Theories of Consciousness

[Andy Kay]

I'm with Kant on this one.

Well I can't ask Kant why he was (imo) incoherent, but I can ask you.

You could always be hallucinating, all your experiences could be illusions, or a computer simulation, or you could be a brain-in-a-vat, or you could be forever deceived by an evil demon, and so on. So you can't have any certainty even "within your consciousness" either. Just like you can't have certainty about what is "outside your consciousness".

So why is it that the former uncertainty is dismissed as irrelevant and the latter uncertainty is taken overly seriously?

"All my experiences are illusions" says two things: Firstly it says that "all my experiences EXIST," and then it goes on to predicate something upon them. It's that first thing that I'm saying is indubitable. It would be inconsistent to doubt it because to doubt anything is to concede that doubt EXISTS.

[Atla]

I'm with Kant on this one.

Well I can't ask Kant why he was (imo) incoherent, but I can ask you.

You could always be hallucinating, all your experiences could be illusions, or a computer simulation, or you could be a brain-in-a-vat, or you could be forever deceived by an evil demon, and so on. So you can't have any certainty even "within your consciousness" either. Just like you can't have certainty about what is "outside your consciousness".

So why is it that the former uncertainty is dismissed as irrelevant and the latter uncertainty is taken overly seriously?

"All my experiences are illusions" says two things: Firstly it says that "all my experiences EXIST," and then it goes on to predicate something upon them. It's that first thing that I'm saying is indubitable. It would be inconsistent to doubt it because to doubt anything is to concede that doubt EXISTS.

That just means that there is something rather than (absolute) nothing. Yes there is something rather than (absolute) nothing. I don't see how that is relevant to what I was asking.

[Andy Kay]

That just means that there is something rather than (absolute) nothing. Yes there is something rather than (absolute) nothing. I don't see how that is relevant to what I was asking.

I don't see what's incoherent about it.

[Noax]

You're going to have to explain exactly what it is you're requesting here.

I'm not really requesting anything.

What is missing from my comment that makes you identify it as a non-sequitur?

I already explained this. Look up the part about "I am" not following from "I think". It requires an additional premise that isn't necessarily held. I for one don't accept the premise (that existence is prior to predictation), also explained above.

What is important is to become aware of one's axioms so that alternative views may be entertained rather than prejudicially ignored.

Or simply labeled 'insane' when somebody doesn't share your personal list of axioms.

I doubt the sanity of anybody arguing that there is nothing at all.

Wow, I never said that. I said I wasn't a realist, but I didn't say I was a nihilist. A nihilist would say that there is a reality, and that reality is empty. Sure, stuff exists to me, but I define existence in a relational manner, not as a property, which is a very sane view since there is no empirical test for something having this property without presuming it is already had.

[Atla]

Sure, stuff exists to me, but I define existence in a relational manner, not as a property, which is a very sane view since there is no empirical test for something having this property without presuming it is already had.

Existence is never really a property, therefore let's take a quasi-solipsistic attitude where stuff exists in relation to me?

[Impenitent]

the invisible maniac applies here...

out of sight, out of mind

-Imp

[Andy Kay]

What is missing from my comment that makes you identify it as a non-sequitur?

I already explained this. Look up the part about "I am" not following from "I think". It requires an additional premise that isn't necessarily held. I for one don't accept the premise (that existence is prior to predictation), also explained above.

So tell me then, what is it that's missing? Explain it like I'm somebody thinking about studying philosophy at university level.

What is important is to become aware of one's axioms so that alternative views may be entertained rather than prejudicially ignored.

Or simply labeled 'insane' when somebody doesn't share your personal list of axioms.

Not insane, but if you reject a view on no stronger grounds than "I don't like it" then prejudiced.

I doubt the sanity of anybody arguing that there is nothing at all.

Wow, I never said that. I said I wasn't a realist, but I didn't say I was a nihilist. A nihilist would say that there is a reality, and that reality is empty. Sure, stuff exists to me, but I define existence in a relational manner, not as a property, which is a very sane view since there is no empirical test for something having this property without presuming it is already had.

As someone calling realism into question, the point is relevant.

If you're going to call realism into question then you have to be clear about what kind of realism you're referring to.

Exactly what you said: There is something rather than nothing.

Looks to me like you said you were calling into question the claim that there's something rather than nothing. If not then you have to be clear about what kind of realism you're referring to.

