Article 18: Freedom of Thought or License for Falsehood?

[godelian]

Godelian, your argument seems to conflate the logical structure of a theory with its alignment to reality, but let’s unpack this in a way that addresses the core issue: whether atheism—or more broadly, skepticism of religious claims—needs to operate like a formal axiomatic system to hold validity.

The analogy of an "atheism GPT" and the idea of a theory with arbitrary axioms, no domain, and restrictive conditions doesn't map well onto atheism itself. Atheism isn’t a comprehensive theory or system of axioms; it’s simply the absence of belief in deities, typically due to a lack of evidence. It doesn’t claim a domain, nor does it need to. It’s a position of non-commitment to claims that lack sufficient empirical or logical support.

The conditions you outlined—restrictive axioms, lack of a domain, and arbitrary axioms—might describe a poorly constructed formal system, but they don’t apply to atheism as it functions in practice. Atheism doesn’t deny the possibility of defined objects (e.g., a deity) outright; it questions the evidence and coherence of the claims made about such objects. If someone presents a consistent, evidence-backed model of a deity, atheism could respond within that framework—but until then, it simply remains unconvinced.

In contrast, religious claims often assert a detailed ontology—a domain of gods, spirits, or supernatural phenomena—which can and should be scrutinized using logic, evidence, and critical thinking. The burden of proof lies on those making specific claims, not on those withholding belief due to insufficient evidence.

Your argument that proving an "atheist theory" has a model is "virtually impossible" misses the point: atheism doesn’t require proving a comprehensive theory. It’s not about constructing a positive model but about assessing the claims of others and withholding belief when those claims fail to meet logical or evidentiary standards.

This ties back to the importance of teaching critical thinking rather than dogma. Encouraging children—and societies at large—to evaluate claims based on evidence and reason doesn’t create an "empty model." It creates an open system where beliefs are proportional to the evidence supporting them. Atheism fits comfortably in such a framework, not as an empty theory, but as a stance waiting for substantiation before accepting extraordinary claims.

I was evaluation the situation exclusively within the context of Tarski's semantic theory of truth.

ChatGPT was doing that too.

Your arguments, however, do not stay within the confines of model theory and do not respect its constraints.

There are indeed other truth theories.

These alternative truth theories say nothing, however, about GPT programs or what exactly they prove. You will have to use something else than mathematical logic, model theory, or computer science because these fields will not support your argument.

Godelian, I appreciate your framing of this discussion within Tarski’s semantic theory of truth, but I believe it’s worth addressing why my perspective on atheism as a corollary to the laws of nature transcends the strict confines of formal model theory. The reason is simple: atheism, as I view it, isn't a formalized axiomatic system requiring models in the Tarskian sense. Instead, it aligns with physical laws and principles that underpin observable reality.

The laws of nature—conservation laws and the four fundamental interactions—leave no room for entities or forces that operate outside their scope. Conservation laws, for instance, dictate that energy, momentum, and charge cannot appear or vanish without cause. These principles inherently exclude phenomena like miracles or interventions by a deity that violate these laws. Atheism, in this view, arises naturally from accepting the deterministic, causal framework of physics as the only viable explanation for the universe.

Tarski’s semantic theory, while useful in formal logic and mathematical truth, isn’t equipped to address empirical truths about the natural world. Empirical truth emerges from observation, experimentation, and alignment with physical reality, not from formal structures alone. For example, the conservation of energy isn’t "true" because it fits within a model-theoretic framework—it’s true because it consistently aligns with every observed interaction in the universe.

Religious claims, by contrast, often posit entities or phenomena that contradict these fundamental principles. For these claims to hold validity, they must demonstrate evidence that withstands empirical scrutiny. Without this evidence, atheism remains the default position—not as an "empty theory" but as the logical outcome of aligning belief with the observed constraints of reality.

While model theory can assess internal consistency within formal systems, it doesn't invalidate atheism’s basis in physical laws. Atheism doesn’t need a "model" in the Tarskian sense to remain grounded in the evidence and logic dictated by nature. My argument for atheism as a corollary to conservation laws isn’t about bypassing logical rigor but recognizing the constraints imposed by the universe itself.

Would you agree that physical laws, rather than formal semantics, are the appropriate basis for evaluating claims about the existence of entities purported to operate within or beyond the natural world?

The reason why there was a need for Tarski's semantic theory of truth is the very fact that physicalism is irrelevant when dealing with the truth of abstractions such as mathematics.

Just like arithmetic theory is an abstraction, a religion is one as well. It is a written text. It is an abstract, Platonic object with particular properties.

For example, what are the relevant properties of a program -- also an abstraction -- and of its running process, which is a virtual truth?

When Turing proved that no program, say, the oracle -- of which the source code is an abstraction -- can ever determine of every other program -- also abstractions -- if they will terminate or run forever, he created an abstraction (the proof) about another abstraction (the oracle) that inspects and deals with other programs (abstractions).

Turing's work is far beyond the understanding of physicalism. Any physical laws are irrelevant in this context. They are never mentioned in any shape or fashion in connection to Turing's work.

The following excerpt is incomprehensible to physicalists:

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_Platonism

Mathematical Platonism is the form of realism that suggests that mathematical entities are abstract, have no spatiotemporal or causal properties, and are eternal and unchanging. This is often claimed to be the view most people have of numbers.

A major question considered in mathematical Platonism is: Precisely where and how do the mathematical entities exist, and how do we know about them? Is there a world, completely separate from our physical one, that is occupied by the mathematical entities? How can we gain access to this separate world and discover truths about the entities?

Religion is not a physical object but also an abstract one and therefore cannot be analyzed by trying to rely on physical laws.

In fact, the analysis of physical laws itself is not governed by physical laws. A physical law is an abstraction that is itself never subject to physical laws.

I use the laws that govern abstract objects when analyzing abstract objects and not any physical laws because physical laws are irrelevant in that context.

Knowledge itself is a Platonic abstraction. Someone who insists on physical laws cannot possibly understand its true nature. Physicalism is a very poor and very ineffective worldview.

[BigMike]

I was evaluation the situation exclusively within the context of Tarski's semantic theory of truth.

ChatGPT was doing that too.

Your arguments, however, do not stay within the confines of model theory and do not respect its constraints.

There are indeed other truth theories.

These alternative truth theories say nothing, however, about GPT programs or what exactly they prove. You will have to use something else than mathematical logic, model theory, or computer science because these fields will not support your argument.

Godelian, I appreciate your framing of this discussion within Tarski’s semantic theory of truth, but I believe it’s worth addressing why my perspective on atheism as a corollary to the laws of nature transcends the strict confines of formal model theory. The reason is simple: atheism, as I view it, isn't a formalized axiomatic system requiring models in the Tarskian sense. Instead, it aligns with physical laws and principles that underpin observable reality.

The laws of nature—conservation laws and the four fundamental interactions—leave no room for entities or forces that operate outside their scope. Conservation laws, for instance, dictate that energy, momentum, and charge cannot appear or vanish without cause. These principles inherently exclude phenomena like miracles or interventions by a deity that violate these laws. Atheism, in this view, arises naturally from accepting the deterministic, causal framework of physics as the only viable explanation for the universe.

Tarski’s semantic theory, while useful in formal logic and mathematical truth, isn’t equipped to address empirical truths about the natural world. Empirical truth emerges from observation, experimentation, and alignment with physical reality, not from formal structures alone. For example, the conservation of energy isn’t "true" because it fits within a model-theoretic framework—it’s true because it consistently aligns with every observed interaction in the universe.

Religious claims, by contrast, often posit entities or phenomena that contradict these fundamental principles. For these claims to hold validity, they must demonstrate evidence that withstands empirical scrutiny. Without this evidence, atheism remains the default position—not as an "empty theory" but as the logical outcome of aligning belief with the observed constraints of reality.

While model theory can assess internal consistency within formal systems, it doesn't invalidate atheism’s basis in physical laws. Atheism doesn’t need a "model" in the Tarskian sense to remain grounded in the evidence and logic dictated by nature. My argument for atheism as a corollary to conservation laws isn’t about bypassing logical rigor but recognizing the constraints imposed by the universe itself.

Would you agree that physical laws, rather than formal semantics, are the appropriate basis for evaluating claims about the existence of entities purported to operate within or beyond the natural world?

The reason why there was a need for Tarski's semantic theory of truth is the very fact that physicalism is irrelevant when dealing with the truth of abstractions such as mathematics.

Just like arithmetic theory is an abstraction, a religion is one as well. It is a written text. It is an abstract, Platonic object with particular properties.

For example, what are the relevant properties of a program -- also an abstraction -- and of its running process, which is a virtual truth?

When Turing proved that no program, say, the oracle -- of which the source code is an abstraction -- can ever determine of every other program -- also abstractions -- if they will terminate or run forever, he created an abstraction (the proof) about another abstraction (the oracle) that inspects and deals with other programs (abstractions).

Turing's work is far beyond the understanding of physicalism. Any physical laws are irrelevant in this context. They are never mentioned in any shape or fashion in connection to Turing's work.

The following excerpt is incomprehensible to physicalists:

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_Platonism

Mathematical Platonism is the form of realism that suggests that mathematical entities are abstract, have no spatiotemporal or causal properties, and are eternal and unchanging. This is often claimed to be the view most people have of numbers.

A major question considered in mathematical Platonism is: Precisely where and how do the mathematical entities exist, and how do we know about them? Is there a world, completely separate from our physical one, that is occupied by the mathematical entities? How can we gain access to this separate world and discover truths about the entities?

Religion is not a physical object but also an abstract one and therefore cannot be analyzed by trying to rely on physical laws.

In fact, the analysis of physical laws itself is not governed by physical laws. A physical law is an abstraction that is itself never subject to physical laws.

I use the laws that govern abstract objects when analyzing abstract objects and not any physical laws because physical laws are irrelevant in that context.

Knowledge itself is a Platonic abstraction. Someone who insists on physical laws cannot possibly understand its true nature. Physicalism is a very poor and very ineffective worldview.

Godelian, your insistence on framing religion and knowledge as "Platonic abstractions" detached from physical reality reeks of intellectual gymnastics designed to avoid addressing the hard constraints of the real world. You claim physical laws are irrelevant to abstractions like religion or mathematics, yet those abstractions only exist because of physical processes—neurons firing in brains, symbols written on paper, or binary encoded in machines.

Your argument is a sleight of hand. By invoking Turing and Platonic realms, you attempt to elevate abstractions above the reality they emerge from. But abstractions, no matter how elegant or complex, are fundamentally grounded in the physical. Turing’s work, for instance, might deal with abstract concepts, but it was conceived, proven, and applied in the material world. The proofs exist because humans—physical beings—encoded them in a physical medium.

Religion, as a set of ideas, is not some untouchable Platonic object. It’s a human construct born out of the physical interactions of brains interpreting the world and constructing stories to explain what they don’t understand. The moment a religious claim crosses into the empirical realm—asserting miracles, divine intervention, or creation stories—it ceases to be purely abstract. At that point, it collides with the natural world, where physical laws demand scrutiny.

To claim physicalism is "ineffective" while conveniently ignoring its role in building the very tools you’re using to make this argument is absurd. Computers, networks, and Turing machines—all built on the foundation of physical laws—are the reasons you can wax poetic about "Platonic abstractions" to begin with.

Physical laws don’t just underpin the material world; they also underpin the mechanisms that allow abstract thought to exist at all. Without them, there’s no mind to conceive abstractions, no medium to communicate them, and no framework to debate their validity. If physicalism is "poor," as you claim, it’s a poverty that gave birth to every advancement that makes your arguments possible. Platonic musings didn’t build the bridges, decode DNA, or enable this conversation. Physics did.

[Alexis Jacobi]

Your argument is a sleight of hand. By invoking Turing and Platonic realms, you attempt to elevate abstractions above the reality they emerge from. But abstractions, no matter how elegant or complex, are fundamentally grounded in the physical.

The bolded part, if I am right, is simply put and fairly put, just opinion.

Interestingly, the recognition that a “universal” exists (such as those recognized by Richard Weaver, a Platonist) is really a fundamental idea for all intellectual ideation. But intellectually recognized ideas (ideals, meaning and much else) are simply not perceivable by sheer physicalism nor can they be sensed.

They are understood, however, to exist and to be real.

Realm is not quite the right descriptor, is it? It implies a place or locality.

Make of it what we will, man is not so much “grounded in the physical”, though he exists through his physical platform, but is man insofar as he realizes or perhaps touches that intellectual realm.

