morality because we are conscious of morality?

No, I'm saying that there is such a thing as morality AND we are conscious of morality. It's not a "because."

It's like the difference between saying, "The Eagles won the Superbowl, and I'm an Eagles fan," (I'm not, by the way) and saying, "The Eagles won the Superbowl because I'm an Eagles fan." The two are in no way equivalent, and the first clause is independent of the second.

If that is the case, then how does that exclude secularists?

It doesn't, because secularism isn't reality. So even secularists have this same conscience that others do: their own consciences are constantly telling them they're wrong, actually.

But what they lack are two things...one is a justification for why they believe in it, as secularism offers them no reason to think morality can even exist, and the second is a conviction that they would have to obey their moral awareness, since secularism tells them it's an illusion that they have any objective moral duties at all.

Fortunately, most secularists still pay attention to their innate moral awareness, even though secularism itself denies them any grounds for believing they need to do so. In their case, the hypocrisy of them not following the logic of their own declared beliefs turns out to be a benefit to us all. The concerning thing is just how long they're going to keep doing it, after they realize that secularism gives them no justification to think they have to.

That's not what I was getting at. You say you know that the world is a moral place. I asked you what makes you think it's a moral place. You replied that we are morally conscious beings. I took that to mean that you think the world is a moral place because you are conscious of something called morality.

That doesn't prove that the world is a moral place outside of what could be our wishful thinking. What makes you think the world is a moral place and that morality is not just a human invention or a development of the human brain that helps society hold together better? How do you know that anything or any being outside of human beings has any concept of morality? What evidence suggests to you that morality is something other than a human invention? That anything other than people are moral? Do you see morality in the non-human world? Do you see morality in the way the world works outside of human affairs? And if so, what is an example of morality that exists outside of human affairs?

[Immanuel Can]

So, are you saying that we know there is such a thing as morality because we are conscious of morality?

No, I'm saying that there is such a thing as morality AND we are conscious of morality. It's not a "because."

It's like the difference between saying, "The Eagles won the Superbowl, and I'm an Eagles fan," (I'm not, by the way) and saying, "The Eagles won the Superbowl because I'm an Eagles fan." The two are in no way equivalent, and the first clause is independent of the second.

If that is the case, then how does that exclude secularists?

It doesn't, because secularism isn't reality. So even secularists have this same conscience that others do: their own consciences are constantly telling them they're wrong, actually.

But what they lack are two things...one is a justification for why they believe in it, as secularism offers them no reason to think morality can even exist, and the second is a conviction that they would have to obey their moral awareness, since secularism tells them it's an illusion that they have any objective moral duties at all.

Fortunately, most secularists still pay attention to their innate moral awareness, even though secularism itself denies them any grounds for believing they need to do so. In their case, the hypocrisy of them not following the logic of their own declared beliefs turns out to be a benefit to us all. The concerning thing is just how long they're going to keep doing it, after they realize that secularism gives them no justification to think they have to.

That's not what I was getting at. You say you know that the world is a moral place. I asked you what makes you think it's a moral place. You replied that we are morally conscious beings. I took that to mean that you think the world is a moral place because you are conscious of something called morality.

No, it was an "and." The fact that people are conscious of morality is not the reason for morality being real. They are conscious of it because morality is real, and we all know it is. And this is but the first of my indications that morality is real, though it's one that's easily underestimated by the skeptical arguments. When there is a phenomenon that transcends all times in history, all cultures, all differences between human beings -- meaning consciousness of moral imperatives -- then that phenomenon requires an explanation, the kind of explanation that secularism cannot even begin to provide.

What makes you think the world is a moral place and that morality is not just a human invention or a development of the human brain that helps society hold together better?

Many things "make a society hold together better," including terror and totalitarianism. But we're not going to mistake them for something moral. In addition, there are moral situations in which the conscientious individual is actually pitted against the unthinking larger society; and if the reason for morality were social cohesion, that would never be the case.

How do you know that anything or any being outside of human beings has any concept of morality?

Of what would you be thinking?...

Do you see morality in the non-human world?"