[Noax]

let's take a quasi-solipsistic attitude where stuff exists in relation to me?

There is no anthropocentrism in what I described. Given system states X and Y, X exists relative to Y iff X is part of the cause of Y. That definition works far better than an epistemic one, and is actually how most people use the term, even if they would never think to put it that way. This definition does not in any way get in the way of the Meinongian's denial of objective existence (or even relational existence) being prior to predication.
Andy Kay however cannot set aside this premise long enough to consider an alternative.

So tell me then, what is it that's missing?

Your unstated premises are missing for one. I pointed it out, and don't find the premise necessary since no contradiction results from the lack of it.
Did you read what I posted?

Not insane, but if you reject a view on no stronger grounds than "I don't like it" then prejudiced.

You're the one quentioning my 'sanity' when encountering a view based not on 'I don't like it', but rather just on open mindedness, that I don't necessarily accept premises that are often held despite no justification of them, no necessity demonstrated.

Looks to me like you said you were calling into question the claim that there's something rather than nothing.

Given that there is meaning to the phrase 'there is something', yes, I call that into question. I don't deny it since I in no way can demonstrate it. But I question everything. My relational definition of 'exists' does not render meaning to a statement referencing existence without a referent (exists in relation to what exactly?) so it references objective existence. I see that as sort of a set of all things that have the property of 'exists', and that set may well be empty, especially since the alternative is either that everything exists (rendering the property indistinct from the lack of it), or that some things have that property and other things do not, in which case one finds the need to explain how whatever you assert to exist happens to exist, an explanation I've never seen addressed except with hand-waving such as 'God always existed' which doesn't explain why 'not god' is the case.

In other words, instead of asking 'why is there something and not nothing?', first ask "is there something?' and be open to the question not having an obvious answer.

[Atla]

let's take a quasi-solipsistic attitude where stuff exists in relation to me?

There is no anthropocentrism in what I described. Given system states X and Y, X exists relative to Y iff X is part of the cause of Y. That definition works far better than an epistemic one, and is actually how most people use the term, even if they would never think to put it that way. This definition does not in any way get in the way of the Meinongian's denial of objective existence (or even relational existence) being prior to predication.
Andy Kay however cannot set aside this premise long enough to consider an alternative.

Is that different from the kind of plain ordinary realism where all things exist in relation to one another?

[Andy Kay]

So tell me then, what is it that's missing?

Your unstated premises are missing for one. I pointed it out, and don't find the premise necessary since no contradiction results from the lack of it.
Did you read what I posted?

Explain it like I'm somebody thinking about studying philosophy at university level.

Not insane, but if you reject a view on no stronger grounds than "I don't like it" then prejudiced.

You're the one quentioning my 'sanity' when encountering a view based not on 'I don't like it', but rather just on open mindedness, that I don't necessarily accept premises that are often held despite no justification of them, no necessity demonstrated.

I question the sanity of anybody that tells me that there is nothing at all.

Looks to me like you said you were calling into question the claim that there's something rather than nothing.

Given that there is meaning to the phrase 'there is something', yes, I call that into question.

So you're saying that IF it's meaningful to say "there is something" then you are indeed calling into question the claim that there is something rather than nothing. So are you saying that it IS meaningful or that it's NOT meaningful?

I don't deny it since I in no way can demonstrate it.

So you're saying that you don't deny that there's something rather than nothing because there's no way you can demonstrate that there's something rather than nothing? I must be missing something. What am I missing here?

But I question everything. My relational definition of 'exists' does not render meaning to a statement referencing existence without a referent (exists in relation to what exactly?)

I think I understand this bit, and if my understanding is correct then I'm not disagreeing. You seem to be saying that for something to 'exist' it must stand out against a background of other things (or to be pedantic, of at least one other thing). From the Latin ex istare meaning "to stand out." Furthermore, that it must follow from this that if we aren't referring to a "something" then we aren't making a statement about the existence of anything. That all seems to make sense.

so it references objective existence.

