Interactivism

[Veritas Aequitas]

I have been reading about Interactivism which I find agreeable. AI can explain it very well.
My purpose is to share and discuss knowledge [if not 'you', someone might find it useful]; so, why the fuss if I use AI?

CONTENT:
What is Interactivism?
Does it involves Philosophical Realism?
It No interests beyond ‘interactivism’ contrast to Kant’s regulative thing-in-itself

AI Wrote:
Interactivism, as developed primarily by Mark H. Bickhard and others, is a philosophical and theoretical framework that seeks to explain cognition, representation, and the mind through a process-oriented and interaction-based perspective. It challenges traditional representational theories of mind, proposing instead that representation emerges through dynamic interactions between an agent and its environment. Below is an explanation of its key principles and ideas:

Core Ideas of Interactivism
Representation as Process, Not Structure:

Traditional cognitive theories often treat representations as static structures or entities (e.g., symbols, images) that "stand for" something in the world.
Interactivism rejects this static view and instead argues that representation is an emergent property of interactive processes between an agent and its environment.

Dynamic Interaction:
Cognition is understood as an ongoing, dynamic process of interaction.
Representations arise as anticipatory models that guide and evaluate actions, rather than as predefined mappings of the world.
This means cognition is inherently action-oriented and situated.

Error and Learning:
A central aspect of representation is its capacity for error detection and correction.
An agent's interactions with the world involve predictions about outcomes, and discrepancies between predictions and actual outcomes drive learning and adaptation.

Emergence of Normativity:
Interactivism explains normativity (e.g., "correct" or "incorrect" actions) as arising from the success or failure of interactive processes.
For example, an organism's survival depends on the effectiveness of its interactions, and this provides the basis for normative evaluations.

Developmental Perspective:
Interactivism emphasizes the developmental nature of cognitive processes, highlighting that representation and cognition evolve through the agent's interactions over time.
This includes biological development, learning, and cultural influences.

Critique of Cartesian Dualism:
Interactivism rejects Cartesian dualism (the separation of mind and body) and instead adopts a holistic, embodied perspective.
It views mental phenomena as grounded in the physical interactions of the agent.
Influences and Theoretical Foundations

Interactivism draws on ideas from several disciplines:

Piagetian Constructivism: The notion that knowledge is actively constructed by the agent through interaction with the environment.

Cybernetics and Systems Theory: Emphasis on feedback mechanisms and dynamic systems.

Philosophy of Pragmatism: Focus on action, practice, and the agent's role in shaping cognition.

Bickhard and others argue that traditional models of cognition—such as computational or symbolic models—fail to adequately capture the dynamism and adaptability of real-world cognition. They advocate for an action-oriented, emergent, and process-based approach as an alternative.

Applications of Interactivism
Artificial Intelligence (AI):
Interactivism offers insights into creating AI systems that can genuinely learn and adapt through interaction, rather than relying on preprogrammed rules or representations.

Developmental Psychology:
It provides a framework for understanding how cognitive and representational capacities develop in children.

Philosophy of Mind:
Interactivism contributes to debates about consciousness, intentionality, and the nature of mental representation, offering a non-reductionist, anti-dualist perspective.
Cognitive Science:

It challenges and complements traditional computational models of the mind by emphasizing real-time interaction and adaptability.

Key References
Mark H. Bickhard:
Bickhard is the primary proponent of Interactivism and has written extensively about its philosophical and theoretical underpinnings.
Key work: "Foundational Issues in Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science: Impasse and Solution" (1993), where he critiques traditional AI and cognitive science paradigms and outlines the interactivist approach.

Contributions to Philosophy:
Bickhard’s work is also informed by the pragmatist tradition (e.g., Dewey and Peirce) and critiques of representationalism from post-structuralist and embodied cognition perspectives.

Discuss??
Views?

[Veritas Aequitas]

Q: Does Interactivism involves philosophical realism or the thing-in-itself, i.e. there is an underlying reality that is absolutely mind-independent regardless of whether there are humans or not?

ChatGPT said:

Interactivism, as articulated by Mark Bickhard and others, does not explicitly commit to philosophical realism in the traditional sense of positing an absolutely mind-independent reality akin to the thing-in-itself in metaphysical realism. Instead, its stance aligns more closely with pragmatic, interaction-based perspectives, which emphasize the relational, emergent, and context-dependent nature of knowledge and representation.

Interactivism and Philosophical Realism
Rejection of Absolute Mind-Independence:

Interactivism focuses on the relational and emergent aspects of knowledge, where the agent (biological or artificial) constructs its understanding through interactions with its environment.
It avoids positing an absolute, mind-independent reality (à la the Kantian noumenon or metaphysical realism).
Instead, the "reality" accessed by agents is inherently interaction-dependent: what agents know and experience is structured by their capacities, goals, and interactions.

Situated, Agent-Relative Epistemology:
Interactivism proposes that knowledge and representation are situated and agent-relative. This means that what is real or knowable is determined by how an agent interacts with its environment and the kinds of distinctions it can make.
There is no claim of accessing a reality-as-it-is (thing-in-itself) outside of such interactions.

