The Power of Art and Emotion: Should We Worry About Manipulation?

[accelafine]

I do hope this isn't AI

[phyllo]

So, here’s the question back to you: do you agree that moral responsibility, as traditionally understood, loses its coherence under determinism? If not, how do you reconcile holding someone morally accountable for actions they had no genuine control over? Or is it enough for you to justify these actions pragmatically, without invoking the illusion of moral blame?

The traditional definition of moral responsibility is lame. Nobody applies responsibility in that way. And I doubt they did even back when some philosopher came up with the idea.

It's become an ossified idea that's just repeated because it has always been that way.

I would compare it to using Aristotelian physics in spite of evidence that the world doesn't function as Aristotle thought.

In a deterministic framework, we absolutely act to prevent harm. Locking up and medicating a dangerous individual, for example, isn’t about punishing them for failing to exercise "free will." It’s about reducing harm and addressing the underlying causes of their behavior—be it mental illness, environmental factors, or social conditions. The goal is pragmatic, not moralistic. This is a critical distinction because it shifts the focus from retribution to systemic reform.

Compatibilists, on the other hand, often blur the lines. They argue that people are "responsible for their actions" even when those actions are fully determined, but then smuggle in the traditional baggage of moral blame. This leads to punitive systems that focus on individual failure instead of addressing root causes. Determinism challenges this by emphasizing causality: if behavior arises from factors outside a person’s control, then blaming them is as pointless as blaming the weather for a storm.

If you looked at it without these filters of "moralistic blame", you would see more clearly what is happening.

As it stands, you have these ideas of free-willers and compatibilist bad because they assign "moralistic blame", determinists good because they don't' blame.

Forget "blame" entirely. Focus on actions.

Your claim that determinists "forget" they’re holding people responsible misses the mark. Determinists recognize that restraint, rehabilitation, and even deterrence are necessary responses to harmful actions. The difference is the justification. Determinists aren’t denying reality; we’re challenging the moral assumptions that underpin traditional approaches to justice. It’s not a denial of "basic facts"; it’s an acknowledgment of them and an effort to align our systems with causality.

Determinists are refusing to accept that they are holding people responsible by restraining them and rehabilitating them.

I just keep getting back that it's not moral responsibility because it doesn't fit some traditional definition of moral responsibility.

If a person was truly not responsible, then there would be no consequences for them.

[BigMike]

So, here’s the question back to you: do you agree that moral responsibility, as traditionally understood, loses its coherence under determinism? If not, how do you reconcile holding someone morally accountable for actions they had no genuine control over? Or is it enough for you to justify these actions pragmatically, without invoking the illusion of moral blame?

The traditional definition of moral responsibility is lame. Nobody applies responsibility in that way. And I doubt they did even back when some philosopher came up with the idea.

It's become an ossified idea that's just repeated because it has always been that way.

I would compare it to using Aristotelian physics in spite of evidence that the world doesn't function as Aristotle thought.

In a deterministic framework, we absolutely act to prevent harm. Locking up and medicating a dangerous individual, for example, isn’t about punishing them for failing to exercise "free will." It’s about reducing harm and addressing the underlying causes of their behavior—be it mental illness, environmental factors, or social conditions. The goal is pragmatic, not moralistic. This is a critical distinction because it shifts the focus from retribution to systemic reform.

Compatibilists, on the other hand, often blur the lines. They argue that people are "responsible for their actions" even when those actions are fully determined, but then smuggle in the traditional baggage of moral blame. This leads to punitive systems that focus on individual failure instead of addressing root causes. Determinism challenges this by emphasizing causality: if behavior arises from factors outside a person’s control, then blaming them is as pointless as blaming the weather for a storm.

If you looked at it without these filters of "moralistic blame", you would see more clearly what is happening.

As it stands, you have these ideas of free-willers and compatibilist bad because they assign "moralistic blame", determinists good because they don't' blame.

Forget "blame" entirely. Focus on actions.

Your claim that determinists "forget" they’re holding people responsible misses the mark. Determinists recognize that restraint, rehabilitation, and even deterrence are necessary responses to harmful actions. The difference is the justification. Determinists aren’t denying reality; we’re challenging the moral assumptions that underpin traditional approaches to justice. It’s not a denial of "basic facts"; it’s an acknowledgment of them and an effort to align our systems with causality.

Determinists are refusing to accept that they are holding people responsible by restraining them and rehabilitating them.