I'm not sure what the "it" refers to here but I'll risk placing an interpretation on this anyway, and assume you mean "something."
So you seem to be saying that IF there is "anything at all" then it must be "objective existence," and you go on to explain further:

I see that as sort of a set of all things that have the property of 'exists',

So you seem to be describing "objective existence" as the set of all existing things -- i.e. of all things that "stand out" from a background of all other things. This seems to be at variance with the more usual meaning of the word "objective" which stands in contrast to the word "subjective." Are you claiming that all subjective things don't "exist"? Or is this some kind of stipulated technical definition that needs further explanation?

and that set may well be empty,

So you seem to be saying that it is logically possible that there is a complete absence of anything that stands out from everything else. Now I would call that state of affairs "nothing at all," which seems consistent with your claim that if a statement has no referent then we aren't making a statement about the existence of anything.

especially since the alternative is either that everything exists

You seem to be saying here that IF it were NOT logically possible for there to be a complete absence of anything that stands out from everything else (this being "the alternative" to the logical possibility), then EITHER "everything stands out from everything else" ...

(rendering the property indistinct from the lack of it),

... in which case there is no distinction between existence and non-existence (I'm not sure why you would make this claim but I'm just interpreting your words here) ...

or that some things have that property and other things do not,

... OR some things stand out from everything else and some things do not ...

in which case one finds the need to explain how whatever you assert to exist happens to exist,

... and if some things stand out from everything else and some do not, then we need to account for why those things that stand out are different from those that don't stand out ...

an explanation I've never seen addressed except with hand-waving such as 'God always existed' which doesn't explain why 'not god' is the case.

... and you haven't come across any such account ...

In other words, instead of asking 'why is there something and not nothing?', first ask "is there something?' and be open to the question not having an obvious answer.

... so one needs to examine the assumption that there are things that stand out from the background of everything else. (Is this really an assumption? I mean, isn't it simply the case? And if not, why not?)

End of interpretation.
Ye gods that was tortuous. Did I get any of it right?

[Impenitent]

brains in vats are best served cold

-Imp

[Noax]

Is that different from the kind of plain ordinary realism where all things exist in relation to one another?

Plain ordinary realism isn't relational at all. It is objective. A thing is part of reality or it isn't, period.

]So you're saying that IF it's meaningful to say "there is something" then you are indeed calling into question the claim that there is something rather than nothing. So are you saying that it IS meaningful or that it's NOT meaningful?

It is syntactially meaningful under some definitions of 'existing', and not meaningful under other definitions. Yes, it is meaningful given an objective definition. I am no realist, so I lay no claim as to what has the property of existence and what doesn't since I cannot think of empirical ways in which it would matter. It only matters when two things interact, in which case it seems likely that both things need to have the same setting of that property, so if there is an 'I' that doubts, then that doubt would have the same ontology as the 'I': either both exist or both do not.

Of course all that is nonsense if you presume that premise I keep mentioning: that (objective) existence is prior to predication. But that premise excludes so many possibilities that are in need of exploration. I cannot accept it without any justification.

So you're saying that you don't deny that there's something rather than nothing because there's no way you can demonstrate that there's something rather than nothing? I must be missing something. What am I missing here?

Close, but makes no sense the way you worded it.
I don't deny that there's something rather than nothing because there's no way I can demonstrate that there's not anything rather than something. I cannot demonstrate that realism is wrong, only that it has problems, but all views seem to have problems.

I think I understand this bit, and if my understanding is correct then I'm not disagreeing.

Good if you actually understand. It is a definition, not an assertion. It isn't something that is correct or not, merely a way that I use a word, a way that I define ontology. It is a product of causality the way I worded it, so it can only be meaningful between states in a causal structure such as our universe.

You seem to be saying that for something to 'exist' it must stand out against a background of other things (or to be pedantic, of at least one other thing).

I do realize the Latin origins of the word, but no, that doesn't seem to capture it. Take the definition quite literally. Rain causes tree to grow, and eventually produce an apple. Thus the rain exists relative to the apple. The apple does not exist relative to that (years prior) rainy day since the weather that day is in no way influenced by the apple in question.

Again, this isn't something right or wrong, it's just an example of that alternate definition being put to use. Notice the utter lack of human observer in the example since the definition isn't an anthropocentric one.

so it references objective existence.

I'm not sure what the "it" refers to here

'It' here refers to any usage of 'exists' without specification of the relation. Any such syntax references objective existence, which is why objective existence is so intuitive. Language forces that intuition, but language is not a valid justification of it.

So you seem to be describing "objective existence" as the set of all existing things -- i.e. of all things that "stand out" from a background of all other things.