Potential Compatibility with Constructivism:
Interactivism shares affinities with constructivist epistemologies, which hold that knowledge is actively constructed by agents rather than passively received from an external, mind-independent reality.
It thus challenges the correspondence theory of truth, which assumes representations must mirror an external reality.

Does Interactivism Involve the Thing-in-Itself?
Kantian Resonances but Not the Same:
Interactivism shares some similarities with Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, particularly in rejecting the notion that humans can access a reality independent of their cognitive framework.
However, it diverges from Kant by rejecting the metaphysical assumption of a noumenal thing-in-itself as a grounding necessity for appearances. Instead, it focuses entirely on the emergent dynamics of interaction, bypassing the need to posit an unknowable underlying reality.

Regulative Idea vs Ontological Commitment:
Like Kant’s treatment of the thing-in-itself as a regulative concept, Interactivism could be interpreted as acknowledging the practical utility of assuming a consistent environment or system with which agents interact, but it does not commit to the ontological reality of something "absolutely mind-independent."
Instead, reality is considered interaction-defined and context-dependent.

Is There an Underlying Reality in Interactivism?
Pragmatic Reality:
Interactivism does not deny that there is a reality "out there." However, it does not commit to the view that this reality exists in an absolutely independent, mind-transcendent form. Reality, for Interactivism, is what is constituted through the processes and interactions of agents.
Relational Ontology:
Reality is relational and emergent, rather than foundational and independent. It arises within the dynamics of interactions between agents and their environments.
In this sense, Interactivism could be seen as anti-realist about an absolute, mind-independent reality but realist about the structures and regularities that emerge through interaction.

Conclusion
Interactivism rejects both philosophical realism (which posits an absolutely mind-independent reality) and the metaphysical notion of the thing-in-itself. Instead, it adopts a process-oriented, interaction-based epistemology and ontology, emphasizing that:

Reality is constituted through the interactions of agents with their environments.
Knowledge and representation are emergent and relational, not about accessing an absolute reality beyond all interaction.
This makes Interactivism closer to pragmatism and constructivist views, focusing on practical engagement and interaction over metaphysical commitments to an independent "ultimate" reality.

AI: "bypassing the need to posit an unknowable underlying reality."
Note there are nuance considerations to 'unknowable' underlying reality discussed elsewhere.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Where Kant and Interactivism differ:

AI Wrote:
Kant: The thing-in-itself is not a substantial or concrete entity, but it is necessary for practical philosophy and morality, serving as a regulative ideal for guiding moral progress and preserving the autonomy of the moral agent.

Interactivism: Eschews the thing-in-itself entirely, as it has no interest in transcendent or regulative concepts. It remains entirely focused on explaining interactional and emergent phenomena in a self-contained manner.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes:

Kant's 'Gemut' and Interactivism

The key question of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (‘Kritik’), as he wrote to Herz, is:
Upon what ground rests the connection of that within us which is called presentation (Vorstellung) to the object (Gegenstand )?

The grounds Kant sought were not causal, but rather cognitive, centrally including normative issues of reference, ascription, truth, accuracy and (cognitive) justification. He knew such issues could not be addressed by contemporaneous physiology or psychology, and adroitly used the common German term “Gemut” to set aside any and all issues of mind-body dualism.
To address those issues Kant developed a very sophisticated epistemology involving a cogent cognitive architecture. How these can be embodied in homo sapiens semi-sapientes Kant did not because he could not address.
Kant’s issues focus on validity, and outline a functionalist cognitive architecture to better identify what epistemological and cognitive issues must be addressed and what philosophical resources may be available to address them. Issues of physiological and psychological process must be deferred, indeed, into the present day.

The key question driving Mark Bickhard’s Interactivism may be posed thus:
How is any (re)presenting at all physiologically possible?

To address this issue Interactivism develops a highly sophisticated thermodynamic model of how (inter alia) biological organisms are at all possible, including how biological organisms can sense, perceive and behave effectively within their environs.
Such biological forms of organic functioning afford bases for further cognitive and ultimately linguistic and social forms of interaction by more sophisticated organisms with their environs and conspecifics.
Thermodynamics is fundamental because we, our Earth and all its features and inhabitants consist in various sorts and combinations of condensed matter, which itself is possible only within a specifiable range of cosmic expansion or ‘deflation’, i.e., a favourable range of thermodynamic dispersion which alone affords any sort(s) of physical stuffs, matter or particulars, such as our planet, which affords conditions in which more complex forms of biological organisms with more sophisticated forms of interaction can emerge (cf. Falkenburg & Morrison, 2015).

Interactivism centrally addresses issues of physiological and psychological processes, including those required for human cognizance; it addresses long-standing problems of how normative issues of validity can be subserved by organic life and ultimately by our human physiology and psychology.
Can Kant’s Cognitive Architecture be Embodied within the Whole Person?
Kenneth R. WESTPHAL, M.A.E.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes: