Why Do the Religious Reject Science While Embracing the Impossible?

[seeds]

If the soul is immaterial, how exactly does it interact with the material brain?

How do AJ's words -- symbols place-holding for immaterial ideas and meanings -- move you, nuthin' but meat, to respond?

Where, in the meat that is Mike, is his understanding, his disagreement, his disappointment, his anger? Where in Mike's meat is his defensiveness, his idealism, his certainty, his pedantry?

Ah, Henry, the classic category error dressed up as profundity. Words are symbols, yes. They represent meanings, which are processed by neural activity in the brain—an entirely material system. Nothing immaterial is required to explain the process of comprehension, reaction, or even the emotional responses that follow. The electrical impulses firing in "my" brain, the neurotransmitters transmitting signals, the networks of neurons forming connections—all of these are physical processes, thoroughly studied and mapped. There is no mystery here that requires invoking some ghostly, non-material essence.

What in the world is the ontological status of this mysterious "my" referenced in the above paragraph, which, apparently, "possesses" a brain?

Just for funzies, I talked to ChatGPT about it (bolding and emphasis by me and Chat, and, as usual, i didn't include all of Chat's chatter)...

Me:

When someone uses the word "my" in declaring ownership of something, doesn't that indicate the presence of a "person" using that word?

ChatGPT:
Yes, when someone uses the word "my" to indicate ownership, it typically implies the presence of a person or entity that possesses something. The word "my" is a possessive determiner that denotes belonging to the speaker or writer.

However, the term "person" can be interpreted in different ways:

• In a grammatical sense, "my" indicates that a first-person subject (such as "I") is implied.
  
  In a philosophical or metaphysical sense, it raises questions about what constitutes a "person." If a machine or an artificial entity says "my data" or "my function," does that imply personhood?

Are you asking this in a general linguistic sense, or is there a deeper question you're exploring?

Me:

If, for example, a hardcore materialist who denies the existence of a nonmaterial entity such as the "soul," or an "I Am-ness," or any inner aspect of our being that might possess "free will," yet that hardcore materialist uses the term "my brain," then what would be the ontological status of this "my" he is referring to?

ChatGPT:
Great question! This probes deep into ontology (the nature of being) and the implications of language in philosophical materialism. Let's break it down step by step.

1. The Hardcore Materialist Position

A hardcore materialist typically holds that:

• Everything is physical—consciousness, thoughts, and identity are ultimately reducible to brain processes.
  
  There is no non-material self (no soul, no "I Am-ness")—the self is an emergent property of neural activity.
  
  Free will is an illusion—decisions are determined by physical causation in the brain.

2. The Ontological Problem of "My"

If this materialist denies any non-material self, then what does "my" refer to when they say "my brain"? The paradox is this:

• If "I" am nothing more than the brain itself, then who or what is doing the possessing?
  
  If the brain is just a physical object governed by physical laws, then what is the "I" that owns it?
  
  Saying "my brain" seems to imply a distinction between the owner ("I") and the thing owned (the brain).

But if the materialist is fully consistent, then no such distinction should exist. Instead of saying "my brain," they should say "this brain" or simply "the brain", since ownership would be meaningless in a purely physicalist framework.

Final Thought

If a hardcore materialist wants to be fully consistent, they should say: "This brain is generating these thoughts" instead of "my brain is thinking."

But no one actually talks like that—because deep down, language reflects a persistent intuition of selfhood that materialism struggles to erase.

As I had pointed out in a prior post, BigMike...

(^^^if he wants to be fully consistent^^^)

...needs to stop using language that implies the existence of an inner "self" or "personhood."
_______

[henry quirk]

I think the crux of the issue is that metaphysics needs to be grounded in evidence.

What's acceptable scientific evidence of courage, or integrity, or love, or compassion, or resolve?

What's the formal scientific measure for cowardice, or subterfuge, or hatred, or derision, or poor character?

Metaphysics is the reality that is only measured subjectively.

A series of agitated synapses may indicate reason or intuition in progress, but only the person himself can tell you what he's reasonin' or intuitin'. If he chooses not to, no science, today or tomorrow, will reveal his interior.

Behaviors and even neurological actions accompany most human emotions, attributes and such. So, for example, if Mike believes that people being told that we are determined and not responsible for our actions leads to better overall social outcomes then stuff like that can be roughly observed and experiments or statistical analyses can be set up to measure whether his contention is the case or not. Someone just has to set up whatever conditions need to be in order to do experiments with as little margin of error as possible.

Well, you're right, we can, in some way, measure the effect an idea might have on a population. But that isn't the same as measuring the idea itself. 'Course Mike sez ideas are material. Mebbe after he consults with his chatbot again he'll do a better job of explaining it all.

[Alexiev]

So now justice just pops into your head out of nowhere, fully formed and ready for philosophical contemplation? Tell me, Alexiev, how exactly does this concept of justice materialize in your mind? Does it whisper itself into your thoughts from the cosmic ether? Does it descend from the great metaphysical beyond like divine inspiration, bypassing your neurons entirely?

Or, and stay with me here, does it form through lived experience, shaped by your interactions, cultural influences, and—oh no!—those pesky electrochemical processes in your brain? You know, the ones you just waved away as irrelevant?

You claim physics is "worthless" in understanding justice, yet you conveniently ignore that every single thought you have, every moral consideration, every philosophical musing—all of it is physically instantiated in your brain. You want justice to exist on some mystical plane, untouched by the material world, yet you rely on that very material world to think about it, articulate it, and argue about it. How delightfully self-defeating.

If metaphysics is "beyond physics," as you say, then how exactly does it interact with your brain? Because unless you have some magic wand that allows purely immaterial entities to make neurons fire, you’re left with a choice: either justice emerges from physical processes, or you’re stuck explaining how the Great Cosmic Tribunal beams moral insights directly into your head.

So tell me, Alexiev, does justice arrive via psychic transmission, or does it knock politely before stepping through the door of your frontal lobe?

None of this is at all relevant to my point. Of course all our thoughts are the result of physical processes. So what? How does knowing (or accepting) that help us understand what constitutes justice? It doesn't.