I just keep getting back that it's not moral responsibility because it doesn't fit some traditional definition of moral responsibility.

If a person was truly not responsible, then there would be no consequences for them.

Phyllo, your point about moral responsibility being an "ossified" idea is interesting, and I agree that the traditional definition doesn’t fit well with how we navigate the complexities of modern justice systems. But rather than discard the concept altogether, I’d argue determinism redefines and refocuses it—aligning it with causality rather than outdated notions of blame.

Let’s start with your suggestion to "forget blame entirely" and focus on actions. This is precisely the determinist approach: actions are evaluated in terms of their causes and consequences, not their moralistic underpinnings. However, the moment you suggest that restraining or rehabilitating someone implies holding them responsible, we need to clarify what kind of responsibility we’re talking about.

Responsibility, in a deterministic framework, isn’t about blame or moral fault. It’s pragmatic—it acknowledges that individuals, while products of their circumstances, are still the proximate cause of their actions. If someone’s behavior endangers others, we intervene to prevent harm and address the root causes of that behavior. This isn’t "holding them responsible" in the traditional sense; it’s recognizing that their actions are part of a causal chain we can influence.

Your assertion that determinists "refuse to accept" they’re holding people responsible misunderstands this distinction. Determinists don’t deny the need for consequences; we argue that those consequences should be framed as part of harm reduction and systemic reform, not as moralistic punishment. The key difference is the absence of retributive intent. For example, incarcerating someone to protect society and rehabilitate the individual is fundamentally different from incarcerating them as "payback" for their choices.

Your claim that "if a person was truly not responsible, then there would be no consequences for them" conflates responsibility with retribution. Consequences under determinism are necessary, but they are pragmatic tools, not moral judgments. A dangerous individual is restrained or rehabilitated because their actions pose a risk, not because they "deserve" to suffer. This shift in justification has profound implications for how we build justice systems: it prioritizes prevention, understanding, and reform over blame and punishment.

You also suggest that determinists unfairly villainize free-willers and compatibilists for assigning blame. The issue isn’t villainizing—it’s pointing out the logical inconsistency in compatibilist frameworks. Compatibilists claim to align with determinism but then smuggle in notions of autonomy to justify moral blame. This often leads to systems that focus on individual failings rather than addressing the broader causal web that produces harmful behavior.

Finally, let’s address your comparison to Aristotelian physics. Just as we moved past outdated views of how the world operates physically, determinism invites us to move past moral frameworks that no longer serve us. Traditional moral responsibility, with its roots in metaphysical free will, is one such relic. A deterministic approach isn’t about denying responsibility altogether; it’s about reframing it in a way that reflects our understanding of causality and human behavior.

So, here’s the core takeaway: determinism doesn’t eliminate responsibility—it redefines it as pragmatic accountability rooted in causation. Consequences exist not as retribution but as harm reduction. Does this distinction resonate, or do you still see determinism as dodging the concept of responsibility entirely?

[phyllo]

Finally, let’s address your comparison to Aristotelian physics. Just as we moved past outdated views of how the world operates physically, determinism invites us to move past moral frameworks that no longer serve us. Traditional moral responsibility, with its roots in metaphysical free will, is one such relic. A deterministic approach isn’t about denying responsibility altogether; it’s about reframing it in a way that reflects our understanding of causality and human behavior.

So, here’s the core takeaway: determinism doesn’t eliminate responsibility—it redefines it as pragmatic accountability rooted in causation. Consequences exist not as retribution but as harm reduction. Does this distinction resonate, or do you still see determinism as dodging the concept of responsibility entirely?

This appears to be your first admission that responsibility exists in determinism. And if we are taking about behaviors which are commonly labeled as 'morality' then it is 'moral responsibility'.

So then, compatibilists are not saying anything irrational, incoherent or inconsistent when they assign responsibility. And there is nothing wrong about redefining or reframing responsibility when we find that the traditional definition is inadequate. Right?

[BigMike]

Finally, let’s address your comparison to Aristotelian physics. Just as we moved past outdated views of how the world operates physically, determinism invites us to move past moral frameworks that no longer serve us. Traditional moral responsibility, with its roots in metaphysical free will, is one such relic. A deterministic approach isn’t about denying responsibility altogether; it’s about reframing it in a way that reflects our understanding of causality and human behavior.

So, here’s the core takeaway: determinism doesn’t eliminate responsibility—it redefines it as pragmatic accountability rooted in causation. Consequences exist not as retribution but as harm reduction. Does this distinction resonate, or do you still see determinism as dodging the concept of responsibility entirely?

This appears to be your first admission that responsibility exists in determinism. And if we are taking about behaviors which are commonly labeled as 'morality' then it is 'moral responsibility'.

So then, compatibilists are not saying anything irrational, incoherent or inconsistent when they assign responsibility. And there is nothing wrong about redefining or reframing responsibility when we find that the traditional definition is inadequate. Right?

Phyllo, let’s dig into this, because while determinists and compatibilists might both "reframe" responsibility, the frameworks diverge significantly in their focus and implications. Your point that determinists acknowledge responsibility is correct—but it’s not the same kind of responsibility that compatibilists assert. The determinist perspective is entirely forward-looking, rooted in causality and systemic accountability, whereas compatibilists often carry remnants of moralistic, backward-looking blame, even after redefining free will.

In a deterministic framework, responsibility isn’t about assigning moral blame for past actions. Instead, it’s about understanding causation and using that understanding to influence future behavior. Responsibility in this sense never applies in the immediate "now." It’s not about condemning someone for what they’ve done—because their actions were determined by a web of causes beyond their control—but about shaping conditions to reduce the likelihood of harm in the future. For example, someone who commits a crime might be restrained or rehabilitated, not as punishment but as part of a broader effort to prevent recurrence and improve societal outcomes.

What distinguishes determinism from compatibilism here is where responsibility is placed. Determinists argue that responsibility lies primarily with society, not the individual. Society is responsible for creating environments, systems, and structures that reduce harm and promote positive outcomes. When harmful actions occur, they’re seen as failures of these systems—not as moral failings of individuals. This approach shifts the focus from individual culpability to systemic accountability.

Compatibilists, on the other hand, often maintain a backward-looking element to responsibility. Even as they redefine free will to align with determinism, they still smuggle in the notion that individuals "own" their actions in a way that justifies moral judgment. This isn’t necessarily incoherent, but it does risk perpetuating punitive systems that focus on individual blame rather than systemic reform. The problem isn’t that compatibilists are irrational—it’s that their framework often stops short of fully addressing the causal factors that determinists prioritize.

Your question about reframing responsibility gets to the heart of the issue. There’s nothing inherently wrong with redefining responsibility when the traditional definition proves inadequate—determinists do it too. But compatibilist reframing often falls into a halfway position: acknowledging determinism while clinging to the language and implications of moral blame. Determinists take the redefinition further, fully aligning responsibility with causality and rejecting moralistic notions altogether.

So, yes, determinists acknowledge responsibility, but it’s fundamentally different from what compatibilists mean. It’s forward-looking, systemic, and tied to understanding and influencing causation—not about judging past actions. Does that distinction make sense? Or do you still see compatibilist and determinist views of responsibility as fundamentally aligned?

[phyllo]

Phyllo, let’s dig into this, because while determinists and compatibilists might both "reframe" responsibility, the frameworks diverge significantly in their focus and implications. Your point that determinists acknowledge responsibility is correct—but it’s not the same kind of responsibility that compatibilists assert. The determinist perspective is entirely forward-looking, rooted in causality and systemic accountability, whereas compatibilists often carry remnants of moralistic, backward-looking blame, even after redefining free will.

I don't think compatibilists are as you describe them. It sounds a lot like 'us and them' thinking.

In a deterministic framework, responsibility isn’t about assigning moral blame for past actions. Instead, it’s about understanding causation and using that understanding to influence future behavior. Responsibility in this sense never applies in the immediate "now." It’s not about condemning someone for what they’ve done—because their actions were determined by a web of causes beyond their control—but about shaping conditions to reduce the likelihood of harm in the future. For example, someone who commits a crime might be restrained or rehabilitated, not as punishment but as part of a broader effort to prevent recurrence and improve societal outcomes.

The restraint and rehab is or can be seen as a punishment to the one being restrained or rehabilitated.
The altered wording does not change the physical reality of the one being restrained.

What distinguishes determinism from compatibilism here is where responsibility is placed. Determinists argue that responsibility lies primarily with society, not the individual. Society is responsible for creating environments, systems, and structures that reduce harm and promote positive outcomes. When harmful actions occur, they’re seen as failures of these systems—not as moral failings of individuals. This approach shifts the focus from individual culpability to systemic accountability.

This comes up all the time in these discussions of determinism ... Responsibility and agency is taken away from living individuals, away from real agents, and placed in some abstract or inanimate object. The person is not responsible, the person is not in control, the person is not making decisions ... instead society is responsible, society is in control, society is making decisions. Or it's the 'laws of nature' or the Big Bang that are doing it.

Just think about this : Society has moral responsibility and the individual does not. How can that make any sense?

[BigMike]

Phyllo, let’s dig into this, because while determinists and compatibilists might both "reframe" responsibility, the frameworks diverge significantly in their focus and implications. Your point that determinists acknowledge responsibility is correct—but it’s not the same kind of responsibility that compatibilists assert. The determinist perspective is entirely forward-looking, rooted in causality and systemic accountability, whereas compatibilists often carry remnants of moralistic, backward-looking blame, even after redefining free will.

I don't think compatibilists are as you describe them. It sounds a lot like 'us and them' thinking.

In a deterministic framework, responsibility isn’t about assigning moral blame for past actions. Instead, it’s about understanding causation and using that understanding to influence future behavior. Responsibility in this sense never applies in the immediate "now." It’s not about condemning someone for what they’ve done—because their actions were determined by a web of causes beyond their control—but about shaping conditions to reduce the likelihood of harm in the future. For example, someone who commits a crime might be restrained or rehabilitated, not as punishment but as part of a broader effort to prevent recurrence and improve societal outcomes.

The restraint and rehab is or can be seen as a punishment to the one being restrained or rehabilitated.
The altered wording does not change the physical reality of the one being restrained.

What distinguishes determinism from compatibilism here is where responsibility is placed. Determinists argue that responsibility lies primarily with society, not the individual. Society is responsible for creating environments, systems, and structures that reduce harm and promote positive outcomes. When harmful actions occur, they’re seen as failures of these systems—not as moral failings of individuals. This approach shifts the focus from individual culpability to systemic accountability.

This comes up all the time in these discussions of determinism ... Responsibility and agency is taken away from living individuals, away from real agents, and placed in some abstract or inanimate object. The person is not responsible, the person is not in control, the person is not making decisions ... instead society is responsible, society is in control, society is making decisions. Or it's the 'laws of nature' or the Big Bang that are doing it.

Just think about this : Society has moral responsibility and the individual does not. How can that make any sense?

Phyllo, I see your concern, and it’s worth addressing because the notion that determinism somehow disempowers individuals or defers all agency to "society" or "nature" is a common misinterpretation. Let me clarify the position so it doesn’t sound like an abdication of personal agency but rather a reframing of how agency is understood and applied within a deterministic framework.

To your first point, the idea that compatibilists retain a backward-looking sense of blame isn’t an "us and them" caricature; it’s an observation about how compatibilism often reconciles determinism with traditional notions of moral responsibility. Compatibilists argue that even if actions are determined, individuals are still "responsible" because their actions align with their desires and intentions. But this framework often carries an implicit moral judgment about past actions, which determinists reject. The distinction isn’t meant to vilify compatibilists but to highlight how their framing can perpetuate retributive systems.

Now, about restraint and rehabilitation feeling like punishment: You’re absolutely right that, to the person being restrained, it may feel punitive. But the determinist position doesn’t deny that experience—it reframes the purpose behind the action. The intent is not to inflict suffering as a form of payback, but to reduce harm and improve outcomes. The subjective experience of punishment doesn’t change the pragmatic goal, which is about addressing the causes of harmful behavior and preventing its recurrence. It’s a shift in motivation, not a denial of the individual’s experience.

As for the responsibility of society versus the individual, here’s where the confusion often arises. Determinists don’t argue that individuals are entirely passive, devoid of agency, or incapable of making decisions. Instead, they recognize that individual actions are shaped by a web of causation, including societal influences. This doesn’t mean society acts in place of individuals—it means that societal structures play a significant role in shaping the conditions under which individuals make decisions.

When we say "society is responsible," it’s shorthand for acknowledging that systemic factors—like education, economic inequality, healthcare access, and social norms—profoundly influence individual behavior. These systems are created and maintained by people, but they operate at a scale that requires collective action to change. Shifting responsibility to society isn’t about negating individual contributions; it’s about addressing the broader context that enables or constrains those contributions.

Your objection—"how can society have moral responsibility if individuals don’t?"—arises from conflating two levels of analysis. Society doesn’t "decide" or "act" as a singular entity; it’s a collective term for the systems and structures shaped by people over time. Individuals within society are the agents who create, perpetuate, or reform those systems. But when harm occurs on a large scale—like systemic poverty or unequal access to justice—it makes more sense to talk about societal responsibility because these are issues that no single individual can resolve alone.

Determinism doesn’t strip individuals of responsibility altogether; it places their actions within a broader causal framework. Individuals are still the proximate agents of their choices, but their choices are informed by the conditions they inherit. A determinist perspective argues that addressing those conditions is the most effective way to prevent harm and promote well-being—not because individuals are irrelevant, but because they’re deeply influenced by their environments.

Does this distinction help clarify how determinism views the interplay between individual and systemic responsibility? Or do you still see this as an unfair displacement of agency?

[LuckyR]

Determinism doesn’t strip individuals of responsibility altogether; it places their actions within a broader causal framework. Individuals are still the proximate agents of their choices, but their choices are informed by the conditions they inherit. A determinist perspective argues that addressing those conditions is the most effective way to prevent harm and promote well-being—not because individuals are irrelevant, but because they’re deeply influenced by their environments.

Does this distinction help clarify how determinism views the interplay between individual and systemic responsibility? Or do you still see this as an unfair displacement of agency?

You seem to be conflating influencing and causing as it pertains to decision making. Just about everyone, including most subscribers to Free Will, agree with the idea of externals "influencing" (yet not totally "causing") human decision making. Thus identifying and proving the existence of externals that influence decision making does nothing to support Determinism.

[BigMike]

You seem to be conflating influencing and causing as it pertains to decision making. Just about everyone, including most subscribers to Free Will, agree with the idea of externals "influencing" (yet not totally "causing") human decision makkng. Thus identifying and proving the ecistance externals that influence decision making does nothing to support Determinism.

Let me approach this by explaining determinism in a way that roots it firmly in the physical principles that govern our universe. At its core, determinism means that everything has a cause. Every event, every decision, every action is the result of a chain of prior events, stretching back to the beginning of time. This isn’t just a philosophical idea—it’s embedded in the very fabric of physical reality.

Here’s how it works:

The universe operates under physical conservation laws, which state that certain physical quantities—like energy, momentum, and charge—cannot be created or destroyed. These quantities are conserved, meaning they can only be transferred or transformed from one object to another. This happens through the four fundamental interactions of physics: gravity, electromagnetism, the strong nuclear force, and the weak nuclear force.

Each of these interactions governs exchanges between specific types of objects:

1. Gravity transfers momentum and energy between objects with mass. It doesn’t affect things without mass.
2. Electromagnetism operates between objects with charge, exchanging energy, momentum, and angular momentum through electric or magnetic forces.
3. The strong nuclear force binds the particles in atomic nuclei together.
4. The weak nuclear force governs certain types of particle decay and nuclear processes.

The crucial point is this: these interactions only occur between compatible objects. For example, gravity cannot affect something that has no mass, and electromagnetism cannot interact with something that has no charge. This is why the physical world is so tightly interconnected but also strictly governed by these rules.

Now, let’s bring this back to the mind, soul, or free will. If the mind, soul, or free will is truly non-physical—lacking mass, charge, or any of the properties that allow interaction with the physical world—then it cannot interact with the neurons in our brains or anything else in the physical world. It would be entirely cut off, like a ghost incapable of moving a single atom.

On the other hand, if the mind, soul, or free will does have mass or charge, then it becomes part of the physical universe. It would be subject to the same laws of conservation and causality as everything else, and it would be pushed and pulled by every other object in the universe. In this scenario, it’s no longer "free" in any meaningful sense because it’s just another physical system governed by deterministic interactions.

This is the crux of determinism: if everything that exists is part of this causal web—governed by the conservation laws and the four fundamental interactions—then there’s no room for "free" will to exist outside of it. Choices, decisions, and actions are all products of the physical processes in our brains, which are shaped by genetics, environment, and prior experiences.

When people talk about "influences" on decision-making, they’re describing the same causal chain. In a deterministic view, there’s no separate "you" standing outside the chain, choosing freely. Every thought, every feeling, every decision is a result of the physical conditions and processes that preceded it.

If free will exists, it must fit into this framework. But as soon as it does, it ceases to be "free" in the traditional sense—it’s just another part of the causal system. This is why determinism isn’t just about external influences; it’s about the entire structure of causality that underpins everything we experience.

