A Better Future Through Science?

[Gary Childress]

1) Is there a better future through science?

2) Are we ultimately deterministically locked into whatever the future delivers to us?

3) Can greater scientific literacy lead to good (or at least better) decision making?

4) Is decision making based on science ultimately "undemocratic" if not everyone is privy to the science behind the decisions to be made?

5) What ought to be the role of the scientist in a representative democracy? Is it as an advisor or is it as a decision maker (maybe either or none of the above)?

6) With the advent of computers and the Internet, is direct democracy now possible and/or desirable?

[Flannel Jesus]

1) Is there a better future through science?

2) Are we ultimately deterministically locked into whatever the future delivers to us?

Even if 2 is the case (and it might not be, idk), we could still talk about "better futures" through counterfactuals. You could still say, "if we didn't use science, the future would be worse", because one could imagine a counterfactual world where people collectively decided somehow to abandon science, and we can consider the causal consequences of that.

Well if we stop studying science then we stop improving medicine, and in fact medicine gets decidedly worse, and poeple get more sick and die eralier and blah blah.

Determinism conceptually doesn't undermine counterfactual reasoning. Especially given the fact that we do not, and can not, know the future in great detail.

[BigMike]

1) Is there a better future through science?

"Better" is a value judgment, and values are determined by historical, biological, and environmental influences. But if we define "better" as a future where humanity has fewer preventable catastrophes, greater health, and more stability, then yes—science, as a method of uncovering reality, is a tool that naturally pushes in that direction. It is not a matter of choice; science progresses as an inevitable consequence of human cognition interacting with its environment. The accumulation of knowledge and technological advancement is as inevitable as erosion shaping a landscape over time.

2) Are we ultimately deterministically locked into whatever the future delivers to us?

Yes. The future is the result of a vast chain of prior causes extending from the Big Bang to now. There is no "locking into" anything—it’s simply the natural unfolding of physical events governed by the conservation laws and the four fundamental interactions. That doesn’t mean we know what the future holds, only that whatever happens was always going to happen exactly as it does.

3) Can greater scientific literacy lead to good (or at least better) decision making?

Again, defining "better" is key, but if we’re asking whether scientific literacy results in decisions that align more closely with reality, the answer is yes. An understanding of cause and effect, probability, and empirical evidence reduces reliance on superstition and biases. However, the level of scientific literacy in a society is also determined by prior causes—education systems, political structures, economic conditions—so individuals don't "choose" to become scientifically literate; they are shaped into it.

4) Is decision making based on science ultimately "undemocratic" if not everyone is privy to the science behind the decisions to be made?

This is an interesting question because it assumes democracy is an inherent good. But democracy, like anything else, is just another emergent phenomenon resulting from material conditions and historical contingencies. Science-based decision-making is not inherently undemocratic any more than engineering a bridge with physics in mind is undemocratic. The real issue is access to education—if a society lacks scientific literacy, decisions made by experts might feel authoritarian, but that’s an illusion caused by unequal knowledge distribution, not an inherent problem with science itself.

5) What ought to be the role of the scientist in a representative democracy? Is it as an advisor or is it as a decision maker (maybe either or none of the above)?

Neither, in an ideal deterministic system. Scientists are simply individuals processing reality in a way that allows them to make better predictions. The issue is that politics is not about truth; it's about power. The deterministic view would suggest that if societies were structured rationally, governance would be handled through empirical, evidence-based decision-making, with scientists playing a central role. But, given historical and economic conditions, scientists are often sidelined in favor of demagogues and power brokers because human societies evolved to favor social cohesion over truth.

6) With the advent of computers and the Internet, is direct democracy now possible and/or desirable?

It’s possible in a technical sense, but whether it emerges depends on the same deterministic forces as everything else. Societies do not "choose" governance models—they transition into them through necessity and pressure. Right now, those in power benefit from controlled narratives and gatekeeping, so direct democracy would be a threat to the current power structures. But in the long term, if technological systems become sophisticated enough to filter out misinformation and manipulation, we could see more direct participation in governance—again, not as a "choice," but as an inevitable shift caused by changing conditions.

So, in summary: The future is determined. Science is an emergent consequence of deterministic progress. The role of scientists depends on the structures that shape governance. And democracy, like everything else, is just another outcome of historical causality, not an autonomous decision made by free agents.