The question is, or the problem revolves around, the notion of the pre-existence of those “abstractions”. Mustn’t it be supposed that they “exist” and existed prior to their realization by an advanced brain mechanics?

[godelian]

Godelian, your insistence on framing religion and knowledge as "Platonic abstractions" detached from physical reality reeks of intellectual gymnastics designed to avoid addressing the hard constraints of the real world. You claim physical laws are irrelevant to abstractions like religion or mathematics, yet those abstractions only exist because of physical processes—neurons firing in brains, symbols written on paper, or binary encoded in machines.

Your argument is a sleight of hand. By invoking Turing and Platonic realms, you attempt to elevate abstractions above the reality they emerge from. But abstractions, no matter how elegant or complex, are fundamentally grounded in the physical. Turing’s work, for instance, might deal with abstract concepts, but it was conceived, proven, and applied in the material world. The proofs exist because humans—physical beings—encoded them in a physical medium.

Religion, as a set of ideas, is not some untouchable Platonic object. It’s a human construct born out of the physical interactions of brains interpreting the world and constructing stories to explain what they don’t understand. The moment a religious claim crosses into the empirical realm—asserting miracles, divine intervention, or creation stories—it ceases to be purely abstract. At that point, it collides with the natural world, where physical laws demand scrutiny.

To claim physicalism is "ineffective" while conveniently ignoring its role in building the very tools you’re using to make this argument is absurd. Computers, networks, and Turing machines—all built on the foundation of physical laws—are the reasons you can wax poetic about "Platonic abstractions" to begin with.

Physical laws don’t just underpin the material world; they also underpin the mechanisms that allow abstract thought to exist at all. Without them, there’s no mind to conceive abstractions, no medium to communicate them, and no framework to debate their validity. If physicalism is "poor," as you claim, it’s a poverty that gave birth to every advancement that makes your arguments possible. Platonic musings didn’t build the bridges, decode DNA, or enable this conversation. Physics did.

Your views are not compatible with mathematical realism:

Google: AI Overview

Mathematical realism is the idea that mathematical truths are objective and independent of human beliefs, activities, and abilities. It's the belief that mathematics is the study of unchanging and necessary facts that mathematicians discover, not create.

Explanation

Mathematical realists believe that mathematical statements are true or false in the same objective way that concrete sentences are. For example, "1 + 1 = 2" is true because the abstract world is as the sentence describes it, not because we think it's true.

Mathematical realists believe that mathematical objects exist in an abstract world.

Mathematical realists believe that mathematical concepts exist independently of human discovery.

Physicalism is incompatible with the view that mathematical objects exist in an abstract world. Neurons firing in brains are irrelevant to this abstract, Platonic world. These abstractions do not emerge from the physical world. They exist independently. Turing’s work describes properties and truths of this independent, abstract, Platonic world, which exists independently from the physical universe. The existence of the physical universe does not diminish the existence of the abstract, Platonic world in any shape or fashion. Physical laws do not underpin the existence of abstract, Platonic objects. Physicalism is poor exactly because it denies the existence of the abstract, Platonic world. This conversation will never physically exist in the physical world. It only exists in the virtual world of this forum. In fact, no conversation ever exists in the physical world. It is not a physical object. It is an abstract one.

[BigMike]

Godelian, your insistence on framing religion and knowledge as "Platonic abstractions" detached from physical reality reeks of intellectual gymnastics designed to avoid addressing the hard constraints of the real world. You claim physical laws are irrelevant to abstractions like religion or mathematics, yet those abstractions only exist because of physical processes—neurons firing in brains, symbols written on paper, or binary encoded in machines.

Your argument is a sleight of hand. By invoking Turing and Platonic realms, you attempt to elevate abstractions above the reality they emerge from. But abstractions, no matter how elegant or complex, are fundamentally grounded in the physical. Turing’s work, for instance, might deal with abstract concepts, but it was conceived, proven, and applied in the material world. The proofs exist because humans—physical beings—encoded them in a physical medium.

Religion, as a set of ideas, is not some untouchable Platonic object. It’s a human construct born out of the physical interactions of brains interpreting the world and constructing stories to explain what they don’t understand. The moment a religious claim crosses into the empirical realm—asserting miracles, divine intervention, or creation stories—it ceases to be purely abstract. At that point, it collides with the natural world, where physical laws demand scrutiny.