No. There, I see creatures that operate by instinct and conditioning. But there's no evidence of them operating on principle, far less any moral one, and no evidence of moral thinking. Metacognition seems to be entirely limited to the human species, and metacognition is essential for moral reflection, among other things. The uniqueness and profundity of that phenomenon needs explication for sure.

But consider yourself: what is this intution you have that the present world, the one you experience, is "not what it should be," so to speak, or even that it is, in some sense "immoral" in the way it presently functions? How could somebody who lived in an entirely secular way of thinking imagine that he has any entitlement for things to be "better" or even "different" than they are? Surely your own instinctive sense of rightness is telling you that there's a moral assessment of this world that needs to be made, and you're making it, and finding the world "unfair," or "unjust" or "immoral" -- all of which requires you to believe in objective moral terms. Why do you believe in something that secularism tells you is not real, and imagine this world can be "unfair" to anybody? Secularism holds that whatever is, simply is. Que sera, sera. C'est la vie. Secularism says there's nothing anybody can do about it, it's not unfair, and anybody who imagines otherwise must simply be mentally ill, because they're imagining things that don't exist in reality.

I don't think you think your moral assessments are unfounded...and I agree with you that you're intuiting something real.

But I'm a Christian. I also believe that morality is not something we're left to guess at. I believe God has spoken on that subject quite exhaustively. So revelation would be the second evidence I'd point to.

[CIN2]

But let us see. I put a challenge to you, and you can refute me so, so easily: just demonstrate that secularism can serve as justification for one moral precept. Just one. Any one.

Go ahead.

I'm quite willing to answer your post in full, but we must first get one thing out of the way: I am not going to try and demonstrate that secularism can serve as justification for moral precepts, for the simple reason that I have never claimed, and would never claim, that it can. As I said, secularism is simply the principle of separation of the state from religious institutions. Secularism is therefore a position in political philosophy, not ethics, and consequently secularism could never be a source of morality.

Possibly what you really mean to ask me is to show that moral precepts can be justified in the absence of religious belief. That is a challenge I am quite happy to meet. But there's no possibility of proceeding in this discussion while you attribute a view to me that I don't hold.

[Immanuel Can]

But let us see. I put a challenge to you, and you can refute me so, so easily: just demonstrate that secularism can serve as justification for one moral precept. Just one. Any one.

Go ahead.

I'm quite willing to answer your post in full, but we must first get one thing out of the way: I am not going to try and demonstrate that secularism can serve as justification for moral precepts, for the simple reason that I have never claimed, and would never claim, that it can.

If that's your answer, then my case is totally made. Secularism can tell us nothing at all about morality, and hence ends up denying morality's very existence. And we may safely conclude that the only remaining options for a secularist are a complete skepticism about any policy offered "for moral reasons," which simply, then, cannot be allowed to exist at all.

But since people cannot live without a moral compass, and they can't make policy or even personal decisions without working from some conception of "the Good," the Original Poster's question returns with a vengeance: what is a secularist then going to do? Does it mean he's going to have to "construct another belief system"? In which case, what "belief system" is that, and how does he justify the "constructing" of it?

As I said, secularism is simply the principle of separation of the state from religious institutions.

There's more to it than that, of course.

You've segmented one part of the definition off, and made it the ONLY definition of something that's actually capable of a more sweeping definition. The secular mindset can include all sorts of things: not just "the separation of church and state," but also the separation of belief from things like education, public policy-making, the correctional system, distributive justice, skepticism about all morality, and even resistance to the pangs of individual conscience, as if they ought not to be allowed to impinge on normal decision-making. It can include a variety of positions on religious questions, as well -- including the NOMA hypothesis, the "siloing" of religion from knowledge, agnostic paralysis, the banishing of all religious thought from the public square, and outright Atheism. They all fit the "secular" frame.

Now, when I use the term "secularism" in this context, it means the very general usage, therefore, or in specific reference to this thread, it means, "those who reject morality because of its religious roots." That seems fair, given the OP. I suggest we both use it in the way the OP chooses.

Possibly what you really mean to ask me is to show that moral precepts can be justified in the absence of religious belief. That is a challenge I am quite happy to meet.

I would like to see how you think we might meet that challenge.