I see no meaningful distinction between influencing and causing within this framework.

[iambiguous]

iambiguous, your response dives deeply into the philosophical labyrinth, as it always does, and I admire your persistence in turning these concepts over and over, trying to see every angle. Let me try to weave through it in a way that brings clarity to your points about determinism, autonomy, and meaning.

Okay, you admire my persistence. But then those hard determinists compelled to point out that you were never able not to admire persistence that I was never able not to sustain myself.

How are you not now in fact weaving through my posts given the only possible reality? And if it's the only possible reality, your reaction is just along for the ride.

The ride? Well, that's the part that "somehow" started when existence itself "somehow" precipitated the Big Bang -- unless it's the other way around? -- precipitating the evolution of matter into biological life that "somehow" brought into existence the human condition. Then The Gap and Rummy's Rule. Then the part where each of us fits "I" into that.

But then the part where many of these folks...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_r ... traditions
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_p ... ideologies
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_s ... philosophy

...will insist that if the ontological and teleological Truth is important to us, we'll become "one of them".

When you say that determinism renders enlightenment or enriched appreciation meaningless because we were "never able to opt otherwise," I understand the frustration.

Like you were free to opt otherwise? But understanding my frustration and being able to demonstrate that you are not compelled by your entirely material brain to understand anything at all that you do...?

It can feel as though determinism reduces every experience, every insight, every emotional response to a kind of preordained inevitability. But that framing oversimplifies what determinism actually entails. Determinism doesn’t flatten reality into a script we merely follow—it describes how complex systems, like our brains, emerge from and adapt to the interplay of countless causes.

Unless, perhaps, your own framing here is incorrect? In other words, the part where the human brain thinks and feels and intuits and says and does everything -- no exceptions -- from the cradle to the grave.

Let me offer an analogy.

An analogy you were never able not to offer me...but "somehow" you are still responsible for offering it? To me, given my own undertanding of hard determinism "here and now", that's like holding an ant reponsible for doing its thing in an ant colony. Only with ants, their brains have not evolved to the point where the psychological illusion of free will is a factor in sustaining the colony.

As for this...

Many people assume that when you swipe across a laptop or phone screen—say, from left to right—the device inherently reacts in a specific, natural way. If I struggle to navigate an app on an iPad or iPhone, they often conclude that I must lack an understanding of how computers work. What baffles them is that I’ve developed four commercial-quality programs on Windows and, before that, on the MS-DOS platform—right down to the last pixel. They find it puzzling, skeptical, or outright doubtful. How, they wonder, can someone who writes precise software not know how to operate an iPhone?

I explain that my difficulty has nothing to do with understanding how the iPhone works. Instead, it’s about not being able to predict the intentions and decisions of the app’s programmer. The app’s behavior is a product of the programmer’s design choices, not some inherent quality of the device itself.

This misunderstanding flips the reality on its head. They think they understand how computers “work,” but they don’t. What they actually know, through repeated use and learning, is how a programmer has chosen their device to respond to inputs. The idea that a computer operates by manipulating 0’s and 1’s to produce outputs—aligning with their expectations—is beyond their grasp. They might know it at a surface level, but they don’t truly understand it.

Similarly, many people know about fundamental conservation laws and the four fundamental interactions, yet they fail to grasp how those “basic” principles can lead to everything that happens in the world, including our thoughts. They believe—and think they understand—that thoughts and feelings exist independently, floating above and beyond the “0’s and 1’s of reality.” To them, the fundamental building blocks of reality—like conservation laws and interactions—are for things like apples and planets, not for human beings.

...even given free will as the Libertarians construe it, this all unfolds mechanically in the either/or world. Here something either is applicable to all of us objectively or it's not.

This brings us back to your struggle with meaning and determinism. People often think that for something to be meaningful, it must exist independently of these fundamental processes.

Unless perhaps these fundamental processes resulted in human autonomy in such a way that the brain sicentists themselves still grapple with explaining not only what that means but why all rational men and women are obligated to share that meaning in the same way.

But that’s a misunderstanding. Just as the operation of a phone app is determined by the code written for it, so too are our thoughts, feelings, and experiences determined by the neural pathways etched into our brains by our history and interactions. This doesn’t make them any less profound—it simply situates them within the causal web of the universe.

Okay, but unless and until this causal web is encompassed in the one and the only defintive understanding of the universe itself, how does one go about determining the nature of this "profundity"?