To claim physicalism is "ineffective" while conveniently ignoring its role in building the very tools you’re using to make this argument is absurd. Computers, networks, and Turing machines—all built on the foundation of physical laws—are the reasons you can wax poetic about "Platonic abstractions" to begin with.

Physical laws don’t just underpin the material world; they also underpin the mechanisms that allow abstract thought to exist at all. Without them, there’s no mind to conceive abstractions, no medium to communicate them, and no framework to debate their validity. If physicalism is "poor," as you claim, it’s a poverty that gave birth to every advancement that makes your arguments possible. Platonic musings didn’t build the bridges, decode DNA, or enable this conversation. Physics did.

Your views are not compatible with mathematical realism:

Google: AI Overview

Mathematical realism is the idea that mathematical truths are objective and independent of human beliefs, activities, and abilities. It's the belief that mathematics is the study of unchanging and necessary facts that mathematicians discover, not create.

Explanation

Mathematical realists believe that mathematical statements are true or false in the same objective way that concrete sentences are. For example, "1 + 1 = 2" is true because the abstract world is as the sentence describes it, not because we think it's true.

Mathematical realists believe that mathematical objects exist in an abstract world.

Mathematical realists believe that mathematical concepts exist independently of human discovery.

Physicalism is incompatible with the view that mathematical objects exist in an abstract world. Neurons firing in brains are irrelevant to this abstract, Platonic world. These abstractions do not emerge from the physical world. They exist independently. Turing’s work describes properties and truths of this independent, abstract, Platonic world, which exists independently from the physical universe. The existence of the physical universe does not diminish the existence of the abstract, Platonic world in any shape or fashion. Physical laws do not underpin the existence of abstract, Platonic objects. Physicalism is poor exactly because it denies the existence of the abstract, Platonic world. This conversation will never physically exist in the physical world. It only exists in the virtual world of this forum. In fact, no conversation ever exists in the physical world. It is not a physical object. It is an abstract one.

Godelian, your argument conflates the independence of mathematical abstractions as conceptual entities with their ontological status as part of some "Platonic realm." This distinction is critical: mathematics is not "discovered" in a mystical, detached domain but is instead a system of logical constructs derived from axioms that are taken as true for the sake of inference.

I am a mathematician, not a mathematical realist. Theorems are true within the framework of a given mathematical system, conditioned on the acceptance of its axioms. These axioms themselves are not "eternal truths" but chosen starting points—arbitrary within the boundaries of the system they define. For example, Euclidean geometry operates under the parallel postulate, but non-Euclidean geometries emerge when that axiom is altered. Both are internally consistent and valid within their respective frameworks, demonstrating that mathematics is a construct contingent on assumptions, not some pre-existing abstract reality.

Your reliance on mathematical Platonism fails to account for the human role in defining and utilizing these systems. The "abstract world" you describe is not an independent entity floating in some metaphysical realm; it is a conceptual framework devised and manipulated by physical beings—humans—through physical processes such as thought, language, and communication. While these frameworks can transcend individual minds in the sense of shared understanding, they do not transcend the physical universe that gives rise to those minds.

Turing’s work, which you invoke as proof of an abstract Platonic world, operates within this same contingent framework. His proofs depend on axioms and logical constructs that humans agreed upon for the sake of analyzing computation. These are not "Platonic truths" but logical inferences within a human-created framework. The physical universe—neurons firing, machines operating, circuits transmitting information—makes this analysis possible. The idea that physical laws are irrelevant here is a category error.

Conversations, like this one, "exist" in the sense of shared meaning, but they are rooted in physical substrates—neurons, electrical signals, and digital encoding. Denying this foundational reality to elevate abstractions into untouchable Platonic entities is a philosophical distraction. The beauty and power of mathematics come not from its supposed independence but from its utility, coherence, and ability to describe and predict the behavior of the physical universe. Mathematics is a tool we’ve created to make sense of the world, not a deity to be worshipped in some imaginary realm.

[Alexis Jacobi]

Denying this foundational reality to elevate abstractions into untouchable Platonic entities is a philosophical distraction.

Only for a certain type of man, operating within a specific system of thought, with specific pre-defined objectives that exclude the products and attainments that become available to man dealing in an intellectual framework that, for example, recognizes “universals”.