[popeye1945]

Religion is not the source of morality; religion and external systems of morality are biological extensions of human biology. Religion is not supernatural, but the creation of our ancestors as their biological extensions in trying to make sense of the world. Biology is the measure and the meaning of all things, in the absence of which the physical world is meaningless; meanings are biological experiences and their judgments. If the Bible contains meaning, it was bestowed upon it by biological subjects, for there is no other source of acquired meanings. Our everyday reality is a biological readout of the energies surrounding us and may not exist other than subjectively. So, people construct their belief systems and place them in buildings called churches, among other biological extensions like universities, theatres, and ballparks. Humanity will never gain self-control until it is accepted that biology is the source of all meanings, being the only source.

[CIN2]

Now, when I use the term "secularism" in this context, it means the very general usage, therefore, or in specific reference to this thread, it means, "those who reject morality because of its religious roots." That seems fair, given the OP. I suggest we both use it in the way the OP chooses.

Neither you nor the OP can change the usual meaning of a word.

However, since I have no wish to let this discussion die over a disagreement about word meanings, I propose whenever you say 'secularism' to substitute in my own mind 'absence of religious belief'.

Possibly what you really mean to ask me is to show that moral precepts can be justified in the absence of religious belief. That is a challenge I am quite happy to meet.

I would like to see how you think we might meet that challenge.

Very well. I will defend the moral precept 'other things being equal, it is morally bad to intentionally and knowingly cause pain'. (Strictly speaking, of course, this is not a moral precept but a moral judgment. I am supposing, perhaps over-optimistically, that it would be possible to derive a precept from this judgment. This is an area I am still investigating.) When I have done so, it would be only fair for you to meet the same challenge, i.e. justify some moral precept (or judgment) on theistic grounds.
For the purposes of this demonstration, I am going to assume that there is such a thing as free will (without which there can be no such thing as moral responsibility, and hence no morality), although I do not believe this myself. I take it that you, as a Christian, would not wish to take me up on this point.

Demonstration:
1. 'X is bad' means 'X has a property or properties which provide reason to give an anti-response to X'.
2. Pain has a property (namely, dislikeability) which provides reason to give an anti-response (namely, dislike) to pain.
3. Therefore pain is bad.
4. Therefore, other things being equal, an action which causes pain is bad.
5. (On the assumption that there is free will) an agent is morally responsible for an action performed intentionally and knowingly.
6. Therefore an agent intentionally and knowingly causing pain is morally responsible for causing the pain.
7. Therefore an agent intentionally and knowingly causing pain is morally responsible for performing a bad action.
8. Therefore (other things being equal) it is morally bad to intentionally and knowingly cause pain.

QED

Notes:
1. An anti-response is any negative response. It could be dislike, disapproval, discommendation, fear, hatred, avoidance, running away from, etc..
This definition is a variant of one proposed by A.C.Ewing in The Definition of Good. If you wish to reject it, you must either show that there is something wrong with it, or produce a better definition, or else argue, with G.E.Moore, that 'good' is indefinable.
The definition does not apply to non-evaluative uses of 'good', e.g. 'white goods.'

2. By 'pain' I mean any experienced unpleasantness.
Here I am following Goldstein (https://philarchive.org/rec/GOLWPP) in holding that 'Pleasure presents us with reason to seek it, pain presents us reason to avoid it.'
The point is that what pleasure is like to experience provides a reason to respond to the pleasure positively, and what pain is like to experience provides a reason to respond to the pain negatively. It appears to me that the likeability of pleasure and the dislikeability of pain are not merely intrinsic properties, but essential properties. This seems to be my experience of both pleasure and pain, and I assume that it is the same for all beings capable of experiencing pleasure and pain. Of course there may be additional reasons for responding differently, e.g. one might respond positively to pain because it clears one's head; but this would not alter the fact that the pain qua pain provides reason to respond negatively, it is just that there is a further effect of the pain which produces a pro-response in addition to the anti-response.
If you wish to reject my or Goldstein's view, you must again show that there is something wrong with it or present a better theory of the relationship between pain and responses to pain.

3. i.e. intrinsically bad. From 1 and 2.

4. i.e. instrumentally bad. From 3 plus the generally accepted notion of instrumentality.