So stow it with your naive accusations that I "conveniently ignore" physical processes from which ideas derive. I ignore them because they are of no value whatsoever in understanding what constitutes justice (or in answering other metaphysical questions). Every time I try to explain this to you, you return to the same idiotic and irrelevant response. Cut it out!

[Veritas Aequitas]

My reference and meaning of 'faith' is the following;

• Faith = firm belief in something for which there is no proof; complete trust or confidence in someone or something.

Rather than blind faith [high in a continuum] as in religion, science do get involved with 'pragmatic faith' [very low in the other extreme of the continuum].

Personally, I reserve the term "blind faith" for beliefs that persist despite clear evidence to the contrary—such as the belief in deities and free will. Faith, in that sense, is not just belief without evidence but belief *against* evidence, which is why science does not belong in the same category.

Theistic religions are based on 'blind faith'; but rather than "against" evidence, theistic religions are more like lack of a higher degree rationality and critical thinking [within a continuum].
https://www.criticalthinking.org/pages/ ... inking/766

The ultimate of rationality and critical thinking is the FS approach to reality and knowledge which determine the credibility and objectivity, thus, trustworthiness of its outputs.

Yes, science starts with foundational assumptions—like the uniformity of nature or the reliability of logic—but these assumptions are not held dogmatically. They are constantly tested, challenged, and refined. The difference between science and religious faith is precisely in this self-correcting mechanism. A scientific theory is not an article of faith; it is a working model, always subject to falsification. If an assumption no longer holds under scrutiny, science adapts. Faith does not.

Science is definitely not 'a faith' [a noun] as in theistic religion defined as "a faith".
'Faith' in our discussion is a verbal noun.
The point is, it is a fact science cannot exclude 'faith' [verbal noun] albeit in very low degrees [within a continuum] and high degrees in theistic religions.

This is why your FS classification system, while a neat analytical tool, seems limited in practical utility. As long as science remains self-correcting, it will always be our best and most reliable system of reference. Unlike religious frameworks, which cling to preordained truths, science acknowledges its provisional nature—and that is precisely what makes it superior.

Every field of knowledge [& reality] is conditioned upon its specific Framework and System, there is no exception. As such, it is useful to determine the credibility and objectivity of all fields of knowledge.

As generally understood, [mine],

Scientific facts are verified by repeatable careful observation or measurement by experiments or other means. [within the scientific FS]
........
"This sentence contains words." accurately describes a linguistic fact, [within the linguistic FS] and
"The sun is a star" accurately describes an astronomical fact [astronomy FS]. Further,
"Abraham Lincoln was the 16th President of the United States" ........ accurately describe historical facts [History FS, US Legal FS].
Generally speaking, facts are independent of belief and of knowledge and opinion.

One will note people like FDP is stuck within the linguistic FS [Philosophy of ordinary language] and claim the linguistic output is highly superior.

Framing science as another kind of "faith," even if you call it "pragmatic faith," risks misleading people into thinking that all belief systems are on equal footing. They are not. Theists may argue that their beliefs serve psychological or social functions, but those are not epistemic justifications. Science, by contrast, does not *require* belief—it earns trust through demonstrable results.

Within the Philosophy of Science, it is accepted [factual] that the Science-FS has elements of faith, beliefs and values.
But, science has merely a sliver of element of faith [belief without proof and empirical evidence], i.e. "pragmatic faith" say 0.1% in contrast to 99.9% of theistic religion.

So while theistic belief may still be *psychologically* useful to some, it remains *epistemically* bankrupt. The question is not how to accommodate it, but how to continue the process of weaning humanity off illusions, in favor of a reality-based understanding of existence. The future is not about ranking religion on a continuum; it is about ensuring that, eventually, it no longer needs a place on that continuum at all.

I believe, at present, given that humans are more animal than being more human, it is optimal to rank theistic religions on a continuum with Science, so as to facilitate the weaning-off of all religions in the future [next 75, 100 or > years].

All human behaviors are centralized to the human brain structures and operations.
Given the current trend of the exponential expansion of knowledge, IT, AI and technology, this FS ranking will facilitate humanity to compare its relative brain structures and operations and thus facilitate to change in brain connectivity to expedite the foolproof weaning process.

Btw, there are many great Scientists who are theists, e.g. Mendel, Newton, Faraday, Lord Kelvin, James Maxwell. Which mean there is room for Science and theistic religion in the same brain of an individual.
It seems it is more efficient to contrast science with theistic religion within the psychological FS continuum besides the epistemic continuum.

[Veritas Aequitas]

That actually makes a great deal of sense; a mystery, by its very nature, remains more potent than any sense in having resolved it. The mind, in contemplating it, must travel further than merely stagnating at a known port where all questions are easily digested and responded to. The mystery on its own becomes a guide while remaining totally impersonal in its feedback. One may even, I think, qualify a true mystery as not having an answer and, in that sense, existing forever, standing fast as a beacon which time cannot resolve and the mind, in consequence, never ceases to contemplate. It's the kind of alchemy where the impersonal becomes an expansive power, blending one's identity with the mystery. It creates the perspectives inclusive in what we denote as spirit...or, better still, as Melville wrote in Moby Dick, in landlessness alone resides the highest truth, shoreless, indefinite as god.

Mysteries are the metaphysics of existence and inescapable regardless of any discoveries made now or in the future, including those we ourselves have created.

At present Metaphysics is a critical necessity for the majority of people based on the existing evolutionary psychological state.
As verified and justified, metaphysics is rated at the lowest rung of the epistemic ladder [FSK in terms of credibility and objectivity].
The point is we cannot let metaphysics have a free reign else one will end up being delusional.

As Kant alluded, metaphysics is mired in a sea of illusions.

I use the term metaphysics contextually, quite removed from its historical versions Kant and other philosophers of his time encountered. Yes, in that sense, metaphysics had and has no viability on the epistemic ladder; that much is clear.