[Gary Childress]

1) Is there a better future through science?

2) Are we ultimately deterministically locked into whatever the future delivers to us?

Even if 2 is the case (and it might not be, idk), we could still talk about "better futures" through counterfactuals. You could still say, "if we didn't use science, the future would be worse", because one could imagine a counterfactual world where people collectively decided somehow to abandon science, and we can consider the causal consequences of that.

Well if we stop studying science then we stop improving medicine, and in fact medicine gets decidedly worse, and poeple get more sick and die eralier and blah blah.

Determinism conceptually doesn't undermine counterfactual reasoning. Especially given the fact that we do not, and can not, know the future in great detail.

I agree in so far as science seems critical in making better decisions. It's difficult to believe that blind guessing or remaining ignorant is going to turn out better (if it turns out well at all).

[Gary Childress]

1) Is there a better future through science?

"Better" is a value judgment, and values are determined by historical, biological, and environmental influences. But if we define "better" as a future where humanity has fewer preventable catastrophes, greater health, and more stability, then yes—science, as a method of uncovering reality, is a tool that naturally pushes in that direction. It is not a matter of choice; science progresses as an inevitable consequence of human cognition interacting with its environment. The accumulation of knowledge and technological advancement is as inevitable as erosion shaping a landscape over time.

2) Are we ultimately deterministically locked into whatever the future delivers to us?

Yes. The future is the result of a vast chain of prior causes extending from the Big Bang to now. There is no "locking into" anything—it’s simply the natural unfolding of physical events governed by the conservation laws and the four fundamental interactions. That doesn’t mean we know what the future holds, only that whatever happens was always going to happen exactly as it does.

3) Can greater scientific literacy lead to good (or at least better) decision making?

Again, defining "better" is key, but if we’re asking whether scientific literacy results in decisions that align more closely with reality, the answer is yes. An understanding of cause and effect, probability, and empirical evidence reduces reliance on superstition and biases. However, the level of scientific literacy in a society is also determined by prior causes—education systems, political structures, economic conditions—so individuals don't "choose" to become scientifically literate; they are shaped into it.

4) Is decision making based on science ultimately "undemocratic" if not everyone is privy to the science behind the decisions to be made?

This is an interesting question because it assumes democracy is an inherent good. But democracy, like anything else, is just another emergent phenomenon resulting from material conditions and historical contingencies. Science-based decision-making is not inherently undemocratic any more than engineering a bridge with physics in mind is undemocratic. The real issue is access to education—if a society lacks scientific literacy, decisions made by experts might feel authoritarian, but that’s an illusion caused by unequal knowledge distribution, not an inherent problem with science itself.

5) What ought to be the role of the scientist in a representative democracy? Is it as an advisor or is it as a decision maker (maybe either or none of the above)?

Neither, in an ideal deterministic system. Scientists are simply individuals processing reality in a way that allows them to make better predictions. The issue is that politics is not about truth; it's about power. The deterministic view would suggest that if societies were structured rationally, governance would be handled through empirical, evidence-based decision-making, with scientists playing a central role. But, given historical and economic conditions, scientists are often sidelined in favor of demagogues and power brokers because human societies evolved to favor social cohesion over truth.

6) With the advent of computers and the Internet, is direct democracy now possible and/or desirable?

It’s possible in a technical sense, but whether it emerges depends on the same deterministic forces as everything else. Societies do not "choose" governance models—they transition into them through necessity and pressure. Right now, those in power benefit from controlled narratives and gatekeeping, so direct democracy would be a threat to the current power structures. But in the long term, if technological systems become sophisticated enough to filter out misinformation and manipulation, we could see more direct participation in governance—again, not as a "choice," but as an inevitable shift caused by changing conditions.

So, in summary: The future is determined. Science is an emergent consequence of deterministic progress. The role of scientists depends on the structures that shape governance. And democracy, like everything else, is just another outcome of historical causality, not an autonomous decision made by free agents.

What if someone was making decisions that had great consequences for us and they were making them based on erroneous assumptions? Ought we try to overthrow that person's governance in favor of someone who was better informed? Or does it all come down to deterministic processes and whether we actually overthrow them or not? Or to put it more clearly, what role does the word "ought" play in a deterministic universe? Does it have a role?

