LuckyR wrote: ↑Mon Feb 03, 2025 7:48 am
Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Sun Feb 02, 2025 9:49 pm
LuckyR wrote: ↑Sun Feb 02, 2025 7:39 pm
If theists believed in the concept of gods, but not necessarily any particular god, then they'd be correct if any god existed.
That doesn't add up. Why would somebody who said, "I believe in oceans, but not the Pacific Ocean," be "more correct" than somebody who said, "I believe the Pacific Ocean exists"?
However, just about all theists believe in a particular god and by corollary specifically disbelieve in over 99.9% of all gods. Thus the statistical chance of that sort of theist being correct is quite low, especially if the gods of future human cultures are also added to the tally.
I have to say, if I can say it without offence, that that's a very poor strategy of calculation. It errantly supposes that all alternatives are equally valid and possible, and all deserve to be equally weighted: and it makes the false assumption that many wrong answers reduce the chances of there being a right one. Clearly, neither is the case.
Use the same strategy of statistical assessment you're using, you would have to reason as follows: only 4% of the world's population is composed of actual Atheists. And counting in the earlier inhabitants of the world, the number of Atheists dwindles to negligible. Therefore the chances of Atheism being true are exceedingly small.
Would you reason that way?
In point of fact, there is an infinite number (quite literally) of wrong answers to the question, "What is the sum of 2+2?" And that doesn't make it even slightly less probable that there's a real answer, 4. So it's totally irrelevant how many false gods people invent: it doesn't even reduce the chances of there being a true God.
I don't know (as everyone else doesn't).
Wait.

You claim to know what other people CAN or CANNOT know? You think you can say that "everybody else" doesn't know what you admit you don't know?
What's the basis of that claim? How do you know the limits of what everybody else can know?
Wow. I'm sure the guy you're arguing against is losing badly... Except that obviously isn't me since you've misquoted just about everything I'm (trying to) saying.
I don't mind being set straight on that, if that's the case. Let's see what you find objectionable.
First, when you quote me as saying "more correct", when in reality I wasn't speaking comparatively, I merely said "correct".
That's actually a very minor complaint. My point was merely to question the implication that the vague concept "gods" was more plausibly "correct" than the more precise term, "God." Usually, the person who has the more precise information is more likely to be the one that has a chance of being correct; the vague one has a chance of only being correct in a very vague way, and not in any precise one.
For example, the claim, "the supernatural exists," is very vague, and even if correct, is highly unlikely to convey to us any precise knowledge of what is being talked about. The claim, "ghosts exist" is much more precise, and potentially more testable, and offers a chance of more exact understanding, one way or the other, even if still too vague. "The ghost of Soren Kierkegaard visits me nightly" offers even more precise and testable options, and would be easier to confirm or disprove -- even though none would be completely disprovable.
It seemed to me, rightly or wrongly, that you were saying somebody who talks vaguely about "gods" is more likely to be speaking truth than somebody who claimed the existence of "a particular God." And I couldn't see why one would imagine that.
Second, you seem to be missing the point that all of the 10,000 gods had actual believers (not theoretical "believers" that you or I just made up, like making up numerous wrong answers to 2+2, that no one believes in).
I'm not
missing it. I can see that it's just not relevant in any way at all. It doesn't matter how many people believe in a thing: if not true, their belief won't make it more true, and if untrue, then a billion believers will not make it true -- or even significantly increase our reasons to think it's true.
At one time, every last person in the entire world believed in a flat earth. And every last one of them was completely wrong.
So I couldn't see your argument there.
Third, while it is psychologically understandable that members of the current culture believe that their brand of metaphysical beliefs have a higher chance of being correct than those of the distant past, it is opaque to just about all laypersons that members of future cultures will identically downgrade the current culture's quality. No one escapes becoming ancient history.
Again, I can't see the value of the argument here. It seems to depend on a very straightforward fallacy -- namely, that "ancient" means "wrong." Things don't become right or wrong by being "ancient": "ancient" is a very different adjective from "errant."
It also seems to ask us to know what "future cultures" will believe, which, of course, isn't at all possible. And it assumes that these "future cultures," if they have disdain for the past, will be right to do so. Why would we assume that? How would science build on knowledge if all knowledge that becomes "ancient" is also
wrong?
Lastly, you can pop your eyes back in your head, I wasn't saying that I have special knowledge about metaphysical entities. Rather that since metaphysical entities defy proofs using physical evidence that while we all have our personal beliefs, no one (including myself) has any proof of the existence or nonexistance of the metaphysical.
That's clearly not going to be the case. I can't claim to know what you have experienced. So how can you claim to know not just what I can experience, but what "everybody" can experience?
If you say, "I live in Boston," and I say, "I don't believe Boston is a real place," then how do we adjudicate those claims? Can I simply insist, "Your belief in Boston is personal, and there is no physical proof of Boston"? Wouldn't you think me absurd, if I gave such a rejoinder?
What you can say, in all fairness, is "I, personally, have no evidence for the existence of the metaphysical," or better, "I don't recognize that I have any evidence for the metaphysical." And if you stopped there, it would be fine. But can you really go on to add, "...therefore, nobody else can possibly have any evidence for the metaphysical," or even "it's impossible that I'm overlooking evidence I actually do have for the metaphysical"?
For I think you do have such evidence, whether you're prepared to recognize it or not. And I say that because human beings all have "spooky" stuff like cognition, self-awareness, aesthetic or moral judgments, rationality, personhood, or soul -- none of which can be confirmed by mere
physical test, but all of which we actually depend on for doing things like the task you and I are performing right now...discussing.
I submit to you that the problem with
physical tests is that
they test only the physical.

As such, they are completely incapable of telling us whether or not the physical is all there is. But other things can tell us that the physical is NOT all there is, such as our ability to question whether or not the physical is all there is, which employs our minds, our reasoning, our consciousness...all the spooky stuff you're currently supposing can't possibly exist: the metaphysical.