Experientially considered, it incorporates a different reality based on perspective, emanating from the physics or process which allows for a consciousness to improvise its own values as it must. It's an imperative implicit with the human ability to reason both epistemically and improvisationally either separately or in tandem depending on the subject, which can be artistic as well as resolutely epistemic. In effect, meta-physics as it derives from physics without which all our creations, including discoveries, wouldn't exist. In that sense, the word epistemic does not summarily preclude metaphysics nor does it negate the deterministic processes responsible for the creation of consciousness and its improvised contents.

Here is a point re Metaphysics,

Metaphysics differs from the individual sciences by studying the most general and abstract aspects of reality.
The individual sciences, by contrast, examine more specific and concrete features and restrict themselves to certain classes of entities, such as the focus on physical things in physics, living entities in biology, and cultures in anthropology.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics#Definition

Since the Scientific FS is the most credible and objective as the gold standard, whatever you claim as Metaphysics has to be ranked with the gold standard.

For your
"the deterministic processes responsible for the creation of consciousness and its improvised contents"
to be credible and objective, it must be justified by the Scientific FS.

If not, demonstrate how your,
"deterministic processes responsible for the creation of consciousness and its improvised contents"
can be justified and validated with sufficient credibility and objectivity relative to the gold standard i.e. the Scientific FS?

So far, it appear you are relying on merely sentiments, speculations, crude logic and a high degree of faith.

If you resort to empirical evidences to justify you metaphysics claim, you are actually stepping into Science which is not metaphysics.

[Veritas Aequitas]

What in the world is the ontological status of this mysterious "my" referenced in the above paragraph, which, apparently, "possesses" a brain?

Just for funzies, I talked to ChatGPT about it (bolding and emphasis by me and Chat, and, as usual, i didn't include all of Chat's chatter)...

Me:

When someone uses the word "my" in declaring ownership of something, doesn't that indicate the presence of a "person" using that word?

ChatGPT:
Yes, when someone uses the word "my" to indicate ownership, it typically implies the presence of a person or entity that possesses something. The word "my" is a possessive determiner that denotes belonging to the speaker or writer.

However, the term "person" can be interpreted in different ways:

• In a grammatical sense, "my" indicates that a first-person subject (such as "I") is implied.
  
  In a philosophical or metaphysical sense, it raises questions about what constitutes a "person." If a machine or an artificial entity says "my data" or "my function," does that imply personhood?

Are you asking this in a general linguistic sense, or is there a deeper question you're exploring?

Me:

If, for example, a hardcore materialist who denies the existence of a nonmaterial entity such as the "soul," or an "I Am-ness," or any inner aspect of our being that might possess "free will," yet that hardcore materialist uses the term "my brain," then what would be the ontological status of this "my" he is referring to?

ChatGPT:
Great question! This probes deep into ontology (the nature of being) and the implications of language in philosophical materialism. Let's break it down step by step.

1. The Hardcore Materialist Position

A hardcore materialist typically holds that:

• Everything is physical—consciousness, thoughts, and identity are ultimately reducible to brain processes.
  
  There is no non-material self (no soul, no "I Am-ness")—the self is an emergent property of neural activity.
  
  Free will is an illusion—decisions are determined by physical causation in the brain.

2. The Ontological Problem of "My"

If this materialist denies any non-material self, then what does "my" refer to when they say "my brain"? The paradox is this:

• If "I" am nothing more than the brain itself, then who or what is doing the possessing?
  
  If the brain is just a physical object governed by physical laws, then what is the "I" that owns it?
  
  Saying "my brain" seems to imply a distinction between the owner ("I") and the thing owned (the brain).

But if the materialist is fully consistent, then no such distinction should exist. Instead of saying "my brain," they should say "this brain" or simply "the brain", since ownership would be meaningless in a purely physicalist framework.

Final Thought

If a hardcore materialist wants to be fully consistent, they should say: "This brain is generating these thoughts" instead of "my brain is thinking."

But no one actually talks like that—because deep down, language reflects a persistent intuition of selfhood that materialism struggles to erase.

As I had pointed out in a prior post, BigMike...

(^^^if he wants to be fully consistent^^^)

...needs to stop using language that implies the existence of an inner "self" or "personhood."
_______

As usual you are always barking up the wrong tree of reality due to dogmatic and shallow thinking.

I posted the above to ChatGpt;

VA to AI:
As I understand, materialism believes that the self cannot exist independent of matter, i.e. the self emerged out of matter, the self cannot be absolutely independent from matter.

According to Kant, the ontological "I AM" is an illusion while what is real is the 'empirical self' i.e. the "I-that-thinks".
In this case, the 'my' is referenced to the empirical self which can be empirically verified and justified within the social-science-FS, i.e. the psychological-FS with inputs from the science-biology-FS.

ChatGpt Wrote:
Your analysis aligns well with Kantian thought and provides a coherent response to the materialist dilemma posed in the discussion. Let's break this down further:

1. Materialist Ontology and the "My" Problem
The hardcore materialist asserts that all mental phenomena, including selfhood, emerge from physical processes in the brain.
However, when they say "my brain", this implies a possessor distinct from the brain itself, leading to an apparent inconsistency.
The AI's response argues that a fully consistent materialist should abandon possessive language and say "this brain" instead.

2. Kant's View: No Ontological "I AM," Only the Empirical Self
Kant would reject both the materialist's implied substantial self and the dualist's soul-based self.
In Kantian terms:
The ontological "I AM" (a metaphysical self) is an illusion.
The "I-that-thinks" (the empirical self) is real and tied to experience.
Selfhood, for Kant, is not an independently existing entity but a necessary structure of cognition—an organizing principle rather than a substance.

3. The "My" as Empirical Self in Framework-Systems
In a framework-sensitive (FS) approach:
The empirical self can be grounded within the social-science FS, especially the psychology FS.
Biology (within the science FS) provides further empirical input, supporting the notion that selfhood is an emergent property of brain and bodily processes.
The "my" in "my brain" is thus not a metaphysical entity but an empirically verifiable psychological construct—a product of cognitive functions and social-linguistic practices.

4. Resolving the Materialist Inconsistency
The AI's response critiques the materialist for linguistic inconsistency but does not recognize that language naturally reflects the empirical self rather than an ontological ego.
From a Kantian-FS perspective, the materialist can rightfully say "my brain", as this reflects an empirical, psychological reality, not a metaphysical possession.
The mistake is assuming that "my" implies an ontologically independent self, rather than simply denoting the functional, empirical self embedded in cognition and social experience.

Final Thought
Instead of rejecting "my brain" as inconsistent with materialism, we should reinterpret "my" in empirical terms—not as an absolute owner but as a functional reference within the empirical self’s framework.
This aligns both with Kant and a scientifically-informed materialist view, avoiding both ontological dualism and linguistic reductionism.

The above is just for information only because;
"you can't teach an old dog new tricks"

[seeds]

What in the world is the ontological status of this mysterious "my" referenced in the above paragraph, which, apparently, "possesses" a brain?

Just for funzies, I talked to ChatGPT about it (bolding and emphasis by me and Chat, and, as usual, i didn't include all of Chat's chatter)...

Me:

• When someone uses the word "my" in declaring ownership of something, doesn't that indicate the presence of a "person" using that word?

ChatGPT:
Yes, when someone uses the word "my" to indicate ownership, it typically implies the presence of a person or entity that possesses something. The word "my" is a possessive determiner that denotes belonging to the speaker or writer.

However, the term "person" can be interpreted in different ways:

• In a grammatical sense, "my" indicates that a first-person subject (such as "I") is implied.
  
  In a philosophical or metaphysical sense, it raises questions about what constitutes a "person." If a machine or an artificial entity says "my data" or "my function," does that imply personhood?

Are you asking this in a general linguistic sense, or is there a deeper question you're exploring?

Me:

• If, for example, a hardcore materialist who denies the existence of a nonmaterial entity such as the "soul," or an "I Am-ness," or any inner aspect of our being that might possess "free will," yet that hardcore materialist uses the term "my brain," then what would be the ontological status of this "my" he is referring to?

ChatGPT:
Great question! This probes deep into ontology (the nature of being) and the implications of language in philosophical materialism. Let's break it down step by step.

1. The Hardcore Materialist Position

A hardcore materialist typically holds that:

• Everything is physical—consciousness, thoughts, and identity are ultimately reducible to brain processes.
  
  There is no non-material self (no soul, no "I Am-ness")—the self is an emergent property of neural activity.
  
  Free will is an illusion—decisions are determined by physical causation in the brain.

2. The Ontological Problem of "My"

If this materialist denies any non-material self, then what does "my" refer to when they say "my brain"? The paradox is this:

• If "I" am nothing more than the brain itself, then who or what is doing the possessing?
  
  If the brain is just a physical object governed by physical laws, then what is the "I" that owns it?
  
  Saying "my brain" seems to imply a distinction between the owner ("I") and the thing owned (the brain).

But if the materialist is fully consistent, then no such distinction should exist. Instead of saying "my brain," they should say "this brain" or simply "the brain", since ownership would be meaningless in a purely physicalist framework.

Final Thought

If a hardcore materialist wants to be fully consistent, they should say: "This brain is generating these thoughts" instead of "my brain is thinking."

But no one actually talks like that—because deep down, language reflects a persistent intuition of selfhood that materialism struggles to erase.

As I had pointed out in a prior post, BigMike...

(^^^if he wants to be fully consistent^^^)

...needs to stop using language that implies the existence of an inner "self" or "personhood."
_______

As usual you are always barking up the wrong tree of reality due to dogmatic and shallow thinking.

Ah yes, once again, weedhopper, the "glaze" tries to accuse the "clay" of being too shallow.

I posted the above to ChatGpt;

VA to AI:
As I understand, materialism believes that the self cannot exist independent of matter, i.e. the self emerged out of matter, the self cannot be absolutely independent from matter.

According to Kant, the ontological "I AM" is an illusion while what is real is the 'empirical self' i.e. the "I-that-thinks".
In this case, the 'my' is referenced to the empirical self which can be empirically verified and justified within the social-science-FS, i.e. the psychological-FS with inputs from the science-biology-FS.

ChatGpt Wrote:
Your analysis aligns well with Kantian thought and provides a coherent response to the materialist dilemma posed in the discussion. Let's break this down further:

1. Materialist Ontology and the "My" Problem
The hardcore materialist asserts that all mental phenomena, including selfhood, emerge from physical processes in the brain.
However, when they say "my brain", this implies a possessor distinct from the brain itself, leading to an apparent inconsistency.
The AI's response argues that a fully consistent materialist should abandon possessive language and say "this brain" instead.

2. Kant's View: No Ontological "I AM," Only the Empirical Self
Kant would reject both the materialist's implied substantial self and the dualist's soul-based self.
In Kantian terms:
The ontological "I AM" (a metaphysical self) is an illusion.
The "I-that-thinks" (the empirical self) is real and tied to experience.
Selfhood, for Kant, is not an independently existing entity but a necessary structure of cognition—an organizing principle rather than a substance.

3. The "My" as Empirical Self in Framework-Systems
In a framework-sensitive (FS) approach:
The empirical self can be grounded within the social-science FS, especially the psychology FS.
Biology (within the science FS) provides further empirical input, supporting the notion that selfhood is an emergent property of brain and bodily processes.
The "my" in "my brain" is thus not a metaphysical entity but an empirically verifiable psychological construct—a product of cognitive functions and social-linguistic practices.

4. Resolving the Materialist Inconsistency
The AI's response critiques the materialist for linguistic inconsistency but does not recognize that language naturally reflects the empirical self rather than an ontological ego.
From a Kantian-FS perspective, the materialist can rightfully say "my brain", as this reflects an empirical, psychological reality, not a metaphysical possession.
The mistake is assuming that "my" implies an ontologically independent self, rather than simply denoting the functional, empirical self embedded in cognition and social experience.

Final Thought
Instead of rejecting "my brain" as inconsistent with materialism, we should reinterpret "my" in empirical terms—not as an absolute owner but as a functional reference within the empirical self’s framework.
This aligns both with Kant and a scientifically-informed materialist view, avoiding both ontological dualism and linguistic reductionism.