5. I take it that this is the generally accepted notion of moral responsibility.

6. From 5.

7. From 4 and 6.

8. Generalised restatement of 7.

The reason why I said earlier that it is impossible for God to set moral values is that if pleasure is intrinsically and essentially good, and pain intrinsically and essentially bad (and if you think there are, or can be, other intrinsic goods and bads, the burden of proof is on you to show what they are), he cannot create a world in which this is not the case. He can of course (if he exists, and has this power) create a world without pleasure and pain altogether, but as long as the world contains pleasure and pain, it follows from the above demonstration that actions that knowingly and intentionally cause them must, other things being equal, be respectively morally good and morally bad, and God cannot change that.

(BTW, I apologise for the slowness of my responses to your posts. I have a very busy life, and philosophy has to fit in where it can.)

[Immanuel Can]

Now, when I use the term "secularism" in this context, it means the very general usage, therefore, or in specific reference to this thread, it means, "those who reject morality because of its religious roots." That seems fair, given the OP. I suggest we both use it in the way the OP chooses.

Neither you nor the OP can change the usual meaning of a word.

Good thing I'm not changing it, then. Nor were you. You were just narrowing it beyond the standard definition...which you can do, but it's called "stipulating a definition," and one always has to explain exactly the scope with which you're intending the word...just as I also did.

Possibly what you really mean to ask me is to show that moral precepts can be justified in the absence of religious belief. That is a challenge I am quite happy to meet.

I would like to see how you think we might meet that challenge.

Very well. I will defend the moral precept 'other things being equal, it is morally bad to intentionally and knowingly cause pain'.

So, people who work out, or run marathons, or create pregancies, would be "immoral"? And what about your surgeon, who will cause you pain in order to excise a tumour?

I think the relationship between pain and morality is rather complex: it's certainly more complex than pain is bad. Sometimes, pain is neutral, and sometimes it is morally virtuous to cause pain. And I think that case is pretty clear.

When I have done so, it would be only fair for you to meet the same challenge, i.e. justify some moral precept on theistic grounds.

So easy to do. I'll be happy to.

For the purposes of this demonstration, I am going to assume that there is such a thing as free will (without which there can be no such thing as moral responsibility, and hence no morality), although I do not believe this myself. I take it that you, as a Christian, would not wish to take me up on this point.

Some Christians are Determinists, but I'm not. However, if you really believe in Determinism, you're cutting yourself off from being able to say anything at all about justifying morality, because, as you imply, there would be no such thing, for you.

Demonstration:

I've already raises the obvious rejoinders above. Pain is not always bad. Some pain is morally virtuous, even when you cause it to another. Some of it is elective, and is willingly self-caused in the aid of some higher goal. So I'm afraid your demonstration doesn't even pass the first gate.

I admire your serious effort to make your case, though, and I appreciate the effort. I just don't think it's uncontroversial -- or even defensible. Lots of pains are caused for good reasons.

The reason why I said earlier that it is impossible for God to set moral values is that if pleasure is intrinsically and essentially good, and pain intrinsically and essentially bad (and if you think there are, or can be, other intrinsic goods and bads, the burden of proof is on you to show what they are), he cannot create a world in which this is not the case. He can of course (if he exists, and has this power) create a world without pleasure and pain altogether, but as long as the world contains pleasure and pain, it follows from the above demonstration that actions that knowingly and intentionally cause them must, other things being equal, be respectively morally good and morally bad, and God cannot change that.

(BTW, I apologise for the slowness of my responses to your posts. I have a very busy life, and philosophy has to fit in where it can.)

As I say, I respect you for the care with which you assembled your response, and am honoured by your investment of time and effort: but I can't really concede your point, for the reasons cited above. However, if you wish to modify your argument to include such cases, I'd be interested in what that might produce.

I don't want to fail to honour your earlier request, namely, that I point out a moral precept sustainable and justifiable by way of Theism. I'm happy to comply.

Of course, we're starting with a Theistic assumption, namely, that the Creator God of Christianity exists. If we started with any other assumption, it couldn't be a Theistic argument, right?

So then, the case becomes quite straightforward: God is the Creator, and only the Creator can possibly say what the purpose (or telos) of something He has created is.