[BigMike]

What if someone was making decisions that had great consequences for us and they were making them based on erroneous assumptions? Ought we try to overthrow that person's governance in favor of someone who was better informed? Or does it all come down to deterministic processes and whether we actually overthrow them or not? Or to put it more clearly, what role does the word "ought" play in a deterministic universe? Does it have a role?

Gary, in a deterministic universe, "ought" is just a shorthand for describing what will produce a particular outcome given specific goals and conditions. It’s not some floating moral imperative; it’s a practical statement of causality.

If someone is making decisions based on erroneous assumptions, whether they are overthrown depends entirely on the causal chain—public perception, access to information, economic and social pressures, and the willingness of people to act. The overthrow doesn’t happen because it ought to—it happens if the right conditions cause it to happen.

So when we say, "We ought to replace bad leaders with better-informed ones," what we’re really saying is:
1. If we value accuracy and competence, then removing the uninformed leader will better serve those values.
2. Whether we actually remove them depends on the complex web of deterministic forces in play.

In other words, ought has a role, but it’s just another deterministic description of cause-and-effect outcomes, not a statement of moral free will.

[Gary Childress]

What if someone was making decisions that had great consequences for us and they were making them based on erroneous assumptions? Ought we try to overthrow that person's governance in favor of someone who was better informed? Or does it all come down to deterministic processes and whether we actually overthrow them or not? Or to put it more clearly, what role does the word "ought" play in a deterministic universe? Does it have a role?

Gary, in a deterministic universe, "ought" is just a shorthand for describing what will produce a particular outcome given specific goals and conditions. It’s not some floating moral imperative; it’s a practical statement of causality.

If someone is making decisions based on erroneous assumptions, whether they are overthrown depends entirely on the causal chain—public perception, access to information, economic and social pressures, and the willingness of people to act. The overthrow doesn’t happen because it ought to—it happens if the right conditions cause it to happen.

So when we say, "We ought to replace bad leaders with better-informed ones," what we’re really saying is:
1. If we value accuracy and competence, then removing the uninformed leader will better serve those values.
2. Whether we actually remove them depends on the complex web of deterministic forces in play.

In other words, ought has a role, but it’s just another deterministic description of cause-and-effect outcomes, not a statement of moral free will.

So it's not really the case (in and of itself) that we "ought" to have a say in matters that will affect our own lives. It's more a matter of whether or not having a say in such matters meets a particular goal? is that correct? And if so, who's goal takes precedence where goals conflict? Or are you saying that "ought" is ultimately an irrelevant word that needs to be replaced with "is" or something?

For example, it's not the case that we "ought to tell the truth" but rather we "ought to tell the truth, if we deem it best to relay accurate information."

Is that correct?

Overall, I'm sort of confused on the word "ought"? Is there anything we ought to do for no other reason than to be virtuous? Or is morality (strictly speaking) only instrumental?

[BigMike]

What if someone was making decisions that had great consequences for us and they were making them based on erroneous assumptions? Ought we try to overthrow that person's governance in favor of someone who was better informed? Or does it all come down to deterministic processes and whether we actually overthrow them or not? Or to put it more clearly, what role does the word "ought" play in a deterministic universe? Does it have a role?

Gary, in a deterministic universe, "ought" is just a shorthand for describing what will produce a particular outcome given specific goals and conditions. It’s not some floating moral imperative; it’s a practical statement of causality.

If someone is making decisions based on erroneous assumptions, whether they are overthrown depends entirely on the causal chain—public perception, access to information, economic and social pressures, and the willingness of people to act. The overthrow doesn’t happen because it ought to—it happens if the right conditions cause it to happen.

So when we say, "We ought to replace bad leaders with better-informed ones," what we’re really saying is:
1. If we value accuracy and competence, then removing the uninformed leader will better serve those values.
2. Whether we actually remove them depends on the complex web of deterministic forces in play.

In other words, ought has a role, but it’s just another deterministic description of cause-and-effect outcomes, not a statement of moral free will.

So it's not really the case (in and of itself) that we "ought" to have a say in matters that will affect our own lives. It's more a matter of whether or not having a say in such matters meets a particular goal? is that correct? And if so, who's goal takes precedence where goals conflict? Or are you saying that "ought" is ultimately an irrelevant word that needs to be replaced with "is" or something?

For example, it's not the case that we "ought to tell the truth" but rather we "ought to tell the truth, if we deem it best to relay accurate information."

Is that correct?

Overall, I'm sort of confused on the word "ought"? Is there anything we ought to do for no other reason than to be virtuous? Or is morality (strictly speaking) only instrumental?

In a deterministic universe, ought is just a way of describing what will lead to a specific outcome, given a set of values or goals. It’s not an independent moral truth floating above cause and effect.

So yes, when we say, “We ought to tell the truth,” what we’re really saying is, “If accuracy and honesty are valued for practical reasons, then telling the truth is the best strategy to achieve those ends.” There’s no cosmic imperative to be truthful—just the deterministic fact that truthfulness produces certain results.

As for conflicting goals, the dominant one in any given scenario is simply the one backed by stronger causal forces—historical, social, economic, psychological. There’s no metaphysical arbiter deciding which goal ought to win. The one that prevails is the one that does prevail, determined by the forces at play.

So, morality isn’t some external duty—it’s always instrumental. We don’t ought to do anything in some absolute sense; we simply act based on the deterministic factors that shape us.

[Gary Childress]

Gary, in a deterministic universe, "ought" is just a shorthand for describing what will produce a particular outcome given specific goals and conditions. It’s not some floating moral imperative; it’s a practical statement of causality.

If someone is making decisions based on erroneous assumptions, whether they are overthrown depends entirely on the causal chain—public perception, access to information, economic and social pressures, and the willingness of people to act. The overthrow doesn’t happen because it ought to—it happens if the right conditions cause it to happen.

So when we say, "We ought to replace bad leaders with better-informed ones," what we’re really saying is:
1. If we value accuracy and competence, then removing the uninformed leader will better serve those values.
2. Whether we actually remove them depends on the complex web of deterministic forces in play.

In other words, ought has a role, but it’s just another deterministic description of cause-and-effect outcomes, not a statement of moral free will.

So it's not really the case (in and of itself) that we "ought" to have a say in matters that will affect our own lives. It's more a matter of whether or not having a say in such matters meets a particular goal? is that correct? And if so, who's goal takes precedence where goals conflict? Or are you saying that "ought" is ultimately an irrelevant word that needs to be replaced with "is" or something?

For example, it's not the case that we "ought to tell the truth" but rather we "ought to tell the truth, if we deem it best to relay accurate information."

Is that correct?

Overall, I'm sort of confused on the word "ought"? Is there anything we ought to do for no other reason than to be virtuous? Or is morality (strictly speaking) only instrumental?

In a deterministic universe, ought is just a way of describing what will lead to a specific outcome, given a set of values or goals. It’s not an independent moral truth floating above cause and effect.

So yes, when we say, “We ought to tell the truth,” what we’re really saying is, “If accuracy and honesty are valued for practical reasons, then telling the truth is the best strategy to achieve those ends.” There’s no cosmic imperative to be truthful—just the deterministic fact that truthfulness produces certain results.

As for conflicting goals, the dominant one in any given scenario is simply the one backed by stronger causal forces—historical, social, economic, psychological. There’s no metaphysical arbiter deciding which goal ought to win. The one that prevails is the one that does prevail, determined by the forces at play.

So, morality isn’t some external duty—it’s always instrumental. We don’t ought to do anything in some absolute sense; we simply act based on the deterministic factors that shape us.

Well, I suppose that makes consistent sense.

[Gary Childress]

Just for the record, the title of this thread was created in the mixed spirit of Dupont Chemicals' old slogan "Better living through Chemistry".

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Better_Li ... _Chemistry

Thoughts?

[Gary Childress]

Once upon a time, humans did not possess nuclear weapons. Once upon a time human population did not have the power to render nearly every other species on the globe extinct through our everyday living habits. Now it seems that we do.

What happens if/when technology reaches a point where single individual human beings may come into possession of enormous capabilities on an individual basis? We know how well guns and some school students seem to mix. We know how well terrorists and airliners seem to mix. How well will things mix if we ever reach a point where any individual with an Internet connection (and the desire) can create an atom bomb in their garage?

Will science make us better or will science mostly make us more dangerous?

EDIT: However, to be fair, the world is a dangerous place and to hope for a world without danger, seems to be a misguided hope. Perhaps all we can do is go forward toward whatever is over the horizon waiting for us.