The above is just for information only because;
"you can't teach an old dog new tricks"

Are you actually dumb enough to believe that by getting ChatGPT to respond to my post from the narrow perspective of Kant's archaic horse crap, that it somehow refutes the points being made in "my" discussion with Chat?

Really, V?

Nonsense!!!

Furthermore, I thought I had made it clear to you that, other than Kant's concept of the "phenomenon/noumenon" duality seeming to be a good analogy for the "particle/wave" duality in quantum mechanics, I couldn't care less about anything else he came up with.
_______

[Dubious]

Since the Scientific FS is the most credible and objective as the gold standard, whatever you claim as Metaphysics has to be ranked with the gold standard.

I've been off the gold standard for a very long time. You're free to accept it as it stands and as you wish; besides which, standards have a way of changing, just like language, meaning and perspectives change. Standards, in effect, have a limited life always subject to revision.

Judging by any standard has a tendency to become less philosophic and more programmatic.

[BigMike]

So now justice just pops into your head out of nowhere, fully formed and ready for philosophical contemplation? Tell me, Alexiev, how exactly does this concept of justice materialize in your mind? Does it whisper itself into your thoughts from the cosmic ether? Does it descend from the great metaphysical beyond like divine inspiration, bypassing your neurons entirely?

Or, and stay with me here, does it form through lived experience, shaped by your interactions, cultural influences, and—oh no!—those pesky electrochemical processes in your brain? You know, the ones you just waved away as irrelevant?

You claim physics is "worthless" in understanding justice, yet you conveniently ignore that every single thought you have, every moral consideration, every philosophical musing—all of it is physically instantiated in your brain. You want justice to exist on some mystical plane, untouched by the material world, yet you rely on that very material world to think about it, articulate it, and argue about it. How delightfully self-defeating.

If metaphysics is "beyond physics," as you say, then how exactly does it interact with your brain? Because unless you have some magic wand that allows purely immaterial entities to make neurons fire, you’re left with a choice: either justice emerges from physical processes, or you’re stuck explaining how the Great Cosmic Tribunal beams moral insights directly into your head.

So tell me, Alexiev, does justice arrive via psychic transmission, or does it knock politely before stepping through the door of your frontal lobe?

None of this is at all relevant to my point. Of course all our thoughts are the result of physical processes. So what? How does knowing (or accepting) that help us understand what constitutes justice? It doesn't.

So stow it with your naive accusations that I "conveniently ignore" physical processes from which ideas derive. I ignore them because they are of no value whatsoever in understanding what constitutes justice (or in answering other metaphysical questions). Every time I try to explain this to you, you return to the same idiotic and irrelevant response. Cut it out!

You don’t get to just wave your hands and declare science irrelevant when it inconveniences your argument. Determinism—real determinism, the one supported by science, not the watered-down mystical nonsense you're clinging to—says that nothing happens without a cause. Every thought, every concept, every so-called metaphysical musing, is a consequence of prior physical interactions. You don’t get to carve out an exception for your pet ideas just because you find the implications uncomfortable.

Science isn’t here to coddle your philosophical preferences. It doesn’t exist to stroke your ego about justice or any other abstract concept. Science connects the dots, it tracks causality, it establishes patterns. It doesn’t claim to tell us how things "really" work in some ultimate sense—it maps reality as we can observe and test it. And that’s all that matters.

Now, when someone—like you—introduces explanations that flatly contradict those well-established dots and connections, science dismisses them. Not because it’s close-minded, not because it "ignores" philosophy, but because the burden of proof is on the person claiming something beyond what has already been demonstrated to be true. If your mystical, pseudo-metaphysical nonsense wants to be taken seriously, it has one job: show that the existing, repeatedly verified, rigorously tested scientific connections are false. That’s it. That’s the standard.

But you don’t even try. You just whine about how physics doesn’t help you “understand justice.” As if that’s some deep revelation. Physics isn’t here to spoon-feed you your moral intuitions. That’s your problem to work out. What physics does do is establish the framework within which all things—including justice, including morality, including your own ability to think and speak—must operate. And if your understanding of justice rests on introducing supernatural, immaterial explanations that contradict that framework, then your understanding of justice is wrong.

You can call that “idiotic and irrelevant” all you want. It doesn’t change the reality that your argument is intellectually bankrupt. So maybe it’s you who should cut it out—cut out the hand-waving, the evasions, the desperate attempt to keep your favorite ideas floating safely above the realm of scientific scrutiny. They’re not above scrutiny. They’re delusions if they don’t align with what is demonstrably true. And science doesn’t give a damn about your feelings on the matter.

[BigMike]

My reference and meaning of 'faith' is the following;

• Faith = firm belief in something for which there is no proof; complete trust or confidence in someone or something.

Rather than blind faith [high in a continuum] as in religion, science do get involved with 'pragmatic faith' [very low in the other extreme of the continuum].

Personally, I reserve the term "blind faith" for beliefs that persist despite clear evidence to the contrary—such as the belief in deities and free will. Faith, in that sense, is not just belief without evidence but belief *against* evidence, which is why science does not belong in the same category.

Theistic religions are based on 'blind faith'; but rather than "against" evidence, theistic religions are more like lack of a higher degree rationality and critical thinking [within a continuum].
https://www.criticalthinking.org/pages/ ... inking/766

The ultimate of rationality and critical thinking is the FS approach to reality and knowledge which determine the credibility and objectivity, thus, trustworthiness of its outputs.

Yes, science starts with foundational assumptions—like the uniformity of nature or the reliability of logic—but these assumptions are not held dogmatically. They are constantly tested, challenged, and refined. The difference between science and religious faith is precisely in this self-correcting mechanism. A scientific theory is not an article of faith; it is a working model, always subject to falsification. If an assumption no longer holds under scrutiny, science adapts. Faith does not.

Science is definitely not 'a faith' [a noun] as in theistic religion defined as "a faith".
'Faith' in our discussion is a verbal noun.
The point is, it is a fact science cannot exclude 'faith' [verbal noun] albeit in very low degrees [within a continuum] and high degrees in theistic religions.