God created man for fellowship with Him. Therefore, seeking and having fellowship with God is an unalloyed good for all men.

And, of course, this would be true for anybody else, as well. If we posit the existence of the Theistic-Christian God, then fellowship with that God remains the ultimate good for Christians, Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists, Zoroastrians, pagans, agnostics and all Atheists, as well. It's just that many of them may, perhaps, willfully fail to choose that ultimate good...not that it's not the ultimate good for them, if they were to choose it. If there's only one God, there's only one ultimate good, and that's it.

[CIN2]

Very well. I will defend the moral precept 'other things being equal, it is morally bad to intentionally and knowingly cause pain'.

So, people who work out, or run marathons, or create pregancies, would be "immoral"? And what about your surgeon, who will cause you pain in order to excise a tumour?

That was why I was careful to say 'other things being equal'. In cases such as the ones you mention, other things are not equal: the pain is bad, but the other features of the case (e.g. the removal of the tumour) may be good.

I think the relationship between pain and morality is rather complex: it's certainly more complex than pain is bad. Sometimes, pain is neutral, and sometimes it is morally virtuous to cause pain. And I think that case is pretty clear.

In my demonstration, I explained exactly why pain is bad. You haven't refuted, or even tried to refute, the points I make in my demonstration. I made it quite clear that in order to do so, you would have to show that premises 1 and/or 2 were wrong, or could be improved on. You haven't even attempted that, and consequently you have not even begun to refute my demonstration. All you are doing here is ignoring my demonstration and presenting an alternative view, and not even trying to support that alternative view with argument or evidence. In other words, you are not doing philosophy. This is a philosophy forum, and that is what you are supposed to be doing here.

I don't want to fail to honour your earlier request, namely, that I point out a moral precept sustainable and justifiable by way of Theism. I'm happy to comply.

Of course, we're starting with a Theistic assumption, namely, that the Creator God of Christianity exists. If we started with any other assumption, it couldn't be a Theistic argument, right?

So then, the case becomes quite straightforward: God is the Creator, and only the Creator can possibly say what the purpose (or telos) of something He has created is.

God created man for fellowship with Him. Therefore, seeking and having fellowship with God is an unalloyed good for all men.

So your argument goes like this:
1. God created man for fellowship with Him.
2. Therefore, , seeking and having fellowship with God is an unalloyed good for all men.
This is not a valid argument. In the premise you talk about creation, and in the conclusion you talk about good. You do not provide any reason to connect these two different ideas, and so the conclusion does not follow from the premise.

You could make the argument valid by inserting a second premise, i.e.:
1. God created man for fellowship with Him.
2. If A creates B for fellowship with A, then seeking and having fellowship with A is an unalloyed good for B.
3. Therefore, , seeking and having fellowship with God is an unalloyed good for all men.
The problem then is that you need to show that premise 2 is true. I see no reason to suppose that it is. You assume that what a creator purposes for his creation must be good for that creation but:
1. you do not define 'good', and until you do, what you are saying is unclear
2. you do not justify the claim that a creator's purpose has to be good.


Over to you.

[Immanuel Can]

Very well. I will defend the moral precept 'other things being equal, it is morally bad to intentionally and knowingly cause pain'.

So, people who work out, or run marathons, or create pregancies, would be "immoral"? And what about your surgeon, who will cause you pain in order to excise a tumour?

That was why I was careful to say 'other things being equal'.

Yes, I saw...but I can't see anything "unequal" in cases of athletic pain, which is chosen by the athlete, or birth pain, which is chosen by the mother, or the pain of a surgery that saves a life. So I can't agree that pain and bad are the same thing. And what I'm saying is not new: all hedonic and hedonistic ethical systems, such as utilitarianism and the other consequentialisms, have been criticized in the same way.

You'll have to define very precisely when "things are equal," so to speak...what conditions can signal to us that we have "equality" in a case. For if we can't, and if we have no way to tell when "all things are being equal," then we cannot know whether or not the pain we are considering is of the "bad" or "good" kind, and we can't make any moral judgments based on the presence of "pain" -- it might be good pain, it might be bad pain, and we don't know.