Yea, pretty much. Presumably we are on the list and the unicorn is not, but hey, it could be the other way around and we'd not be able to tell the difference, unless, once again, one accepts that pesky premise that I keep bringing up, in which case the unicorn must exist because it is horny (a predicate).

This seems to be at variance with the more usual meaning of the word "objective" which stands in contrast to the word "subjective."

Sorry about that. Another word that needs a definition. Not talking about objective vs subjective. I've been talking about objective vs relative. Realism says that something is real, period, not conditional on say a point of view. e.g. Theory of relativity says that velocity and simultaneity are both relative (frame dependent), but proper dimensions and acceleration are both objective (not frame dependent).
"Exists' without relation is an objective use of the term, and with the relation it becomes a relative use of the term.
'The sun exists' (objective wording). 'The sunset in Halifax' is a relative reference since it isn't setting in Zurich.

So you seem to be saying that it is logically possible that there is a complete absence of anything that stands out from everything else.

I can accept that statement. There is no evidence of it being otherwise since the empirical experience would be no different. Some things stand out more than others relative to my point of view, sure, but that's got nothing to do with objective existence. Hence I find far more utility in using a relational definition when using the term.
The weather is nice. That's objectively worded, but the reference is implied: The weather is nice here and now, but not necessarily elsewhere or here on other days.

Now I would call that state of affairs "nothing at all," which seems consistent with your claim that if a statement has no referent then we aren't making a statement about the existence of anything.

Except if a statement has no referent, we ARE making an objective statement. Your wording there is that we're not making an objective statement, which is not the case.

especially since the alternative is either that everything exists

You seem to be saying

If nothing stands out, that would be pretty much the same as everything standing out, or the whole 'standing out' business being essentially useless.

[quote... and if some things stand out from everything else and some do not, then we need to account for why those things that stand out are different from those that don't stand out ...[/quote]If we're talking relational here, then the explanation is pretty simple. If we're talking about standing out in an objective sense, then yea, what you said.

... so one needs to examine the assumption that there are things that stand out from the background of everything else. (Is this really an assumption? I mean, isn't it simply the case?

Only in a relational view is it demonstrably the case. In the objective sense, yes, it is an assumption, one you are obviously assuming when asking ' isn't it simply the case?'. It isn't simple.


Not trying to torture you. I started in on this 1) trying to grok your view (still don't know), and 2) trying to point out places you are making unjustified assumptions without knowing it. That has led us down this road, and I must compliment you that you seem to have genuine interest in this exploration. I assure you that I'm not asserting any correctness of any view of mine, but you have partially followed the logic behind these things being not just possible, but lacking in evidence to the contrary. What it is is horribly unintuitive, but I know where the intuitions come from, and most of it is lies, however well intended. I've learned to trust those lies for my pragmatic survival, but not to trust them for search for a self-consistent view.

[Andy Kay]

Not trying to torture you. I started in on this 1) trying to grok your view (still don't know), and 2) trying to point out places you are making unjustified assumptions without knowing it. That has led us down this road, and I must compliment you that you seem to have genuine interest in this exploration. I assure you that I'm not asserting any correctness of any view of mine, but you have partially followed the logic behind these things being not just possible, but lacking in evidence to the contrary. What it is is horribly unintuitive, but I know where the intuitions come from, and most of it is lies, however well intended. I've learned to trust those lies for my pragmatic survival, but not to trust them for search for a self-consistent view.

Why have we travelled down this path? I'm guessing it has something to do with my description of "consciousness" as "everything" but if so then I see this as something of a distraction. So I have two questions:
1. how are you using the word "consciousness"?
2. why do you consider this ontology of 'things' relevant to a discussion of consciousness?

[Noax]

Why have we travelled down this path?

2. why do you consider this ontology of 'things' relevant to a discussion of consciousness?

You said "it's impossible for me to doubt the existence of my consciousness", and that you welcomed constructive criticism, so I showed a valid view where consciousness (however defined) does not meaningfully exist (with 'exist' defined the way you did). I did what you labeled 'impossible'.

1. how are you using the word "consciousness"?

I kind of don't use it at all since little of what I said is specific to it. I can define it if it comes up and one is needed.

[Atla]

Is that different from the kind of plain ordinary realism where all things exist in relation to one another?

Plain ordinary realism isn't relational at all. It is objective. A thing is part of reality or it isn't, period.

Objective reality can be relational.