This is why your FS classification system, while a neat analytical tool, seems limited in practical utility. As long as science remains self-correcting, it will always be our best and most reliable system of reference. Unlike religious frameworks, which cling to preordained truths, science acknowledges its provisional nature—and that is precisely what makes it superior.

Every field of knowledge [& reality] is conditioned upon its specific Framework and System, there is no exception. As such, it is useful to determine the credibility and objectivity of all fields of knowledge.

As generally understood, [mine],

Scientific facts are verified by repeatable careful observation or measurement by experiments or other means. [within the scientific FS]
........
"This sentence contains words." accurately describes a linguistic fact, [within the linguistic FS] and
"The sun is a star" accurately describes an astronomical fact [astronomy FS]. Further,
"Abraham Lincoln was the 16th President of the United States" ........ accurately describe historical facts [History FS, US Legal FS].
Generally speaking, facts are independent of belief and of knowledge and opinion.

One will note people like FDP is stuck within the linguistic FS [Philosophy of ordinary language] and claim the linguistic output is highly superior.

Framing science as another kind of "faith," even if you call it "pragmatic faith," risks misleading people into thinking that all belief systems are on equal footing. They are not. Theists may argue that their beliefs serve psychological or social functions, but those are not epistemic justifications. Science, by contrast, does not *require* belief—it earns trust through demonstrable results.

Within the Philosophy of Science, it is accepted [factual] that the Science-FS has elements of faith, beliefs and values.
But, science has merely a sliver of element of faith [belief without proof and empirical evidence], i.e. "pragmatic faith" say 0.1% in contrast to 99.9% of theistic religion.

So while theistic belief may still be *psychologically* useful to some, it remains *epistemically* bankrupt. The question is not how to accommodate it, but how to continue the process of weaning humanity off illusions, in favor of a reality-based understanding of existence. The future is not about ranking religion on a continuum; it is about ensuring that, eventually, it no longer needs a place on that continuum at all.

I believe, at present, given that humans are more animal than being more human, it is optimal to rank theistic religions on a continuum with Science, so as to facilitate the weaning-off of all religions in the future [next 75, 100 or > years].

All human behaviors are centralized to the human brain structures and operations.
Given the current trend of the exponential expansion of knowledge, IT, AI and technology, this FS ranking will facilitate humanity to compare its relative brain structures and operations and thus facilitate to change in brain connectivity to expedite the foolproof weaning process.

Btw, there are many great Scientists who are theists, e.g. Mendel, Newton, Faraday, Lord Kelvin, James Maxwell. Which mean there is room for Science and theistic religion in the same brain of an individual.
It seems it is more efficient to contrast science with theistic religion within the psychological FS continuum besides the epistemic continuum.

You're still stretching the definition of "faith" in a way that does more harm than good. When you insist that science operates with even a "sliver" of faith, you're engaging in a category error—one that provides an unnecessary opening for theists to equate their baseless beliefs with the rigor of scientific inquiry. The fact that science, like all human endeavors, begins with certain presuppositions does not mean it operates on faith. Science is a method—a process of systematically refining our understanding based on evidence.

The assumptions underpinning science—such as the uniformity of nature and the reliability of logic—are not dogmatic articles of belief. They are working hypotheses, continuously tested and refined. The difference is crucial: faith, particularly in a religious sense, demands belief without evidence or despite counter-evidence. Science, on the other hand, thrives on conditional trust—trust that remains contingent on empirical verification and falsifiability. Conflating these two under the same umbrella term of "faith," even on a continuum, is misleading.

You say that religious belief at present remains necessary because humans are still largely "animal" and require psychological comfort. That may be true to an extent, but it does not justify keeping religion in the epistemic framework at all. The task is not to give it a respectable place on a continuum with science—it is to render it obsolete. By continuing to entertain religion as something that merely ranks lower rather than something that should eventually be dismissed entirely, you grant it an intellectual legitimacy it does not deserve.

Your reference to religious scientists like Newton and Mendel is equally flawed. Yes, historically, many great scientists were theists. But that was not because their faith contributed to their scientific achievements—it was because they lived in a time when religious belief was the default. The success of their scientific work came despite their religious views, not because of them. As scientific knowledge has advanced, religious belief has declined precisely because faith is not an epistemic asset—it is an obstacle that must be worked around or abandoned.

Your framework, while logically structured, still offers religion a place at the table it no longer deserves. The future of human knowledge and psychological well-being is not about accommodating faith but about eliminating the need for it altogether. If religion is to have any place, it is within the realm of psychology—as a historical and sociological curiosity, a vestige of an earlier stage of human development, not as a legitimate means of knowing anything about reality. The ranking system you propose is not a means to an end—it risks becoming a justification for prolonging the inevitable: the total intellectual extinction of faith-based thinking.

And if we’re talking about Isaac Newton as an example of a scientist who was also a theist, let’s not conveniently ignore the man beyond his equations. Newton was not some enlightened fusion of science and faith—he was, in many ways, a deeply disturbed fanatic whose religious convictions fueled some of his more sadistic tendencies.

Take, for example, his time as Warden of the Royal Mint. Newton wasn’t just an administrator overseeing the currency; he personally took to hunting down counterfeiters with an almost unhinged zeal. He would disguise himself, infiltrate criminal circles, and gather evidence through coercion and manipulation. Once he had enough, he ensured that these men were executed in the most brutal ways possible—hanging, drawing, and quartering. And he didn’t just oversee their executions; he attended them, standing close enough to watch their agony, reportedly without a flicker of remorse. This wasn’t merely about enforcing the law—it was about a sense of divine justice, a belief that he was the instrument of God's wrath against the wicked.

Then there’s the way he treated his intellectual rivals, particularly Robert Hooke. Newton had an obsessive hatred for Hooke, whose work on optics and gravitation posed a challenge to his own claims. When Hooke died, Newton ensured that his portrait and much of his legacy were erased from the Royal Society’s records. This wasn’t just academic rivalry—it was vengeance, driven by Newton’s belief that he was divinely chosen to reveal the truths of nature. Anyone who challenged him was not just an opponent, but an offense against God's ordained order.