So can you do that? Can you explain exactly when "all things" are "being equal"?

I think the relationship between pain and morality is rather complex: it's certainly more complex than pain is bad. Sometimes, pain is neutral, and sometimes it is morally virtuous to cause pain. And I think that case is pretty clear.

In my demonstration, I explained exactly why pain is bad. You haven't refuted, or even tried to refute, the points I make in my demonstration.

Actually, I did respond relevantly -- not piling up critiques on every premise, which would be petty, but commencing with the first fallacy in the sequence, and giving you time to deal with that before we move on. I was trying to make your job easy, and since the first premise hangs the whole ensuing argument, criticizing the rest would be redundant -- nailing the barn door shut after the horse has bolted, so to speak.

The argument's first problem was in its very premise. And as you know, in logic, if one premise is already bad, then the conclusion isn't warranted. And the same would be true if the fault were in premise 2, 3, or 4. So where we need to start is to revise the assumption that pain is bad. It isn't.

You wrote: "It appears to me that the likeability of pleasure and the dislikeability of pain are not merely intrinsic properties, but essential properties."

This creates additional problems: one is that to me, and apparently to a whole lot of the critics of hedonic ethics, it's far from clear that pain is inherently "dislikeable." Rather, that seems to be situationally decided, and there are certainly cases in which pain is accepted or even embraced as "pleasurable" in some other way. (Here, I don't merely allude to phenomena like sadism and masochism, though they also furnish countercases, but in situations in which we note the truthfulness of the ancient observation that suffering is often itself the road to a virtuous outcome, such as the acquiring of wisdom and the improvement of the character.)

But the second problem is even bigger: how do we attach the word "likeabilty" to the words "good" or "essential"? What is there in this world, secularly considered, that would assure us that what we "like" is good, and that we are owed in any moral or even practical sense to have what we "like"? That argument surely needs to be spelled out. That is yet to be achieved here.

The next problem is in the idea of "essential" moral status. In a world governed by secular assumptions, how do we secure to ourselves the confidence that "good" or "likeability," or any other word you wish, is an "essential" anything? Could we not simply say that the order of Nature (our God substitute) is "red in tooth and claw," or "survival of the fittest," with total disregard for "good" or "like"? Darwinism would certainly hasten us toward that conclusion: so how would we justify the faith that indifferent Nature cares about the "good" and "likings" of only one species, or indeed of any at all? And how would we go about locating these "essences" in the merely material universe?

But you see that things get very complicated very fast. And I didn't want to overwhelm you with negatives, so I picked my best shot with premise 1, and left the rest until later. I was not dishonouring your effort; I was trying to set a doable and clear level of response-opportunity for you, rather than cavilling at every tiny point and overwhelming you with all these things I could have added.

And I'm offering you the chance to improve that first premise. If you don't, the argument become untenable at the first post, of course. But if you fix that unwarranted suppostion, I'm fine with entertaining the next one, and the next, and so on. This is how philosophy works. This is logic. This is critique. Try not to take it personally.

I don't want to fail to honour your earlier request, namely, that I point out a moral precept sustainable and justifiable by way of Theism. I'm happy to comply.

Of course, we're starting with a Theistic assumption, namely, that the Creator God of Christianity exists. If we started with any other assumption, it couldn't be a Theistic argument, right?

So then, the case becomes quite straightforward: God is the Creator, and only the Creator can possibly say what the purpose (or telos) of something He has created is.

God created man for fellowship with Him. Therefore, seeking and having fellowship with God is an unalloyed good for all men.

So your argument goes like this:
1. God created man for fellowship with Him.
2. Therefore, , seeking and having fellowship with God is an unalloyed good for all men.
This is not a valid argument. In the premise you talk about creation, and in the conclusion you talk about good. You do not provide any reason to connect these two different ideas, and so the conclusion does not follow from the premise.

You missed my second premise: "only the Creator can possibly say what the purpose/telos (or, we might say, rightful good) is for all men." (see above) That's obviously true, too: only the one who created can say why or for what end a particular thing was created, since only His volition, and nobody else's, was involved.

