ThinkOfOne, this is a good question, but the answer lies in understanding what volition actually is under determinism. Volition—the sense of choosing, deciding, or intending—is not denied by determinism; it’s reinterpreted. What we experience as choice is the result of underlying causes: neural processes, past experiences, environmental influences, and current conditions. When we “intervene,” “address,” or “manipulate,” these actions are themselves caused by factors like knowledge, values, and external circumstances.
In a deterministic framework, volition isn’t some mystical, uncaused force. It’s a higher-level process emerging from a complex web of causation. For example, if someone advocates for better education to reduce violence, their advocacy is determined by their awareness of the issue, their empathy, their understanding of causal relationships, and countless other factors. They aren’t "free" in the sense of being uncaused, but their actions are no less real or impactful.
The handles we “manipulate” are causal factors—poverty, education, social systems—whose changes can influence outcomes. Determinism doesn’t negate the meaningfulness of these efforts; it provides the context in which they occur. In fact, by acknowledging causation, determinism makes interventions more precise and effective. Volition, in this sense, is simply the human experience of being part of this deterministic chain, not outside it.
You seem to have misunderstood what I was driving at. My fault. I should have been more explicit. That said, I imagine its "turtles all the way down" given your responses. As such, I'll take a different tack.
You seem to have redefined "volition". Not sure, but you seem to think that volition can only be explained by some "mystical, uncaused force" OR as the "experience of being part of [a] deterministic chain" with the "illusion" of volition. Another option is that the mind has the capacity to consciously direct thought outside of the "deterministic chain". In other words, true volition.
Evidently you've drawn the conclusion that true volition does not exist. That is only an illusion, despite the fact that it does not feel like an illusion to the individual. From what I've seen, there is nothing in neuroscience that precludes true volition. If you think there is, then present it here. Or direct me to the appropriate post if you already have. I've only spot-checked your posts, so I very well could have missed it.
If you’re suggesting that the mind has a capacity to direct thought outside this chain, it would require evidence of causeless events—a break in the physical or biological processes we observe.
Neuroscientific evidence doesn’t explicitly rule out the possibility of "true volition," but it has revealed mechanisms that challenge its plausibility. For instance, experiments by Benjamin Libet and subsequent researchers have shown that neural activity predicting a decision occurs before a person becomes consciously aware of making that decision. While these findings don’t conclusively disprove free will, they strongly suggest that what we experience as conscious choice is shaped by unconscious processes that precede it.
C'mon Mike. I plainly stated the following: "Another option is that the mind has the capacity to consciously direct thought outside of the 'deterministic chain'. In other words, true volition."
As such, I'm not merely "suggesting that the mind has a capacity to direct thought outside this chain".
While I agree that "conscious choice is shaped by unconscious processes that precede it", that doesn't preclude volition.
Moreover, brain studies have consistently shown that our decisions are influenced by factors like genetics, environmental inputs, and prior experiences—all of which are outside our conscious control. This doesn’t mean we don’t "decide" things; it means that our decisions emerge as the result of these interacting factors. The feeling of being in control is itself part of the deterministic process—a complex outcome of neural activity that gives rise to consciousness.
There's a wide gulf between "influences...that are outside our conscious control" and positing that true volition does not exist.
While these findings don’t conclusively disprove free will, they strongly suggest that what we experience as conscious choice is shaped by unconscious processes that precede it. As far as we know, no such evidence has been observed. This doesn’t close the door entirely, but it places the burden of proof on those who posit "true volition."
The concept that true volition doesn't exist is a relatively new theory. As such, the "burden of proof" lies with those who posit that true volition doesn't exist - you have that backward. Unless you have something more, there remains insufficient evidence to reasonably conclude that true volition doesn't exist. Do you have something more?
ThinkOfOne, this is a good question, but the answer lies in understanding what volition actually is under determinism. Volition—the sense of choosing, deciding, or intending—is not denied by determinism; it’s reinterpreted. What we experience as choice is the result of underlying causes: neural processes, past experiences, environmental influences, and current conditions. When we “intervene,” “address,” or “manipulate,” these actions are themselves caused by factors like knowledge, values, and external circumstances.
In a deterministic framework, volition isn’t some mystical, uncaused force. It’s a higher-level process emerging from a complex web of causation. For example, if someone advocates for better education to reduce violence, their advocacy is determined by their awareness of the issue, their empathy, their understanding of causal relationships, and countless other factors. They aren’t "free" in the sense of being uncaused, but their actions are no less real or impactful.
The handles we “manipulate” are causal factors—poverty, education, social systems—whose changes can influence outcomes. Determinism doesn’t negate the meaningfulness of these efforts; it provides the context in which they occur. In fact, by acknowledging causation, determinism makes interventions more precise and effective. Volition, in this sense, is simply the human experience of being part of this deterministic chain, not outside it.
You seem to have misunderstood what I was driving at. My fault. I should have been more explicit. That said, I imagine its "turtles all the way down" given your responses. As such, I'll take a different tack.
You seem to have redefined "volition". Not sure, but you seem to think that volition can only be explained by some "mystical, uncaused force" OR as the "experience of being part of [a] deterministic chain" with the "illusion" of volition. Another option is that the mind has the capacity to consciously direct thought outside of the "deterministic chain". In other words, true volition.
Evidently you've drawn the conclusion that true volition does not exist. That is only an illusion, despite the fact that it does not feel like an illusion to the individual. From what I've seen, there is nothing in neuroscience that precludes true volition. If you think there is, then present it here. Or direct me to the appropriate post if you already have. I've only spot-checked your posts, so I very well could have missed it.
ThinkOfOne, I appreciate your willingness to engage deeply with the question of volition. Let’s address this idea of "true volition" head-on, along with the role neuroscience plays in this discussion.
The crux of the deterministic argument isn’t that volition, as experienced, doesn’t feel real—it absolutely does. What determinism suggests is that this feeling arises from underlying causes, not from an independent, self-directed force that exists outside the causal chain. To claim that the mind can "consciously direct thought outside of the deterministic chain" implies the existence of phenomena that operate without prior causes. This is where we run into the principles of physics and neuroscience.
Neuroscientific evidence doesn’t explicitly rule out the possibility of "true volition," but it has revealed mechanisms that challenge its plausibility. For instance, experiments by Benjamin Libet and subsequent researchers have shown that neural activity predicting a decision occurs before a person becomes consciously aware of making that decision. While these findings don’t conclusively disprove free will, they strongly suggest that what we experience as conscious choice is shaped by unconscious processes that precede it.
Moreover, brain studies have consistently shown that our decisions are influenced by factors like genetics, environmental inputs, and prior experiences—all of which are outside our conscious control. This doesn’t mean we don’t "decide" things; it means that our decisions emerge as the result of these interacting factors. The feeling of being in control is itself part of the deterministic process—a complex outcome of neural activity that gives rise to consciousness.
If you’re suggesting that the mind has a capacity to direct thought outside this chain, it would require evidence of causeless events—a break in the physical or biological processes we observe. As far as we know, no such evidence has been observed. This doesn’t close the door entirely, but it places the burden of proof on those who posit "true volition."
In short, determinism aligns with the evidence we currently have: it’s grounded in the observable laws of physics and the causal structure revealed by neuroscience. If you believe in a concept of volition that operates outside of this framework, I’m genuinely curious to hear how you define it and what evidence supports its existence. Let’s explore that further.
Do you intend to respond to my previous post? You seemed interested in discussing this topic. Is that no longer the case?