The deterministic lens doesn’t rob a sunrise of its beauty or a personal epiphany of its depth. It explains why you feel those things, grounded in the cumulative impact of past experiences and the physical reality of your brain’s structure.

It? How "here and now" is that not but one more inherent manifestation itself of the only possible reality?

The neural and synaptic pathways that define your personality are no more separate from the laws of physics than the trajectory of a thrown ball. The difference is complexity—not some mystical "ghost in the machine."

How about this...

You post your arguments on this thread. No ghost here in your machine. Now, are you arguing that what your brain compels you to post others are then compelled to note in turn the only possible reaction they were ever able to have?

That presumption regarding compatibilism? That, in other words, it's how you are compelled to explain it above? And, thus, how others who do not share your own set of assumptions are...wrong?

Your point about moral responsibility is also key. Compatibilists often redefine "free will" to align with determinism, but as you rightly note, they frequently smuggle the "free" part back in when discussing accountability.

Well, from my own rooted existentially in dasein frame of mind "here and now", that's basically what you are doing here in turn. There's how you understand all of this [the correct way] and how others understand it differently [the incorrect way].

Determinists, however, look beyond blame. The aim isn’t to dismiss actions but to understand their causes. By focusing on those causes—poverty, mental illness, systemic inequities—we can address the roots of harm rather than perpetuate cycles of retribution.

This sounds considerably more like Libertarian autonomy to me.

You mention the apparent futility of mapping a deterministic universe. But consider this: mapping isn’t futile because it’s deterministic; it’s essential because it’s deterministic. The map allows the system to refine itself—to understand its own processes and, in doing so, adapt to create outcomes that align with human values. Determinism doesn’t remove meaning from this endeavor; it frames it as an extension of the causal network.

No, I suggest that if one maps in accordance with how the hard determinists construe all of this, they are never able to map it other than in how their brain compels them to. Then the brains of others compelling them, in turn, to react to that given the only possible reality.

So, does determinism lead to the only possible world? Yes. But within that world is a vast web of interactions that shape and reshape us in response to countless inputs. Your reflections, your questions, and your doubts are part of that web. They don’t float above it; they are its product, as is my response to you now. This isn’t a flaw in the system—it’s the beauty of its complexity. Does this help you see the deterministic framework in a way that doesn’t feel so reductive or constraining?

Nope. On the other hand, your own understanding of the human condition unfolding in the only possible reality is clearly different from my own. Only "I" am no less fractured and fragmented here given the enormous gap that surely exists between what I think I know about reality here and all that there is to know about it going back to...to what exactly?

I merely suggest as well that this is applicable to all mere mortals in a No God world.

[Gary Childress]

Should We Worry About Manipulation?

Is there any "should" at all? We will or we won't depending upon the trajectory of the matter that comprises us, right? This is all a play that has already been written on a stage whose foundation has already been designed, like a movie script we are little more than actors who perform our pre-written lines and routines as they were assigned to each of us billions of years in advance. Is there any other choice? Is there any such thing as "choice" at all?

How depressing and pointless life now seems. Everything is "matter", and yet my mind now says nothing "matters". In a sense, there is no mind called Gary Childress that donated all his life savings to help a woman he loved get out of a financial jam. There was no Gary Childress who callously teased poor Kenneth Pirnat back in Elementar School. Gary Childress, as an author of his own life is simply a fiction. There is no "Gary Childress" the author of a book of poetry (indeed, Gary Childress did not write that book). I am little more than a collection of matter moving in the direction it has already been determined to travel. How depressing that seems.

[BigMike]

iambiguous, you’ve raised a fascinating challenge to determinism: whether meaning can exist in a deterministic universe where we’re, as you put it, "just along for the ride." Let’s unpack this step by step, because your skepticism touches on both the nature of meaning and the assumptions we bring to discussions about causality.

First, your framing implies that for meaning to exist, it must be something more than a product of the causal web—a kind of "extra" quality that transcends physical laws. But let me ask: does this assumption not itself hint at a belief in an external creator, a being or force that imbued the universe with meaning? If so, whose meaning are we discussing? Are we looking for some universal, intrinsic meaning designed by an external agent, or are we seeking meaning as it arises naturally within the deterministic framework?

From a deterministic standpoint, meaning is not handed down from above; it emerges from within the system. Imagine a sunrise. It doesn’t need to be "assigned" meaning to be awe-inspiring—it simply is meaningful because it evokes responses in us that are rooted in our biology, culture, and personal experiences. These responses aren’t "less real" because they’re caused; they’re profoundly real because they’re caused.