Now, you're right that I owe you another premise in addition to that, but I thought it was pretty obvious: "God says that man was created to have fellowship with Him." I could have added, "The Christian God does not lie," but both of these are part of the very definition of "the Christian God," so I didn't feel the need to state them. However, here they are.

Over to you.

Thanks for the chance to explain. And now, back to you.

[CIN2]

So, people who work out, or run marathons, or create pregancies, would be "immoral"? And what about your surgeon, who will cause you pain in order to excise a tumour?

That was why I was careful to say 'other things being equal'.

Yes, I saw...but I can't see anything "unequal" in cases of athletic pain, which is chosen by the athlete, or birth pain, which is chosen by the mother, or the pain of a surgery that saves a life. So I can't agree that pain and bad are the same thing.

I'm not claiming that pain and bad are the same thing (i.e. numerically identical). I claim that badness is necessarily a property of pain (in the sense in which philosophers usually use the word 'pain').

Let me put this as accurately as I can. By 'pain' I mean any experience that is subjectively unpleasant. And I claim that 'bad' means something like 'having properties such as to give more reason for an anti-response than for withholding an anti-response.' I am therefore claiming that if an experience is unpleasant, the unpleasantness gives more reason for an anti-response than for the withholding of the anti-response, and that this is necessarily true because of what unpleasantness is like to experience.

And what I'm saying is not new: all hedonic and hedonistic ethical systems, such as utilitarianism and the other consequentialisms, have been criticized in the same way.

I'm sure you are aware that an argument cannot be won simply by claiming that other people have advanced similar arguments.

You'll have to define very precisely when "things are equal," so to speak...what conditions can signal to us that we have "equality" in a case.

No, that misses the point. I am not claiming that there are actual cases where other things are equal. What I mean is that if we ignore all other facts which might alter the moral or evaluative properties of a case, and consider only the unpleasantness of the experience, then it is always the case that that unpleasantness is bad. So, for example, in the case of the surgeon saving the life, if we ignore the fact that a life is being saved, and consider only the pain caused to the patient, it is necessarily the case that that pain, or more accurately the unpleasantness of the pain, is bad. We can easily see that this is true, because if the surgeon can save the life without causing the pain, then he should do so: he would be removing something that is bad from the situation (which, after all, is why we have anaesthetics).

You wrote: "It appears to me that the likeability of pleasure and the dislikeability of pain are not merely intrinsic properties, but essential properties."

This creates additional problems: one is that to me, and apparently to a whole lot of the critics of hedonic ethics, it's far from clear that pain is inherently "dislikeable." Rather, that seems to be situationally decided, and there are certainly cases in which pain is accepted or even embraced as "pleasurable" in some other way. (Here, I don't merely allude to phenomena like sadism and masochism, though they also furnish countercases, but in situations in which we note the truthfulness of the ancient observation that suffering is often itself the road to a virtuous outcome, such as the acquiring of wisdom and the improvement of the character.)

I hope I have answered this point by clarifying that what is bad is the unpleasantness of pain. If there are indeed people who find pain pleasant, then for those people, pain is not bad. It is unfortunate that 'pain' is used instead of 'unpleasantness' in philosophy: really we philosophers should clean up our act, and instead of talking about pleasure and pain, we should talk about pleasantness and unpleasantness. And if suffering leads to a virtuous outcome, then the suffering, i.e. the unpleasantness, is still bad even if the virtuous outcome is good. It would be better if the virtuous outcome could be achieved without the suffering: that may perhaps be impossible, but this impossibility does not make the suffering good, it means instead that the badness of the suffering is unavoidable.

But the second problem is even bigger: how do we attach the word "likeabilty" to the words "good" or "essential"? What is there in this world, secularly considered, that would assure us that what we "like" is good, and that we are owed in any moral or even practical sense to have what we "like"? That argument surely needs to be spelled out. That is yet to be achieved here.

I thought I had made this clear. Likeability is an example of a property that gives reason for a pro-response. I claim that 'good' means something like 'having properties such as to give more reason for a pro-response than for withholding a pro-response.' Pleasantness is unavoidably likeable, and likeability gives more reason for a pro-response than for the withholding of a pro-response, and is therefore good, according to my theory of the meaning of 'good'. As for whether we are owed what is good, that is a further issue, and goes beyond what I have claimed so far.