And then there’s his theological writings, where his sadism emerges in an entirely different form. Newton spent vast amounts of time deciphering Biblical prophecy, convinced that he alone had unlocked God's hidden messages. But his interpretations were not just scholarly exercises—they were filled with visions of divine punishment, apocalyptic wrath, and the ultimate destruction of those he considered heretics. He fervently believed that those who deviated from his vision of Christianity—particularly Catholics—were destined for brutal divine retribution. The same mind that so elegantly described gravity was also consumed with an almost gleeful obsession with the suffering of those he deemed unworthy.

So no, citing Newton as an example of a religious scientist does nothing to support the idea that faith and reason can coexist productively. If anything, his story is a warning: even the greatest minds are not immune to the poison of religious dogma, and when that dogma festers in a mind as relentless as Newton’s, it can manifest in cruelty, fanaticism, and a thirst for domination disguised as righteousness. His faith didn’t enhance his science—it corrupted his humanity.

[Skepdick]

Is this dictatorial cunt still trying to get you to surrender your freedom of thought to him under the guise of determinism?

He can't even sugarcoat the shit-sandwich it in charm, charisma or eloquence.

[Veritas Aequitas]

What in the world is the ontological status of this mysterious "my" referenced in the above paragraph, which, apparently, "possesses" a brain?

Just for funzies, I talked to ChatGPT about it (bolding and emphasis by me and Chat, and, as usual, i didn't include all of Chat's chatter)...


As I had pointed out in a prior post, BigMike...

(^^^if he wants to be fully consistent^^^)

...needs to stop using language that implies the existence of an inner "self" or "personhood."
_______

As usual you are always barking up the wrong tree of reality due to dogmatic and shallow thinking.

Ah yes, once again, weedhopper, the "glaze" tries to accuse the "clay" of being too shallow.

I posted the above to ChatGpt;

VA to AI:
As I understand, materialism believes that the self cannot exist independent of matter, i.e. the self emerged out of matter, the self cannot be absolutely independent from matter.

According to Kant, the ontological "I AM" is an illusion while what is real is the 'empirical self' i.e. the "I-that-thinks".
In this case, the 'my' is referenced to the empirical self which can be empirically verified and justified within the social-science-FS, i.e. the psychological-FS with inputs from the science-biology-FS.

ChatGpt Wrote:
Your analysis aligns well with Kantian thought and provides a coherent response to the materialist dilemma posed in the discussion. Let's break this down further:

1. Materialist Ontology and the "My" Problem
The hardcore materialist asserts that all mental phenomena, including selfhood, emerge from physical processes in the brain.
However, when they say "my brain", this implies a possessor distinct from the brain itself, leading to an apparent inconsistency.
The AI's response argues that a fully consistent materialist should abandon possessive language and say "this brain" instead.

2. Kant's View: No Ontological "I AM," Only the Empirical Self
Kant would reject both the materialist's implied substantial self and the dualist's soul-based self.
In Kantian terms:
The ontological "I AM" (a metaphysical self) is an illusion.
The "I-that-thinks" (the empirical self) is real and tied to experience.
Selfhood, for Kant, is not an independently existing entity but a necessary structure of cognition—an organizing principle rather than a substance.

3. The "My" as Empirical Self in Framework-Systems
In a framework-sensitive (FS) approach:
The empirical self can be grounded within the social-science FS, especially the psychology FS.
Biology (within the science FS) provides further empirical input, supporting the notion that selfhood is an emergent property of brain and bodily processes.
The "my" in "my brain" is thus not a metaphysical entity but an empirically verifiable psychological construct—a product of cognitive functions and social-linguistic practices.

4. Resolving the Materialist Inconsistency
The AI's response critiques the materialist for linguistic inconsistency but does not recognize that language naturally reflects the empirical self rather than an ontological ego.
From a Kantian-FS perspective, the materialist can rightfully say "my brain", as this reflects an empirical, psychological reality, not a metaphysical possession.
The mistake is assuming that "my" implies an ontologically independent self, rather than simply denoting the functional, empirical self embedded in cognition and social experience.

Final Thought
Instead of rejecting "my brain" as inconsistent with materialism, we should reinterpret "my" in empirical terms—not as an absolute owner but as a functional reference within the empirical self’s framework.
This aligns both with Kant and a scientifically-informed materialist view, avoiding both ontological dualism and linguistic reductionism.

The above is just for information only because;
"you can't teach an old dog new tricks"

Are you actually dumb enough to believe that by getting ChatGPT to respond to my post from the narrow perspective of Kant's archaic horse crap, that it somehow refutes the points being made in "my" discussion with Chat?

Really, V?

Nonsense!!!

Furthermore, I thought I had made it clear to you that, other than Kant's concept of the "phenomenon/noumenon" duality seeming to be a good analogy for the "particle/wave" duality in quantum mechanics, I couldn't care less about anything else he came up with.
_______

Here is the counter to your above.

Why Kant Empirical Self [the I-Think] is More Realistic that the absolutely independent Ontological Self [the I-AM]?
viewtopic.php?p=755362#p755362

[BigMike]

Is this dictatorial cunt still trying to get you to surrender your freedom of thought to him under the guise of determinism?

He can't even sugarcoat the shit-sandwich it in charm, charisma or eloquence.

Oh, Skepdick, such passion, such fire—so much rage, and yet, not even a whisper of an argument. What could possibly be the reason for all that bluster? Is it frustration at not being able to refute a single point? A knee-jerk reaction to the mere suggestion that your precious "freedom of thought" might be an illusion? Or is it just projection, lashing out at the uncomfortable realization that your own beliefs rest on nothing more than unexamined assumptions?

And dictatorial? Please. I'm not the one demanding blind submission to comforting fictions—I’m the one asking for evidence, for consistency, for rational coherence. If that feels like tyranny to you, maybe the real problem isn’t determinism—it’s that you can’t stomach the weight of reason.

[Veritas Aequitas]

You're still stretching the definition of "faith" in a way that does more harm than good. When you insist that science operates with even a "sliver" of faith, you're engaging in a category error—one that provides an unnecessary opening for theists to equate their baseless beliefs with the rigor of scientific inquiry. The fact that science, like all human endeavors, begins with certain presuppositions does not mean it operates on faith. Science is a method—a process of systematically refining our understanding based on evidence.

The assumptions underpinning science—such as the uniformity of nature and the reliability of logic—are not dogmatic articles of belief. They are working hypotheses, continuously tested and refined. The difference is crucial: faith, particularly in a religious sense, demands belief without evidence or despite counter-evidence. Science, on the other hand, thrives on conditional trust—trust that remains contingent on empirical verification and falsifiability. Conflating these two under the same umbrella term of "faith," even on a continuum, is misleading.

You say that religious belief at present remains necessary because humans are still largely "animal" and require psychological comfort. That may be true to an extent, but it does not justify keeping religion in the epistemic framework at all. The task is not to give it a respectable place on a continuum with science—it is to render it obsolete. By continuing to entertain religion as something that merely ranks lower rather than something that should eventually be dismissed entirely, you grant it an intellectual legitimacy it does not deserve.

Your reference to religious scientists like Newton and Mendel is equally flawed. Yes, historically, many great scientists were theists. But that was not because their faith contributed to their scientific achievements—it was because they lived in a time when religious belief was the default. The success of their scientific work came despite their religious views, not because of them. As scientific knowledge has advanced, religious belief has declined precisely because faith is not an epistemic asset—it is an obstacle that must be worked around or abandoned.

Your framework, while logically structured, still offers religion a place at the table it no longer deserves. The future of human knowledge and psychological well-being is not about accommodating faith but about eliminating the need for it altogether. If religion is to have any place, it is within the realm of psychology—as a historical and sociological curiosity, a vestige of an earlier stage of human development, not as a legitimate means of knowing anything about reality. The ranking system you propose is not a means to an end—it risks becoming a justification for prolonging the inevitable: the total intellectual extinction of faith-based thinking.

And if we’re talking about Isaac Newton as an example of a scientist who was also a theist, let’s not conveniently ignore the man beyond his equations. Newton was not some enlightened fusion of science and faith—he was, in many ways, a deeply disturbed fanatic whose religious convictions fueled some of his more sadistic tendencies.

Take, for example, his time as Warden of the Royal Mint. Newton wasn’t just an administrator overseeing the currency; he personally took to hunting down counterfeiters with an almost unhinged zeal. He would disguise himself, infiltrate criminal circles, and gather evidence through coercion and manipulation. Once he had enough, he ensured that these men were executed in the most brutal ways possible—hanging, drawing, and quartering. And he didn’t just oversee their executions; he attended them, standing close enough to watch their agony, reportedly without a flicker of remorse. This wasn’t merely about enforcing the law—it was about a sense of divine justice, a belief that he was the instrument of God's wrath against the wicked.

Then there’s the way he treated his intellectual rivals, particularly Robert Hooke. Newton had an obsessive hatred for Hooke, whose work on optics and gravitation posed a challenge to his own claims. When Hooke died, Newton ensured that his portrait and much of his legacy were erased from the Royal Society’s records. This wasn’t just academic rivalry—it was vengeance, driven by Newton’s belief that he was divinely chosen to reveal the truths of nature. Anyone who challenged him was not just an opponent, but an offense against God's ordained order.

And then there’s his theological writings, where his sadism emerges in an entirely different form. Newton spent vast amounts of time deciphering Biblical prophecy, convinced that he alone had unlocked God's hidden messages. But his interpretations were not just scholarly exercises—they were filled with visions of divine punishment, apocalyptic wrath, and the ultimate destruction of those he considered heretics. He fervently believed that those who deviated from his vision of Christianity—particularly Catholics—were destined for brutal divine retribution. The same mind that so elegantly described gravity was also consumed with an almost gleeful obsession with the suffering of those he deemed unworthy.

So no, citing Newton as an example of a religious scientist does nothing to support the idea that faith and reason can coexist productively. If anything, his story is a warning: even the greatest minds are not immune to the poison of religious dogma, and when that dogma festers in a mind as relentless as Newton’s, it can manifest in cruelty, fanaticism, and a thirst for domination disguised as righteousness. His faith didn’t enhance his science—it corrupted his humanity.

We both agree, eventually theistic religions and all religions must be weaned off from humanity [in a foolproof manner] which has to be in the future when there is the ability to do so.

We will have to agree to disagree on the treatment of 'faith' as related to Science. Perhaps a thread on this specific issue can be raised to discuss it in detail.

Regardless of the above, I believe there is an inherent evolutionary algorithm within all humans that drive for the continual unfoldment towards an impulse for greater degree of rationality and critical thinking.
This trend is undeniable if we compare the average rationality and critical thinking within humanity from since 200,000 years ago to the present.
Since theistic religions are grounded on blind faith, irrational thinking and low on critical thinking, in time, they will naturally be weaned off.

My concern is to expedite the above improvement in quantum jumps, thus my introduction of the FS approach to reality and knowledge.

In your case, if you do not bring theistic religions into the same arena of rationality and critical thinking [FS approach], there is no place & opportunity to give it a knock-out within the same ring. It will be status quo as it has been going on at the same snail pace since 10,000 years ago.

[Belinda]

Mike, referencing electro-chemical reactions is not an explanation or answer.

If you want me to accept ideas as material, then you must explain how, for example, justice (as a concept, an ideal, an idea) is material.

You can't just say electrical impulses firing in my brain, the neurotransmitters transmitting signals, the networks of neurons forming connections or the electrochemical processes that shape perception, memory, and cognition and leave it there, as though all that explains anything.

You see this, yes?

Henry, justice is a concept that your brainmind creates. There is no need to deny the existence of the brain and there is no need to deny the existence of the mind. Brain and mind are the same thing . Your brain is what a neurosurgeon can see and feel: your mind is what you and you alone can feel.These are not separate but are the same thing (called Henry's 'brainmind') from different points of view.