Additionally, one need not deny, negate nor dismiss the “foundational reality” of sense-perception.

[godelian]

I am a mathematician, not a mathematical realist.

That is a particular choice. Other people make other choices. According to Gödel, mathematical realism is an essential ability for mathematicians:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_Platonism

Kurt Gödel's Platonism[1] postulates a special kind of mathematical intuition that lets us perceive mathematical objects directly.

Davis and Hersh have suggested in their 1999 book The Mathematical Experience that most mathematicians act as though they are Platonists, even though, if pressed to defend the position carefully, they may retreat to formalism.

Rejecting mathematical realism typically reflects a lack of mathematical talent. A mathematician without mathematical intuition, is a poor mathematician.

mathematics is a construct contingent on assumptions, not some pre-existing abstract reality.
The "abstract world" you describe is not an independent entity floating in some metaphysical realm
they do not transcend the physical universe that gives rise to those minds.
These are not "Platonic truths"
to elevate abstractions into untouchable Platonic entities is a philosophical distraction

That is a particular choice. Other people make other choices. Other people simply have other talents.

The idea that physical laws are irrelevant here is a category error.

According to ChatGPT's take on the matter, it is your views on the matter that are in error:

ChatGPT: Do physical laws apply to the abstract, Platonic realm?

The question of whether physical laws apply to the abstract, Platonic realm touches on the intersection of metaphysics, philosophy of science, and ontology. Here's a nuanced breakdown:

The Platonic Realm

The "Platonic realm" refers to a hypothetical, non-physical realm where abstract entities—such as numbers, mathematical truths, and ideal forms—exist independently of the physical world. In Plato's view, this realm is timeless, unchanging, and non-material.

Physical Laws and Their Domain

Physical laws, as understood in science, describe the behavior and relationships of matter, energy, space, and time within the physical universe. They emerge from empirical observation and are expressed in mathematical form. Their domain is the observable universe, where they govern interactions and transformations.

Key Questions

Are abstract entities bound by physical laws?

Abstract entities in the Platonic sense are typically considered to be outside space and time. Since physical laws govern phenomena within space-time, it seems inappropriate to apply them to the Platonic realm.
For example, the number "2" or the Pythagorean theorem doesn’t exist in space-time in a way that could be affected by gravity or quantum mechanics.

Are physical laws themselves abstract?

Some argue that physical laws, particularly their mathematical formulations, might themselves exist in the Platonic realm. However, these laws as concepts differ from their instantiated effects in the physical universe. The distinction between the abstract representation and the physical manifestation is important here.

Can the abstract influence the physical?

In mathematics and physics, abstract constructs (like equations or models) help us describe and predict physical phenomena. While the abstract may not be "governed" by physical laws, it enables their articulation.

Philosophical Positions

Platonists argue that abstract entities are independent of the physical realm, making the question of physical laws applying to them moot.
Nominalists deny the independent existence of abstract entities, suggesting that such questions are unnecessary since these "realms" don't exist.
Dualists might propose some interaction or parallelism between the abstract and physical, though this is debated.

Conclusion

Physical laws, as empirically derived descriptions of the universe, do not naturally extend to the abstract Platonic realm. The Platonic realm, being non-physical, operates under a different conceptual framework—one of logical necessity and mathematical coherence rather than empirical causation.

[Alexis Jacobi]

Oh God above, help! Help me!

For I just used Meta’s AI program to write this six line “poem”:

A mathematician with skills so rare,
Rejected realism, without a care.

He claimed numbers were just a game,
And math mere fiction, with no aim.

His proofs were flawed, his logic astray,
But still he insisted, "Math's just what I say!"

[godelian]

Godelian, your insistence on framing religion and knowledge as "Platonic abstractions" detached from physical reality reeks of intellectual gymnastics designed to avoid addressing the hard constraints of the real world. You claim physical laws are irrelevant to abstractions like religion or mathematics, yet those abstractions only exist because of physical processes—neurons firing in brains, symbols written on paper, or binary encoded in machines.

The essence of Platonism is the exact opposite of what you claim. Google AI produced another excellent summary on the matter:

Google AI: do physical laws apply to the platonic realm?

According to Plato's philosophy, physical laws do not apply to the Platonic realm, as it is a realm of perfect, unchanging forms that exist outside of space and time, making it fundamentally different from the physical world where physical laws operate; essentially, the Platonic realm is considered a non-physical realm of pure ideas, not subject to the constraints of the physical world.