The next problem is in the idea of "essential" moral status. In a world governed by secular assumptions, how do we secure to ourselves the confidence that "good" or "likeability," or any other word you wish, is an "essential" anything? Could we not simply say that the order of Nature (our God substitute) is "red in tooth and claw," or "survival of the fittest," with total disregard for "good" or "like"? Darwinism would certainly hasten us toward that conclusion: so how would we justify the faith that indifferent Nature cares about the "good" and "likings" of only one species, or indeed of any at all? And how would we go about locating these "essences" in the merely material universe?

What I actually said was this:
"It appears to me that the likeability of pleasure and the dislikeability of pain are not merely intrinsic properties, but essential properties. This seems to be my experience of both pleasure and pain, and I assume that it is the same for all beings capable of experiencing pleasure and pain."
This is a much more modest claim than what you seem to be attributing to me here. I said nothing about 'essential moral status' (whatever that would be), nor did I claim that goodness or even likeability are essential in the sense of being unavoidably part of nature. All I claim (and let me use the more accurate words this time) is that likeability is an essential property of pleasantness, and dislikeability is an essential property of unpleasantness. Let's remind ourselves what an essential property is:
"an essential property of an object is a property that it must have, while an accidental property of an object is one that it happens to have but that it could lack." (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/esse ... ccidental/)
My claim, then, is that you cannot have an experience which is pleasant which is not also in itself likeable, nor an experience which is unpleasant and which is not also in itself dislikeable. If you find something pleasant, then in itself you like it; and if you find something unpleasant, then in itself you dislike it. Of course you may dislike a pleasant experience for other reasons, such as that you feel you are letting yourself down by liking it (e.g. when you smoke a cigarette when you are supposed to be giving them up), and similarly you may like an unpleasant experience for other reasons (e.g. when you feel exhausted after a workout but you like that because it makes you feel that you are getting fitter). But these complications do not alter the fact that, in themselves, pleasantness must be likeable and unpleasantness must be dislikeable.

But you see that things get very complicated very fast. And I didn't want to overwhelm you with negatives, so I picked my best shot with premise 1, and left the rest until later. I was not dishonouring your effort; I was trying to set a doable and clear level of response-opportunity for you, rather than cavilling at every tiny point and overwhelming you with all these things I could have added.

And I'm offering you the chance to improve that first premise. If you don't, the argument become untenable at the first post, of course. But if you fix that unwarranted suppostion, I'm fine with entertaining the next one, and the next, and so on. This is how philosophy works. This is logic. This is critique. Try not to take it personally.

You needn't worry on that score. I had all that knocked out of me by my tutors in three years as a philosophy undergrad at Oxford. I hope I have answered your objections thus far, but if you think I haven't, by all means have another go at me.

You missed my second premise: "only the Creator can possibly say what the purpose/telos (or, we might say, rightful good) is for all men." (see above) That's obviously true, too: only the one who created can say why or for what end a particular thing was created, since only His volition, and nobody else's, was involved.

Now, you're right that I owe you another premise in addition to that, but I thought it was pretty obvious: "God says that man was created to have fellowship with Him." I could have added, "The Christian God does not lie," but both of these are part of the very definition of "the Christian God," so I didn't feel the need to state them. However, here they are.

Okay, so your argument now becomes this:
1. God created man for fellowship with Him.
2. Only the Creator can possibly say what the purpose/telos (or, we might say, rightful good) is for all men.
3. Therefore, , seeking and having fellowship with God is an unalloyed good for all men.
Clearly 1. stands in need of support, in the form of evidence and/or argument. But in the context of the current discussion, 2. is of more interest. This seems to be in effect the same claim you have been making, i.e. that God can create values of good and evil. Now I want to ask you a question: what do you think the words 'good' and 'bad' mean? I have offered a theory about this: I don't think you have offered a theory of your own. Perhaps you could now do so. At the moment, you see, the only theory on the table is mine, and your premise 2 is not consistent with my theory, because my theory makes no mention of God, and instead bases its definitions of 'good' and bad' on reasons to give certain responses, which fits in better with the idea that good and bad in the end boil down to something in nature.

So: over to you again.