Atla, this is exactly where the confusion happens—between the physical “I” and the epiphenomenal “I.” And the distinction matters.Atla wrote: ↑Thu Apr 10, 2025 11:35 am1. Depends on how you define yourself. Another definition of "I" is that you are the brain, including those preparing actions which are parts of you, even if other parts of you get affected by it with a delay.BigMike wrote: ↑Thu Apr 10, 2025 11:26 amGood—this is a sharper point, Atla.Atla wrote: ↑Thu Apr 10, 2025 11:11 am
Ok Mike now try to play close attention to what I'll point out again:
According to science, physics, determinism, there is no such thing in nature as a true "echo" / "reflection" / "displaying" / "illusion", that isn't simply made of more physical stuff. And is therefore part of causal chains, is technically just as much a cause as it is a consequence.
So how can you say, how can you know that consciousness is just a consequence?
You’re absolutely right that in physics, there’s no metaphysical divide between “real” things and their “echoes.” If something exists—an image, a reflection, an electrical impulse—it’s physical, and it’s part of the causal chain. So yes, the processes we label “consciousness” are themselves physical phenomena. I don’t deny that at all.
But the key difference here is not whether consciousness is part of the causal chain (it is), but whether the experience of being conscious—the narrative “I”—is the source of action or simply a byproduct of prior brain activity.
Yes, the conscious state is physical. But it’s assembled after the fact by subconscious systems that have already made the decisions and launched the actions. We know this from experiments in neuroscience—from Libet onward—that show the brain begins preparing actions before we’re aware of “deciding.” Your conscious mind is notified after the machinery has already moved.
So when I say consciousness is an “afterimage,” I mean this: the felt experience of “I chose” is post hoc. It’s real as a physical process. But it's not the driver. It’s the story the brain tells to make sense of what it already did.
Think of it like this: the news report is real. It’s made of electrons, screen pixels, sound waves. But it doesn’t cause the events it reports. The causal arrow goes the other way. That's the mistake people make with consciousness. They treat the report as the engine.
So yes, consciousness is made of “physical stuff.” But it’s not the origin of action. It’s the witness. The observer. The explainer. Not the initiator.
And that’s the whole point: being physical doesn’t mean being in control. The brain’s deeper processes steer the ship. Consciousness is the spotlight, not the steering wheel.
2. Once the volitional I you talk about does get assembled, how do you know that it doesn't become an actor in itself? It's literally a psychological mechanism of volition.
I think you're basing your philosophy on a very lopsided interpretation of the Libet experiments.
The physical “I” is the total organism: the brain, the body, the nervous system, the whole causal engine. When someone says “you made a choice,” that’s technically true in the same sense that a calculator “solves” a problem. Your brain took in inputs, ran computations, and produced outputs—those outputs being speech, movement, or thought. This “I” absolutely participates in causal chains. It’s physical, it’s observable, and it’s real.
But the epiphenomenal “I”—the one that shows up in introspection, the narrator inside your head, the part that says “I chose this” or “I meant to do that”—is not the same thing. That self is a constructed model, a representation that rides on top of the underlying processes. It’s not where the decisions originate—it’s where they’re explained. It’s like the voice-over in a documentary, not the events being filmed.
The problem is that we intuitively equate the two. We feel the conscious narrator is in charge simply because it witnesses the outcome. But just because it narrates the action doesn’t mean it caused it. The causality lies deeper—in brain activity we’re never directly aware of.
So yes, the whole brain, including unconscious processes, is “you.” But the part that feels like the decision-maker—the one you call the “volitional I”—is assembled after the decision has begun. It may influence future decisions, just like memory or feedback loops do, but it’s still not initiating anything from outside the system. It’s not the top of the hierarchy. It’s a reflection inside it.
That’s not a misreading of Libet. That’s what the broader body of neuroscience has been reinforcing for decades. Consciousness isn’t directing the orchestra—it’s listening to the music and convincing itself it’s the conductor.