Key points about the Platonic realm and physical laws:

Non-physical nature:

The Platonic realm is not composed of matter, so concepts like mass, motion, and energy, which are governed by physical laws, do not apply to it.

Perfect forms:

In this realm, "perfect" versions of things like triangles, chairs, or even concepts like justice exist, completely unchanging and beyond the limitations of the physical world.

Access through intellect:

Plato believed humans can access knowledge of these perfect forms through reason and philosophical inquiry, not through physical senses.

These intellectual gymnastics are the essence of Platonism:

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Platonism

At the most fundamental level, Platonism affirms the existence of abstract objects, which are asserted to exist in a third realm distinct from both the sensible external world and from the internal world of consciousness, and is the opposite of nominalism.[1] This can apply to properties, types, propositions, meanings, numbers, sets, truth values, and so on (see abstract object theory).

Tarski's semantic theory of truth is an elaborate exercise in Platonism, resulting in model theory, which is the modern incarnation of Plato's theory of forms.

I resolutely reject nominalism and physicalism because these views are irrelevant and even highly unproductive when investigating the true nature of knowledge.

Tarski's semantic theory of truth is the only theory of truth that is compatible with universal algebra. From a certain level on, higher levels of abstraction do not even function anymore unless you adopt Tarski's theory. It is simply not possible to understand these things if you insist on physicalism.

[Alexis Jacobi]

The "abstract world" you describe is not an independent entity floating in some metaphysical realm; it is a conceptual framework devised and manipulated by physical beings—humans—through physical processes such as thought, language, and communication.

To describe “it” in this way, to explain it away in this way, must be part of a comprehension error.

Intellectual understanding of what is metaphysical — what Mike speaks of as epiphenomenal and produced by the brain — is an understanding that grasps something that is there, though it is not tangible, and cannot be registered by our instrumentations of sense, be they biological or mechanical.

It is a curious exercise in speculation to wonder what other biological beings that have arisen in the cosmos would have come to realize in those intellectual realms of abstraction. Would their discoveries, say in mathematics and other conceptual realms, concur with our own?

If yes, then it is less a question of invention and actually one of discovery and realization. The entire notion if revelation then becomes considerable.

I am not saying that we should abandon a healthy skepticism of what the space-peoples may have come up with, or what their intentions are, please don’t misunderstand.

[Eodnhoj7]

Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms the right to "freedom of thought, conscience, and religion," including the right to change one's beliefs and manifest them in teaching, practice, worship, and observance. While this principle seems noble, a deterministic perspective invites us to scrutinize its implications more deeply, particularly concerning the indoctrination of children and the dissemination of falsehoods.

If human behavior and beliefs are entirely the result of preceding causes—biological, social, and environmental—then the concept of true freedom of thought becomes questionable. Children, for instance, are not born with the capacity to freely choose their beliefs; instead, they are molded by the ideologies of their caregivers, communities, and institutions. This raises an ethical concern: is it justifiable to instill unprovable or demonstrably false religious beliefs in children, knowing that such indoctrination can heavily influence their future reasoning, decisions, and actions?

From the standpoint of Ex Falso Quodlibet—the principle that anything can follow from a falsehood—should societies tolerate the propagation of unverifiable claims under the guise of religious freedom? When falsehoods are embedded early in life, they can distort an individual's worldview, limit their capacity for critical thinking, and perpetuate cycles of misinformation and conflict.

A deterministic approach suggests that beliefs and actions stem from causal chains rather than individual choice. This understanding challenges the ethicality of allowing unchecked "freedom" to impose ideologies on young minds or spread falsehoods in the public sphere. Should there be limits on religious expression to safeguard intellectual integrity, particularly for children? And if so, how can these limits be reconciled with human rights?

I invite members to discuss Article 18 through this lens. How might a deterministic framework reshape our understanding of freedom of belief? What ethical responsibilities do societies and parents have in ensuring that beliefs instilled in children align with truth and reason, rather than inherited dogma or convenient falsehoods?

And how thought, conscience and religion are defined determines what can be expressed and what cannot, people forget that complete freedom is the ability to define the foundations of laws, thus making them malleable for those in power.