Now, let’s address the claim that determinism reduces everything to inevitability, leaving us as passive passengers. This is a common misunderstanding. Determinism means that everything has a cause, but it doesn’t mean we lack agency. Instead, agency is part of the causal web. The human brain is an immensely complex system that processes inputs, generates outputs, and adapts over time. While this process is fully determined, it doesn’t feel reductive because it operates with such incredible sophistication.

Here’s where the analogy of computers comes in. Many people believe they "understand" how their devices work, but what they really grasp is how the interface—the app or operating system—interacts with them. They don’t think about the underlying mechanisms: the binary code, the electrical impulses, or the algorithms. Similarly, people assume that their thoughts and feelings float above the physical universe, but they’re just the emergent "interface" of our brain’s neural pathways. These pathways, shaped by experience, create the unique sense of self that gives rise to our feelings of meaning and purpose.

So, what about free will? You’ve suggested that determinism denies any autonomy or responsibility, reducing us to ants in a colony or dominoes in a chain. But consider this: if free will exists as something separate from the causal web, it must either have physical properties—mass, charge, or energy—or it must exist as a non-physical entity. If it’s non-physical, how does it interact with the physical world? Conservation laws show us that only objects with mass or charge can participate in the fundamental interactions. And if free will is physical, it’s subject to the same deterministic forces as the rest of the universe.

This leads to a profound realization: whether we like it or not, our actions, thoughts, and beliefs are shaped by causality. Yet this doesn’t render them meaningless. Meaning isn’t negated by causation—it’s contextualized by it. Your reflection on meaning itself arises from the interplay of countless causes, from your experiences to this conversation. It is no less profound because it has roots in the physical.

Finally, your question about responsibility: determinists argue that responsibility isn’t about blame for past actions; it’s about understanding causes to influence the future. The challenge isn’t to escape causality—it’s to navigate it intelligently, recognizing the web of interactions that shape us. Society, as a collective of individuals, bears the responsibility of creating conditions that reduce harm and foster well-being. Responsibility, in this sense, is a forward-looking concept tied to improving outcomes, not a backward-looking judgment of moral fault.

So, does meaning exist in a deterministic universe? Absolutely. It arises from the interplay of cause and effect, just as we do. The question isn’t whether we’re "just along for the ride" but whether we understand and embrace the complexity of the journey.

[Gary Childress]

Now, let’s address the claim that determinism reduces everything to inevitability, leaving us as passive passengers. This is a common misunderstanding. Determinism means that everything has a cause, but it doesn’t mean we lack agency. Instead, agency is part of the causal web. The human brain is an immensely complex system that processes inputs, generates outputs, and adapts over time. While this process is fully determined, it doesn’t feel reductive because it operates with such incredible sophistication.

But it is reductive, whether it "feels" so or not. We're not creating anything. We are literally on a ride that we are not controlling. Control is an illusion because if we could control anything (move something in any way other than what has been determined for it), then conservation laws would be broken. So called "consciousness" can do nothing, does nothing. Is consciousness even necessary? All this could happen without the existence of consciousness.

[accelafine]

Should We Worry About Manipulation?

Is there any "should" at all? We will or we won't depending upon the trajectory of the matter that comprises us, right? This is all a play that has already been written on a stage whose foundation has already been designed, like a movie script we are little more than actors who perform our pre-written lines and routines as they were assigned to each of us billions of years in advance. Is there any other choice? Is there any such thing as "choice" at all?

How depressing and pointless life now seems. Everything is "matter", and yet my mind now says nothing "matters". In a sense, there is no mind called Gary Childress that donated all his life savings to help a woman he loved get out of a financial jam. There was no Gary Childress who callously teased poor Kenneth Pirnat back in Elementar School. Gary Childress, as an author of his own life is simply a fiction. There is no "Gary Childress" the author of a book of poetry (indeed, Gary Childress did not write that book). I am little more than a collection of matter moving in the direction it has already been determined to travel. How depressing that seems.

Yes it's all rather depressing when put like that, especially as some people were 'determined' at the Big Bang to have a charmed life of joy without abject misery or any major obstacles to overcome. Heck, even the lottery results were determined billions of years ago

[Gary Childress]

Heck, even the lottery results were determined billions of years ago

Ah, now I see how pursuing science could be profitable.