Sartre’s Being & Nothingness: The Bible of Existentialism?
Christine Daigle discusses some of the key concepts and ideas in Sartre’s most important philosophical book.
June 1943, occupied France. A writer named Jean-Paul Sartre sees his latest philosophical manuscript, Being and Nothingness, a “phenomenological essay on ontology”, 722 pages of fine print (in the original French edition), published in the midst of World War II. The presentation wrapper on the early reprint of 1945: “What counts in a vase is the void in the middle”!
Phenomenology is the study of conscious experience from the first-person point of view. Husserl used principles of formal ontology even as he bracketed the natural-cultural world in describing our experience, and Heidegger pursued fundamental ontology in his variety of phenomenology describing our own modes of existence. I shall address the role of ontology in phenomenology, and vice versa. Our account of what exists depends on our account of what and how we experience. But, moreover, our understanding of the structure of consciousness depends on our understanding of structure, basic ontological structure, and hence of the place of consciousness in the structure of the world. What makes consciousness “hard” for contemporary philosophy of mind is understanding how intentionality and subjectivity fit into the structure of the world: how phenomenology fits with ontology. Phil Papers
Formal or pure ontology describes forms of objects, as Husserl says. Phenomenology describes forms of conscious experiences, as we readily say. cairn
Now, all we need is for some here to react to this by instantiating it. In other words, noting how, given their own understanding of it, it impacts the behaviors they choose pertaining to conflicting value judgments.
Then the particularly tricky part where, given some measure of free will, one makes a distinction between the phenomenological and the ontological when, for example, posting here.
This wasn’t the first of Sartre’s writings to make some waves. His article on Husserl’s phenomenology from 1936-1937, ‘The Transcendence of the Ego’, had made quite an impression in philosophical circles. Its author cleverly re-appropriated Husserl’s goal of going back to the things themselves by kicking the ego out of consciousness and carefully delineating the various modes of consciousness and its encounter with the world. No longer personal, consciousness was presented as something that would only form an ‘I’ through its encounter with the world. The ‘I’ thus becomes an object, just like any other, only slightly more personal. After all, we care more for our ‘ego’ than for a rock!
Now, all we need is for some here to react to this by instantiating it. In other words, noting how, given your own understanding of this, it impacts the behaviors you choose pertaining to conflicting value judgments given interactions with others.
Then the particularly tricky part where, given some measure of free will, one makes a distinction between the phenomenological and the ontological.
This wasn’t the first of Sartre’s writings to make some waves. His article on Husserl’s phenomenology from 1936-1937, ‘The Transcendence of the Ego’, had made quite an impression in philosophical circles. Its author cleverly re-appropriated Husserl’s goal of going back to the things themselves by kicking the ego out of consciousness and carefully delineating the various modes of consciousness and its encounter with the world. No longer personal, consciousness was presented as something that would only form an ‘I’ through its encounter with the world. The ‘I’ thus becomes an object, just like any other, only slightly more personal. After all, we care more for our ‘ego’ than for a rock!
Over and again in philosophy circles, we come upon this distinction:
Being is subdivided, as it were, into two major regions – being for-itself (l'être pour-soi) or consciousness, and being-in-itself (l'être en-soi) which is everything other than consciousness, including the material world, the past, the body as organism and so on. REP
As though given The Gap, Rummy's Rule and the Benjamin Button Syndrome, this distinction is actually, what, a piece of cake?
Which is why I would be particularly interested in discussing this part...
...consciousness was presented as something that would only form an ‘I’ through its encounter with the world. The ‘I’ thus becomes an object, just like any other...
Why? Because this is the part I construe to be revolving existentially around dasein. Also, when Sartre speculated that "hell is other people", I've always seen this as revolving around the assumption that not only will others objectify us but, for the overwhelming preponderance of us, we objectify ourselves.